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COHmiCiiT DEPOSED 



The Lives and Campaigns 



OK 



GRANT AND LRB 

A Comparison and Contrast of the Deeds and 
Characters of the Two Great Leaders in the Civil War. 



BY 



AUTHOR OF "SAMSON," "aTLANTEANS," ETC. 
WITH 

INTRODUCTORY REMINISCENCES 

BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD, U.S.A. 

AND 

BISHOP JOHN P. NEWMAN, D.D. 



II^LUSTRATEE>. 



STAR PUBLISHING COMPANY 
CHICAGO 
.895 




Copyrighted, 1895, by 

SAMUEL W. ODELL. 

[ALL RIGHTS RESERVED] 



preface. 



Much has been written about both Grant and Lee and 
the parts that each bore in the bloody strife that so nearly 
wrecked the Union, but, we believe, there are elements of 
novelty and interest in taking these two great master-spirits 
of the war, and, in the same book, analyzing their careers ; 
comparing them step by step, to find what elements of 
similarity or dissimilarity existed between them, and wherein 
each succeeded or failed, and, if possible, to determine why. 
Such, at least, is the aim of the present work. 

The utmost care has been used to verify all facts and 
figures from the very highest authorities. No judgment has 
been passed on any person or event without weighing care- 
fully all the evidence, and with a desire to be entirely fair 
and impartial. 

Special pains have been taken to avoid stirnng up any 
spirit of controversy, and to judge each side in the great 
conflict only as the facts warrant. The publishers fully 
realize that in a narrative of so intense a struggle as the 
Civil War, where great bitterness was engendered, not only 
between the two opponents, but, also, even among some of 
the rival commanders on the same side, whose interests may 
have come in conflict, that any opinion that may be expressed 
about a leader, or his acts, is liable to be dissented from by 
those who may be his special friends or adherents. 



PREFACE. 



It is, therefore, but fair to say in behalf of those who have 
so kindly contributed the "Introductory Reminiscences," 
that their connection with the book in no way commits them 
to the endorsement, or approval, of any judgment that may 
be passed by the author on any person or event connected 
with the war. 



Contents* 



INTRODUCTION. 

Pages, 
Personal Recollections or Grant and Lee. 

Major-General O. O. Howard, U. S. A 7- 10 

Reminiscences of General Grant. 

Bishop John P. Newman 11- 18 

BOOK I. 

PREPARATION. 

The Birth and Parentage of Grant and Lee — Their Early Education and 
Surroundings — Traits of Character in each — Career at West Point 

— Life after Graduation — The Mexican War — Subsequent Events, 

etc., etc I9~ 73 

BOOK II. 

THE RISE OF GRANT. 
Outbreak of the War — Re-enters the Army— First Command — Belmont 

— Donelson — Shiloh — Corinth — Vicksburg — Chattanooga, etc., etc. 74-260 

BOOK III. 

THE RISE OF LEE. 

John Brown — Casts his lot with the South — The West Virginia Cam- 
paign — In Temporary Retirement — The Peninsula Campaign — 
Invasion of Maryland — Fredericksburg — Chancellorville — Gettys- 
burg, etc., etc 261-390 

BOOK IV. 

THE CONFLICT. 
Grant and Lee as Opponents — Preparations for the Death Struggle — 
The Wilderness — Spottsylvania — North Anna — Cold Harbor — 
Siege of Petersburg — Five Forks — Fall of Richmond — Surrender 
of Lee, etc., etc 391-561 

BOOK V. 

REST. 
After Life of Lee — President of Washington College — Lee's Death — 
Grant as President — Financial Reverses — Sickness and Death, 

etc., etc 562-584 

Appendix 585-586 

Index 587-602 



irilustratfons anb fiftaps* 



Surrender of Lee Frontispiece 

Major General O. O. Howard 6 

Bishop John P. Newman lo 

Birthplace of Grant, Point Pleasant, 30 

General Robert E. Lee 37 

General Winfield Scott 47 

Map of Mexico City and Vicinity 61 

Grant's home near St. Louis , . 70 

General Ullysses S. Grant 74 

Confederate Flag 76 

Map of Battlefield near Belmont 89 

Major General John A. McClernand 94 

Admiral Andrew H. Foote 95 

Map of Forts Henry and Donelson 97 

Gunboats on the way to attack Fort Henry 99 

Fort Donelson 100 

River Battery at Fort Donelson loi 

Major General Lewis Wallace 103 

Gunboats attacking Fort Donelson 105 

Pittsburg Landing 118 

Shiloh Meeting House 119 

Map of the Field of Shiloh 123 

General Albert Sidney Johnston 127 

luka, Mississippi 143 

Major General William S. Rosecrans 145 

Map of Battles of luka and Corinth 147 

Major General Henry W. Halleck 155 

Map of Grant's Operations above Vicksburg 160 

Cutting the Canal 162 

Bayou Navigation 165 

Through the Swamps 167 

Map of Vicksburg Campaign 170 

Running the Vicksburg Batteries 174 

Fleet attacking Grand Gulf 176 

Map of Battle of Port Gibson 180 

Crossing Bayou Pierre 183 

Crocker'^s Charge at Jackson 187 

Map of Battle of Champion Hill 193 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Map of Battle of Big Black River Bridge 199 

Sherman's Right at Haines' Bluff 205 

Map of the Siege of Vicksburg 206 

Blowing up a Fort at Vicksburg 214 

Surrender of Pemberton 217 

Chattanooga from Lookout Mountain 226 

Lookout Mountain 229 

Map of Battles about Chattanooga 231 

Hooker Storming Lookout 243 

General William T. Sherman 246 

Storming Mission Ridge 25 1 

Major General James Longstreet 259 

John Brown ^ 262 

Mountains of West Virginia 269 

Map of Eastern Virginia 276 

Birdseye View of Richmond and Vicinity 278 

Major General George B. McClellan 280 

Map of Region near Richmond 284 

Charge at Gaines' Mill 287 

Map of movements in Peninsula Campaign 288 

White Oak Swamp 290 

Battle of Frazier's Farm 292 

Battle of Malvern Hill 294 

Map of Campaign in Virginia 302 

Map of Battles around Groveton 305 

Thoroughfare Gap 3°/ 

Lee's Army Crossing the Potomac 311 

Map of the Invasion of Maryland 313 

Map, from Frederick to Antietam 314 

Turner's Gap and Boonesboro 3^6 

The Stone Bridge at Antietam 323 

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside 329 

Fredericksburg 33° 

Map of Battle of Fredericksburg 332 

Marye's Hill, Fredericksburg 335 

Map of Region near Chancellorsville 344 

Rout of the nth Corps near Chancellorsville 346 

Map of Gettysburg Campaign 357 

Map of Battle of Gettysburg 362 

Meade's Headquarters, Gettysburg 364 

Lee's Headquarters, Gettysburg 366 

The Last Day at Gettysburg '. 372 

Major-General George G. Meade 376 

Abraham Lincoln 382 

Winter Quarters— On Picket 388 

General Ulysses S. Grant 397 

General Robert E. Lee 400 

Map of the Wilderness 411 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Crossing the Rapidan 413 

Fighting in the Wilderness 419 

Scene of Wadsworth's Death 428 

Spottsylvania Court House 437 

Map of Battle of Spottsylvania 443 

Map of Battle of North Anna 461 

Jericho Mills, North Anna 463 

Quarle's Mill, North Anna 464 

Rifle Pits, North Anna 466 

Crossing the North Anna 468 

Crossing the Pamunkey 47° 

Map of Battle of Cold Harbor 474 

Battle of Cold Harbor 481 

Birdseye View of Virginia Campaign 487 

Petersburg 489 

Map of Defences of Richmond and Petersburg 495 

A Mortar Battery 499 

Explosion of the Mine 5°^ 

Battle of Winchester 515 

Grant's Headquarters at City Point 5^8 

View of Works near Petersburg 5^2 

General Philip H. Sheridan 5^9 

Map of Battle of Five Forks 534 

Union Army Entering Petersburg 541 

Map of Lee's Retreat 543 

McLean's Home 549 

Facsimile of Grant's Letter 552 

Lee's Army at Time of Surrender 555 

The Surrender of Johnston $60 

Grant's Tomb 57<5 




MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD. 



Ifntrobuction. 



REMINISCENCES OF GENERALS GRANT AND LEE 



BY 



MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, U. S. A. 



My first remembrance of Robert E. Lee was when he 
was a captain of engineers and visited the Academy at 
West Point. His son Custis was a classmate of mine and 
so, naturally, all eyes turned upon the distinguished Captain 
Lee, at the visit of which I speak. He was then very young 
looking. He seemed about five feet-ten in height; of a 
figure without corpulency. He had on the uniform of 
Engineers, probably being upon inspection duty at the 
Academy at that time. His head seemed a little too large 
for his body, and he had an abundance of hair, some 
what curly, just sprinkled with gray. His eyes were large, 
clear and black. He looked you steadily in the face 
while in conversation. He appeared to be as fine a speci- 
men of manhood as I had ever seen. He had been breveted 
for his grand service in the Mexican War, and was called 
"Colonel." 

A little later he came to West Point as the Superintendent, 
and I remember a personal visit from him while I was in 
the hospital. I think I had received some injury from a fall, 
but at any rate, the kindness of Colonel Lee, the Superin- 
tendent, In visiting me, then a cadet, and inquiring after my 
health, impressed me greatly. 

I had an opportunity that day to study his face. The 
impression he made upon me was that of a man of much 



INTRODUCTION. 



personal dignity ; something after the fashion of Winfield 
Scott. While he was kind, he impressed me as condescend- 
ing, and I could not help feeling the wonderful distance be- 
tween myself and this celebrated Engineer and Superin- 
tendent. During my last year at the Academy I was very 
pleasantly received in his family and knew Mrs. Lee and 
the young gentlemen and ladies that made up his household. 

Had anybody asked me then my opinion of Lee as an 
officer and as a man, I should have said that as an officer he 
had few superiors, either in natural ability or attainment, 
and as a man he was one of whom the French phrase always 
obtained, "noblesse oblige." 

With regard to General Grant, I never knew him until 
his reputation had been firmly established ; never until after 
the surrender of General Pemberton and his army, which set 
him far ahead of our other generals in point of actual 
accomplishment. 

My first meeting was in a railway coach, at Stevenson, 
Alabama. I was presented to him by a brother officer. He 
looked me full in the face, smiled pleasantly, and said, 
"General Howard, I am glad to meet you." That day he 
declined all hospitalities offered him at Stevenson, and went 
on with me to Bridgeport, Alabama, and stayed in my tent 
over night. At that time he was very lame; suffering from 
an injury received by the fall of a horse, and too weak really 
to be campaigning. In those days Grant allowed no suf- 
fering to restrain him from active work. 

I had long conversations with him that night and next 
morning; he had stayed in my tent. He took dinner with 
me and also breakfasted early the next day, before starting 
upon his most perilous journey, by way of Jasper, to Chat- 
tanooga, some forty miles. 



INTRODUCTION. 9 

I found him the opposite of Lee. He was firm and 
sufficiently dignified, but made you feel completely at home 
with him. You never were impressed with his greatness of 
acquirements, or family, or ability. He rather drew you out 
than allowed himself to be drawn out. He talked enough, 
but managed to introduce those subjects that would be 
especially interesting to both. 

One remark he made showea me that he aad implicit 
reliance upon what he called Providence. Another short 
sentence conveyed to me his distrust of ambition and selfish- 
ness. I did not, at the time, realize that Grant was a great 
man, but after-reflection brought to my mind those qualities 
which marked him — such as self-abnegation, suffering with- 
out complaint, unselfish patriotism, indomitable resolution. 

A little later I saw him in battle. There I found him 
absolutely undisturbed. His mind rested never upon him- 
self or upon danger. He hardly seemed to see at all his 
immediate surroundings. The army of his enemy appeared 
to fully occupy his mind, and the different portions of his 
own were as familiar to him as to a father are the different 
members of his family. He always seemed to be weighing 
in his mind the different things that could be done, and I 
think he invariably selected the best. He did not adhere 
rigidly and scrupulously to any original plan, but followed 
in his action, according to the apparent necessities of the 
hour. Grant's make-up was such that I did not wonder that 
he became distinguished before the other generals; for he 
was uniformly taking, against his enemy, " the offensive." 

If at any time one said to Grant, " Our men are worn 
out," " They are short of rations," " They need rest," he 
would answer, " Just so it is with the enemy ! ! " Speeches 
like this sometimes seemed, to sympathetic officers, al- 



10 INTRODUCTION. 

most heartless; but this was not the proper interpretation. 
It simply meant "Go on, now, and make a little larger sacri^ 
fice and you will gain the victory; for the enemy is as weak 
as you are." 

Robert E. Lee, a southern man, educated to state suprem- 
acy, decided to link his fortunes with Virginia, and though 
he had always been trusted by everybody representing the 
United States Government, yet he concluded that it was his 
duty to strike for dismemberment of his country. His de- 
cision was, and still is, a mystery to me. Grant came back to 
the army from civil life and represented the humblest ; was 
a special friend to volunteers. He gave all his strength, all 
his acquirements, and all his magnificent ability to the defense 
of the American Union ; and he succeeded. Doubtless both 
Grant and Lee, behind all human thought and action, were 
instruments in the hand of the Almighty for the working out 
of the great problems of humanity, which, without them, 
or such instruments, could not have been solved. 

North and South, we are together again. The same flag 
waves over us. Just now the whole country is in a ferment 
from financial troubles, but we must trust the same Almighty 
power to give us leaders who shall bring us out of the valleys 
of humiliation and sorrow, and plant us upon the hill-tops 
of prosperity. Let nobody be discouraged. Whatever 
sacrifices may be necessary will be made by the followers of 
Grant and Lee, and their countrymen, to prevent the ills 
which ambition and greed have been introducing and im- 
bedding in our borders. 




BISHOP JOHN P. NEWMAN, D. D. 



PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL GRANT 

BY 

BISHOP JOHN P. NEWMAN, D.D., LL. D., 

THE FRIEND AND PASTOR OF THE FAMOUS SOLDIER AND PRESIDENT. 



Through my long acquaintance with Grant I had oppor- 
tunities to judge of his moral character. 

After five years in camp and field he returned to his fire- 
side without a stain upon his character. Given to no excess 
himself, he sternly rebuked it in others. He never took 
the name of his Creator in vain, and an impure story never 
polluted his lips. Gratitude was one of the noblest emotions 
of his soul. His words were few, but pregnant with grateful 
recognition. When restored to the army as General, and 
retired on full pay, he was deeply touched, and, taking the 
wife of his youth by the hand, he read the telegram which 
announced the fact, while, more eloquent than words, tears 
of gratitude to the nation moistened those cheeks never 
blanched with fear. 

It is difficult to be victorious and not be proud. But read 
Grant's orders; read the reports of his victories; read the 
memoirs of his life; how he praised his great subordinates 
and the army and navy that did the fighting. And not once 
in all the four lustra since the strife was over, in the decade 
since he retired from his Chair of State with a name great in 
bofh liemispheres, was he ever heard to speak of his deeds 
of valor or the. success of his administrations. It was 
a mistake to suppose that Grant was a stoic, insensible 
alike to .f)ain and pleasure; indifferent to public opinion or 



12 INTRODUCTION. 

careless about the honor of his rights. He loved the praise 
of men, when the reward of honorable action. He was a 
sensitive, high-spirited, manly man, who had the will and 
courage to contend to the last for what was his due. 

His self-control was a masterful characteristic. In all 
my intercourse with him I never knew him to lose himself 
but once, and that only for a moment. He was a man 
with all the passions and appetites of human nature; and to 
make him other than a well-poised, self-mastered man would 
be an injustice to his memory. He was a man of change- 
less sincerity. He abandoned himself to his life's mission 
with the hope of no other reward than the consciousness of 
duty done. With him true greatness was, that in great 
actions our only care should be to perform well our part and 
let glory follow virtue. 

As his friend and pastor through many years, I had the 
privilege to observe Grant in the quiet of his home, where 
he was the sweetest and happiest of men ; where mutual 
and reciprocal love of the wedded life was ever present. 
Husband and wife were the happy supplement of each other, 
their characters blending in the sweetest harmony, like the 
blended colors in the bow of promise. 

How tender was that scene in the early dawn of an April 
day when all thought the long expected end had come ; 
when he gave her his watch, and, tenderly caressing her 
hand, said, "This is all I have to give you." And the dying 
hero whispered: "I did not have you wait upon me because 
I knew it would distress you, but now the end draws nigh." 
When he was dead, there was found on his person a letter 
addressed to his wife. It came to her as a message from 
the spirit world. It was found secreted in his robe, en- 
veloped, sealed, and addressed to his wife. He had written 



INTRODUCTION. 13 

it by times ; written it secretly, and carried the secret missive 
day after day during fourteen days, knowing that she would 
find it at last. In it he had poured forth his soul in love 
for her.and also for their children. 

"Look after our de'ar children, and direct them in the 
paths of rectitude. It would distress me far more to think 
that one of them could depart from an honorable, upright, 
and virtuous life, than it would to know that they were 
prostrated on a bed of sickness from which they were never 
to arise alive. They have never given us any cause for alarm 
on their account, and I earnestly pray they never will. With 
these few injunctions, and the knowledge that I have of your 
love and affection, and of the dutiful affection of all our 
children, I bid you a final farewell until we meet in another 
and, I trust, a better world. You will find this on my person 
after my demise." 

It fell to my lot to pass behnd the curtain of his domestic 
life, and often converse with him in the privacy of his quiet 
home. I was with him when the financial crash came. It 
seemed to crush his brave soul, which mighty armies could 
not daunt. 

When, on the morning or May 6, 1884, he left his home 
for his office on Broadway and Wall street, General Grant 
thought himself a millionaire, but in an hour thereafter he 
found that his fortune had been swept away, as it were in a 
night. 

His second son was a banker in New York, in company 
with Ward & Fish, and solicited his father to invest his for- 
tune and become a partner in the same firm. This proved 
the blunder of his life. He was nothing more than a 
silent partner. He loaned his name and invested his 
money, but others did the business. In reality. Ward 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

acted for the firm; made all investments, drew all checks, 
received all deposits, and disposed of them. The General 
was assured that the investments were proper, and, unac- 
customed as he was to business, he inquired little further. 
The apparent returns from the business were enormous, but 
not larger than other bankers and brokers around him. He 
had put all available capital into the bank. One of his sons 
was a partner, another became an agent of the firm, and a 
third had entrusted $80,000 to the company for investment. 
When he arrived at his place of business, his son ap- 
proached him and said : " Father, return home, the bank 
has failed." He was silent, and, after a moment, calmly said 
to a friend : "We are all ruined here; the bank has failed. 
Ward cannot be found. The securities are locked up in the 
safe; he has the key; no one knows where he is." In a few 
moments the General entered his carriage and was driven 
home. He never returned to Wall street. 

But a greater evil was at hand. His bodily health gave 
signs of decay. A terrible cancer appeared. The most 
eminent physicians were in attendance, but gave no promise 
of recovery. His pains became excruciating; he could not 
swallow without torture, and his sufferings at the table were 
intense. Liquid food was a necessity. Death seemed pre- 
ferable, and for a time he desired to die. For hours he 
would sit alone, propped up in his chair, with hands clasped, 
looking at the blank wall before him, silent, contemplating 
the future. He seemed not alarmed, but solemn, as the end 
approached. But he revived ; his apathy disappeared ; his 
indifference was soon gone. He had another battle to fight. 
It was with poverty. His sword was sheathed, but his pen 
was ready, and was destined to be mighty. The proprietors 
of the Century Magazine solicited him to write four articles 



INTRODUCTION. 15 

on the battles of Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and the 
Wilderness campaign. They assured him of an honorable 
compensation, not less than $2,000, and that the public 
would hail his productions with delight. He consented. 

Then dawned upon him the purpose to write his personal 
memoirs, the sale of which has brought the widow nearly 
half a million of dollars. At first he dictated to a stenog- 
rapher and corrected the notes thereof. When the pro- 
gress of the cancer had interrupted his speech, then with 
pad and pencil he would write many hours of the day. His 
intellect was clear, his memory suggestive. Facts and fig- 
ures of his great campaign came trooping through his mind. 
It was the mastery of mind over a suffering body. It was 
the greatest achievement of his time, intellect defying the 
pain of disease and the approach of death. His hold on 
life was strengthened by his determination to live until the 
work was done. 

But there was something higher that sustained his great 
soul in this final battle of his life. " Life to him was not a 
walking shadow; death was not an endless dream." His 
calmness in suffering was not stoical philosophy, but inspired 
by Christian fortitude. Reared in the Methodist Episcopal 
church, and baptized in his last illness, his religious nature 
was sincere, calm, and steadfast. The principles of Christi- 
anity were deeply engraved upon his spirit. Firm, but never 
demonstrative, he was not a man of religious pretense. 'His 
life was his profession. 

It was in the early part of April, 1885, when I gave him 
Chistian baptism. Death seemed imminent. Even his 
physicians had given up hope. I had watched with him all 
night. At five in the morning the baptism took place. All 
supposed that the General was dying. 



16 INTRODUCTION. 

As I entered the sick room Mrs. Grant said to me, " Doc- 
tor, the General has not been baptized, and we wish you 
to baptize him now!" I consulted his sons; and to his wife 
and sons I replied, " I will baptize him if he is conscious; I 
cannot baptize an unconscious man!" 

We all knelt around his chair, and as I began to pray 
the General opened his eyes and looked steadily at rne. As 
his physicians thought that he could not live five minutes 
longer, I prayed that God would receive his departing soul. 
I then approached him, and spoke to him about his bap- 
tism, when he answed; "I am obliged to you doctor: I had 
intended to take that step myself." 

In the meantime his son had brought in a silver bowl 
full of water, and, by the General's expressed wish, I bap- 
tized him in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of 
the Holy Ghost. He was fully conscious, and with his own 
hand wiped away the water that had run down upon his 
face. A few days after, I spent two hours with him in re- 
ligious conversation. I asked if he recalled the scenes of 
his baptism, to which he replied : "Yes, perfectly. And 
as you came into the room I wondered why they had 
called you at that hour of the night." 

To my remark, " All thought you had not five minutes to 
live," he gave his characteristic answer: "I knew I was very 
low, but I did not intend to die; my work is not done. Three 
times I have been raised from the valley and shadow of 
death." And during four months thereafter he lived and 
suffered, reviewed his first volume, and wrote the second. 
In that conversation he said to me: 

" I believe in the Holy Scriptures. Whoso lives by them 
will be benefited thereby. Men may differ as to the inter- 
pretation, which is human, but the Scriptures are man's best 



INTRODUCTION. 17 

guide." He revered their source, recognizea their ini^uence, 
responded to their requisitions, trusted in their promises, 
found consolation in their hopes. His faith in God as the 
sovereign ruler and Almighty Father was simple as a child's 
and mighty as a prophet's. 

He was a man of prayer. It was on a Sabbath evening 
in March of that year when I called and found him alone 
with Mrs. Grant. I informed him that three hundred Meth- 
odist preachers, with their bishops, in Conference assembled 
had stood up and offered prayer for his recovery. His 
response was in accord therewith, and he informed me that 
a company of friends in Boston had leagued together to 
pray for him every day, and that the little children in the 
neighborhood had sent him word that they added his name 
in their little prayer when they prayed for "papa and 
mamma." 

I saw his great eye moisten, and, in answer to my sug- 
gestion that we should join in this universal prayer, he re- 
sponded, "Yes," with emphasis. The spirit of the Lord 
came upon us, and, as we prayed for his soul, for the recov- 
ery of his health, and that his life might be spared until his 
work was done, at each petition he responded " Amen." It 
was the hour of his surrender to God. That amen by that 
silent man was more significant than volumes by others. 
Thereafter it was his custom and habit to call to prayers. 

On one of those delusive April days, when hope re- 
vived in all our hearts, I said to him, " You are a man of 
Providence. God made you the instrument to save our 
nation, and he may have a great spiritual mission to accom- 
plish by you, and may raise you up." In the most solemn 
and impressive manner, with a mind clear and purpose dis- 
tinct, he replied : " I do not wish to proclaim it; but should 
2 



18 INTRODUCTION. 

He spare my life, it is my intention and resolve to throw 
all of my influence by my example in that direction." 

On one of those days when the treacherous disease 
seemed to gain the mastery, he said to me, " Doctor, I am 
going." I replied, " I hope the prospect of the future is 
clear and bright." His answer was: "Yes, oh, yes." 

Then followed a scene of infinite tenderness. The 
honored wife, the precious daughter, the devoted sons and 
their wives, each in turn approached, and he tenderly kissed 
them. "Do you know me, darling?" was the loving wife's 
inquiry, and he whispered back, "Certainly I do, and I bless 
you all in my heart." Such love melted the marble heart 
of death, and the king of terrors fled affrighted. 

The sufferer revived. Heaven added months to a life so 
dear to us all. When he recovered sufficiently I asked him, 
"What was the supreme thought in your mind when eter- 
nity seemed so near?" " The comfort of the consciousness 
that I had tried to live a good and honorable life," was 
the response which revealed the hidden life of his soul. 

Again the angel of death cast his shadow over the one 
we loved so well, and amid the gathering gloom I said: 
"You have many friends awaiting you on the other side." 
"I wish they would come, and not linger long," was the 
answer of his Christian faith and hope. They came at last. 
They came to greet him with the kiss of immorality. They 
came to escort the conqueror over the last enemy, and to a 
coronation never seen on thrones of earthly power. 



^^ 




Book ®ne. 



PREPARATION. 



'ARS and diplomatic conflicts have always occupied 
more space in history than the peaceful pursuits of 
^;^) men; and the descriptive story of marches, battles, 
and sieges, than the study of motives, or the causes 
and effects of contests. The soul of man delights in being 
moved, thrilled, and exalted. The excitement of conflict, 
the shock of battle and the clever movement of armies, 
related in burning sentences, rouse his passions and claim 
his sympathies. He desires to be entertained rather than 
instructed. He does not generally delve deeply into rea- 
sons; he looks rather at the action and the result and judges 
one by the success or failure that may attend his efforts 
without considering, or giving due weight to, surrounding 
circumstances. External appearances, submitted to super- 
ficial observation, not to the test of reasoning thought, 
generally determine opinions. True genius has been thus 
often underrated, or good fortune mistaken as evidence of 
its presence. The passions of men, too, warp their judg- 
ments. Prejudice weighs heavily in the balance of Jus- 
tice. It is difficult, therefore, to render praise where praise 
is due, sometimes, or to abstain from too severe criticism. 



20 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Partizanship, that necessary evil in republics, often mis- 
taken for principle and as often set above principle, is 
fraught with virulent prejudice. It has not only been able 
to drive the sons of freedom into a rebellious defense of 
most degrading slavery, but it lives yet and keeps alive 
the hatred aroused in the war it caused long after the 
strife has been ended. All citizens are more or less infected 
with it. Hence it is difficult to see the truth concerning the 
men who took part in the great conflict through the mist 
thrown around them by this powerful agent, and more diffi- 
cult to make others see it when discerned. Men arose by 
the success that attended their efforts; they were dashed 
to earth again by some ill-fortune for which they, perhaps, 
were not to blame. Yet it is true in a certain measure that 
success marks the genius. Other circumstances being equal, 
it is a never failing evidence. Genius compels success to 
attend it. It snatches victory from the very jaws of defeat. 
It is much more difficult for a citizen of the Republic to 
write of the men who were engaged in the late civil war 
in the United States, called from its magnitude the Great 
Rebellion, than to write of men engaged in foreign wars. 
For so hot were the passions of men during this conflict, 
that, although a quarter of a century has passed since it 
closed, they have not yet cooled, they do not all sleep, but 
they exert a powerful influence still. If some boast of vic- 
tory, others curse the day of their defeat. The parties 
which arrayed themselves as parties on the opposing sides 
of the contest are still the chief parties among the people. 
Eighty years of contention, ending in four years of deadly 
combat, aroused such prejudice and tore asunder so widely 
the ties that bound the hearts of men to one common coun- 
try and to each other, that a century will not heal them. 



LEADERS OF GREAT MOVEMENTS. 21 

Still progress has been made toward unity, and the intol- 
erance of the war is disappearing. The problems growing 
out of the great contest were many and intricate. Consum- 
mate statesmanship and wise counsel have not availed to 
solve them wholly. The negroes are free, nominally, but 
not practically. The former masters can not endure to 
share offices with, or acknowledge the equality of those, who 
were once their slaves. Nevertheless, these problems will 
be solved and in a more peaceable manner, every patriot 
trusts, than was the great problem out of which they 
sprang. The example of those great men who were chief 
leaders in the war is being followed. Their influence lives 
after them. First in war, when peace was established, they 
became first in peace. They deserve study and comparison. 
In all civil conflicts there have been leaders who have 
in themselves personified the spirits of the factions at 
war, and were true representatives, or genii of the times. 
Caesar led the Plebs against Pompey and the Aristocrats; 
Cromwell was the impersonation of the spirit that roused 
the semi-religious revolution against King Charles; Robes- 
pierre well represented the destructive genius of the French 
Revolution, which Napoleon with fierce energy turned 
against other nations than his own; George Washington 
was the very soul of that spirit of resistance to tyranny 
which animated the Colonies to resist the tyrannical meas- 
ures of England's rulers. In them, the elements of dispute 
found centres and channels of action. Imbued with the 
spirit of the times, they threw themselves into the rising tide 
of public opinion and were borne upward to heights which 
but few men are permitted to reach. Their lives have 
become special studies to men; for that they but reflected 
the thought and action of the times in which they lived. 



22 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

So also, in Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, the 
elements at war in the late Rebellion found impersonation. 
For while they were not the only great actors in the con- 
flict, yet they were chief actors, and became imbued with 
the opinions of their respective factions. They had little 
to do with the rousing up of strife; but they had much 
to do with the prosecution of the war when roused, one as 
the chief support of the Confederacy, the other as the 
power that crushed it to death. Grant, like the ruling party 
in the loyal states, was in favor of reconciliation as long 
as there was hope of keeping the peace. He hesitated to 
vote with the party that had the abolition of slavery for its 
ultimate object, though opposed to the system from princi- 
ple, because that party's success he feared meant civil war; 
but, when the gage of battle was thrown, he was then in 
favor of prosecuting the war to the bitter end, and was one 
of the first to approve of emancipation. He was one from 
the laboring class, a democratic citizen, one who recognized 
all men as equals and none as better than himself. He was 
practical, energetic, tenacious, inventive and sound in judg- 
ment. These words apply as well to the people of the 
states that remained loyal. A strong will, immense resour- 
ces, modest behavior — these marked the man. He was 
indeed the representative leader of his people. 

Lee, on the other hand, was an impersonation of the 
spirit which moved the seceding states to rebellion and to 
persist in that rebellion as long as their resources enabled 
them. He was aristocratic in birth and training. He was 
a slaveholder. He was honest, brave, ambitious, energetic 
and of good judgment. The contempt with which the aris- 
tocracy of the southern states regarded their neighbors of 
the northern was in him tempered, however, by a certain 



THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH, 23 

gentility of manner, and he was not so rash and hot headed 
as the majority of his friends. He was well fitted to be a 
leader of men, who, though in error, won for themselves 
a great reputation for valor and dash. 

The Great Rebellion was, in many respects, a struggle 
between aristocratic and democratic institutions. The peo- 
ple who settled New England and the Middle States were 
for the most part common people, laborers, artisans, farm- 
ers, with a sprinkling of gentlemen of means and noble birth 
who soon lost these distinctions. All became equal, differ- 
ing only in natural ability. The leading people of the 
South Atlantic States, though by birth they were not of 
better families than their northern brethren, grew to be 
pseudo-aristocrats after the introduction of slavery. They 
were lords of manors, owners of lands and slaves, and 
rulers by virtue of their birth and riches. Like many unfor- 
tunate, rich, enervated manikins of to-day, they aped the 
customs of foreign lordlings. They became a slave-oligarcy, 
looking upon a poor white man, or one that labored for his 
daily bread, as little better than the blacks subject to their 
lashes. It was impossible that such an institution as that 
upon which their social system was founded should exist 
under this free government. The fundamental law of the 
American nation is that all men are free and equal. This 
law did not agree with the system of slavery. One was des- 
tined to destruction. The secession leaders saw the inevit- 
able result that would come; they sought, by separation 
from the power that threatened their riches and position, to 
perpetuate the system. It is not a matter for wonder that 
the rebellion broke forth, then, though it seems wonderful. 
For it is preposterous to state that the southern states were 
oppressed or that they had cause to fear the tyrannical rule of 



24 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lincoln's government. The first ordinance of secession w^as 
passed while a president and his cabinet v^hich favored 
their views were in power; and it was the declared policy of 
Lincoln and his party to let slavery alone where it already 
existed. The rebellion was the result of a conspiracy among 
the aristocratic leaders of the southern people, having for 
its object the perpetuation of slavery, the establishment of a 
government whose offices might be filled with the leaders 
themselves, and the final destruction of the United States 
as a unit. It was very natural that Lee should become a 
leader among those leaders. It was, on the other hand, 
just as natural that Grant should become the leader of those 
democratic Unionists who placed their country's salvation 
above every other consideration. For Lee was one of the 
first among his people in birth and breeding; Grant was a 
commoner, possessing only his great genius. 

The sentiments leading to disunion and resistance to 
disunion differed in their origin, as did the sentiments of anti- 
slavery and pro-slavery. The doctrines of pro-slavery and 
disunion were formulated by the leaders of the people; the 
opposing doctrines arose from the masses of the people and 
spread to the leaders. In the one case, many years of false 
teaching, by speeches, pamphlets and newspapers, could not 
wholly mislead the southern people; in the other, the leaders 
did not utter a word in behalf of the truth, but temporized 
and conciliated, until the voice of their constituents com- 
pelled them. On the one hand, the leaders taught the people ; 
on the other, the people taught the leaders. The mass of 
the southern people was ignorant, or the Rebellion could 
never have happened. They believed all that scheming 
politicians told them and verily believed their northern 
brethren intended to subjugate them, to take away their 



THE PEOPLE OF 'THE SOUTH DECEIVED 25 

rig-hts and property; and the most ignorant, it is said, were 
taught, and believed, that a Yankee w^as as malevolent as 
hib Satanic Majesty himself. It was policy on the part of the 
leaders to disseminate such false ideas. For should the 
rising tide of abolition sentiment be permitted to sweep away 
the institution which gave them wealth, leisure to act the 
gentleman, title of master of servants and lord of manors, 
they would be reduced, perhaps, to the necessity of depend- 
ing, like other plebians, upon their personal exertions for a 
livelihood, a result not at all desirable in their view. It was 
not the love of liberty that moved them to drag their states 
and the people thereof into disastrous rebellion; it was selfish 
interest to preserve the institution on which their wealth and 
social position were founded. The loyal people never could 
have been dragged thus into war by their leaders. Being 
educated very generally, they could not have been so de- 
ceived. No oligarchy of rulers could have ruled them. 
The war proved in the end, as the passing years show, to be 
a blessing to those who so valiantly maintained it. It tore 
aside the veil of ignorance from the people's eyes, and gave 
them a chance to improve; and it is pleasing to note that 
they are improving. Could the Confederacy have achieved 
its independence, its people in no longtime would have had 
cause to lament. All the elements of an oligarchy, a form 
of government worse than a despotic monarchy, were there 
— classes, the aristocracy, the common poor, and the slaves. 
From what depths of degradation and oppression the masses 
of these people were saved by a destructive war will never 
be known. Only the philosophic mind, by comparing the 
data of history, is able to perceive dimly the depths to which 
they might have sunk. 

The birth of those genii, the Spirit of Liberty and the 



26 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Spirit of Slavery, if we may be permitted to personify them, 
dates back to the earliest period of history, and further. In 
the beginning men were equal, but strength soon marked 
the master. To strength was added wisdom, and to wisdom 
the power of wealth. The prestige of the father, descend- 
ing upon the son, clothed him with a superior majesty and 
rendered him worshipful in the eyes of his fellows. Soon 
class-rule, king-rule, and despotisms, were established. So- 
ciety assumed the form that it held till the last century 
ushered in a new era. The love of liberty, however, being 
inherent in the hearts of men, was never totally lost. It 
lived here and there, and sprouted and blossomed forth 
gloriously whenever some superior agent succeeded in tear- 
ing away the bands that held it. The majority of civil 
wars have been conflicts between these opposite principles. 
Liberty came to America with the Colonial Fathers; it 
fought for independence and established the United States. 
But Slavery came also. Brave men, who stood nobly for 
their own political rights, were themselves slaveholders, 
and oppressors of the rights of others. Even Washington 
was not free from this reproach, though he was the kindest 
of masters to his people. But in accordance with his love of 
liberty, he, by will at his death, made freemen of his slaves. 
When the Colonies became independent States, the 
great men who had guided them to liberty perceived that, 
unless the newly acquired freedom was properly guarded, 
it would leave them. Union was their only safe-guard. The 
revolution against kingly rule had carried the colonies too 
far, however, for a close union, and at first only a con- 
federacy was formed. The experience of a few years 
proved how weak this loose union was; and the statesmen 
again consulted. This Union, under which the States 



THE CONSTITUTION AND SLAVERY. 27 

flourish today, was the result of their deliberations. The 
Constitution became the supreme law of the land; it was 
the voice of the People. In its formation the interests of 
liberty and slavery clashed; and, for the sake of peace, 
nothing was said in it concerning the evil, it being left to 
the care of future generations. Majority rule was estab- 
lished. Parties were at once formed. Slavery, or some 
question arising out of it, became the bone of contention 
between them. The compact being made, the Constitution 
being ratified by the people, not by the states, even though 
the people's voice was expressed through the medium of 
the state, it became impossible for one or more states to 
recede from its power without the consent of a majority. A 
portion of the rights of the states was given up to the Cen- 
tral Government. The people, not the states, made the 
Constitution; only the people could annul it by their ma- 
jority vote. Not all the people assented to these views, 
however, and strong parties either supported or denied it. 
At last war was roused; and the people by force of arms 
settled the question forever. 

The underlying cause of all the questions, about which 
arose the disputes leading to the Rebellion, was slavery. 
From it arose the tariff, state-rights and other discussions 
upon which the parties were divided. Old parties were 
abandoned and merged into new. Gradually the different 
disputes assumed the character which they bore at the begin- 
ning of the war. During the half century preceding the war, 
the pro-slavery leaders were more often successful in their 
efforts than their opponents. Their demands were met with 
concession after concession; but instead of pacifying, these 
only seemed to make them more avaricious. Bold of speech 
and hot-headed, they did not hesitate to declare their in- 



28 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

tention to dissolve the union if their demands were not 
granted. The greatest statesmen, the most eloquent orators 
and the wisest politicians sought to settle, by argument and 
concession, the vexed dispute, which, when partially quieted, 
was liable at any moment to break forth as fiercely as ever. 
Newspapers, books, pamphlets and tracts spread the dis- 
cussion, and demagogues found willing ears to listen to their 
tirades. 

Grant and Lee came under the influences of these con- 
flicting opinions before they had reached the age of reason. 
Born in the early part of the present century, they heard, 
while still at their mothers' breasts, the discussions of the 
day. Grant was nurtured in a free state among people who 
loved liberty; and he imbibed from them that love for his 
country which was so great in him. Some of his family were 
Whigs; others were Democrats. From the first, he learned 
to love and respect the Constitution and to oppose the ex- 
tension of slavery; from the second, he received opposite 
ideas, tempering and rendering his opinions conservative. 
He was thus fitted not only to become the Nation's strongest 
defender against treason, but to act as a pacificator. Lee, 
whose birth-place was in the state into which slavery was 
first introduced, was surrounded by influences of a different 
nature. The pernicious evil of the age was around him. 
His relatives and friends were slave-holders. The majority 
of those people, also, were strong advocates of the doctrine 
of state-rights. But prior to the war, he expressed himself 
as in sympathy with the Union and opposed to secession. 
Only great considerations could have moved him from his 
loyalty. 

It is a trite saying, that as the child is, so will the man be. 
It may be said with as much truth, that, as a man's surround- 



grant's birth. 29 

ings are, so will he be. For while there may be certain 
natural qualities in every man which distinguish him from 
his fellows, and which may raise or lower him in their esti- 
mation, it is true that circumstances govern these in a great 
measure in bringing them out, or suppressing, elaborating or 
destroying, directing or frustrating them. Had Grant been 
bred with Lee's surroundings, he would likely have been a 
secessionist; had Lee occupied Grant's place, he would have 
been, perhaps, a strong supporter of the Union. Judgment 
on their respective courses in the war ought, therefore, to 
be tempered with excuse. Ambition both had, though of 
different strength. Genius both had, though exerted in. 
opposite lines. 

Grant was the son of a tanner who was also a farmer in 
a small way. He was born at Point Pleasant, Ohio, on the 
north bank of the Ohio river, not far from the city of Cin- 
cinnati (April 27, 1822). His parents were poor but respect- 
able — honesty and independence being their only distinc- 
tions. They could trace their ancestry back to a certain 
Mathew Grant who landed from a ship at Dorchester, 
Massachusetts, early in the seventeenth century. No aris- 
tocratic blood ran in their veins. They were of the com- 
mon people, the respectable middle class, who disdained 
any other title than that won by upright living. Nobility of 
character, not of birth, gave them the right to be held hon- 
orable citizens of the Republic. Yet the Clan Grant of 
Scotland claimed Grant as a descendant of their clan, when 
in after years he visited their country. Their battle-cry, 
"Stand fast, Craig Ellachie!" was certainly a fitting motto 
for him. Ohio State, which has produced many notable 
men, here produced one destined to be most notable of 
all. The clear sky, the pure air and the beautiful hills 



30 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



and streams, all instill into the hearts of her youth a strong 
love for home and country. Grant, as he played by the 
blue waters of the Ohio, fished and bathed in the streams 
that were tributary thereto, hunted in the woods that cov- 
ered the hills, and wandered at will through the pastures 
and meadows, unrestrained by the bonds of elegant society, 




BIRTHPLACE OF GRANT, AT POINT PLEASANT, OHIO. 

became a lover of nature and a worshipper of Nature's God. 
The conventionalities of life were to him a tyrannical sys- 
tem of laws, and were observed by him later in life only 
because of necessity. And when he had grown to man's 
estate, and was occupying the highest offices in the gift of 
his grateful countrymen, his love of the pure country air, 
the beauty of rural scenery, and his fondness for animals 
and birds, served often to call him away from the oppressive 
cares of business to some peaceful retreat in the country. 



lee's birth. 31 

Lee was born at Stratford, the ancient manor house of 
the Lee family in the State of Virginia (January 19, 1807). 
The house was built by a noted ancestor in the latter part 
of the seventeenth century, and several successive families 
of Lees had been reared there, thus giving it an air of re- 
spectability which always attaches to ancient places. Lee 
could trace his ancestry back to a certain Launcelot Lee, 
who left his home in Loudon, France, to accompany Wil- 
liam the Conqueror, across the English Channel. Some of 
his later ancestors were prominent men in the Colonies and 
became noted during the Revolution. Richard Henry Lee 
deserves special mention as one who signed the Declaration 
of Independence. The Lee family was, therefore, one of 
the first families of Virginia, a distinction of which those 
first families were inordinately proud. They were aristo- 
cratic and influential. The contrast between Lee's family 
and that of Grant was as great as the varied conditions of 
life in the Republic will permit. Lee's birth in such position 
gave him chances of rising and becoming noted that Grant 
never possessed. He was a great man among the people 
before he had accomplished anything to entitle him to that 
appellation. He felt himself a master; his teachings made 
him jealous of his rights as a gentleman of family, and he 
held intimate relations only with his equals socially. 

The childhood of Grant and Lee is not well known to 
history, little having been written of them by any that knew 
of their youthful days. Grant seldom spoke of himself, and, 
when in later life he wrote his own memoirs through 
pecuniary necessity, he wrote rather of his campaigns than 
of his personal history. Like all country lads, he enjoyed a 
freedom from restraint which city boys do not have. His 
father, a man of iron will, ruled him with a firmness that 



32 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

would brook no misbehavior and allow no disobedience to 
the rules laid down for the son's guidance. Only a general 
supervision of his actions, however, was maintained. No 
special teachings or training were imposed. He was made 
self-reliant in this manner. He hated the tannery business, 
which his father pursued, but liked farming. His labor 
was, therefore, wisely directed to the care of the small farm 
which was owned in connection with the tannery. When 
he was one year old his parents removed from Point 
Pleasant to a farm near Georgetown, a place not far from 
his first home, and there he lived until he entered West 
Point sixteen years later. This farm was covered with 
primeval forest which had to be cleared away and the 
ground broken before it could be planted. The father 
gave little attention to farming; and, as soon as the son 
was strong enough, the whole care of the land was left to 
him. At the age of six he drove a team drawing cord- 
wood; at the age of eleven he followed the plow; and from 
that time on he performed a man's labor. He became a 
man while yet a boy. He was very fond of animals, 
especially of horses. It is said of Alexander the Great that 
he conquered a horse which no one else could subdue. A 
like story is told of Washington. Grant, also, won the 
reputation of having conquered more than one vicious 
beast. The gifts, which, in later years while he was 
traveling among foreign nations, were bestowed upon him, 
contained none more appreciated than some beautiful 
Arabian steeds presented to him by the Sultan of Turkey. 
His life on the farm was not without its pleasures and 
periods of relaxation. Parties, spelling-matches, singing- 
schools, and various other country amusements, served to 
break the monotony of work. Quiet, industrious, of good 



lee's youth. 33 

habits, very unobtrusive and persistent in doing anything 
undertaken, he yet exhibited no special marks of genius or 
ability. No one prophesied that he would have a great 
future; few said that he would make his mark in the world; 
all said he was a good-enough boy. He was possessed of 
no remarkable personal beauty; but his clear, honest, blue 
eyes, his brown cheeks and strong limbs, were preposses- 
ing. Under all this plain exterior, however, there was a 
heroic soul capable of rising to any emergency. He was 
destined to become great, even against his own belief; 
but he did not then think of becoming anything but a 
farmer. 

Lee's childhood is even more obscure than Grant's. 
When he was eleven years old, his father's death placed 
him under the exclusive control of an invalid mother, to 
whom he proved a worthy son. Not allowed to work, since 
slaves did that, he was nurtured in gentility and refinement. 
He was a child of the home, a helper in the house, an 
attentive nurse to his mother, and of exceptionally good 
habits. He was handsome, a model of grace and good 
manners. If all is to be believed that is said of him, he was 
a model boy. His disposition was, however, subject to 
frequent changes. At times he was playful and teasing, but 
only to familiar friends; again he was reticent and severe. 
Being early recognized as the master of his mother's house, 
and having control of the family affairs almost exclusively 
on account of her ill-health, he became accustomed at an 
early age to act the master. While he loved horses and 
other animals, he had not the same fondness for them that 
Grant had. Books pleased him better. When he was four 
years old, his parents removed to Alexandria, which re- 
mained his home several years. He thus received the 



34 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

benefits of city breeding without being harmed by its vices. 
While his friends hoped great things for him, they never 
dreamed, perhaps, of the important place he would fill in 
the world's history. Special genius he did not exhibit. 
Like many other aristocratic young Virginians, he was held 
in high esteem because of his high birth and manly beauty. 
Flattery, however, did not seem to make him vain. He 
had a pardonable pride in his position and influence his 
ancestry and his connections with the elite. He desired to 
emulate those illustrious men who had honored his name. 
His choice of a soldier's life cleared the way for achieve- 
ments even greater than they had performed. 

The rudimentary education of Grant was neglected; 
that of Lee was well finished. Grant was no lover of text- 
books, and had few opportunities for attending schools 
while a boy. For there were no public schools such as 
there are to day, and private schools were few and high 
priced. Three or four months during the winter, when 
farm work could not be done, and for few winters at that, 
constituted his schooling before he entered West Point. 
He was not a brilliant scholar, but rather ordinary. He 
never attained high grades, but never allowed himself to 
fail in his lessons. There was small encouragement to edu- 
cation among the people of his acquaintance. It was the 
prevailing opinion that education made a man too lazy for 
work. To know how to read, write and calculate the sim- 
plest sums, was held to be sufficient. People learned more 
from experience than from books; yet none were so illiter- 
ate as their neighbors further south. Grant was for the 
most part self-taught. He had little to say, but he thought 
much, and everything that came before his mind was 
retained. He learned from individual observation. His 



lee's early education. 35 

judicial brain quickly formed an opinion, and that opinion 
once formed was rarely changed and more rarely wrong. 
He listened to the suggestions of others attentively, but he 
formed his own plans. The adage, "Still water runs deep," 
applied well to him. Lee's education was more thorough 
and perhaps more extensive. He was a student of high 
merit, noted for his close application, his neatness and his 
perfect recitations. His schools were the best of the day, 
and his time was not occupied with work of any kind that 
would hinder his attendance. Still he did not learn for the 
love of learning, but because it was necessary for a gentle- 
man of his station to be educated. His education was not 
the result of personal observation so much as Grant's, and 
therefore not so practical. Indeed, during his whole career, 
he did not show himself so practical. He weighed all prob- 
lems in the light of his acquired knowledge, rather than 
upon his own trained judgment. He gave much weight to 
the advice of others, sometimes to the detriment of the 
cause he represented. Experience did not prove to him as 
valuable a teacher as to Grant. 

The life of a soldier has a fascination for the majority of 
men. But Grant never dreamed of becoming a soldier until 
his father informed him one day that his appointment as a 
cadet to West Point was secured. The young man's wishes 
had not been consulted in the matter, and he answered that 
he would not go. But the father answered grimly, that he 
would go; and so the matter was settled. Young Grant 
bowed to the dictum of his superior, though much against 
his inclination. He knew how to obey as well as to com- 
mand. What his parents said to him was law to be obeyed. 
After thinking the matter over, he began to like the idea of 
going to West Point. He was passionately fond of travel- 



S6 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

ing and had a great desire to see the world that was beyond 
the very limited circle of his home. On his way to school, 
he would pass through the great cities of Philadelphia and 
New York, and the Allegheny Mountains, noted for their 
beautiful scenery. Assured that the matter of his going to 
West Point was settled, he applied himself diligently to pre- 
paratory studies necessary for the preliminary examination. 
When on his way to school he loitered so long at the cities 
above mentioned that his father sent him a letter of severe 
reprimand. But his dislike to the idea of attending the 
military course laid out for him was go great that he made 
no haste, and since has said that he then wished some acci- 
dent would happen to prevent him going further. Lucky was 
it for his fame, and for the nation of which he was a son, that 
his father's will prevailed in this matter. Seldom has the 
world presented so remarkable a case as this to the view 
of mankind. Great soldiers with scarce an exception have 
passionately desired to become soldiers from their ear- 
liest years; but Grant, possessed of military genius of the 
highest order, was a lover of peace and without desire for 
the field and camp. 

Lee chose for himself the life of a soldier. The influ- 
ence of the deeds of illustrious ancestors, some of whom 
had been noted warriors, urged him to win fame and for- 
tune by arms. He had heard and read of them from his 
earliest years. Powerful friends easily obtained for him an 
appointment to West Point Academy. The most honorable 
profession that could be chosen by the prominent families 
of Virginia was his choice. The rich found it a pleasant 
position, adding honor to their wealth. The poorer found it 
a support where pride was not compelled to stoop to manual 
labor for bread. To Lee, this life served a double purpose, 




GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE. 



38 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

By some means, his family had become reduced in wealth 
till it was at times in sore straits. By becoming a soldier, 
he was able to support himself and keep up his honorable 
name. The national government bears the expenses of 
those it trains for use in the army, requiring only a few 
years of service from them in return. How well he after- 
wards repaid the beneficence of his country history has 
shown. But he was one of many, though the greatest per- 
haps, that made a like return. 

Grant and Lee were of nearly equal age when they 

« 

entered school at West Point, though Lee had graduated 
more than ten years, and was in active service before Grant 
began. There were striking contrasts between them; there 
were also many similar qualities. Lee was tall, handsome 
and graceful; Grant was of medium height, plain and awk- 
ward. Lee was among the foremost gallants, a good fellow 
whom every body sought in society; Grant was shy, retiring, 
but well respected and liked by all with whom he associated. 
Neither was profane or vulgar. Grant in particular being 
sensitively pure in this respect. Lee was a nominal member 
of the Episcopal church; Grant was a member of no church 
then, though he always held God in reverence, and after- 
wards became a member of the Methodist church. Both 
were temperate, Grant making little or no use of intox- 
icants, and Lee drinking nothing stronger than wines. 
Neither gambled or was extravagant. It would be hard to 
find two, rising from different circumstances, so unlike in 
training and composition, yet so pure morally and so well 
endowed with genius of the first order. 

Fresh from the country when he entered the Academy 
(1839), Grant was ignorant of polite manners and became 
an object of ridicule to his more polished companions. But 



GRANT AT WEST POINT. 39 

he was not averse to using the weapons Nature had provided 
him, and his sturdy limbs, tough muscles and hard knuckles 
soon won for him peace and respect. Being utterly with- 
out fear, he could not be in the least intimidated. Position 
being established, he turned his attention to his duties. It 
soon became manifest wherein lay his power. He was not 
good at minute matters contained in his instruction, and did 
not learn readily that which required the special aid of 
memory; but those things which required deep thought and 
study and the scrutiny of a clear judgment were his best 
fields. He could not give attention to matters that did not 
interest his mind and call for thought and reasoning, though 
he could, if by exerting his will, he brought himself to the 
task, master any subject. He, therefore, became more pro- 
ficient in such branches as mathematics, strategy and tac- 
tics, than in others. He won good grades in all and excel- 
lent in those that interested him. In recitations he trusted 
as much to his reason and sense to frame answers to ques- 
tions as to the remembrance of his texts. Much of his 
time was spent in the library connected with the school. 
He enjoyed the company of a good author far more than 
that of sportive companions. History, biography and fic- 
tion were eagerly devoured by his mind until now never 
treated to the luxury of genuine books. He derived great 
benefit from this promiscuous reading. His views were 
widened, his ideas were fashioned, and he was taught by the 
experience of others. Thus two years passed. Then he 
became ambitious to be a teacher, and applied himself with 
great diligence to his studies, especially to mathematics. 
The time he had lost during the first years was hard to 
redeem; and, w^hen at the end he stood with the others for 
examination, he did not head his class. But during these 



40 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

last two years of study, he became more interested in his 
work and more ambitious to win distinction in his profes- 
sion. Of the soldiers of that day he most admired Scott. 
From him he afterwards learned some valuable lessons. 

When Lee became a student at West Point (1825), he at 
once assumed a high place among his fellows. Zealous, 
quick to learn, possessed of a good memory and of a pleas- 
ing address, he soon stood near the head of his class and 
won favor with his teachers. He had not that backwoods 
awkwardness to overcome that attended Grant's entrance 
to school. He did not have to win peace and position by 
force of arms; they were his by birth. The four years he 
spent there were pleasantly and profitably employed. 
Unfortunately little is known of his life at that time beyond 
the general facts that he was a student of merit and was 
liked and respected by all that knew him. He gave special 
attention to the study of engineering, becoming quite pro- 
ficient in that line. In after years his knowledge of this 
branch made him one of the greatest generals to operate in 
the defensive that have ever lived. 

As there was a marked contrast between the zeal which 
each manifested in the work at West Point, so there was a 
contrast between the respective grades that Grant and Lee 
received at graduation. For Grant was numbered twenty- 
three, the middle of his class, while Lee won the second 
place, almost the head. These places were gained on gen- 
eral average of merit marks, though both would have stood 
better on special studies. There may have been favor- 
itism in the matter as some have suggested, since West 
Point was in those days not entirely free from that reproach; 
but, on the whole, one may judge fairly the interest that 
each took in his work from the results of this test. After 



grant's modesty. 41 

the final examination came the choice of arms. Grant, 
because of his love for horses, desired to be enrolled in the 
cavalry; but that arm of the service was a favorite among 
the cadets, and more favored men filled the offices. He 
became a second lieutenant in the 4th infantry. Lee, fol- 
lowing his inclination, was given a second lieutenancy in the 
Engineer Corps. The novices were well started on their 
career. 

With their commissions the young soldiers received a 
furlough, and Grant availed himself of the opportunity to 
visit his parents. It would naturally be expected that he 
would be conceited and vain, as many graduates, even of 
civil colleges, are; but what conceit he had was soon lost. 
For the boys of his former acquaintance made such sport of 
him as he rode about for the first time in his uniform, with 
its showy stripes and buttons, that he entertained a sudden 
disgust to wearing it and at once donned citizen's clothes. 
Nor ever afterwards, unless necessity compelled him, would 
he wear a uniform, and he became noted for the extreme 
simplicity of his dress, wearing no better than the private 
soldiers he commanded. To pose before the public, to gain 
the admiration of the fair, and to be thought handsome and 
heroic — such it is said have always been the desires of the 
soldier, till a soldier's vanity has become a proverb. Grant 
had little of that vanity. He was, perhaps, too modest and 
sensitive for his own comfort. For on more than one occa- 
sion he was placed in a position where assertiveness would 
have closed the mouths of liars that defamed him. He was 
glad when his furlough came to an end. The old home and 
companions were not the same as before to him. He had 
become used to the army. Its surroundings were congenial 
to his nature. He rejoined his regiment, which was then 



42 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

on garrison duty at St. Louis, Missouri, and remained there 
some months. Here, in the gay and dissipated life of a 
state metropolis, where many young soldiers contracted 
ruinous habits, he kept himself aloof from evil associations 
and immoral practices. His strict morality was known 
and respected by all. One hurtful habit alone he learned 
and retained — that of smoking tobacco. The cigar was his 
favorite companion, and its excessive use, it is thought, led 
to the disease from which he died. The soldier's life is one 
of danger and temptation; but Grant was fortunate in escap- 
ing without a wound and without a fall. 

Lee also availed himself of the customary furlough to 
visit his mother and friends. He was eager to enjoy the 
pleasures of rest and recreation. A round of fetes and 
parties was given him, at which, with natural vanity, he 
appeared in full uniform, and was lionized to an extent fully 
warranted by his position and personal beauty. The aristo- 
cratic circle in which he moved, far from ridiculing him, as 
did the democratic friends of Grant their hero, were proud 
of him and the excellent record he had made. Great things 
were said to be in store for him. It was with regret that he 
returned to the service at the end of his furlough. He was 
employed first upon the sea-coast defences and afterwards 
in surveying the channel and rapids of the Mississippi 
River. Later the works near Washington, the Capital, New 
York Harbor, and at Fortress Monroe, received his atten- 
tion. Many years of useful employment were in this way 
rendered the Government byliim before Grant had entered 
the academy. 

Courtship is the poetic period of man's life. The tender 
passion, the chief theme of poets and novelists, old, yet ever 
new, demands for itself everything or nothing. By its 



MARRIAGES OF GRANT AND LEE. 43 

power men are mightily influenced either for good or for 
evil; it drags them down or it aids them to ascend the hill 
of fame. Felicitous marriages have made many great who 
would otherwise, perhaps, have remained obscure; infe- 
licitous marriages have often made the good bad and the 
bad worse. The constant association of two souls, each of 
which continually imbibes the spirit of the other, serves to 
strengthen or weaken both. Fortunately for them, Grant 
and Lee both made happy marriages, associating them- 
selves with refined, good women, who in no way proved 
drags to them, but in many ways aided them in their upward 
courses to the heights they attained. Their homes were 
happy, and their children proved an honor to them. Grant, 
while stationed at St. Louis, became acquainted with an 
excellent young lady, Julia Dent, daughter to a merchant of 
that city. He has written, very modestly and somewhat 
naively, of his quiet, pleasant courtship, leading to marriage 
a few years later. The marriage proved to be a very con- 
genial union, and several children sprang therefrom, some 
of whom have occupied honorable positions in the service of 
the Republic. Throughout his eventful life, Grant's home 
was a quiet retreat to which he could retire from the labors 
of the day. His wife often accompanied him with the 
army, and his eldest son, Frederick, shared some of his 
hardest marches. 

Lee married earlier in life than Grant. While yet a 
student at West Point he became acquainted with Mary 
Custis, granddaughter to the wife of Washington, an 
heiress of great wealth; and, though her parents thought 
she might marry a richer man, he won her promise. The 
marriage happened a short time after his graduation, and 
proved to be, in all respects, a happy one. Several children 



44 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

were born to them, one of whom became quite prominent in 
the Rebellion, and afterwards in the politics of his native 
state. Lee was an affectionate husband and father. The 
marriage, a most brilliant affair, made him the manager of 
a large estate and the master of many slaves. It also very 
greatly increased his influence and importance, since the 
descendants of the family of Washington were looked upon 
with almost as much worship as the royalties of Europe 
receive. 

During the years between his graduation and the Mexican 
War, Grant saw no active service. Unlike Lee, who be- 
longed to an arm of the service that was used in peace as 
well as war, he had nothing to do beyond the duties of camp 
life. This life was monotonous in the extreme. He sought 
to lighten it by making excursions on horseback in the 
surrounding country, by studying, with a view to becoming 
a teacher of mathematics at West Point, a position which 
had been promised him, and by writing a sort of commentary 
of his daily life, of the times and the men of the day, and of 
those things which particularly impressed him. Unfor- 
tunately for those who study him, this composition has been 
lost; but. it indicates that he was of a contemplative nature 
and of a literary turn. The Mexican War interfered with 
his plan of becoming a teacher. 

Meanwhile Lee was engaged on the work heretofore 
mentioned, a work of great benefit to the people. There is 
but meager record of his actions up to the Mexican War, 
which called him, too, into active service; but it is enough 
to show that he became a practical engineer of great skill 
by reason of long experience. He kept no record of his 
life, having no love for the fine art of composition. His 
was a life of pleasant work, and having, by a fortunate 



CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR. 45 

marriage, placed himself beyond want, he had as yet no 
incentive to extraordinary exertions to support himself. He 
cared little for politics, preferring to be known only as a 
soldier. 

Now came a war which proved to Grant and Lee a better 
school for their professional education than was West Point. 
To the Mexican war perhaps, is due the fact that the Rebell- 
ion found an experienced soldier to lead its greatest army, 
and the Union found a finished general to lead its troops to 
continuous successes. It will be necessary, properly to un- 
derstand this war and its connection with the Rebellion, 
briefly to review its causes. Texas was formerly a part of 
Mexico. By a decree made during the early part of the 
present century, the Mexican Government offered great 
inducements and advantages to all immigrants who would 
settle in Texas and the adjoining territory. The purpose 
was to populate that extensive and fertile region with a vig- 
orous race which would improve its resources. The scheme 
was successful beyond the Government's hopes and wishes. 
Sturdy people from the United States flocked thither in 
great numbers, taking their ideas, which were not at all 
favorable to their adopted country, with them. They enter- 
tained a great contempt for the Mexicans, a mixed race of 
Spaniards and Indians who were yet bound down under the 
oppressive customs of Europe, and a greater contempt for 
the weak government of the country, torn and tossed about 
by factions, comparing it with the stable government of the 
United States. Contempt soon ripened into disobedience, 
and quarrels arose between the local and national authori- 
ties. The Texans rebelled; and, after a war noted for its 
ferocity and barbarism, having captured Santa Anna, the 
Mexican President, they compelled him to acknowledge, as 



46 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

President, their independence. The Mexican Government 
did not accede with good grace to this arrangement. It 
was willing to recognize the independence of the new state, 
which took the euphonius title of "The Lone Star Repub- 
lic," but claimed that its boundary was marked on the south 
by the Nueces river, while the new nation claimed the Rio 
Grande river to be the boundary. The territory between 
those rivers, a part of the old State of Coahuila, was thus 
claimed by both, the one on the ground that it had seceded 
with Texas, the other, that it had not. 

Such was the situation when the Lone Star Republic 
petitioned the United States to be admitted to the Union as 
a state. Mexico was not at all willing that its larger 
neighbor should absorb territory which it was not able to 
retain and title to which it had not wholly relinquished, 
though Santa Anna, while a prisoner, had been compelled 
to grant the insurgents independence. Notice was given 
that the passage of the bill granting admission would 
be tantamount to a declaration of war. The great parties 
in the United States at that time, the Whig and the Demo- 
cratic, or, in other words, the Anti-Slavery and the Pro- 
Slavery parties, chose sides on the question of admission, 
the one against and the other for, and cast the solution into 
the election for President that was shortly to take place 
(1844). These parties were straining every nerve to 
increase their power by capturing, politically, new territory. 
Whether slavery should be restricted to the states which 
were now in its possession, or whether the territories from 
which new states were being constantly formed should 
remain free from the evil, was the question on either side of 
which the political forces were rallied. The people who 
had settled Texas were chiefly from the slave states and 




GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT 



48 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

had taken their slaves v^rith them. Indeed, their determin- 
ation to retain their slaves in defiance of the Mexican 
Government, which had not permitted slavery to exist 
within its jurisdiction, had been one of the causes of the 
Texan Rebellion. If the new state should be admitted to 
the Union, the Pro-Slavists, or Democrats, would have a 
vast advantage over their opponents. Consequently, the 
campaign carried on by the parties, with the admission as 
an issue, was very bitter. The Democrats, despite the fact 
that Mexico was threatening war, won the victory, and their 
nominee, James K. Polk, was elected. The annexation, or 
admission, bill was at once passed, and received the Presi- 
dent's signature. Texas became a member of the Union. 
The Mexican Legate at once demanded passports and 
left the country, thus closing all friendly relations between 
his Government and the United States. As one of the chief 
grievances of the Mexican Government was that the annex- 
ation of Texas embraced the territory between the Nueces 
and the Rio Grande rivers, the United States Executive, 
having gained the new state, offered to negotiate a settle- 
ment. But the haughty Mexicans refused to submit their 
claims to arbitration and made threats. Thereupon Presi- 
dent Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to assemble an 
army in Texas to overawe them. The Mexicans also sent 
troops to their frontiers. Thus was a war roused, the first, 
if the least, that the evil of slavery brought upon the United 
States. It was an unjust war in many respects, and yet the 
Mexicans were to blame as well as the Americans. It was 
the beginning of the final conflict between the genii of 
liberty and slavery, the beginning of the end. 

General Winfield Scott was at this time the chief officer 
in the United States Army. He was a Whig, a prominent 



FIRST CONFLICT 49^ 

man and a probable candidate for the Presidency. It was 
the aim of the administration to guard against the possi- 
bility of his popularity increasing to an extent dangerous to 
its political existence. He was not allowed, therefore, to 
lead the Army of Occupation into Texas, lest success there 
would raise his fame. That honor was given to General 
Taylor, who, though a Whig, was not then a possible can- 
didate. He was ordered to assemble his command at Cor- 
pus Christi, a town near the mouth of the Nueces. Taylor 
at once issued the order and was engaged during the winter 
(1845-6) in gathering his forces. In January, by order, he 
advanced his troops to Point Isabel, a place on the gulf 
coast in the disputed territory, and there established a depot 
for supplies. He then advanced to the Rio Grande, and, at 
a point opposite Matamoras, erected a small earthen fort- 
ress, named afterwards Fort Brown. A few days later 
(April 26), Arista, the Mexican in command of the troops 
of his Government near by, notified Taylor that he might 
consider hostilities begun. On the same day, a force of 
Mexican troops attacked a scouting party of American 
dragoons, killed or wounded sixteen of them, and captured 
the remainder. This was the first blood shed, and was caused 
by the Mexicans. So began a conflict remarkable only for 
the uninterrupted series of successes that attended the 
American arms. 

Grant's regiment was one of those ordered to attend 
Taylor, and was first stationed at Camp Salubrity, so called 
from its healthful location, a place on the eastern border of 
Texas. When the order came to proceed to Corpus Christi, 
the regiment went by way of New Orleans on board ship to 
that point. As a Whig, Grant was opposed to the war, con- 
sidering it unjust and impolitic; as a soldier, he believed it, 
4 



50 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

his duty to follow his leaders, and felt pride in the achieve- 
ments of the armies. His first duty in the field was to 
accompany a detachment of troops escorting an army pay- 
master to San Antonio, Texas, where a small force was 
stationed. He then became acquainted with a few of the 
hardships incident to a soldier's life in the field. Sleeping 
on the ground with no other covering than a blanket, eat- 
ing a soldier's hard but substantial fare, and taking his turn 
at the various duties, he began his practical training. 
Upon his return, he found himself promoted to the full rank 
of second lieutenant from the brevet, and that he had been 
assigned to the Seventh Regiment. He requested to be 
returned to the Fourth, however, and his wish was allowed. 
The first blood having been shed by the Mexicans, Tay- 
lor resolved to prosecute the war with vigor. Leaving three 
hundred men under Major Brown at the fortress he had 
built on the Rio Grande, he returned with the remainder of 
his army to Point Isabel, a distance of twenty-one miles, to 
bring up supplies sufficient to enable him to march into the 
enemy's country. The Mexicans at once took advantage of 
this movement and laid siege to the fort, at the same time 
putting their army between it and Taylor. The siege was 
vigorously pressed and as gallantly resisted. The heavy 
boom of the cannonade rolled across the plain and came to 
Taylor's ears. He hastened to return to the fort. His 
army numbered less than three thousand men, a small force 
to attempt the invasion of a large country; but it was well 
disciplined and commanded. Grant now for the first time 
heard the sound of hostile cannon, and felt that dread, for 
the first and only time, which the young soldier feels when 
in the presence of an enemy. He has said that he wished 
himself on the old farm whence his parents had sent him 



PALO ALTO 51 

forth. Nevertheless, he was eager for the battle to come, 
and was as cool as any of his comrades. He had no fear. 
The bravest men are not the most insensible. The veteran 
only is able to face death in battle without a qualm. 

The Mexicans, six thousand strong, left Fort Brown, when 
they learned that Taylor was coming, advanced to a place 
called Palo Alto, and there drew up in battle array to inter- 
cept him (May 8) . Their position was quite strong. Tay- 
lor's army soon appeared with proud step and flying banners 
and drew up in battle line. It was a time for dread, a battle 
of great moment in the eyes of young, inexperienced 
soldiers like Grant, but only a skirmish compared with the 
battles that he should later see. The opponents were armed 
with flint-lock muskets and a few inferior cannon, and the 
Mexicans also had spears and lances. Only in number and 
valor did they differ. Their fighting qualities were displayed 
for the most part at a distance, artillery being used. In this 
kind of battle, the Americans had the advantage of better 
guns and artillerymen, and inflicted double the loss upon 
their opponents that they themselves sustained. After five 
hours of cannonading the Mexicans retreated, leaving 
Taylor's army in possession of the field. The latter did not 
pursue at once, its leader having no desire to bring his raw 
troops into too close quarters with an enemy at the begin- 
ning, — a wise precaution. The easy victory increased the 
ardor of the soldiers, while the loss of fifty men killed and 
wounded gave them a sight of the horrors of war. On the 
following day the Americans advanced, and soon came 
upon their enemy at a place named Resaca de la Palma, 
about three miles from Fort Brown. Here the Mexicans 
had intrenched themselves along the west side of a deserted 
river-bed where formerly the Rio Grande flowed, but which 



52 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

was now thickly grown over with tall grass and underbrush. 
Their position was strong. The battle, as on the preceding 
day, began with an artillery duel, the Mexican guns being 
served with better effect than before, and galling the Ameri- 
cans severely. Taylor presently ordered his cavalry under 
Captain May to charge the enemy's batteries, and his army 
to follow with a charge along the whole line. The charge 
of the cavalry was brilliantly executed. The Mexican gun- 
ners were sabered, and La Vega, their commander, was 
captured. The Mexican army thereupon became demora- 
lized and fled, not waiting to cross bayonets with Taylor's 
infantry. Grant, in the absence of his superior officer, who 
had been detailed to lead a reconnoitering party, was in 
command of the company during the greater part of the 
battle, and led it in the final charge, capturing some pris- 
oners. His position during the day was on the right wing 
of the army, not exposed to the brunt of the battle, though 
the company was obliged to lie on the ground to escape the 
enemy's shot. The Mexicans retreated across the Rio 
Grande, leaving their artillery and many small arms in the 
hands of the victors. The latter encamped that night 
around Fort Brown. 

After these contests the Government of the United 
States declared war against Mexico, on the ground that the 
latter had shed American blood upon American soil. 
Three armies were then placed in the field to operate, one 
under Kearney in the west, another under Scott in the 
south, and a third, Taylor's army of occupation, in the center. 
While the two former were making ready and getting to 
their positions, the latter was actively invading the enemy's 
country, occupying Matamoras on the south side of the Rio 
Grande, and pushing on toward the strong city of Mon- 



MONTEREY. 53 

terey, to which the opposing army had retired. Reinforce- 
ments swelled Taylor's army to the number of six thousand 
men. It was brought part by land and part by water to 
Camargo, thence by a slow march to Walnut Springs, three 
miles from Monterey where a camp was formed (19th Sept., 
1845). Grant was detailed to act as Quartermaster at 
Camargo, and remained such during the campaign. His 
position was by no means a pleasant or inactive one, be- 
cause of the difficulty of handling the long trains of wagons 
and pack-mules which carried the army supplies. He 
proved however to be a valuable officer in this duty. 

The defences of Monterey consisted of a large fortress 
of stone called the Bishop's Palace, which stood on an 
eminence at the west side, a fort, called by some the Black 
Fort, in the plain at the north side, and various fortifications 
on the east, and also the houses on the city's outskirts were 
barricaded and occupied by troops. Taylor found himself 
confronted with a problem similar to that which Cortez had 
met several centuries before at Mexico, and the battle that 
was here fought was a street fight similar to some that the 
doughty warrior of old experienced. Ten thousand Mexi- 
cans commanded by General Ampudia, garrisoned the city, 
resolved to hold it against six thousand Americans. Tay- 
lor was not at all daunted by the strength of the place 
or the number of its defenders. He carefully studied the 
situation and decided to make the main assault against 
the west side defences, at the same time to attack on 
the north and east. The regiment to which Grant be- 
longed was placed at the north side to assault the Black 
Fort. Here during the night, a battery was established 
in the plain before the fort, supported by the regiment. 
Morning came and the thunder of cannon ushered in the 



54 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEB. 

Strife. It was Grant's duty, as quartermaster, to stay 
with the trains, but the sound of battle aroused his mili- 
tary ardor so that he did not resist the impulse to go 
into the fight with his comrades. Mounted on a horse, he 
rode at the head of the regiment, when, at the order for a 
general assault, it moved out against the fort. The Ameri- 
can right wing fiercely assaulted the stone fortress at the 
west side, the Bishop's Palace, and captured it after a 
gallant struggle. It then swept into the city driving the 
enraged Mexicans before it. Then the centre and left wing 
also pressed forward. It was the object of all to reach the 
central square usually known as the Plaza, but it was no 
easy matter to do this, as every house was filled with ene- 
mies who used the roofs as parapets, from which only the 
most persistent efforts could force them. Grant joined in 
the rush across the plain toward the Black Fort, the only 
man on horseback, a conspicuous target for the enemies' 
bullets, but was not harmed. The regiment was not able 
to charge directly across the plain against the fire of the 
fort's cannon, but veered to the left to avoid it. Twiggs' 
Division had succeeded in effecting a lodgment within the 
defences at the northeast of the city, and the regiment 
joined him. When night came it found the Americans in 
possession of all the outworks of the defences. But the 
battle was not yet done. A desultory fire of skirmishers 
was kept up during the night. The troops slept on their 
arms. The Mexicans during the night strengthened their 
barricades. 

At daylight next morning the battle was resumed. The 
method of fighting was peculiar. The invaders pushed their 
way slowly along the streets converging to the Plaza, halt- 
ing at every house to break down the doors and barricades 



MONTEREY. 55 

and to fight their way up narrow stairs to the roof and there 
to engage in a hand to hand struggle with the defenders. 
Piles of sand-bags' on the flat roofs served to screen the 
Mexicans, who from behind them poured a hail of bullets 
upon their enemies. Bayonets, swords, spears and stones, 
were freely used. The shouts of combatants, the intermit- 
tent rattle of small arms and the crash and roar of cannon- 
ade sounded throughout the devoted town, the advancing 
or retreating of either party known to the other only by the 
noise. A cloud of smoke floated up and lay like a pall over 
the city. The heroic assailants slowly but surely forced 
their way to the Plaza. The regiment with which Grant 
fought all day, discovered, after it had almost reached the 
objective point, that its ammunition was about to fail. Re- 
treat was not to be thought of, since, as the Mexicans had 
re-occupied the barricaded houses after the Americans had 
passed on it was almost as dangerous to retreat as to stand 
still and much more demoralizing. In the emergency, a vol- 
unteer was called for to hasten to General Twiggs and 
inform him of the danger. Grant promptly offered to go, 
and as he was well mounted he was ordered to undertake 
the task. He knew it would be a dangerous ride, but did 
not hesitate. His magnificent horsemanship stood him in 
good service. Clasping one arm around his horse's neck 
and clinging with one leg over its back, he threw his body 
on one side of the animal and protected in this manner, 
rode at full speed along the streets, while hundreds of bul- 
lets were fired at him from either side. He reached Twiggs 
in safety and delivered the message. Haste was made to 
collect ammunition and supports were hurried forward. 
These found the regiment retreating but quickly changed 
the movement, and presently the Plaza was reached. This 



56 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

act of Grant was one of great bravery and was important 
to the success of the battle. The Americans fought their 
way to the Plaza, drove the Mexicans from the batteries 
placed there and turned the captured guns against the city. 
The Mexican Commander seeing that he was beaten and 
that the city was about to be destroyed, made haste to sur- 
render. The victory was won. 

General Scott, having at last been ordered to assume 
command in Mexico, hastened to gather an army to invade 
that country from a new point, yet not new, if it be remem- 
bered that Cortez attacked at the same point. Taylor's 
fame had grown too great for his welfare with his superiors 
whose political success was thereby endangered. He was 
already being pushed forward as Whig candidate for the 
presidency at the next general election. Scott, whose right 
to the command in the field was highest, was therefore now 
given command in order that Whig might oppose Whig in 
popularity, and neither grow too great. Scott at once 
ordered his troops to assemble near Vera Cruz and with- 
drew all Taylor's supports from Texas and a part of the 
troops from the Army of Occupation. Taylor was thus left 
with a small army to oppose any invasion that might be 
attempted toward Texas; but with this small force he won a 
hard-fought battle at Buena Vista. Grant was among those 
drawn from Taylor's army, and Lee was with General Wool, 
who, at San Antonio, Texas, had been engaged in forward- 
ing troops to Taylor, but who with others, was ordered to 
join Scott at Vera Cruz. Thus both came to be in the same 
army. This army, when finally concentrated before Vera 
Cruz, contained about twelve thousand troops. It was a small 
force for the great work laid out for it to perform, but all 
the men were brave and well disciplined, and the people 



VERA CRUZ. 57 

to be attacked were without either competent leaders or 
warlike spirit. 

The city of Vera Cruz was protected by a wall, which, 
reaching from the shore of the sea above to the same below 
around on the land side, inclosed it. On the water side was 
an ancient castle, San Juan de Ulloa, armed with old- 
fashioned guns, and little able to resist the arts of modern 
warfare. Scott landed his army (gth March, 1847) south of 
the city, and marching up, spread his lines around the wall, 
at the distance of eight hundred yards from it, and in- 
trenched. The American fieet moved up, and closed the 
sea, and the doomed city was entirely surrounded. Scott 
placed his batteries and bombarded the town for three days, 
raining a terrible storm of shot and shell upon its defences. 
Grant's duties were not more special than the other officers 
of his rank, and consisted mainly in holding himself in 
readiness to act on an emergency. Lee, being an engineer, 
was very useful in placing batteries and marking out the 
lines of circumvallation, and was honorably mentioned later 
by General Scott, who was his personal friend. Stone walls 
and battlements, designed to protect combatants from 
arrows and other weapons of ancient warfare, could not 
long resist the blows of Scott's artillery. The city sur- 
rendered with five thousand prisoners and four hundred 
cannon. The first step in the march to Mexico was suc- 
cessful. This was Grant's second lesson in the art of 
attacking fortified cities; it was Lee's first lesson in real 
warfare. Grant, though younger than his competitor in 
years, had heretofore seen more field service in war and 
was already a veteran. 

Immediately upon receiving the surrender of Vera Cruz, 
Scott set out toward Jalapa, seventy miles inland, in order 



58 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

that he might penetrate as far as possible into the interior 
before the Mexicans should be able to fortify strong points 
on the road. He left orders that the reinforcements, which 
he expected, should follow in his steps. The army was 
advanced in detachments, each being in supporting distance 
of the other. This was necessary on account of the difficult 
road and the need of making haste. But, in spite of his 
haste, the Mexican general, Santa Anna, reached Jalapa 
first, and took up a strong position at Cerro Gordo, about 
fifteen miles east of that city, in a spur of the Sierra Madre 
mountains, where the road passed through, and threw up 
works. Santa Anna exhibited superior energy in this move- 
ment. Only a few days before he had sustained a severe 
defeat at the hands of Taylor in the battle of Buena Vista, but 
at once, thereafter, accomplished a march of several hundred 
miles to throw himself between Scott and the Capital. 
One almost regrets that he had not the genius or the 
quality of troops to enable him to profit by his celerity. 
His army numbered twenty thousand men, but they had 
been hastily raised and were poorly disciplined. The 
position he had chosen, however, made up for the disparity 
in the quality of the troops. Scott was not daunted either 
by the array of troops, far outnumbering his, or the posi- 
tion that his enemy had taken. He brought his army 
near to the works and halted to reconnoitre. His engi- 
neer corps, an extraordinarily efficient one, was called 
into action. It contained such men as Lee, McClellan and 
Beauregard, who afterwards became famous in the Re- 
bellion. It was ordered to find, or make, a path around the 
right wing of the Mexican position, where the broken 
nature of the hills made it possible to pass. Lee had 
direction of the force that cut a path along which, with 



JALAPA. 59 

great difficulty, several cannon were dragged and a body of 
troops was led. This movement was made unperceived by 
the enemy, who supposed that the rugged nature of the 
mountain was a sufficient guard, and had omitted to watch 
in that direction. Therefore, when (i8th April, 1847) Scott 
ordered a general assault along the front of the Mexican 
position, this body of troops, appearing suddenly in the rear, 
threw the Mexicans into such disorder that they could not 
be re-formed, but fled wdth great haste from the field. 
Three thousand prisoners, forty-three bronze cannon and 
many small arms fell into the hands of the victors. So per- 
fectly had Scott's orders been carried out by his lieutenants 
that not one mistake was made, and the result came just as it 
was expected. This battle was an excellent illustration of 
the power of disciplined troops in the hands of a competent 
officer. In its effects, if not in its heroic deeds, this was a 
second Thermopylae, in that it opened to the invaders the 
interior of Mexico. It disheartened the natives and em- 
boldened the Americans. It gave the soldiers with Scott a 
belief that they were invincible. It was to Grant a lesson 
that he never forgot, and he afterwards applied the same 
tactics in more than one battle. To Lee much of the credit 
of the successful execution of the flank movement, which 
really won the day, was due. He, too, did not forget the 
lesson here illustrated. 

Scott did not delay a moment after his victory, but sent 
Worth's division in rapid pursuit of the flying enemy In order 
that he might seize the mountain passes before they could 
be fortified. Worth marched with little opposition to 
Perote and occupied that city without trouble. The Mexi- 
cans were too demoralized to offer resistance. Here the 
army was concentrated, and thence it descended into the 



60 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

plain. Puebla was found evacuated. Scott halted at this 
great city and awaited reinforcements. His army was much 
reduced by casualties and the expiration of the term of ser- 
vice of many of his troops, who, when they were thus free, 
did not desire to re-enlist but returned home. He found 
himself thus left in the midst of a hostile nation with barely 
five thousand effective men, and had the Mexicans taken 
spirit and fallen upon him like soldiers he could have been 
annihilated. The government at home did not, for politi- 
cal reasons, support him as it should have done. But, for- 
tunately, the Mexicans entertained a wholesome terror of 
meeting the Americans in battle. Two months passed, 
during which the army lived off the country, which being as 
productive as a garden, afforded an excellent subsistence to 
the small force. Grant, as quartermaster, was actively 
engaged in the collection of provisions and often went out 
with large parties. At length five thousand reinforcements 
came and the advance upon Mexico was resumed. The 
capital city contained at least one hundred thousand inhabi- 
tants, besides an army of thirty thousand men. It seemed 
a rash enterprise to lead ten thousand men against such 
multitudes; but the Mexicans were more enervated and 
undisciplined than the Persians of old whom the ten 
thousand Greeks met and conquered. The Americans 
marched in four divisions, with reconnoitreing parties in 
advance and on either side to prevent surprises. The Rio 
Frio mountains were found unguarded. Emerging from 
the pass through them, the army uttered a shout of surprise 
and delight at the beautiful scene which burst upon its view. 
The Mexican valley, with its white city and glassy lakes in 
the midst and its mountain boundaries on every side, was 
as fair as the fabled garden of the gods. It seemed sacri- 



MAP or 

MEXICO CITY 
AHD VIClhlTY 



— ROUTE or u a.AHnv 

f» BATTLES 




1 



62 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

legious to carry war into the peaceful scene. So felt Grant 
and other young and impressible soldiers; but General Scott 
could only turn his lip in contempt for the people who had 
not spirit to defend such a home with their lives, and 
contest every step that invaders took toward it. Hav- 
ing reached Ayotla, on the direct road to the city, Scott 
halted to study the approaches. Mexico, the ancient city 
and the once proud capital of the Montezumas, was not so 
well defended as of old by its lake, the waters of which had 
receded and left it surrounded only by marshes. In those 
ancient days it could only be approached by causeways, but 
at this time, being on the western shore of Lake Texcoco, 
it could be approached by land from the south and on that 
side Scott determined to attack. The Mexican General, 
supposing the invaders would attack along the direct road 
to the city, had strongly fortified that, road and guarded it 
with his best troops. But Scott chose to take a different 
route, and passed around to the southwest of Lake Chalco, 
coming up toward San Augustin, ten miles south of Mexico 
and halted here at the ancient Tlalpam. Santa Anna, thus 
out-flanked, made haste to abandon his works on the direct 
road, and changed front so as to meet his enemy at this 
point. This movement of Scott's was brilliant, and Grant 
in later years executed similar movements at Vicksburg and 
Petersburg, profiting perhaps from the lesson. 

Between the invading army and the city were the strong 
fortifications of Contreros, San Antonio and Churubusco, 
and the Castle of Chapultepec on a rocky height. The 
three first named were at the apices of a natural triangle, 
and within the triangle was the Pedregal, a space of volcanic 
tumuli, covered with rocks and rent into deep chasms and 
gullies. A horse could not pass over it, much less an army 



CONTREROS. 63 

with its impediments. Contreros was at the southwest apex 
of the triangle, a strategic point, which, if taken, would com- 
pel the evacuation of San Antonio. Roads and paths con- 
nected both it and San Antonio with Churubusco. It was a 
position of great strength, being almost unapproachable by 
an army. A precipitous mountain guarded the rear, and as 
it was on a table land rising abruptly from the plain of the 
Pedregal, the volcanic field guarded it in front. General 
Valencia with six thousand men held the position. Scott 
determined to reach this place at all hazards, believing that, 
on account of its secure situation, it would not be guarded 
as closely as was San Antonio in his immediate front. The 
aid of his engineers was called for, and they were directed 
to find, if possible, a way across the Pedregal. The attempt 
was at once made, and though the natural difficulties of the 
field were increased by the darkness of night, it being 
necessary to operate there by night to succeed in the under- 
taking, a way was found, and an assaulting column was led 
across and ranged in front of the works, ready to assault at 
daybreak ( igth Aug.) The column arrived at its position 
about midnight, and Lee undertook to carry ^back word to 
Scott that the movement was successful. The night was 
rainy and intensely dark, and it required no small courage 
in one to accomplish the task, but he arrived safely at Scott's 
head-quarters and reported. A simultaneous assault was 
therefore made upon Contreros and San Antonio. At day- 
light, before the Mexicans were aware of their danger, 
Smith's gallant men burst over the fortifications at Con- 
treros, and in seventeen minutes captured the works with 
their guns, scattering Valencia's terrified men like chaff. 
Worth, at San Antonio, found more difficulty, as the enemy 
were alert and ready to resist his attack; but when the 



64 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Mexican general heard of the disaster at Contreros he 
ordered a retreat upon Churubusco. The garrison did not 
retire, however, without being sharply assaulted, and finally 
routed, by the Americans. Grant was with Worth on this 
day, and had his part in the battles. Lee was occupied as one 
of Scott's staff. No delay was allowed. The two divisions 
of Scott's army, from San Antonio and Contreros, were 
directed by converging roads upon Churubusco, where 
the whole Mexican army was drawn up in array prepared for 
a general battle. The two columns of Americans had some 
difficulty to form a junction in the face of the enemy, but 
finally accomplished this, and a bloody battle was fought. 
The Mexican troops redeemed themselves on this field 
from the imputation of cowardice which their easy defeats 
had formerly brought upon them. Having twice as many men 
as their assailants, they might have won the victory if Santa 
Anna had properly directed them. As it was, they stub- 
bornly held every position for hours, and resisted the fierce 
onslaught of Scott's maddened troops. But the steady valor 
and persistent assaults of the latter finally won. Pillow's 
division of the Americans, though with great loss, broke the 
right wing of the Mexican army, and drove it in confusion 
from the field. At the same time Twiggs' division stormed 
the heights in its front, and the field was won. Santa Anna 
hurried up reinforcements and sought to drive back the 
victors, but these were quickly broken and forced to retreat. 
Santa Anna then hurriedly fell back, and gathered the con- 
fused masses of his army around the stronghold of Chapul- 
tepec and its outwork, Molino del Rey, the sole defensive 
work -between the enemy and his capital. Thirty thousand 
men had been defeated on this fatal day by ten thousand; 
but, except in the last and chief battle, that great body, in 



MOLINO DEL REY 65 

its separate parts, had suffered defeat in detail. The blows 
struck by Scott were so rapid that no time was given his 
opponent for concentration. Grant and Lee, at Vicksburg 
and Cliancellorsville, profited by the example here set before 
them. Three battles won in a day could the old general 
in command boast. 

Santa Anna was wily, if not a genius. He now demanded 
and obtained a truce, with the object, apparently, of nego- 
tiating a peace, but in reality to gain time to get his troops 
in fighting order and strengthen his defences. He demanded 
terms due only to a victor as a condition of granting peace. 
Scott contemptuously rejected his offers, and, perceiving his 
purpose, abruptly broke off the truce by giving notice that 
hostilities would be resumed. Chapultepec Fortress was a 
precipitous hill, which rose one hundred and fifty feet above 
the surrounding plain. It was fortified at every available 
point of its rock}' sides, and was crowned by an ancient 
castle. Heavy batteries had been placed so that their guns 
guarded ever^^ approach. Near it was a large stone struc- 
ture which had been used as a mill, but which now, with 
fortifications on either side, was a strong fort. Scott, in order 
that he might assault the heights of Chapultepec with 
greater ease, resolved to attack Alolino del Rey, as this mill 
was named, first, and ordered Worth's division to do this 
work. Grant was thus given an opportunity to participate 
in the bloodiest struggle of the war. The troops were 
moved into position at night (8th September) , and early 
next morning rushed to the assault. At once the batteries 
at the mill and the guns from the heights above poured 
upon the assailants a storm of shot, and ere they touched 
the works one-fourth of their number were stricken to the 
earth. But they reached the mill, poured over the works, 
5 



66 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and, after a short, sharp fight, drove the defenders headlong 
out. Grant was one among the first to face the hail of 
death and to enter the mill. He received the surrender of 
a part of the Mexicans that could not escape. Scott turned 
the guns of the captured works towards the heights, and 
having established other batteries, bombarded Chapultepec 
four days. But the bombardment had little effect on the 
rock-bound hill. An assault was ordered and brilliantly 
executed. The Americans were irresistible. The Mexicans 
fled hastily into the city, leaving parties at various points to 
retard their pursuers. Lee was wounded at the storming of 
the heights, and was not able to take part in the closing 
operations. Grant had no part in that struggle other than 
supporting the storming party. Scott made no delay, but 
pressed relentlessly toward the city gates. The batteries 
placed along the causeways were carried successively; the 
various detachments supporting them were either captured 
or driven in haste to the gates, and night saw a part of the 
invading force established in the suburbs of the capital. 
Grant distinguished himself in a remarkable manner dur- 
ing this pursuit. At one point, by an adroit movement, he 
led a small company of men to the rear of a battery and cap- 
tured it. At another point he noticed that a certain work 
near the San Cosme gate was galling the Americans con- 
siderably, and taking a small cannon, with a few men to aid, 
into the belfry of a church near by, from that commanding 
position directed such effectual fire upon the force in the 
work that it fled. The cannon was then turned upon the 
San Cosme gate, and aided materially in driving its de- 
fenders back into the city. General Worth, perceiving the 
remarkable effect produced by this airy battery, was well 
pleased, and having sent for the young officer, complimented 



THE TERMS OF PEACE. 67 

him, and placed an entire company, with its captain, under 
his command. Within the five days after the fight at 
Molino del Rey, Grant was twice breveted for gallantry. 

During the night Santa Anna and the Mexican Govern- 
ment fled from the city. Scott took possession next day and 
established martial law. Thus ended a war notable only for 
the constant success that attended the arms of the one side 
and the reverses that as constantly befell the other. After 
some time spent in negotiations, a treaty of peace, honorable 
to both nations, was concluded. The United States obtained 
possession of the territory in dispute, and acquired by cession 
an immense territory further west, reaching to the Pacific 
Ocean and along its shores northward, establishing the 
present boundaries. In consideration of this loss Mexico 
received a large sum of money and the permission of the 
victor to retain the rest of her territory. Thus the pro- 
slavists triumphed, and rejoiced in the fact that they had 
acquired an immense tract from which to carve out many 
future slave states. Yet a result not calculated upon came 
from the war. Taylor, by his victories, had won himself so 
much renown, and in the midst of his victorious career had 
been stopped so unjustly, that he had become an idol to the 
people. He was nominated for president at the next general 
election and easily elected. 

No better school could have been found for young 
soldiers than the Mexican war. Grant, especially, seems to 
have derived great benefit from this experience. He served 
under two generals, each of a different temperament. 
Taylor was a man of great simplicity, and in this respect 
was well liked by the young soldier. Scott was a man of 
more pompous manners, yet possessed of great military 
knowledge. Taylor passed over the small details of army 



68 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

command, looking only at the essential things. Scott was 
exact in every detail, and demanded of his subordinates 
that they be as exact as himself. Both were good com- 
manders and never at loss on the field. Grant preferred 
Taylor as a commander, perhaps, because he was much like 
him in disposition. Lee was a friend of Scott, and his 
ardent admirer. Through him the young soldier's qualities 
were duly rewarded, both by praise and promotion. Both 
Grant and Lee profited by the practical lessons received 
from Scott. The maxims they had learned from text-books 
were here illustrated as in no other way could they have 
been. 

Grant was promoted to a first-lieutenancy at the City of 
Mexico. He was then but twenty-five years old. He had 
taken part in all but one of the great battles of the war, and 
deserved a higher grade; but, as the casualties had been 
few among the officers of the army, there were few openings 
for promotion. Nor did he have any influential friends near 
the commander, much less a friend in the commander him- 
self, to obtain promotion for him. He rose on his own merits 
exclusively. No one can ever say of him that powerful 
friends won for him his advancement. Lee, on the other 
hand, while he deserved all the promotion he received, was 
especially fortunate in having the chief commander for a 
friend. At Cerro Gordo he was breveted major, at Churu- 
busco, lieutenant-colonel, and at Chapultepec he was brev- 
eted colonel. He was justly recognized as one of the most 
promising officers in the army. In the prime of life, hand- 
some and dignified, he was a favorite with his comrades. 

While peace was being discussed between the commis- 
sioners appointed to negotiate by the belligerent powers, 
and the army occupied the capital city, the officers availed 



RAMBLES NEAR MEXICO. 69 

themselves of the opportunity to explore the surrounding 
country, so celebrated in history. So strong was the hand 
of military government established by Scott, that it was said 
the country was never in better order, and robbers were 
never better suppressed. Scott's example in this respect was 
excellent for the instruction of his subordinates. 

Grant and Lee both made wide excursions to celebrated 
points. To Grant's contemplative nature it was a never 
failing source of pleasure to wander alone amongst the ruins 
of a prehistoric civilization. He visited Popocatepetl, and 
ascended its steep sides to some distance. He witnessed a 
bull-fight, and true to his nature which was always sympa- 
thetic toward animals, was so disgusted that he would never 
see another; and, when, many years after, he was visiting 
Mexico, those who would entertain him suggested such an 
exhibition, he refused to allow it. Unnecessary pain, 
whether to beast or man, was never willingly given by him. 
He could see thousands die doing their duty, and not flinch 
from causing their death, however much he felt for them; but 
he could not witness unnecessary slaughter. Lee, too, 
because of his scholarly instincts, enjoyed visiting the noted 
places in this country. He, too, witnessed the barbaric sports 
denominated the national pleasures of Mexicans and Span- 
iards, and, doubtless, he too was disgusted with the cruel 
exhibition. For it is a trait of all truly great men that they 
can not tolerate the infliction of unnecessary pain, or the 
indulgence of brutal instincts. 

The war ended, peace concluded and its mission done, 
the army returned home covered with glory in the eyes of 
the people. The Fourth Infantry, of which Grant was an 
officer, was sent into camp at Pascagoula in the state of 
Mississippi. Grant at once obtained a leave of absence for 



70 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



four months, hastened to St. Louis, and, though he was 
possessed of no other fortune than his commission, married 
the lady of his choice. After his leave had expired he 
returned to the service, and for several years was employed 
doing garrison duty. One year at Sackett's Harbor, New 
York; two years at Detroit, Michigan, and then came a 




grant's home near ST. LOUIS. 

transfer to the Pacific Coast. The regiment went to this 
last named field by the way of the Isthmus of Panama, and 
in crossing the Isthmus suffered much from cholera. Grant, 
as quartermaster, had the brunt of the work to obtain 
transportation across the narrow neck of land separating 



GRANT RESIGNS FROM THE ARMY. 71 

the oceans. He was also left to care for the sick, and 
for a week was so constantly employed that he found no 
time to rest or sleep. This arduous task would have broken 
the health of a less rugged man; but his farm-nurtured body 
withstood the strain. The dread disease did not touch him. 
He was reserved for a nobler fate. 

He was stationed at Fort Vancouver for a time, having 
no more important duties to perform than to watch the 
neighboring Indian tribes. The garrison amused itself with 
gardening, its work being no more exciting. Later (5th July, 
1853), Grant was promoted to a captaincy and stationed at 
Humbolt, California. He was not satisfied, however, to 
remain inactive. He now had two children. His family, 
owing to the remoteness of his post of duty, had been com- 
pelled to remain at St. Louis. It did not seem that any 
further chances for promotion, or an increase of pay, would 
present themselves. His family could not live fairly on the 
slender salary that he was receiving. His country did not 
specially need his services. Other considerations, also, 
induced him to resign his commission and return to civil 
life. He did so (1854) and returned to St. Louis. 

His means were very small to begin the battle for bread 
in a new field; but he went to work earnestly. His wife was 
possessed of a small farm near St. Louis. This he undertook 
to cultivate; but it was no easy task to provide implements 
and stock for this purpose. Fever and ague, a disease very 
common to the Mississippi Valley in those days, laid hold 
upon him and rendered life miserable. He felt the crush- 
ing effects of poverty, but did not despair. The farm not 
being remunerative he turned his attention to real estate 
and collections, and for a time was thus occupied. Then 
his father offered him the position of clerk in his leather 



72 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

Store at Galena, Illinois, upon accepting which he removed 
his family to that city (i860). In this humble occupation 
he remained until the need of his country called him to 
resume the uniform and bear arms in her defence. 

Lee, after the close of the Mexican War, was employed, 
as formerly, in his capacity of engineer. He had charge of 
the defensive works which were being raised at Baltimore, 
Maryland. While there, it is said, he was offered the com- 
mand of an expedition organized by the Cuban League, a 
conspiracy, having for its object the liberation of the Island 
of Cuba from the rule of Spain, to be sent from the United 
States by private parties; but he refused such invidious 
honor. He was appointed Superintendent of West Point 
Academy (Sept., 1852), and remained such three years, 
doing very efficient work. Relieved of his command there, 
he was sent to the frontier in Texas, as brevet colonel 
of the Second Regiment of Cavalry. The Indians were 
troublesome in that section, and he engaged in several com- 
bats with them. His life on the plains was enjoyable, 
mingled excitement and rest. Some of the time he spent 
in surveying and mapping the country. He was in this field 
when the Rebellion called him to other scenes. 

Such was the early training of Grant and Lee. Thus 
were they prepared for the high positions they were des- 
tined to fill. Such were the schools which fashioned their 
genius and characters. Each had seen service enough to fit 
him for a commander of armies. The skill they displayed 
at once, when placed in command of independent bodies, 
demonstrated how well they had profited from experience 
and observation. Other generals were participants in similar 
advantages and passed through the same schools and wars; 
but none others seem to have so well profited thereby. 



GRANT AND LEE MOULDED BY CIRCUMSTANCES. 73 

We have followed their training thus far from the beginning 
in order that we might judge them in the light of all those 
matters that had influence upon them, that they might be 
judged on their merits which were based on characters, 
original in genius, yet trained and fashioned by the circum- 
stances of birth and education. The characteristics which 
they displayed in youth remained with them in age. 




GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT. 



Book Z\Qo. 



RISE OF GRANT. 




IVIL WAR is generally the most deplorable evil that 
Iji can befall a nation. It hinders progress, destroys 
internal resources, and creates sectional prejudices, 
^ even if it do not lead to destruction of the body 
politic. But often good results flow from it. Evils that, 
perhaps, hamper a nation's growth are eliminated by it, and 
the efforts made to recuperate almost exhausted resources 
produce advancement in all the lines of civilization. Evils 
cherished by a great people, as well as those held by indi- 
viduals, are subject to the eternal laws of justice; they bring 
punishment sooner or later, and often a bloody expiation. 
The French Revolution, at the beginning of this century, 
the English Revolution, in the time of Cromwell, and the 
great Rebellion in America are sufficient testimony in sup- 
port of this assertion. The evils of the slave trade, of the 
system of slavery, which, beginning with the ruthless 
slaughter of natives, the ravishing of their homes, and the 
transportation of the people to strange climes, and con- 
tinuing in their subjection to the whips of masters, were 
preserved in these states for two hundred years, could only 
be properly expiated by the bloodshed incident to the 



76 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



lamentable Civil War lately closed. The United States, 
claiming to be a leader in progressive liberty, professing to 
hate tyranny of every kind, glorying in the fact that the 
original states had fought for and obtained liberty from 
King George, inconsistently kept millions of men in much 
worse slavery than their forefathers ever suffered. And 
when a sense of justice moved a portion of the people to 
remonstrate in behalf of the slaves, the other portion re- 
volted with greater inconsistency to preserve their liberties. 
History records nothing of like nature in all its pages. 




CONFEDERATE FLAG. 



The conditions existing at the inception of the Rebellion 
were peculiar. The party about to revolt was in power; the 
government was in the hands of the conspirators. But 
public sentiment was rising, and from it was the revolt. 
There was no oppression, no tyranny; the conspirators 
revolted from what they feared would happen. Buchanan 
was not, perhaps, a Confederate, but his sympathies were 
with them, and some of his cabinet officers were openly 
partisans. The secretaries of war and navy purposely scat- 
tered the army and navy, and transported the munitions of 



THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN. 77 

war to southern cities in order that they might be easily 
seized when hostilities should begin. It made no difference 
in the status of the case that the party coming into power 
proclaimed that its mission was not to abolish slavery, but 
to restrict It to the states where it already existed, and that 
Lincoln gave out this to be his future policy. There were 
several parties, but none, save the Abolitionists, threatened 
extreme measures. Sentiment had not risen to that height 
which would warrant a party, hoping to win, taking such 
extreme grounds. 

The Presidential Campaign arrived (i860) whose issue 
was to finally determine the great dispute. The contest for 
election was preceded by a bitter contest for nomination, at 
least in the Democratic party. This party contained many 
who were staunch Unionists, as well as many who were 
Secessionists. The Unionists followed the leadership of 
Stephen A. Douglass, though advocating the doctrine of 
States Sovereignty. They were conservative and did not 
at all please the slavists of the same party. A dissension 
arose, resulting in a separation of the party into two wings. 
Douglass was nominated by the conservative Union ele- 
ment; Breckenridge by the radicals. This division made it 
possible for the Republicans to elect their candidate, Abra- 
ham Lincoln. Other minor parties made nominations 
which figured little in the contest for election. The chief 
struggle lay between Lincoln and Douglass. The radical 
Democrats who followed Breckenridge and some of Doug- 
lass' followers boldly declared that Lincoln's election would 
be the signal for secession. The loyal people were in a 
measure influenced by this threat, and many of them voted 
for Douglass simply as a measure of pacification; but enough 
votes were cast for Lincoln to elect him. The conspirators 



78 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

at once proceeded to carry out their threat. The order 
passed among them (Dec. i860), and South Carolina 
seceded. Buchanan took no steps to prevent this action, 
and his ministry, or cabinet, actively aided the insur- 
gents. Other states followed and (Feb. 1861) the revolted 
states formed a new^ government. Jefferson Davis was 
elected President of the Confederacy, as it was called. 
Forts, arsenals, munitions of war and other government 
property, were seized and converted to the use of the con- 
spirators. Active preparations were begun for war. So 
rapidly was the work done that when Lincoln was inaugu- 
rated (Mch. 4, 1861), he found an organized foe ready to 
dispute with him the rights he was sworn to exercise and 
preserve. This rapidity conclusively proves that the plans 
of secession were well laid long before they were set in 
operation. The leaders planned; the people blindly fol- 
lowed. 

Grant was no politician. He kept himself wed inrormed 
upon the events and movements of politics, but rarely dis- 
cussed them. He desired no office and never applied for 
one. Having the good fortune not to have attained sud- 
denly to distinction, he was in a position to profit by study- 
ing others and the thoughts of the leaders. When the 
Whig party was disrupted, he found himself without a 
party. He loved the Union above all other things. He 
believed that the National Government ought not to inter- 
fere with the existing order of society with reference to 
slavery, because he feared such interference would lead to 
war, and, perhaps, to the destruction of the Union. For 
this reason, and because the radical Democrats threatened 
a rebellion if Lincoln were elected, he hoped that Douglass 
would succeed. He could not vote for him, however, 



THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS. 79 

because he had not resided in Illinois long enough before 
election day to entitle him to vote. Conservative in his 
creeds, he was not easily induced to change them. But 
when he saw that the war was inevitable, he did not hesi- 
tate an instant to declare for the Union, and to offer his 
services to the National Government. His patriotism, 
joined with his conservatism, fitted him well to become the 
chief leader in the defence of his country. Loth to see war 
come, he was, when it came, determined that it should not 
cease as long as resistance should be made to the National 
power. 

The war was come. The first gun was fired; it was the 
death knell of slavery. The nation was surprised. It had 
not heeded the mutterings of war so long continued and 
was unprepared; but it shortly awakened, threw aside all 
temporizing expedients and prepared for the struggle. 

Many believed ninety days would compass the end of 
the conflict. Grant, at first, shared in this belief; but, when 
he saw the gigantic proportions the struggle soon assumed, 
he changed his opinion. Lincoln's call for seventy-five 
thousand men came to the loyal states. Mass meetings were 
held in every school-house, and patriotism found vent and 
increase in discussions. Volunteers rushed to enlist; many 
thousands more than were demanded came forward. A 
large meeting was held at Galena, where Grant resided, 
and he was made chairman of it, though a stranger 
to most of the people. He had little to say, but what 
he said was forcible and patriotic. He was for imme- 
diate action ; he was a man of action, not of words. Under 
his instructions and guidance a company of troops was 
raised, forwarded to Springfield, the State Capital, and 
offered to Governor Yates for service, — one of the first to 



80 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

respond to the call. The company desired to elect him 
Captain, but he would not allow it, believing himself fitted 
for a higher position, and desiring an assignment to regular 
duty. He accompanied his recruits to Springfield, however, 
and being offered a place in the Adjutant-General's office 
by Governor Yates, he accepted the position. Here he ren- 
dered efficient service in the matter of recruiting and equip- 
ing troops, his methodical mind being well suited to the 
duty. Meanwhile, he wrote the Adjutant-General of the 
National Army, offering his services and desiring an assign- 
ment. He received no answer to his application. Later, 
he went to Cincinnati, Ohio, to see General McClellan, 
thinking he might receive an appointment on that rising 
young officer's staff. He called twice at McClellan's head- 
quarters, was not able to see the General, and went home 
disgusted. He desired much to be taken into the regular 
service, but was not mean-spirited enough to fawn upon the 
great. When he arrived at Springfield, on his return, Gov. 
Yates handed him a commission as Colonel, appointing 
him to command the 21st Regiment of Illinois Volunteers 
(June, 1861). Not to the regular army was to be the honor 
of producing the chief soldier of the age, but to those who 
voluntarily gave themselves to the service of their country. 
The regiment now under his orders was one that he him- 
self, while acting in the Adjutant-General's office, had raised 
in Central and Southern Illinois. It had elected a colonel, 
according to custom, when it organized, but, as he did not 
understand the first principles of military science, it had 
become demoralized and mutinous. In Grant the men 
found a different commander, a will of iron that would be 
obeyed, and, withal, a kindly spirit. In a short time the 
regiment was under control, and soon reached a high state 



grant's first command. 81 

of discipline. When orders came to move to the front 
(July 3, 1861), they found Grant and his command ready 
and eager to go. Independence Day, a day to be later 
celebrated with his greatest success, saw the regiment on the 
march to Quincy, Illinois, starting out with light step to 
fields where many of its members were about to fall in 
death. Grant left his family at Galena, there, like thousands 
of others, to wait and watch, to daily scan the columns of 
newspapers and to look for letters, telling of the loved one 
on the field where death lurked. Further orders directed 
the regiment toward fronton, Missouri, and later to 
Palmyra, to relieve a small Union force, said to be sur- 
rounded by Confederates. Having found the beleagured 
force freed from its unpleasant situation, he was next 
employed in building bridges over Salt River. Then he was 
sent against a camp of Confederates at Florida, with orders 
to drive it from that region. He at once set out at the head 
of his regiment, about one thousand strong. It was his first 
experience as an independent commander in the field. 

He nas said that he dreaded the meeting he thought was 
about to take place between his troops and the hostile forces 
more than ever he dreaded to direct the shock of battle when 
a hundred times as many men as were in his force rushed to 
battle. Nevertheless, he advanced boldly, kept strict order 
in his ranks, and was ready for a fight. He was relieved to 
find the enemy had fled when he arrived at Florida. He 
never again felt the dread of battle so keenly. 

Some time after this expedition he was given the com 
mand of a small sub-district under General Pope, with head- 
quarters at Mexico, Missouri. He had three raw regiments 
under his command, which called forth all his powers as a 
drill-master. Thus, in minor, bloodless campaigns, he learned 



82 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

how to handle troops as an independent commander. When 
his army swelled to hundreds of thousands, the lessons 
served him well. 

Meanwhile the severe battle of Bull Run, so disastrous 
to the Union cause, had been fought; the campaign in West 
Virginia by McClellan and Rosecrans against Lee, disas- 
trous to the latter, had been prosecuted, and there had 
come a pause in the operations of war while both sides 
prepared for greater exertions. As an evil fortune, or bad 
generalship, would have it, the Federal arms had been 
decidedly worsted. But they were not discouraged. It 
was a time of organization, when the armies were being 
constructed for war. Soldiers by profession were advanced 
to higher positions and commands; but there were not 
enough trained men to supply the urgent demand. Citi- 
zens who had never dreamed of being soldiers, much less of 
wearing officer's epaulettes, suddenly appeared with swords 
and high-sounding titles, often by reason of political influ- 
ence, overshadowing trained officers who possessed far 
greater ability. Among the officers rightly promoted was 
Grant. He had not asked for promotion. He knew noth- 
ing of the means that raised him. Washburn, a member of 
Congress from Illinois, having the privilege of proposing 
men for promotion, gave the name of Grant; the recom- 
mendation was adopted, and the silent soldier received his 
first advancement since rejoining the army, being made a 
Brigadier General (17th May, 1861). 

He was sent to Southern Missouri, where, having made 
Ironton his headquarters, he at once prepared to attack the 
Confederates under Hardee. In ten days he had made 
ready and had issued marching orders, when General 
B. M. Prentiss came with orders and relieved him of 



AT JEFFERSON CITY. 88 

command. Grant was much displeased with this treat- 
ment until he learned the reason therefor, which was 
that he had been appointed to command at Jefferson, 
supposed to be in great danger of attack. The succes- 
sive changes were due to the frequent shifting of the 
departmental commanders, changes which were a pos- 
itive detriment to the service. They created no little con- 
fusion. Pope, Fremont, Hunter and Halleck commanded 
the district of Missouri in quick succession; and each, hav- 
ing his favorites, his own plans and ideas, upon assuming 
office made extensive changes among his subordinates. 
Grant felt the evil effects of this practice even after he had 
grown beyond the departmental commanders. He often 
saw well laid plans frustrated, his ideas ridiculed, and his 
reputation injured, by men who could not or would not 
understand them, because they were not on the field. 

At Jefferson City, Grant found no easy task. Soldiers 
were without dicipline and people without order, and all 
were terror-stricken with the idea that they were about to 
be taken by the enemy. The iron will of the new com- 
mander soon brought peace and order. He brought 
together the scattered detachments of troops, camped here 
and there or straggling about; he made a compact army; he 
inspired the people with a sense of security, and soon was 
ready to take the offensive against the enemy. He was 
about to begin an advance, when an order came command- 
ing him to report at St. Louis, the departmental headquar- 
ters. Vexed and displeased, he hastened to headquarters 
and asked the reasons for his summary removal from a field 
where he had made ready to meet the enemy. For answer 
he received an order appointing him to a command includ- 
ing portions of Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee, 



84 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

with directions to drive out or destroy a notorious Guerilla 
leader, Jeff. Thompson, who had carried terror and destruc- 
tion to the Union people of those parts. Troops had 
already been ordered to concentrate at Jackson, Missouri, 
for the proposed expedition. Grant desired to take or 
defeat Thompson, and for that purpose demanded the great- 
est speed possible to be made in the concentration of 
troops. But General Prentiss, who was in command of a 
part of the troops, believed himself equal in rank with 
Grant, and would neither make haste nor submit to the 
order. Grant thereupon imperatively commanded Prentiss 
to make all haste, using forcible language. Prentiss took 
offence, and, after bringing his troops to Jackson, left the 
command, went to St. Louis, and complained to the depart- 
mental commander. His dallying gave Thompson time to 
escape, much to Grant's displeasure. The fates seemed, 
fighting against the young Brigadier; but perhaps they 
were fortunate fates. For the practice which these fruit- 
less expeditions gave him was invaluable. 

Cairo was next chosen as his base of operations. Situ- 
ated at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and 
near the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland, it was 
an excellent point from which to move against the enemy. 
For several months, his principal duties were to receive and 
organize the new troops recently recruited in the northern 
states. He, meanwhile, laid various plans for an advance 
movement, and gave material aid to operations of other 
generals by holding the enemy's attention in his front. 
Hearing that a hostile force was about to occupy Paducah, 
Kentucky, he hastily led a body of troops, without waiting 
for orders, there being no time to wait, and seized that 
town just before the enemy appeared in force near it. 



OCCUPYING PADUCAH. 85 

The latter fell back at once, without attacking. Before 
starting, he had telegraphed to his departmental com- 
mander his purpose. After he had seized the place, he 
received a reply authorizing him to take the place if he felt 
strong enough. Thus by exercising judgment, he saved a 
very important point for the Union, one from which later 
expeditions could start. The State of Kentucky, or its 
government, remonstrated, however, against this aggressive 
action. Claiming to be neutral, an extraordinary position, 
this state was bold enough to exclaim against the action of 
the National troops. Grant replied in a respectful manner, 
but did not abandon his prize. He left a garrison in 
Paducah and returned to Cairo. He cared little for the 
opinions of politicians, who howled because he had violated 
neutral soil; he only replied that he who was not for the 
government was against it. By this rapid expedition he 
not only demonstrated his powers of executing a necessary 
movement at the proper time, but showed that keenness of 
perception in recognizing the strategic importance of places 
which ever afterwards distinguished him. 

After this several months of inactivity passed. Grant 
being occupied in organizing and training newly-raised 
troops. There was not a professional soldier under his 
command some of the time. His duties were, therefore, 
exceedingly laborious. He was at once commander, drill- 
master and quartermaster. Recognizing the great value of 
discipline, he exerted all his powers to teach the men, many 
of whom had never before seen a line of troops, the arts of 
war. And that his teaching was not in vain, was well 
demonstrated at Donelson and Shiloh. The army num- 
bered (October-November, 1861), more than twenty thou- 
sand men. They were eager for action, tired of staying in 



Ob THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

camp and drilling. Their commander was no less eager. 

Shortly after taking Paducah, he had asked the privi- 
lege of occupying the city of Columbus, a place of great 
natural strength in Kentucky, situated upon and command- 
ing the Mississippi River. His request was refused. The 
enemy soon occupied and strongly fortified it, making it one 
of the strongest fortresses in the country. It was seen, then, 
but too late, how unfortunate was the refusal of Grant's 
request. For, from this point, the Confederates not only 
stopped the navigation of the river, but had a depot from 
which to launch out expeditions to threaten the Federals in 
Missouri, while protecting their lines in the middle and 
eastern parts of Kentucky. 

Fremont, departmental commander, after much prepara- 
tion, set out to drive Price out of Missouri (October, 1861). 
He ordered Grant to send a force against a body of the 
enemy, said to be on the banks of the St. Francis river, about 
fifty miles southwest of Cairo. Grant sent Colonel Oglesby 
with three thousand men, as ordered. Later, Fremont 
learned that troops were about to come out of Columbus to 
aid Price, thus demonstrating the wisdom of Grant's request 
to be allowed to take that point. Now the latter was directed 
to prevent the troops leaving that stronghold. He requested 
Smith, at Paducah, to make demonstrations from that point 
against the rear of Columbus; he directed Colonel Oglesby to 
abandon his march against the force at the St. Francis river, 
and to turn against New Madrid, several miles below Colum- 
bus, and he himself led a force down the Mississippi to 
threaten the stronghold from the north. All these orders 
were executed with the greatest dispatch. General Polk, at 
Columbus, found troops coming against him from three sides 
at once, and prepared to defend himself desperately. The 



ADVANCE AGAINST BELMONT. 87 

reinforcements that he was about to send to Price were 
halted, and part of them formed a camp at Belmont, just 
opposite Columbus, with others that had previously occu- 
pied that place. Grant learned about the camp at Belmont, 
and resolved to break it up and to strike a blow which should 
be as stunning as it was sudden. Several reasons urged him 
to this purpose. He wished to test his troops and give them 
actual practice in war; he wished to prevent a large force 
from moving out against Oglesby from Columbus, and, 
finally, to give Polk such a blow that he would not dare 
again divide his troops and send a small portion across a 
great river to harass Fremont. The troops were eager for a 
fight, eager to serve their country in the only effective way 
they could, and eager to show their prowess. His deter- 
mination was no sooner formed than he began to move. 

The troops were embarked at their camp, a few miles 
above Columbus, on the Kentucky shore, and in transports 
were conveyed to a point where a bend in the river, four 
miles above Columbus, would conceal them from the garrison 
at that place, and there disembarked on the Missouri shore. 

Two gunboats accompanied him, and their commanders 
had taken upon themselves the task of preventing rein- 
forcements from crossing to aid the enemy at Belmont, 
a task which proved too great for them. General Polk, 
was at a loss to understand his antagonist's movements. 
Having left the crozier and the spiritual sword behind 
him in Louisiana, when he had joined the army to fight 
against his country, he had not assumed much of the 
soldier's proper astuteness. And even after hours of hard 
conflict, the sound of which came to his ears from beyond 
the river, he was slow to send aid to his hard-pressed 
troops. Grant knew how to profit well from an enemy's 



00 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

dullness. He landed his troops rapidly, deployed them in 
battle array, placed one regiment to guard the transport till 
he should return, and gave the word to advance. 

The first battle of a general is an interesting subject for 
study. One seeks in it something indicating the special 
qualities of the man and the soldier, something indicating 
the methods of the commander. Belmont was the first 
battle of Grant in which he exercised an independent com- 
mand on the field. In it we are able to discern plainly the 
traits that distinguished him as a general. There was the 
same calm confidence in himself, the quiet determination, 
the excellent dispositions of forces, the rapid movement and 
the tactics. It was a field requiring genius to overcome its 
natural strength. 

The Confederate camp was situated on the summit 
of an eminence, which rose gradually from the river shore 
and the surrounding country. The land through which 
Grant must march to reach the camp was for the most 
part timbered, with cleared farms interspersed, and with 
marshy tracts here and there, around which the troops 
were compelled to move. The heavy woods did not permit 
the men to keep their line formation intact. The roads and 
paths were narrow and intricate. The camp itself had been 
hastily fortified with rifle-pits and a few large guns, and an 
abattis of trees, felled with their tops outward, had been 
made around the front and flanks of the position. Near 
by was the hamlet of Belmont, a collection of half a dozen 
houses and shops. The enemy did not, however, confine 
themselves to their fortified camp, but moved out into the 
woods and disputed his advance. Grant moved by the right 
flank along roads leading southwestward around and be- 
tween sloughs till he met the enemy's skirmishers, when he 



MAP Of 

BATTLEFJELD /SEAR BELMmT 

nissouRi 




M I5&0URI 



90 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

set the faces of his men toward the camp and fought his 
way slowly forward, meanwhile extending his right wing so 
as to pass around the Confederate left flank. When the 
Federals arrived within about a mile of the camp, skirmish- 
ing began. Soon the battle became general. It was fierce 
and bloody. The soldiers of both sides screened them- 
selves as much as possible behind trees and fences. The Con- 
federates fought well, but were driven steadily back. The 
rattle of musketry was incessant, the shouts of the combat- 
ants mingled with the noise, and the roar of cannon soon 
added its deep thunder to the turmoil. Then the great 
guns in the fortifications at Columbus began to throw shells 
into the woods, endangering friend as well as foe. The gun- 
boats replied to the city batteries, and war raged on the 
river and on both its banks. No such battle had ever been 
fought before on the upper Mississippi. 

Grant was ever where danger threatened, calm, watchful 
and confident. By degrees he extended his right wing until 
it was beyond the Confederate left. Then he directed a flank 
attack, and ordered a general assault along the whole line. 
McClernand, Logan, Buford, and other gallant officers led, 
with Grant in their midst. One horse was killed under the 
commander, but he leaped upon another and continued with 
his men. The assault was delivered with great power, the 
enemy being pressed back on all sides, and the assailed and 
assailants rushed through the abattis of trees almost to- 
gether. The Confederates made a stubborn halt in their 
rifle-pits, for a short time, when from the Federal right a 
strong body of troops fell upon and crushed their left, caus- 
ing a panic to seize their whole force. They fled headlong 
down the hill to the river-shore, leaving the camp with its 
tents, guns and other equipage in the hands of the victors. 



BATTLE OF BELMONT. 91 

Until then the Federals had observed discipline, and fought 
like veterans, and had carried all before them. But they 
were excited by their success and carried away from reason. 
Disregarding the commands of Grant they fell to pil- 
laging the tents, making speeches glorifying their actions 
and fruitlessly bombarding the opposing fortifications of 
Columbus with the captured field guns. Grant, who knew 
that Polk would send over reinforcements from the garri- 
son, and indeed perceiving several steamers starting thence 
covered with men, sought a means to bring the soldiers to 
their senses, and ordered the tents fired. The roused Con- 
federates had, meanwhile, been able to rally, and had pro- 
ceeded a short distance up the shore, where, with the rein- 
forcements sent over to them, they formed a new battle line, 
and attempted to cut off the Federals from their transports. 
This action was reported to Grant and to his troops at 
the same time. The latter suddenly gave over glorying and 
looked apprehensively to their leader. An officer expressed 
his fear that they were in great peril. Grant answered 
grimly: "We cut our way in; we can cut our way out!" He 
directed the battle line drawn up, facing the point where his 
transports lay, and gave the order to move. In a few 
moments the new Confederate line was encountered, but a 
sharp assault caused it to reel back again to the river shore, 
and the Federals passed rapidly by to their boats. At the 
same time, stronger reinforcements arrived to the aid of the 
vanquished, who re-formed and pressed cautiously after the 
victors. Grant found that the regiment which he had left 
to guard the landing had retired to the boats as soon as its 
returning brethren had come in sight. He at once ordered 
it to form again to cover the embarkation while he himself 
went back a short distance to watch the advancing enemy. 



92 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

He found that the latter was following in a line almost 
parallel with the river. He was so near them that they 
could easily have shot him. Satisfied as to their proximity, 
he put spurs to his horse and hurried to the landing. All his 
men had embarked, and already the bullets of skirmishers 
were pattering around them. They had almost left their 
commander behind. A plank was put out to the shore; he 
spurred his horse across it and was safe. The transports pro- 
ceeded up stream, the troops on board replying as best they 
could to the enemy who hurried along the shore and fired 
upon them, and all were presently out of danger. 

The expedition then returned to Cairo and the forces 
that had moved in unison with it presently returned also. 
The objects of the short campaign had been well accom- 
plished. Polk refrained from sending troops to reinforce 
Price and did not attempt to move against Oglesby. 
Besides, a stinging defeat had been inflicted upon the 
enemy, causing the Union troops to be so confident of their 
own prowess, that never upon any field did the army there 
forming under Grant acknowledge defeat or show coward- 
ice. It was the first decided success of western troops. 

Viewing the battle as to its purpose, some have said it 
was not necessary, since Grant could not hope to hold Bel- 
mont against the overwhelming force in Columbus. But 
when one remembers that it was this General's policy ever to 
aim at destroying an enemy's army rather than at capturing 
cities or playing at strategy, this battle was necessary. For 
the rapid, effective blow here inflicted, gave the Confed- 
erates a wholesome fear of their opponents, which they had 
not hitherto felt, and was the beginning of the demoraliza- 
tion which led to the fall of Donelson. That it was a vic- 
tory is not doubtful. The enemy were first routed, their 



THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 93 

camp stormed and burned, and later they were met when 
reinforced and driven from the line of retreat. It is true 
the Federals returned in haste to their boats, but it was 
sensible that they should, since there was no reason why 
they should remain at the destroyed camp and there was 
danger that they would be overwhelmed. It was a daring 
exploit, of which history shows few parallels and none more 
successful or better conducted. The results of the battle 
other than heretofore named, being considered, were found 
to be — that the hostile camp at Belmont was burned, the can- 
non spiked or captured, seven hundred killed or wounded 
and several flags captured. The Federals lost about five 
hundred men. In the first, or chief battle, the enemy had 
thirty-five hundred men engaged, and Polk sent over as 
many more to take part in the final contest. From this 
time. Grant's star was in the ascendant. This was the first 
of that unbroken series of victories that have marked him 
one of the world's greatest soldiers, the greatest soldier of 
the age. In it one may perceive some of the characteristics 
that were always his. In the movement, was energy; in the 
battle, was a flank attack, and an attack along the whole 
line, the immediate cause of victory; and the expedition 
was aimed at the Confederate army, or a portion of it, with 
design to destroy. Had the Union troops remained under 
control, had they not exercised their rights as freemen to 
stop and glorify themselves over success, but had pursued 
the fleeing foe down the hill to the river, none of the fugi- 
tives could well have escaped. It was their first battle; and, 
though well disciplined in the art of obeying in battle, they 
forgot order when they believed there was no longer need 
of it, but readily resumed order when danger compelled 
them. Veterans could not have done better. Their ene- 



94 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



mies were not cowards by any means, their stubborn 
defence of their position showing this; but they were out- 
fought and out-generaled. Such was Grant's first battle 
and victory. It was indicative of his mode of procedure. 

During several weeks after the battle of Belmont, Grant 
remained quiet at Cairo, disciplining and forwarding 
troops. Though eager for further action, he was not per- 
mitted to go southward. The attention of the depart- 
mental commander was drawn toward Missouri and eastern 




MAJOR GENERAL JOHN A. MCCLERNAND. 

Kentucky. General Buell was operating near Bowling 
Green in the latter state, and was confronted by a large 
Confederate force. Other hostile forces occupied Forts 
Henry and Donelson and other points in the general line of 
strongholds reaching westward to Columbus. In order to 
prevent troops from proceeding out of these places to aid 
Buell's antagonist, Grant was ordered to make demonstra- 
tions toward Donelson and Columbus. He sent out forces 



IMPORTANCE OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON 



95 



under command of Generals McClernand and Smith, who 
accomplished the order, and the various garrisons were 
held from proceeding against Buell. About this time (Jan. 
1862), his district was enlarged by the addition of a portion 
of Kentucky, including the forts just mentioned. He at 
once applied for permission to proceed against them. With 
unerring judgment, he had early perceived the importance 
of these strongholds. They stood guard over the two 
waterways, which led in almost parallel lines southward 
to the center of the Confederacy — the Cumberland and the 




ADMIRAL ANDREW H. FOOTE. 



Tennessee rivers. Their capture would cut in twain the 
advance line from Bowling Green to Columbus, and by 
enabling the Federals to take Bowling Green and Colum- 
bus in the rear, would insure the evacuation of those posts. 
Halleck, whose attention was then occupied in other direc- 
tions, refused his young Brigadier's request, leaving the lat- 
ter to chafe in his camp. But presently Smith, an officer of 



96 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

merit, and Foote, Commodore of the Mississippi river 
flotilla of gun-boats, added their influence to that of Grant, 
and Halleck was at length persuaded to consent to an 
expedition against Fort Henry (Feb. i, 1862). On the day 
after he received the coveted order. Grant had his troops 
on transports steaming up the Ohio to the mouth of the 
Tennessee. Foote accompanied him to co-operate in the 
reduction of the stronghold. 

The scope of Grant's plan included the reduction of 
three forts, though his orders from Halleck contemplated 
the reduction of but two. Forts Henry and Heiman, the 
one on the east bank, the other on the west bank, of the 
Tennessee river, opposite each other. Fort Donelson, on 
the west bank of the Cumberland river, connected with 
Henry by a road eleven miles long, was the ultimate object 
of Grant's movements. Fort Henry was a strong earth- 
work, an irregular, bastioned pentagon, with an armament of 
seventeen heavy guns, and contained a garrison of three 
thousand men. A camp, large enough to hold fifteen thou- 
sand men, fortified with rifle pits and breastworks, was con- 
nected with the fort. The fort proper was situated on a 
slight elevation, but had a battery of guns on the lower 
shore of the river. At this time, heavy rains had swollen 
the river so much that the fort was practically surrounded 
by water, and the roads about it were almost impassable. 

Fort Heiman, on the opposite shore was a small earth- 
work, not yet completed. Both it and Fort Henry were 
practically abandoned by the garrisons at Grant's approach, 
only about one hundred men remaining in Henry to operate 
the guns and hold the Federals in check until the main body 
should make good its escape to Fort Donelson. Grant, 
however, was not aware of this fact, and laid his plans as if 




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tiu 



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FT MtiriAn I 



98 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

there would be a strong garrison to overcome at both posts. 
Part of his troops marched by land, the gunboats accommo- 
dating their speed to keep abreast of them, as soon as the 
expedition came into the Tennessee river. Several miles 
below the forts, a halt was made, and the troops on the 
steamers disembarked upon the east shore of the river. 
Great difficulties were at once encountered. Rain poured 
down without intermission. The low, marshy shores of 
the streams were overflowed. Roads were almost impassa- 
ble. The soldiers, who had not yet learned how to endure a 
campaign, and who had thrown away much of their clothing 
and blankets on the march, and having no tents, since it was 
thought best to leave all impediments behind so that haste 
might be made, suffered from the inclement weather. But 
cheerfulness prevailed, the knowledge that they were about 
to come to blows with the enemy inspiring them with a 
power to endure. Grant laid his plan of attack as follows: 
Smith was directed to cross the river with one brigade 
to assault Fort Heiman; the remainder of the land forces, 
under the commander himself, were to move up to the rear 
of Henry, while the gunboats, by agreement with Foote, 
were to move up and assail the forts by water. The attacks 
were to be made simultaneously, so that forces being 
brought to bear at one time on all sides, the strongholds 
would be overpowered more easily. The plan was well laid, 
but owing to the bad roads, the infantry was not able to take 
part in the battle that ensued. Foote moved his boats up 
close to the forts and opened a rapid and well directed fire 
against Henry. The heroic little garrison withstood the 
bombardment more than an hour, and replied with spirit till 
their guns were nearly all dismounted. Then the flag was 
hauled down and a white flag raised. When Grant's mud- 
bespattered troops approached, the fort was already in pos- 



100 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



session of the fleet. Seventeen heavy guns and ninety pris- 
oners were captured, at the expense, however, of a loss to 
the fleet of about fifty, caused by the explosion of an engine 
boiler which was perforated by one of the enemy's shots. 
Grant had expected that the garrison would retreat from 
the fort, and had designed to prevent it, but the im- 
passable roads had hindered him. He had learned of 
the comparative strength of Henry and Donelson and be- 
lieved that the enemy would concentrate their forces at the 




FORT DONELSON. 



latter, a higher and stronger post. He had now fulfilled 
the extent of Halleck's direct orders, and halted to commu- 
nicate with him and to await reinforcements before proceed- 
ing against Donelson. 

Grant's orders did not limit his operations to the taking 
of Fort Henry, and as the stronger fort was clearly within 
his jurisdiction, he resolved to exercise his own discretion 
and move against it. He so informed General Halleck, 
and stated his needs. 



THE ADVANCE ON DONELSON. 



101 



Halleck did not reply, 
either consenting or de- 
nying, but did write Buell 
that Grant would move 
quickly upon Donelson, 
thus approving the course 
of his energetic subordi- 
nate. Haste was neces- 
sary, because the enemy 
were hurrying reinforce- 
ments into the fort. 
Buckner, from Bowling 
Green, and Floyd, from 
Russelville, were hasten- 
ing to it. Had he been 
able, Grant would have 
at once set out to the 
attack. 

But he needed the co- 
operation of the fleet, 
and he anxiously waited 
for the reinforcements 
that were coming. The 
fleet had to pass down the 
Tennessee and around by 
way of the Ohio into and 
up the Cumberland, a 
voyage that required 
some days. Also, the 
rains continued, making 
it impossible to transport 
the heavy guns and am- 








'^^j 



102 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEB. 

munition necessary for a battle or siege. Halleck instruc- 
ted him, meanwhile, to make Fort Henry safe. Grant 
believed that the best way to make Fort Henry safe was 
to capture Fort Donelson. At length the rains partially 
ceased, and, because he feared that longer delay would 
enable the enemy to gather an overwhelming force, he 
resolved to proceed forthwith against their stronghold. 
Leaving twenty-five hundred men to garrison Fort Henry, 
he marched the remainder of his intrepid forces, amounting 
to a few more than fifteen thousand men, directly across the 
country to Fort Donelson. 

Fort Donelson was situated on a bluff, or, rather, a series 
of bluffs, which rose at points more than one hundred feet 
above the Cumberland's waters. It embraced within its 
outer defences about one hundred acres of land. Somewhat 
less than three miles apart, one above and one below the 
fort, two small streams enter the river, and at this time were 
deep, because of the back water from the overflowing river. 
These streams were a natural protection to the fortress. 
The works, which consisted of redans and demi-lunes, con- 
nected by breastworks, with batteries and rifle-pits, reached 
from stream to stream, in a large semi-circle. Along the 
front of the lines the forest, which covered the hills, had 
been felled, the trees drawn into line, their branches sharp- 
ened and projecting outward, and the whole thus formed 
into an abatis of great strength. A deep ravine, opening in 
the stream on the north side, traversed half the length of 
the line in its front. This abatis, the open space a hundred 
yards wide in its front, and the ravine, made the camp 
exceedingly strong. Charging columns would be compelled 
to face the unobstructed sweep of shot while striving to pass 
these. Gullies and ravines rendered the ground so uneven 
that moving battle-lines could not well be kept in order. 



FORT DONELSON. 103 

On the other hand, the opposing hills afforded protec- 
tion to besiegers, who could make an opposing line quite 
as strong as that of Donelson if they chose. The works 
embraced the little village of Dover. The main fort was 
much smaller and was elaborately built. Its heavily 
armored parapets commanded the surrounding fields, 
while two batteries near the water had been so sunk into 
the hill that, while they were well protected from the guns 
of any fleet, they could, at the same time, direct a plung- 
ing fire UDon it. It was thought to be impregnable to 




MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS WALLACE. 

attack of any kind. Had it been provisioned and its gar- 
rison properly commanded it would, no doubt, have given 
the Union General much trouble to take it. But his 
rapid movements, while they did not prevent large rein- 
forcements from entering the fort, did prevent any large 
quantity of provisions from being gathered there. About 
twenty thousand men garrisoned the works, more by five 



104 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

thousand than Grant first brought before them. But the 
Confederates imagined that their assailants had many 
more troops than themselves, and lay quietly in their lines 
v\rhile Grant's reinforcements hurried to the field. 

The siege began (12th Feb., 1862) with the appearance 
of the Union troops before the fort. They at once spread 
themselves from the creek below to the creek above it. 
It was an act of great daring on the part of Grant to 
attempt the siege of a very strong place with an infe- 
rior force, but his very boldness caused the enemy to be- 
lieve his army much stronger than it was. Nor did he 
know what numbers were opposed to him. He relied 
in some measure upon the incompetency of the com- 
mander, Floyd, a civilian, who had been raised by political 
influence to a high command. 

The Federal lines occupied a succession of ridges almost 
parallel to the enemy's works. McClernand's men held the 
right; Smith's the left. When General Lew Wallace, who 
had been left in command at Fort Henry, and whom Grant 
ordered up when he perceived the danger he had 
incurred, came, he was placed with his troops, and with 
the reinforcements as fast as they arrived, in the centre. 

The line thus assumed the form of a crescent. Bat- 
teries were placed at the best points for annoying the 
besieged, and the men lay quietly on their arms to await 
further reinforcements. So great had been the haste of the 
expedition thus far, that no tents and few other necessaries 
had been brought with it, and no tools suitable for fortify- 
ing. Therefore no intrenchments were made; but the 
ridges of the hills afforded protection in a measure. Grant 
hoped that, with the aid of his gunboats and the reinforce- 
ments that were coming, he might be able to take the for- 



AWAITING REINFORCEMENTS. 



105 



tress by storm, thus obvi- 
ating the necessity of for- 
tifying. It was, perhaps, 
not prudent to trust so 
much to the prowess of 
his troops to resist a 
sortie, if one should be 
attempted, but it was not 
his policy to lay siege 
without first striving to 
obtain immediate posses- 
sion by assault. Time 
enough to fortify when it 
should be demonstrated 
that the besieged place 
was too strong for direct 
assault. If he should be 
able to hold his ground, 
prevent escape of the 
enemy, and keep rein- 
forcements from them, 
he would be satisfied till 
help should come. 

To the danger of his 
position was added the 
discomforts of the incle- 
ment weather. It was 
bitterly cold; snow and 
sleet fell, covering the 
earth with ice; the wind, 
laden with piercing frost, 
swept the hills, and the 




106 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Storms of winter muttered about the camp. Without tents 
and heavy clothing, the soldiers suffered much. Cold, v^et, 
frozen almost, and suffering, yet they never murmured, know- 
ing that soon they would be relieved. Grant sought in 
every way possible to hurry forward his supplies. Foote 
steamed swiftly up the Cumberland, followed by a fleet of 
transports laden with troops and materials of war. It was 
the Commander's policy to avoid a battle till they should 
arrive. No fighting occurred of importance, except on the 
right, where McClernand, irritated by the fire of a battery 
in his front ordered an assault upon it. (13th Feb.) The 
assault was made with spirit, but was repulsed. Grant was 
displeased with the action of McClernand, since a general 
battle might have been precipitated with disastrous results. 

The attack had, perhaps, one good effect; its very bold- 
ness deceived the enemy as to the force in their front. The 
troops on the transports arrived (14th Feb.), and the 
army was swelled to the number of twenty-seven thous- 
and men. There seemed to be no danger of defeat, 
and an assault was resolved upon between Grant and Foote. 
The latter was to silence the batteries of the fort, while 
the troops stood to arms; then the land forces were to storm 
the works. 

Commodore Foote moved slowly against the enemy with 
his gunboats (r. m., 14th Feb.) on the day after his arrival 
at the front. At the same time, the long lines of infantry 
stood to arms and awaited the sound of battle with bated 
breath. Upon nearing the batteries, Foote increased the 
speed of the boats until he came within short range. At 
once the guns of the water batteries of the fort opened with 
tremendous power. The heavy guns of the fleet replied 
with energy. A terrific battle ensued. Every gun that 



THE REPULSE OF THE FLEET. 107 

could be brought to bear on the assailants vomited forth 
solid shot and shell, and with effect. The boats suffered 
greatly; but were unable to inflict much damage on the fort 
owing to its elevation and the manner in which the batteries 
were protected. The leading boat approached within two 
hundred yards of the hostile guns, but was there disabled. 
A second boat was perforated and so disabled that it had 
to withdraw. The commodore was injured and many of 
the sailors were killed and wounded. All of the boats 
were harmed. After an hour of turmoil, the fleet retreated, 
and the Confederates raised a yell of triumph. Only 
the lower batteries of the fort had been injured. The 
assault was a failure and the land troops refrained from 
attacking. The ill success of this first attempt, while it 
did not abate the courage of the troops, threw a shade of 
gloom upon their spirits, already depressed by the severe 
weather. Some of the offtcers were discouraged, but they 
were few. Some talked of retreating; but they had no 
influence. Grant was resolved to succeed. 

Seeing that it would be folly to assault the lines of de- 
fence, he resolved to fortify his position and hold the 
garrison in regular siege. He knew that so large a body of 
troops could not long endure a siege; but he had no idea that 
it was already the Confederate commander's intention to 
escape if possible. And when a messenger came from 
Foote requesting him to come down to the flagship, he did 
not hesitate to comply. Leaving instructions to his subordi- 
nates to keep watch against surprises, he rode down the river 
shore to see the Commodore. It was daylight ( 15th) when 
he started; he remained with Foote several hours discussing 
the plans best to be followed. 

Although victorious in the first conflict, the Confederate 



108 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

commander was convinced that he could not withstand a 
siege, because of the scarcity of provisions and the isolated 
position he occupied. He saw his enemies constantly 
increasing in numbers. Their cannon were so placed that 
they annoyed him continually. It was resolved to make 
a sally, with the purpose of defeating and driving back 
the Federal right, or of cutting a way through, and escap- 
ing. It was ordered that General Pillow should lead 
the assaulting column and attempt to break through at the 
point where McClernand's right wing rested upon the 
creek, and that General Buckner with the Confederate 
right should engage the Union left to prevent it from rein- 
forcing the endangered point, until Pillow should clear the 
way, when he was to follow him. The soldiers' haversacks 
were ordered filled for a march. Pillow's force was seven 
thousand strong. The Federals at the point where his 
attack fell could not muster half that number. Buckner led 
out a strong body against the left of McClernand as soon 
as Pillow was well under way. A heavy artillery fire pre- 
ceded the assault, Avhich was made at five o'clock in the 
morning (15th). The Federals replied with great spirit, 
rendering it difficult for Pillow to form his lines. 

When the attack came, however, the overwhelming num- 
bers of the assaulting column compelled the Federals to give 
way; and when Buckner fell upon the remainder of McCler- 
nand's lines, the latter were forced slowly back, though con- 
testing every foot of the ground with the most obstinate 
bravery and prolonging the combat for hours. The Wynn's 
Ferry road, the only one b}- which the Confederates could 
escape, was at last won and the way seemed open, when 
General Wallace, commanding the centre of the Union army, 
sent a brigade by the right flank to McClernand's aid, 



GRANT ARRIVES ON THE FIELD. 109 

threw it directly across the enemy's path and restored the 
battle. McClernand's men were by no means conquered. 
Their ammunition had failed, so hot had been the fight, and 
they only retired behind Wallace's men to replenish their 
pouches. It was now the critical moment of the contest. 
The Confederates were much broken by their efforts and 
there came a lull in the battle while they reformed for the 
final effort to sweep away their enemies. 

Meanwhile, the Federal Commander had been absent. 
Messengers had been sent to him when the first roar of battle 
rolled over the fields. Fear lent wings to the messenger's 
haste and he soon reached the point where Foote's ship lay. 
He told the Commander that the army was being routed. 
Grant leaped upon his horse and rode with desperate energy 
to the scene of conflict. The sullen roar of the guns told him 
while yet afar off that his soldiers were still fighting. The 
roads were very bad, but he did not heed them. He arrived 
at the critical moment. He rode swiftly past the left, where 
Smith stood patiently awaiting orders with his fine troops 
ready. Grant hurriedly cautioned him to be in readiness to 
move at an instant's warning, and rode on to where McCler- 
nand's lines were standing in disordered array. The troops 
uttered a shout when he appeared, and demanded ammuni- 
tion. He directed them to the train immediately in the 
rear, and they supplied themselves quickly. He ordered 
the commanders to reform their men and advance at once, 
so they might in the coming contest have the advantage of 
an initiative. He rode through the lines, and noted, where 
some prisoners had been captured, that their haversacks 
were stored as for a march. He then knew that the purpose 
of the attack was escape. He resolved to prevent it. He 
saw that to make this great effort, the Confederate gen- 



110 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

erals had weakened their right wing. His left opposed to 
the enemy's right was still fresh. He rode to Smith and 
ordered him to assault with all power the works in his 
front. Smith promptly obeyed. His gallant men went 
over the lines with a shout, easily drove the defenders out 
and planted themselves firmly within the fort. The Con- 
federate Commander was dismayed. He had not thought 
of such disaster. He hurriedly drew troops from his left to 
meet the victors, weakening it so much that the troops 
under McClernand and Wallace were able, with reformed 
lines, to drive it back to its intrenchments, and to capture a 
part of the outworks. Defeat was turned into victory by 
the genius and magnetic influence of one man. Smith's 
position inside the fort was so commanding that it would 
compel the fall of the stronghold. When night came, the 
Confederates who had gone forth so hopefully saw nothing 
but surrender or annihilation before them. Grant ordered 
all his troops to be advanced as soon as the light of the 
next morning should come. 

Grant was well pleased with the day's work, disastrous 
in the beginning, but successful in the ending. He knew 
the enemy would be compelled to surrender or be annihi- 
lated on the morrow. He carefully arranged his forces 
both to prevent surprises and to be ready for an early 
advance. The army was exultant; the inspiration of vic- 
tory aided them to endure the inclemencies of the weather. 
Quite another feeling reigned in the Confederate camp. 
The leaders were discouraged; the soldiers were disheart- 
ened, and the terror of defeat sat upon all. 

General Floyd was nothing as a soldier; he was cowardly 
as well as crafty. His terrors forced him to believe that the 
army must inevitably surrender. He believed that the North 



THE FLIGHT OF FLOYD AND PILLOW. Ill 

particularly desired his capture, because of his activity in 
bringing about the Rebellion and in scattering the national 
army and navy at its inception, when he held the office of 
Secretary of War under Buchanan. Without attempting to 
form his lines to oppose the enemy in their new position, he 
determined to flee. He therefore turned over his com- 
mand to Pillow, the second in rank. Pillow, thinking lib- 
erty better than captivity, though of doubtful honor, 
imitated his superior, and turned the command over to 
Buckner, a real soldier. The latter accepted the respon- 
sibility, openly cursing his recreant superiors as poltroons 
and cowards, and at once began to negotiate for surrender. 

Floyd and Pillow, with about three thousand men, 
boarded some transports and fled up the Cumberland. 
Nearly a thousand cavalry forded the creek on the southern 
side of the camp and also made good their escape. Many 
of the soldiers who were left behind, crowded the river shore, 
while their whilom commanders were going away, and 
heaped curses and reproaches upon them. Buckner, recog- 
nizing the situation as hopeless, caused white flags to be 
raised along his lines, and sent" a flag of truce to Grant ask- 
ing terms of surrender. When the morning dawned and 
the sight of the flags came to the Union troops already 
in line of battle, a great shout of victory went up making 
joyful the otherwise calm Sabbath morning, (Feb. i6). 

Grant's reply to Buckner was short, laconic, and to 
become historical: "No terms except unconditional surren- 
der. I propose to move immediately upon your works." 
This answer shows the spirit of the man who gave it. It was 
decisive, could not be misunderstood nor misconstrued, and 
was expressive of the knowledge that his enemy was within 
his power. Buckner accepted the terms with bad grace; 



112 LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

his men stacked their arms, and Fort Donelson had fallen. 

Over fourteen thousand men, sixty-five cannon, seven- 
teen thousand muskets and many other supplies fell into the 
hands of the victors. Two thousand Confederates had been 
killed or wounded during the siege. Four hundred killed 
and sixteen hundred wounded of the Federal troops testified 
to the severity of the contest. But it was the greatest victory 
yet obtained; it resulted in the capture of the largest body 
of troops ever surrendered on American soil up to that 
time. It was one of Grant's victories, in that it resulted in 
the destruction of an opposing army. It repaid him and 
his brave soldiers for the hardships they had endured. It 
placed Grant at once among the first generals of the army, 
and gave his troops good cause to have boundless confi- 
dence in him. And confidence in a commander renders 
troops trebly effective. The advantages arising from the 
fall of Donelson were immediate and far reaching. The long 
Confederate line was severed in twain; Columbus, Bowling 
Green and Nashville fell, with all the points dependent 
upon them. Bull Run's disgrace w^as counterbalanced in 
effect by the disgraceful flight of Floyd and Pillow, and the 
total destruction of the army left by them, and patriotic 
hearts were greatly encouraged. To Grant was due the 
first bright ray that pierced the gloom of Federal disaster, 
as to him would be due also the final dispersal of the war- 
clouds. 

But, although much praise was heaped upon Grant; 
although his terse answer to Buckner had become a com- 
mon saying, and generally he was lauded sufficiently to 
have made a vain man puffed up, there came a cloud 
over his sky. It is unfortunately true that greatness 
breeds enmity. Grant met trouble in an unexpected place. 



GRANT RELIEVED OF COMMAND. 113 

Halleck had allowed him to take Fort Doneison, and 
ought to have rejoiced at the success of his talented subordi- 
nate. But, though an earnest patriot and an excellent 
soldier, how^ever lacking in the qualities of a commander, he 
allowed trivial matters to stir up his wrath against Grant, 
and became hostile. Instead, therefore, in his report to the 
President, of eulogizing the successful General, he praised 
Gen. Smith, who at Grant's command had led the charge 
which broke the Confederate right wing, as the one to whom 
the victory was due, and recommended him for promotion. 
Grant was unconscious of any offense to his superior, and 
did not know of the intentional slight and insult that had 
been put upon him. He was accused of insubordination 
and disobedience for not reporting frequently the number 
of troops under his command; he was accused of allov/ing 
his troops to disregard discipline after the surrender of the 
fort, and of permitting great irregularities. All these re- 
ports were false, though Halleck might have had a shadow 
of foundation for the first mentioned. Reports did arrive 
to Halleck irregularly; but the cause lay with the defective 
service of the telegraph and a traitorous operator. Storms 
had broken the wires and the lines could not be used at times. 
This defect was seen later by Halleck and he made amends. 

Grant, soon after the fall of Doneison, went to Nashville 
to communicate with Buell and to study the situation. 
He sent a dispatch, as in other cases, to Halleck's chief of 
staff, that, unless he should receive adverse orders, he would 
go to Nashville. Either Halleck did not receive this mes- 
sage, or he sought occasion against his subordinate. He 
complained bitterly of the latter's insubordination, and re- 
lieved him of his command, appointing Smith in his stead. 

Smith, who was an excellent soldier, was indignant at the 
8 



114 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

ill usage of his superior, but assumed the command. He 
had deserved the honor no more than had General McCler- 
nand, whose troops had suffered most at Donelson, or Gen- 
eral Wallace, whose foresight had saved the right wing 
from total destruction; but his age and ability made him 
the only one that Halleck could with reason appoint to 
supersede Grant. In his disgrace, Grant bore himself with 
great equanimity. No complaints fell from his lips. He 
simply demanded as his right that the charges should be 
thoroughly investigated, confident that he would be vindi- 
cated. To Smith he gave his hearty support and assist- 
ance. Thus, within little more than a fortnight after 
his great victory, Grant found himself without command, 
virtually under arrest, and with the odium of disgrace 
heaped upon him, a fact that reflected no credit upon 
either Halleck or upon the Government of the United 
States. At Fort Henry, where Halleck had ordered the 
army to be encamped. Grant handed over the command 
to Smith. 

The system of military departments, into which the Fed- 
eral Government had divided the States, was pernicious in 
its effects. It bound a commander to operate within pre- 
scribed limits; to report, if a field commander, to a testy 
superior, watchful to claim all the glory of any success and 
to lay all the blame of a disaster upon his subordinate, and 
who perhaps had no idea what was needed at the front, but 
from a safe place far in the rear, presumed to direct the 
operations of an army, giving forth orders that very often 
led to disaster. The Departmental Commander report- 
ed to the Commander-in-Chief, and he to the President or 
to the War Department, and the process was so slow that 
swift movements, necessary often to success, could not be 



THE ARMY DIVIDED. 115 

made unless some energetic chief, like Grant, should move 
without orders as he saw fit, and trust to success to vindicate 
his action. If the plan that was adopted later had been 
pursued from the first, and the armies moved under one 
Commander-in-Chief, to whom all field commanders should 
have reported alone, and who would have assumed the gen- 
eral direction of the whole, without confining his subordi- 
nates to a particular territory, the war would have ended 
two years sooner. Could Grant, heavily reinforced, have 
moved without delay up the Tennessee river, after having 
captured the forts, he would doubtless have marched 
through to the Gulf without fighting more than one 
battle. For the Southern forces were so demoralized, their 
defensive line had been so rudely broken, and their plans 
so overturned, that he could have crushed and scattered 
any force which would have been brought against him. 

Smith, soon after being given the command, moved the 
army up the Tennessee, from Fort Henry toward Pittsburg 
Landing, a point on the west bank of the river, which, it 
was thought, would be a good base from which to 
prosecute operations against Corinth, twenty miles to the 
southwest. With singular imprudence, he, with the appro- 
bation of Halleck, distributed his army at three different 
points along the river, placing a part at Savannah, another 
part at Crump's Landing, and still a third part at Pittsburg 
Landing, the most advanced point. This was done, too, in 
the face of a gathering enemy, but with the idea that this 
enemy was too demoralized to be able soon to show a 
threatening front. Grant observed this arrangement with 
some impatience, but was unable to oppose it. 

Meanwhile, the Commander's star was again in the 
ascendent. The loud clamor of indignation that went up 



116 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

from patriotic men because of the injustice done him, and 
his own demands for a thorough investigation of his con- 
duct, had great influence upon Halleck. No doubt a 
natural sense of justice and the investigation of facts 
connected with Grant's behavior removed Halleck's preju- 
dice. However that may be, he suddenly changed his 
tactics, and began to act as a mediator between Grant 
and the government. He wrote a letter stating that he was 
convinced that Grant had acted from purely patriotic 
motives in going to Nashville, and had not intended any 
disobedience to his superiors, and asking that the victor be 
reinstated in command. Then, anxious to regain the confi- 
dence of the Commander, he sent the latter a copy of his let- 
ter of intercession, together with an order reinstating him, 
and bidding him go on to greater victories. Grant ac- 
cepted the issue with the same equanimity with which he had 
received the order of removal, and believed that Halleck 
had been his friend in the whole matter. Nor was he unde- 
ceived until, long years afterwards, active historians found 
Halleck's correspondence in the war records. With the 
magnanimity of a great mind, he put aside his trouble, and 
forgot it in his efforts to accomplish something for the 
Federal cause. 

He proceeded at once to the front, issued orders for the 
immediate concentration of the army at Pittsburg Landing, 
and prepared for an early advance upon Corinth. One 
small division only was left at Crump's Landing as a guard 
to his supply line and base now at Savannah; it was com- 
manded by Gen. Lew Wallace, who had shown himself 
competent to act in an emergency, and his orders were to 
hold himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice 
to Pittsburg Landing, two hours march away. Grant's plan 



WAITING FOR BUELL. 117 

was to march without delay upon Corinth, where the enemy 
were rapidly concentrating an army, in order to take it 
before too strong a force could gather within its fortifica- 
tions. But here Halleck interfered. His plan was to unite 
the army of the Ohio with that of the Tennessee, the former 
under Buell being directed to march from Bowling Green 
to form a junction with Grant at Pittsburg Landing. Buell 
had forty thousand men; Grant as many more. With these 
two strong bodies united, Halleck designed driving all 
before him. Perforce, therefore, Grant had to lie in idle- 
ness at his camp and await Buell's movements. 

Meanwhile, great numbers of new recruits were for- 
warded to him, keeping him busy receiving and distributing 
them. Here was another unfortunate blunder of his superi- 
ors. Raw troops have seldom proven fit to meet an enemy 
at once upon arriving on the field. One third of the sol- 
diers with Grant at the time of the great conflict, shortl}^ to 
take place, had never been in battle. The Commander 
placed his headquarters at Savannah for the purpose of 
receiving and forwarding these recruits, and because that 
was the point from which he could communicate most 
readily with Halleck. But he visited the camp daily, and 
saw that it was properly guarded. He fretted at the delay; 
but was unable to do more until Buell should arrive. And 
though every day added to the strength of the army at 
Corinth, Buell marched leisurely, excusing his slowness by 
reason of the bad state of the roads. Had he reached the 
point of junction two days sooner than he did, there would 
never have been a battle at Pittsburg Landing. 

Pittsburg Landing, so named from a boat-landing near, 
was a small hamlet, situated on the hills rising from the west 
shore of the Tennessee river, a score of miles, as aforesaid. 



118 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 



north-east of Corinth, and near the boundary line separa- 
ting the States of Tennessee and Mississippi. A succession 
of hills and hollows lay out toward the south-west as far as, 
and beyond, Shiloh Church, three miles from the river. 
Scattered groves and masses of undergrowth covered these 
hills, interspersed with fields partly under cultivation. As 
at Fort Donelson, deep creeks above and below the camp, 
emptying into the Tennessee, were natural protections to 




PITTSBURG LANDING. 



the flanks of an army lying between them. On the north, 
Snake Creek, with wide marshes on either side, and its trib- 
utary, Owl Creek, bending far around to the south-west, 
precluded an enemy from attempting attack. On the south, 
Lick Creek, a sluggish bayou protected the left flank. The 
mouths of the two streams were three miles apart, and as 
their courses were generally parallel, the tract which became 
the battle field was thus from three to four miles wide by 



THE SHILOH BATTLEFIELD. 



119 



about the same length. The hollows and ravines, dividing 
at the middle of this field, opened generally north and south 
toward the creeks, though several deep gullies opened 
directly to the Tennessee. 

Roads led from the Landing, one north across Snake 
Creek, and one or more west and south-west toward Corinth, 
branching before they reached Shiloh Church, the minor 
branch turning to the north-west across Snake Creek and 
its tributaries. The field was well chosen for a camp, being 



i //A^. 




SHILOH MEETING HOUSE. 



so well protected on the flanks as to compel an enemy to 
attack in front, and having the river at the rear, by which 
to draw supplies, and along which, in case of disaster, the 
army could retreat with the aid of the gun-boats. Only in 
case of extreme disaster would it be a dangerous position, 
since rapid retreat would be dif^cult. While it precluded 
the enemy from obstructing the river, it also afforded a 
good base from which to march suddenly upon Corinth. 



120 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

It was not rashness, nor a mistake, on the part of Grant, 
that he allowed the troops to remain on the ground where 
Smith, an excellent engineer, and Halleck, the departmental 
commander, had caused them to be stationed. His troops 
were thought to be equal in numbers, if not greater, than 
the force gathering at Corinth. The divisions of the army 
were placed at once for protection and comfort. It was not 
thought that the Confederates intended to take the initia- 
tive and to attack this army; hence there was not that stiff 
regularity necessary to be observed in the presence of an 
enemy, nor were fortifications thrown up along the lines, a 
fault perhaps, but a very common fault with western leaders 
at this time. The line of encampment stretched irregularly 
across from Owl Creek, past Shiloh Church, to Lick Creek. 
Sherman's division held the right wing, guarding the Owl 
Creek crossing and the road to Purdy, and stretching out 
southward across the main road to Corinth. At his left, 
somewhat in advance, and separated from him by a space 
of several hundred yards, was Prentiss' division facing 
south-west, and still further to the left, near Lick Creek, 
and at some distance, was Stuart with a brigade of Sher- 
man's Division. At Sherman's left and rear, closing the 
space between him and Prentiss, was the division of McCler- 
nand. These formed the advance line. In the rear of 
Sherman and McClernand, on a second ridge of hills, 
Hurlbut's division had its camp. To the right and rear 
of Hurlbut, was Smith's division, under command of W. H. 
L. Wallace, the gallant Smith being ill. 

Buell consumed two weeks instead of the one that had 
been thought sufficient to make the march to Savannah. 
Grant became so anxious, because of the threatening demon- 
strations at the camp, that he determined to change his 



) THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE. 121 

i 

headquarters to Pittsburg Landing; but a letter arrived from 
iBuell stating that he would be at Savannah on the 5th of 
lApril, and he desired to meet Grant there. Grant remained, 
but Buell did not appear until the next day, and on that next 
day the mighty roar of conflict could be heard even further 
than Savannah. On the 4th, the Commander, accompanied 
by Sherman and others, rode out in front of his camp to 
observe the field and the demonstrations made by scouting 
parties of the enemy; they could not see or hear sufficient 
evidence that the enemy were near in force enough to cause 
them to think that an attack was imminent. Grant's horse 
fell at this time, hurting the Commander's leg severely. On 
this day, also. General Lew Wallace reported the Con- 
federates in force near Purdy, and Grant, thinking the 
enemy had designs against Wallace, ordered General W. H. 
L. Wallace to hold himself in readiness to go at once to the 
former's assistance. Leaving directions to his generals to 
watch closely the enemy, and filled with impatience and 
anxiety. Grant then went down to Savannah to meet Buell. 
Sunday morning (6th April), at the first gray light of 
dawn. Colonel Peabody sent out several companies of troops 
to reconnoitre and to drive off some troublesome bands of 
skirmishers that had been seen on the preceding day close 
in front. These troops went forth more than a mile, and 
met the Confederate army moving against them in long, 
solid lines. Immediately they opened fire, but the oncoming 
wave of men did not halt. It was led by one of their best 
generals, Albert Sidney Johnston, with Beauregard second 
in command, and numbered over forty-one thousand effect- 
ive soldiers. Fate seemed to have decreed that this assault 
should be made before Buell should arrive, since for several 
days the Confederate general had hesitated to attack. And 



122 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

during the preceding night, in one of the dark hollows a few 
miles from the Federal army, a gloomy, earnest council of 
war had been held over the question whether there should 
be an assault in the morning. It was resolved to attack. 
Beauregard boastfully said that his horse would drink at 
the Tennessee before the sun should again go down. The 
Union pickets retired slowly, firing at every step. The noise 
aroused the soldiers in camp. General Prentiss learned 
the truth, and swiftly drew out his troops into battle 
line several hundred yards in front of his camp. Sherman 
also roused his men and hurried them into position. 
McClernand also formed, ready to go where needed. Had 
Grant at this time not been away from the field, he, no 
doubt, would have so quickly moved up McClernand, 
Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, that he could have 
opposed to the terrible force of the first assault a power 
that would have withstood and hurled it back. But he 
was not there, and the generals had to act for a time 
without orders. The blow fell first upon Prentiss' division, 
which was composed, for the most part, of raw troops. It 
reeled before the impetus, but retired slowly to its camp, 
fighting every step. Almost immediately Sherman's division 
became engaged, but stubbornly held its ground. Beau- 
regard, who led the assault, saw his lines break by reason of 
the rough ground and the vigorous resistance they met. 
Bragg, who led the second line, swept up and renewed 
the battle, his line becoming amalgamated with that of 
Beauregard. The engagement became general along the 
whole front, even Stuart, at the extreme left, being 
attacked. For a short time Prentiss held his camp, but 
the enemy pressed in between his right and Sherman's left, 
where, as before mentioned, there were no troops. Taken 



MAP or ncLO or 

OR 

P0TT3BURC LAMDJ^S 




CO/irtDJ^BATt APPBOACrt CAfl 



12;^ 



124 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

in the flank, he was compelled to retire to a new position 
further back. Sherman's left was also broken and bent 
backward. At this time, opportunely, McClernand hurried 
his men forward and filled the ever-widening breach; 
Hurlbut moved up to strengthen Prentiss, and W. H. L. 
Wallace moved up to their support. The combat was fierce, 
stubborn and exceedingly bloody. The lines swayed back 
and forth like two gigantic wrestlers, giving and receiving 
deadly blows. The Federal troops, though many had never 
faced a foe, stood like veterans to their fearful work. Nine 
o'clock came, and with the hour came the Commander. 

Grant had heard the first rumble of the heavy guns, 
when the battle commenced. He had waited too long for 
Buell, and Buell had not come. At first he thought Wallace 
at Crump's Landing had been attacked; but soon realized 
that the battle was at his main camp. Leaving word for 
Buell to come up with all haste, he boarded a transport and 
ordered the swiftest speed possible to be made to the scene 
of battle. Stopping a moment at Crump's Landing, he or- 
dered Wallace to have his troops under arms ready to come 
when sent for, not ordering an immediate advance till he 
should know the necessity for it. Having arrived at the 
field of battle, he mounted his horse, though in pain from 
the fall two days before, and rode to the front, first leaving 
orders for the ammunition wagons to go at once to the front. 

The gravity of the situation soon appeared to him. He 
saw the divisions of his army acting separately, some being 
driven by the assaults of the enemy, some holding their 
own stubbornly. Sherman's division had held its ground 
with its right wing, but had refused its left at a sharp angle 
to connect with McClernand. The Commander gave the 
necessary orders to make the line continuous, sending a 



THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE CHECKED. 125 

regiment here, another there, and striving to make one body 
of his forces. He had few reserves. Only thirty-three 
thousand men, effective for service, had been in the camp 
when the struggle began, and already thousands had fallen 
dead or disabled. Nearly his whole force present was now 
engaged. The arrangement which he then made was pre- 
served throughout the battle. Sherman on the right; next 
to him, McClernand; then Wallace, Prentiss, Hurlbut, and 
at the extreme left, Stuart; and, when Prentiss was captured 
later in the day, the lines of Wallace and Hurlbut were 
drawn together and the break filled with regiments from 
various divisions. Grant immediately sent orders to Gen- 
eral Lew Wallace to come with all speed by the shortest 
route from Crump's Landing. Having done all that ingen- 
uity could suggest to obtain a strong formation, the Com- 
mander fought his army well. He was continually near the 
front, watching every move, providing for every emergency, 
encouraging by calm example his generals and captains, 
and endeavoring to stem the torrent of stragglers that 
flowed to the rear. 

The tactics of Johnston resembled, as one has said, those 
of a battering ram, giving heavy continuous blows, direct- 
ing the blows during the earlier part of the day against the 
centre and right, and during the latter part, against the left 
and centre; but much of the time the fight was continuous 
along the whole front. 

In order to meet these rapid, concentrated blows, the 
Commander was compelled to shorten his line to render it 
heavier at the point of attack. To do this necessitated a 
series of retrograde movements toward the river, since as 
the troops drew near to the Tennessee, the length of the 
line necessary to span the distance between the two flank- 



123 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

ing streams became less. The troops fought desperately. 
The enemy assaulted with the greatest fury and most deter- 
mined bravery. Blood flowed as never on this continent 
had it flowed before. Bodies lay in heaps and rows; they 
were scattered over the fields so thickly at places that one 
might walk upon them for hundreds of yards without hav- 
ing to step to the earth. 

Noon came and passed, and the sun could hardly pierce 
the battle clouds rolling up over the fields. The Confeder- 
ates aimed their blows now principally at the left wing^ 
striving to break it and to interpose between it and the 
Landing. Grant looked anxiously for the head of Wallace's 
columns to come in sight. With the five thousand fresh 
troops that he would bring, the Commander believed him- 
self able to break the enemy's line, become the assailant, and 
yet grasp the victory, now apparently about to be taken 
from him. He looked in vain. General Wallace mis- 
understood his orders, and acted as he thought would be 
best in the emergency. Instead of taking the road to the 
rear of the Union army, the road along the river bank, 
he followed one leading out into the country towards 
Corinth, designing to come in on the Purdy road, where 
Sherman's right wing had rested at the beginning of the 
battle; but the road was long and difficult, and Sherman 
was no longer at that position. Grant dispatched other 
messages after him, which, finally overtaking him, turned 
him back, and brought him upon the field at sun-down, 
when the first day's battle was already closed. Nelson, also 
with the advance division of Buell's army, had been at 
Savannah early in the morning, and had received orders 
to come up with all speed; but did not arrive until after 
sun-down. A laggard fate seemed fighting against the 



SHERMAN S DIVISION" RETIRES. 



127 



Commander. While these much needed forces were com- 
ing the battle continued with unabated vigor. 

The Confederate Commander, believing that the battle 
could not be won unless the Union line should be pierced, 
massed heavily in front of Sherman's extreme left, where 
there had been a break early in the day. Grant perceived 
the design, hurried up a part of Hurlbut's comparatively 




GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON. 



fresh division, and placed it in the rear of Sherman's tired 
troops. The latter, slowly retiring before the oncoming 
rush, passed through Hurlbut's ranks, and reformed immed- 
iately in the rear. The position was well chosen for defence, 
the troops being drawn out along a ridge from which in 
front sloped gradually down an open field, over which the 
assailants were compelled to pass. Several batteries and 



128 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

parts of batteries were placed here along the Federal line. 
Thus massed, they hurled back the assaults with terrible 
loss to the assailants. Johnston, rashly leading the Confed- 
erate charge, was slain. The command devolved upon 
Beauregard, who continued the battle with vigor. 

One has said that at this point the Federal fire was so 
fierce and deadly that it seemed that the very gates of hell 
had opened to vomit forth fire and destruction. The 
massed charges were thereafter directed against the Union 
left more particularly. At four o'clock the retrograde 
movement occurred which Grant was determined should be 
the last; but it was unfortunate. Prentiss stubbornly held 
his position, while W. H. L. Wallace's division, its leader hav- 
ing been killed, retired from the one flank and Hurlbut's 
division from the other, and Prentiss, with three thousand of 
his men, was captured. This made a wide gap in the line. 
The battle seemed lost; but Grant had been watching for any 
such emergency; and, urging his horse over brush and 
fallen trees at full speed, he brought up reinforcements, 
filled the gap and saved the army. The enemy had been 
somewhat delayed in sending Prentiss and his unfortunates 
to the rear, or this would have been a very difficult task. 
But the battle was restored, the assaults were repulsed with 
great vigor, and presently there came a lull in the contest. 

Buell, riding on in advance of his army, had arrived 
upon the field shortly before this lull. He saw the strag- 
glers, remnants of broken regiments, gathered at the river 
bank, several thousand of them, frantic with terror. He 
looked at the hard pressed lines standing doggedly to their 
deadly work. He concluded that the army was defeated, 
and said to Grant, who sat calmly on his horse watching 
every movement of his troops: "What preparations have 



THE FINAL STAND. 129 

you made for retreating?" Grant replied, "I haven't des- 
paired of whipping them yet." Buell asked: "But if you 
should be defeated, how will you get across the river? 
These transports will carry no more than ten thousand 
men." The answer to this was grim, showing the spirit of 
the Commander: "If I have to cross the river, ten thousand 
men will be all that I shall need transports for." Buell now 
saw the need of more haste than had been hitherto shown, 
and rode back to his army to hurry it forward, stopping, 
however, long enough at the Landing to bitterly curse the 
thronging crowd of terrorized stragglers. Many of these 
men, though now frightened, afterwards regained their 
courage with experience and became excellent soldiers. 
They were as yet new to war, and when they saw the Union 
lines broken they naturally thought all was lost. 

Grant had already adopted the expedient of placing a 
line of cavalry in the rear to turn and bring back the strag- 
glers. About one hour before sunset, the Commander had 
brought the army back to a position which he was resolved 
should be the last place of retreat. There the tide of defeat 
should turn, or destruction should fall upon the army. The 
line was fully a mile in the rear of the first position from 
which they had been driven. Every step of that mile had 
been sorely contested; it had been won by the enemy at a 
terrible cost. It was thickly strewn with corpses and with 
the wounded. Its surface was ploughed with shot and 
trampled by feet. Grant saw that the confederates were in as 
much disorder as his own men; he believed that they would 
make one more great effort, and then be compelled to retire. 
To meet this effort he made hasty arrangements. It would, 
he saw, be directed against his extreme left, in pursuance of 
Beauregard's plan of trying to cut his opponent off from the 
9 



130 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

river. The Federal left rested on the Tennessee a short dis- 
tance south of the Landing, with a deep ravine along its 
front, so deep that the gun-boats on the river could drive 
their shells along the bottom of it. The ravine extended 
along the front of the line more than half a mile. Near the 
river, Colonel Webster, of the artillery, collected a heavy 
battery of guns, or rather a mingling of batteries and pieces 
of batteries, and, to support them, a number of broken regi- 
ments and companies were hurried forward. Also the gun- 
boats moved up and trained their guns up the ravine. Next 
to this battery was Hurlbut's unbroken division; then 
McClernand's, and lastly Sherman's, with its left resting near 
the bank of Snake Creek. The other divisions, Prentiss' 
and Wallace's, had lost their officers and great numbers of 
their men, and the various brigades and regiments compos- 
ing them had been distributed by the Commander wherever 
they were most needed. Upon the maintenance of this line 
unbroken depended the issue of the battle. Both sides 
nerved themselves for the struggle. 

Beauregard directed the weight of the attack towards 
the battery at the ravine, though an assault was attempted 
along the whole line. Generals Polk, Hardee and Bragg, 
led the forlorn hope, as it may well have been named. 
Heavy woods covered their lines while forming, where 
already the shades of night were creeping. Opposed to 
these woods, so full of power and life, were the grim batter- 
ies, the frowning gunboats, the Union army stripped for the 
fray, and at a short distance in the rear the silent Comman- 
der sitting on his horse calmly waiting the issue, and watch- 
ing the opposite shore of the river for a sight of Nelson's 
tired veterans. Presently the heavy rush of feet was heard 
in the woods, and masses of troops appeared on the crest 



THE FINAL REPULSE. 131 

of the ravine, coming at a run. The batteries opened with 
a mighty crash, a blinding flash of musketry mfles in length 
burst forth from the Federal ranks, and in a moment the 
terrific boom of the great guns on the boats joined in, while 
the huge shells from the latter tore up the ravine, enfi- 
lading the Confederate line and mowing down men in long 
swaths. Never were guns worked with greater energy, nor 
did musketry pour its missiles with more rapidity. The 
advancing line was smitten as with hail; it halted, it wav- 
ered, it broke, it fled, and the dark woods swallowed it up 
within its gloomy depths. Again it was rallied, reformed and 
led forth, and again it was driven back by the pitiless shot. 
A third time it was driven forth to the assault; but it had 
been hard work to rally the men for this last attempt, and 
night had almost come. 

Meanwhile Grant saw the troops of Neison come up 
to the opposite bank of the river. It was a most welcome 
sight. The transports were ready, and at once brought 
over a strong body of the advance division. But before 
it could land the third assault came with intense fury, the 
frantic assailants charging blindly almost up to the Union 
line. It was hurled back broken and defeated. It was the 
final effort. A part of Nelson's men came into line with the 
Federal battery, fired a volley into the woods where the en- 
emy had disappeared, and thus laid a foundation for the 
claim that Buell's troops arrived just in the nick of time to 
save the army from annihilation. Beauregard's horse did 
not drink of the Tennessee that night, but it was prevented 
so doing by the sacrifice of twenty thousand killed and 
wounded men, half of whom were his own troops. The 
Federals bivouacked on the line then last held; the Con- 
federates retreated half a mile and there halted. 



132 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

So the first day ended, and neither side could claim the 
victory. But the Confederates rejoiced that they had 
driven their enemy back more than a mile, though at a ter- 
rible cost and only by the most heroic exertions. The Fed- 
erals strengthened themselves with the thought that they 
had so well resisted what they believed to be overwhelming 
numbers, and rejoiced in the knowledge that on the morrow, 
with Lew Wallace's fresh troops and Buell's reinforcements, 
they would win back what they had lost. And even before 
Nelson was within sight. Grant had issued instructions to 
his generals to hold themselves in readiness to take the 
initiative in the morning. He believed that even should 
Buell not arrive, he could, during the night — having reor- 
ganized his divisions, and with the five thousand men that 
Wallace had — drive the enemy before him, or at least beat 
him off in every attempt. He had perceived that the 
Southern army was almost as much disorganized as his own; 
he had been able to judge somewhat as to his enemy's 
strength; he knew the latter's losses were at least equal to 
his own; he did not think Beauregard had any reserves. 
From all that he could hear or see, he had come to the con- 
clusion that he would be equal in strength to his opponents 
in the morning, and the victory would be to him that should 
first assault. Of course the issue would depend much upon 
the fortunes of war; but the Commander, as he had told 
Buell, was not by any means conquered. But when Buell 
came he was certain of victory. 

The tired troops obtained little rest during the night. 
Their indefatigable leader, though suffering much with his 
bruised leg, transferred his left wing to the rear and right, 
leaving a space to be filled by the eighteen thousand men 
that Buell succeeded in bringing upon the field. Nor did 



AN ANXIOUS NIGHT. 133 

the enemy rest well; for the Union gunboats threw shells at 
(regular intervals during the night into their camp, giving 
them much discomfort, and compelling them at some points 
to retreat still further from their advanced position. Mid- 
night saw the arrangements completed, and the troops rested. 
But now a heavy storm of rain, accompanied with thunder 
and lightning, burst over them, brought on by the terrific 
concussions the atmosphere had received during the day. 
To the thirsty wounded scattered over the fields, the rain was 
as God-sent; they held their parched mouths open to receive 
the drops of water. Grant, tired, suffering from his injury, 
but hopeful and courageous, lay down on the earth beneath 
a tree with his soldiers and sought to rest. But the storm 
became so furious, and the pain rendered him so restless, that 
he could not sleep, and presently, accompanied by a part of 
his staff, he went to an old log hut near the landing, seeking 
shelter. The hut had been turned into a hospital, and, 
though the chief of the army, he would not take possession 
of it while the wounded needed it, so he went back to his 
tree and stayed there. It was a gloomy night; it would 
have been gloomier had not the reinforcements arrived. 

With the coming of daylight (7th Apr.) the Union lines 
advanced. As yet Beauregard was not aware of the rein- 
forcements his enemy had received; yet he was in no haste 
to attack. His forces were so badly shattered that several 
hours of daylight would have been necessary to have put 
them in shape for battle. General Lew Wallace, with his 
five thousand fresh troops, was placed in the fore, along the 
centre and right of the united armies, and was supported 
by the remainder of Grant's original force. Buell, under 
Grant's general direction, commanded the eighteen thousand 
men composing the left wing, and swung out toward the 



134 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

southwest, extending his left flank as the nature of the field 
demanded. The Federals advanced half a mile before 
finding their enemy. Wallace's troops opened the battle 
by shelling and driving off an advanced battery. The 
heavy skirmish lines of both armies were soon engaged. 
Because the troops advanced very slowly, feeling their way, 
it was full ten o'clock before the battle became general. 
The Confederates had improved the time by re-forming, 
and were ready to give a hard fight. The battle became 
desperate. From right to left, a distance of three miles, 
the roll of musketry, with the boom of cannon, was con- 
tinuous. The Union right and centre advanced steadily, 
driving the foe step by step from every position, storming 
batteries, assaulting with the bayonet, and cheering as 
they went forward. Buell did not fare so well. Beaure- 
gard had kept his order of battle of the preceding day, 
and the bulk of his forces was yet on his right and 
centre. Repeating his tactics, he hurled his troops in heavy 
masses upon Buell, overwhelmed the line at several points, 
captured some heavy guns, and pushed the enemy back sev- 
eral hundred yards. Only by the greatest exertions could 
Buell recover his advantage. At the same time. Grant, 
who was watching his opportunity, ordered an impetuous 
assault on the right, himself personally directing it, and 
crushed the Confederate left wing, driving it in confusion 
from the field. Beauregard was compelled to draw off a 
part of the masses on his right to strengthen the left, leav- 
ing Buell the advantage of numbers. The latter improved 
the occasion, and again drove all before him. Beaten at all 
points, Beauregard at length gave up the contest. He had 
lost a full fourth of his soldiers in killed and wounded, and 
nearly as many more in stragglers, while his army was so 



THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 185 

broken and demoralized that his retreat resembled a rout. 
The tactics had been turned on him. On this day he could 
not muster more than thirty thousand fighting men; the Fed- 
erals could put into line more than forty thousand. His 
defeat came unexpectedly. The sun had hardly passed the 
meridian before the retreat began; the battle had ended 
ere the sun had descended half way to the western horizon. 

Short pursuit was made. Grant asked Buell to send his 
comparatively fresh troops in pursuit; but Buell refused. 
In the delay that ensued upon this refusal, and before 
Grant could direct his own tired troops to take up the pur- 
suit, the enem}' were well off the field. Sherman followed 
a short distance, but soon rested. So ended the battle of 
Shiloh, sometimes denominated the battle of Pittsburg 
Landing. The bad roads, caused b}' the heav}' rain of the 
preceding night, and the exhausted condition of the Fed- 
erals, saved Beauregard from complete rout. 

Upon the issue of this battle hung man}- interests. Had 
Grant been defeated, not only would he have been immedi- 
ately relegated to the ranks of the unsuccessful generals, 
and remanded to insignificance, but Buell's arm}' might 
have been crushed in turn and the Federals driven back to 
the Ohio river. Even though the battle ended in victory. 
Grant suffered unjustly. The battle was so terrible, so 
bloody, so destructive, that the nation was maddened. 
Twelve thousand men, three-fourths of whom were killed 
and wounded, had each side lost. Men shuddered at the 
magnitude of the struggle; the}' thought blame ought to 
attach somewhere; the}- let it fall upon him whose success 
had made him clamorous enemies, and whose supreme con- 
tempt for slander, and whose silence, gave play to bitter 
tongues. Buell's soldiers naturally claimed the meed of vie- 



136 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

tory. False reports were sent out, from which it appeared 
that Grant had been personally responsible for the first 
day's losses, that he had been drunk when the battle was in 
its hottest hours, that he had been surprised by the enemy 
and taken unawares, and that Prentiss and his gallant 
troops had been captured in their beds. Whereas, the 
truth was, that the errors of others placed the army 
in several separate divisions along the river, where they 
might have been beaten in detail, and Grant's foresight 
concentrated them at Pittsburg Landing, from which, 
on account of Halleck's orders, he could not move; that 
Grant made little use of intoxicants, though President 
Lincoln did say that he wished more generals would "drink 
some of Grant's whisky, if it resulted in such victories;" 
and that the division commanders were not surprised, but 
were ready to fight when the enemy appeared, though sep- 
arately and without much cooperation; and further that 
Prentiss was not captured till late in the afternoon of that 
bloody first day. 

The mists of these preposterous errors have not yet 
entirely blown away; but through them appears the star 
of the silent Commander's genius, testifying that, had 
he been present, and not called away to meet Buell at 
Savannah, and could he have commanded at the beginn- 
ing so as to have opposed a firm front at the first shot, 
and before his troops had become somewhat demoralized, 
the Confederate host would have been terribly defeated be- 
fore the hour of noon had passed of the first day. As it 
was, an army was never fought better and with more 
dogged determination, than this army, after it felt the di- 
recting hand of the commander. The wonder is that it had 
not been swept off the field in detail. The fault that he did 



HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND. 137 

not know such forces lay in his front sooner, lies not with 
the chief Commander, but with those to whom picket and 
scouting duty belonged. Superiors were at fault; Buell was 
slow; the pickets were at fault; but, in studying the bat- 
tle, it is not possible to see how Grant was at fault. For- 
tuitous circumstances had much to do with the battle. Had 
Buell not been delayed; had Grant not been called to Sav- 
annoh; had a better watch been kept; had Lew Wallace 
arrived sooner on the field, another story would have been 
told of the first day's battle. But whatever may have been 
said about it, the battle ended in a decisive victory for the 
Union. To the South it was a most stunning defeat. One- 
fourth and more of their army, their Commander, second, 
as some maintain, to Lee only, as a soldier, and later, as a 
direct result, Corinth, were lost to the Confederate cause. 

Halleck came to the field four days after the conflict, and 
assumed command of the united armies. He issued 
orders to every part of his department for the concentration 
of troops at Pittsburg Landing; and the remainder of 
Buell's army, and Pope's army from its victory at Island 
Ten, were hurried up, and the combined force soon num- 
bered one hundred and twenty thousand men. Detach- 
ments were sent out in various directions to seize what 
Halleck thought strategical points, leaving the effective 
force to advance against Corinth about seventy thousand 
strong. Halleck, now having apparent cause to disgrace 
Grant, did so. Had not Lincoln preserved so great confi- 
dence in Grant, "A man whom he rather liked," no doubt 
the Commander would have been relieved. He was re- 
lieved in fact, though not in form. Halleck distributed 
the various divisions of troops to please himself, and gave 
them orders direct from himself, not deigning to send the 



138 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

orders tnrough Grant, the proper cnannel. He permitted 
reports of the late battle to pass up to the War Department 
without Grant's approval; he was not careful that the reports 
should state facts. 

Hence many errors, falsities, and slanders went out, 
that should not have been permitted, and the effects of 
which have lasted longer than did the life of the illustrious 
Commander. Halleck did not treat him even with the 
courtesy due a soldier in honorable standing. He never 
asked Grant his opinion in any matter, though the latter 
was second in rank to him only. Nor did Grant offer his 
opinions more than once, and at that time was coldly 
ignored. The Commander was under a cloud. Many who 
had been his warm admirers, who had seen in his great vic- 
tory at Donelson the presage of a great career, forsook him 
and joined their voices in the false clamor against him. 

Newspaper correspondents, catering to Halleck's pleas- 
ure, wrote lurid articles in reproach of the victor. But under 
all this load of odium, Grant, though suffering keenly the 
injustice, remained calm and unmoved. Serene in uncon- 
cious magnanimity, he held his peace. Knowing that the 
facts would presently come to light, and that then he would 
be vindicated, he did not raise his voice in protest as others 
would have clone. But once did he allow himself to break 
silence, when a newspaper correspondent, truculent and 
virulent, sent a defamatory article to the press; and then he 
said simply, that he was sorry that a man could stoop to 
writing such falsehoods, and that time would vindicate his 
own actions. 

So Halleck, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, 
having an army opposed to him less than half that number, 
and that, too, broken and dispirited with defeat, armed 



THE ADVANCE ON CORINTH. 139 

his men with spades and proceeded to dig his way into 
Corinth. A day's march would have put him into posses- 
sion of the city and compelled the enemy to flee without 
battle. Yet he consumed six weeks in digging and man- 
euvering, covering a mile some days, sometimes more 
and sometimes less, of the twenty-five miles between 
Shiloh and his objective point. He kept scouts well out, 
often drew up his army for battle when rumors came of a 
skirmish, and fortified every camp and position. 

Having arrived before the city, he halted several days to 
reconnoitre. He erected elaborate works before his lines, 
and kept his army in constant commotion over false alarms. 
Grant, after studying the defences of the city carefully, made 
the only suggestion he attempted to make during the cam- 
paign, stating that the defences were weak in front of the 
Federal right and might be easily carried by assault. Hal- 
leck replied that when he needed advice he would ask for 
it. Grant retorted in strong language to the insult, the 
first and last time that he ever spoke disrespectfully to a 
superior. Then he held his peace, though believing that 
the enemy was about to escape. Demonstrations being 
made by the enemy along their works, Halleck drew up his 
army for battle, certain that he was about to be attacked. 
No attack was made. 

An officer at the head of a small body of men, becom- 
ing suspicious of the truth, advanced to the defences and 
found them deserted. The Confederate army had evac- 
uated the city, taking with it all its equipments and sup- 
plies, leaving only a number of dummy cannon made 
of logs mounted on wheels. Corinth had fallen; but a 
shout of laughter went up from the army and was echoed 
back from the people of the North. Even Grant was 



140 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

compelled to smile. Upon examination, it was found that, 
as he had suggested, the city might have fallen easily by 
an assault of the Federal right wing. 

Nevertheless, Halleck prided himself on a bloodless 
victory, and continued his coolness toward Grant, who 
now again demanded to be transferred to another depart- 
ment. His request would have been complied with had he 
insisted, but Sherman, whose love for his former com- 
mander and confidence in him were very great, persuaded 
him not to insist. Yet he obtained leave to retire from the 
army to Memphis, Tennessee, and, narrowly escaping cap- 
ture on the way by hostile scouting parties, he rode to that 
city and established his headquarters there. Halleck, 
relieved of the presence of his disgraced subordinate, con- 
tinued slowly to follow the enemy. Not more than forty 
thousand men were in his front; he cautiously advanced 
with three times that number. Buell, in command of 
seventy thousand men, came to Booneville, heard that the 
enemy was in his front, and halted to await attack from not 
more than twenty thousand of them, but he was not 
attacked. About the middle of June the pursuit was 
stopped, having accomplished nothing; and the great army, 
which under a competent leader, could have crushed all 
opposition, was broken up, one part under Buell being sent 
towards Chattanooga, the other part under Halleck remain- 
ing at and near Corinth. 

Grant determined to abide, if possible, at Memphis until 
the cloud that obscured his star should pass. He had a 
chance to display his governing powers here, and exercised 
them with firmness and moderation. He established 
martial law throughout the city, heard all complaints of 
citizens, and redressed grievances as needed. He also 



HALLECK RAISED TO CHIEF COMMAND. 141 

adopted measures for the protection and employment of 
fugitive slaves, great numbers of whom came into his juris- 
diction. He promptly suppressed a newspaper for publish- 
ing articles of a treasonable nature. He issued an order 
banishing all citizens who should be proven to have acted 
as spies for the enemy, appointing a certain day by the 
which they should leave. This aroused a storm of indig- 
nant protest among the disloyal north and south. He was 
called a tyrant, a bloody monster, and was threatened with 
assassination; but he quietly and fearlessly caused his orders 
to be executed. As a military governor he achieved great 
success. Good order was maintained, the people lived in 
peace and security. The loyal rejoiced in his protection; 
the disloyal found no sympathy, but stern repression. 

Meanwhile, the course of events was running in his favor 
again. Lincoln had never lost sight of him, though a cloud 
was over him; he studied how to place him again at the 
head of the army, so that some energy might be infused into 
western operations. The great President was a true judge 
of human nature, and a fair judge of the abilities of his 
various generals. It seemed to him, as was the truth, that 
Halleck would make a better military counselor than 
leader. He solved the puzzling complication which the 
battle of Shiloh and Halleck's jealousy of Grant had raised, 
by appointing the former Commander-in-Chief of all the 
armies, with headquarters at Washington, and thus opening 
the way for the latter to return to the command of the army 
in the field. He thus removed all cause of jealousy in 
Halleck, who was raised at once to the object of his highest 
ambition, and in part, at least, gave Grant a chance to 
further prove himself. When this change was announced 
(nth July, 1862), Halleck, it is said, offered the command of 



142 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the Army of the Tennessee to one Colonel Allen, a quarter- 
master, who promptly refused the responsibility. This was 
intended as a direct affront to Grant. It may be said that 
Halleck owed his elevation to the man whom he so spite- 
fully used. For, upon the victories of Forts Henry and 
Donelson, and of Shiloh, Halleck's reputation as a depart- 
mental chief was built. He had, in reality, not only done 
no fighting, but could not truthfully claim the honor of 
having planned the campaign. 

Grant had suggested and carried out the Fort Don- 
elson campaign; he had also saved the army at Shiloh 
out of the very jaws of defeat into which others had 
thrust it. Time, to which the silent general trusted, was 
slow, but sure to vindicate him. It seemed at this time, 
however, that Lincoln was the only man who, through all 
the clouds of falsehood, partisanship and prejudice, could 
recognize the genius in him. Called to Corinth by a dis- 
patch, he obeyed, appeared quietly before Halleck, and was 
briefly and coldly informed that he should again assume 
command. The Commander-in-Chief did not even explain 
to him his plan with reference to this army, nor the situation 
in the field, but departed at once to Washington. But the 
army and its generals hailed the change with delight; they 
now believed that something would be done for the country. 

Grant found only a remnant of the army which had 
moved upon Corinth. More than two-thirds of the great 
force had been sent to far-off fields, and that which was left 
was scattered at various strategical points, according to 
Halleck's ideas. It was in no condition to resist an attack, 
being separated in a similar manner to that before the battle 
of Shiloh. Corinth was occupied by the principal body, less 
than twenty thousand strong. Various points along the 



THE POSITION AT CORINTH. 



143 



railroads which centered at Corinth were occupied by bodies 
of unequal strength. Grant at once requested permission 
to concentrate the army and make ready for aggressive 
operations. But Halleck replied that it was not designed at 
present for this army to assume the aggressive, but that it 
should hold Corinth and the railroads, while Buell should 
fight a battle near Chattanooga. He was thus compelled to 
stand on the defensive and guard a long supply line, subject 
at all times to be broken by bands of the enemy, a state 




lUKA, MISSISSIPPI 



of affairs that galled him more than did his unmerited 
disgrace. He was inactive several months. Price and Van 
Dorn, two sly, energetic leaders, were laying plots to 
attack the Federal detachments in detail. He suffered 
more from anxiety during these months of idleness than 
in any campaign before or afterward. His whole army, 
garrisons and field forces, did not amount to more than fifty 
thousand men, and of this number he could not, on emer- 
gency, concentrate more than thirty thousand. Price's and 
Van Dorn's combined army outnumbered this force, and 



144 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

thousands of guerilla partisans, efficient to harass his com- 
munications, hovered around him. Sleepless vigilance was 
necessary. In order to comply with Halleck's directions, he 
stationed McPherson at Jackson, Hurlbut at Bolivar, and 
Rosecrans at Corinth, the latter having the main body of 
troops. Smaller detachments were at luka and Rienzi. 

Corinth he caused to be very elaborately fortified, its 
defences being shortened and strengthened until it became 
in fact a fort. All these points were connected, more or 
less, by railroads, so that with a day's warning a large part 
of the army could be concentrated at one point. This was 
the best arrangement that could be made under the circum- 
stances. Grant had his headquarters at Jackson. 

luka was a station on the railroad running southeast 
from Corinth, and about twenty miles from that city. The 
Federal force occupying it was small. Price formed the de- 
sign of capturing it, and did so (September 13, '62), after 
a slight contest. Here he waited for Van Dorn to join him 
with the main force. Grant resolved to turn the game 
on his crafty enemies, as a defensive movement, so as to 
comply with Halleck's orders, and to defeat or capture 
Price before his coadjutor could arrive. Having beaten 
Price, he could turn on Van Dorn, and it would go hard with 
the latter to escape. His plan was to place the Confeder- 
ates at luka between two fires, at the same time interposing 
a force between it and Van Dorn's army. Rosecrans was 
ordered to concentrate a force of nine thousand men at 
Rienzi, southwest of luka, and from that point to come 
against Price, swinging around southward as much as possi- 
ble so as to take the enemy in the rear and to interpose 
between him and Van Dorn. In concert with him, and 
moving so as to arrive before luka simultaneously with him. 



PL\NS TO ATTACK PRICE AND VAN DORN, 



145 




MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM S ROSECRANS. 



Ord, with eight thousand men was sent from Corinth direct 
to a point north of the enemy. Ord was directed to wait till 
Rosecrans should inform him of his approach, and the 
attack was to be made in front and rear at the same 
moment ( i8th and 19th Sept.) 

10 



146 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Had the plan been as well carried out as it was con- 
ceived, Price's army would have been annihilated. The 
only mistake that Grant made here was that he entrusted 
the execution of his plan to subordinates, remaining himself 
with the main army so as to be able at once to direct it 
against Van Dorn. Upon Rosecrans especially did the 
v»reight of duty fall, as he led the force designed to be inter- 
posed between the two Confederate armies. He was an 
energetic officer, but unfortunately was too liable to put his 
own judgment over that of his superiors, and to act as he 
thought proper despite orders. Instead of swinging around 
further south and closing the road south of luka, he marched 
direct from Rienzi upon that place. Ord moved promptly, 
assumed his station as directed, and there stopped to wait 
for Rosecrans. Rosecrans marched slowly and cautiously, 
stopping to reconnoitre, though his orders were to march at 
once upon luka, and attack. He was also greatly impeded 
in his movements by the nature of the country, the narrow 
and winding ways, and the bad state of the roads. Price 
discovered his danger in time to escape. He seized the 
southern road and hurried his trains away, at the same time 
sending a heavy force to attack Rosecrans and hold him in 
check. Ord knew nothing of this. A sharp battle, exceed- 
ingly fierce and bloody, ensued. Rosecrans' van was driven 
back, but his main force repelled the assault. The battle 
lasted from four o'clock in the afternoon until darkness 
caused it to cease. Batteries were taken and lost. The 
musketry fire was close and deadly. 

Price, however, made good his escape. Grant was greatly 
disappointed. He had felt sure that Price could not escape. 
But he did not visit his displeasure upon Rosecrans, only 
pointing out to him where he had failed. 



148 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The commander at once placed nim with the garrison 
at Corinth, determined not to send him again to the 
field. This small campaign well exhibited the genius of 
combination of which Grant was so efficient a master. He 
aimed at nothing less than the destruction of an opposing 
army; it might well be said that he never aimed at less. 

Grant's available force was further weakened about this 
time by the withdrawal of General Thomas with a division, 
he being sent to Buell, who was racing with Bragg across 
Tennessee, and maneuvering with him for strategic advan- 
tages. This compelled Grant to further contract his lines 
around Corinth. The two Confederate leaders now saw a 
chance of victory, and having formed a junction, laid plans 
to capture Corinth. They had thirty-eight thousand 
men. In order to throw Grant off guard they marched first 
toward Memphis as if they would attack that city, but when 
they had reached a point northwest of Corinth, they turned 
suddenly and bore down upon the latter city. Grant pene- 
trated the design, and issued hurried orders to Hurlbut, at 
Bolivar, and McPherson, at Jackson, to move up at once. 
Rosecrans was instructed to hold his fortifications and 
detain the enemy before them until the other divisions could 
come up on the assailants' rear, when the latter would be 
placed between two fires. He hoped that the enemy could 
be held twelve hours. If they could be thus held he was 
confident he could destroy their army. But Rosecrans 
gave battle with his nineteen thousand men in the field 
before Corinth, protected but little by works. 

The Confederate leaders at once attacked, hoping to 
crush him before assistance could come (3d October). The 
Federals were unable to withstand the weight of the 
assaults, and took refuge in the stronger works. Now 



BATTLE OF CORINTH 149 

appeared the excellence of Grant's engineering. Rosecrans 
handled the garrison well, repulsing the assaults with terri- 
ble slaughter. Like storm-clouds against a mountain top 
the masses of Confederate soldiers surged up against the 
works, only to be cut down, hurled back and broken. 
Their shattered columns fled just as McPherson's gal- 
lant men leaped from the cars that brought them swiftly 
to the field, and drew up in battle array. Grant had 
ordered Rosecrans to pursue at once in case the assailants 
were beaten off before the reinforcements should arrive. 
But Rosecrans exercised his own discretion, and stayed in 
camp till the next day. This permitted the enemy to 
escape. The latter had retreated toward the Hatchie 
River. Ord and Hurlbut, with a Federal division, as had 
been directed, were coming to the field from that direction, 
and had already seized the fords and bridges. 

The Confederates were caught as in a trap. Swamps lay 
far out along the roads, and the Federal division, though 
small, stoutly held the bridges, compelling the enemy to take 
a backward course and to march to crossings higher up the 
river. Now had Rosecrans been close in their rear, it 
is not to be seen how they could have escaped total destruc- 
tion. Ord was wounded at the combat for the bridge. The 
enemy escaped, though badly demoralized, after losing seven 
thousand men. The Union loss was about two thousand. 
Grant blamed Rosecrans severely for letting the enemy 
escape so easily. Rosecrans conducted himself with so much 
haughtiness that it almost approached insubordination. The 
Commander became convinced that he could not depend 
upon him to accomplish his orders as given, and was tempted 
to relieve him from command, but did not. He was soon 
relieved of embarrassment on this score, however, for 



150 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Rosecrans, to whom alone was attributed the glory of the 
victory of Corinth, was transferred to an independent 
command over the army which Buell had led. 

The battle of Corinth was decisive in its effects. The 
Federals were not further molested in force. Grant had no. 
further anxiety. But still he was not permitted to make 
an aggressive campaign. Lincoln sent a letter of congratu- 
lation to the army, and promoted Grant to the command of 
a Department, that of the Tennessee (25th Oct., '62). So 
grateful was the President, that Grant and his army were 
said by him to be the only commander and army that had 
as yet given him victory instead of complaints and demands. 
It was a relief to the great President to turn from the gloomy 
scenes in other fields to the brighter west. But Halleck, 
pursuing his own plans, chose to hold Grant in idleness and 
to give others chances to win laurels. The result appeared 
later. 

Meanwhile, .during those long months of idleness, Grant 
had industriously worked to solve a great problem, that 
of caring for the hordes of fugitive slaves that poured into 
his camp. They came expecting deliverance and protec- 
tion, and without money or food; and it was an immense 
burden for the government to feed so many thousands of 
useless people. He solved the problem in a practical 
way. He employed as many as were needed for cooks, ser- 
vants to the officers, wagon-drivers, and laborers around 
camp, paying them for their work, and thus supporting 
them. Their labor supplied that of the white men who 
were placed in the ranks as fighting men, an expedient 
which brought good results. 

Thus, in an indirect way, he reinforced tne army, even 
before the Emancipation Proclamation and the orders fol- 



EMPLOYING THE NEGROES 151 

lowing it made the negroes subject to military service. His 
plan was later adopted by all Union generals. Had he 
been permitted he would have straightway enlisted the 
negroes. 

But the scheme of employment could by no means suffice 
for the great numbers of fugitives. He determined to 
make them self-sustaining. He saw all around him 
immense deserted plantations, fruitful if cultivated, but neg- 
lected and deserted. He detailed officers who organized 
squads of workmen and took temporary possession of the 
plantations; and, as the army was composed of farmers as 
well as of all kinds of mechanics and laborers, he set work 
before them and commanded them to direct the negroes to 
perform it. The immense crops of corn and cotton, and of 
other fruits of husbandry, were gathered, used or sold, and 
the surplus money turned over to the government to aid in 
supporting the fugitives. Thus the cotton, much needed at 
the northern mills, was furnished, and corn and vegetables 
of other descriptions were brought in for the support of the 
army. Grant's army was no burden to the government 
during those months, but rather a profitable servant. The 
Freedman's Bureau, of later date, had its origin here. 

After the decisive victories of Donelson and Shiloh, the 
Mississippi was free, from its source to the stronghold of 
Vicksburg, in northern Mississippi. Columbus, Island 
Ten, Memphis and Fort Pillow, and other points, had fallen 
successively. But Vicksburg had withstood a bombardment, 
lasting more than two months, from a fleet of gunboats 
(Summer, 1862), and had defied all attempts at reduction. 
Grant had begun to urge upon his superiors the desirability 
of marching a combined land and naval force against the 
city soon after he was restored to command at Corinth, 



152 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

but Halleck did not approve. The army was too small to 
attempt the task then. After Van Dorn and Price were so 
badly used at Corinth, however, Grant urged a forward 
movement by land. Halleck approved, and promised all 
assistance possible. 

It was now planned at Washington, that Grant himself 
should lead an army by land against Pemberton, who had 
succeeded Van Dorn and Price in command of the opposing 
forces, and hold him from retreating to aid the garrison in 
Vicksburg, while a combined expedition of troops and gun- 
boats should proceed to a point above Vicksburg, and from 
that direction attack it. It was hoped in this way to beat 
the enemy in detail, and thus cause the fall of the city. 
It was a well-laid scheme, if forces adequate to the under- 
taking had been furnished. But Grant, who knew nothing 
about the proposed river expedition at first, and had made 
several marches before it was definitely resolved upon, did 
not have troops enough to guard his long supply line and 
make head against a strong enemy at the same time. The 
people of the country through which he was compelled to 
advance were hostile. A small body of troops, or even the 
guerrilla bands, could interrupt his communications with 
impunity. When he learned that the river expedition must 
go, however, he chose General Sherman, already proven to 
be a competent and energetic soldier, to command it, though 
great influence was exerted to have McClernand appointed 
to that command. Halleck, however, did not have a great 
liking for politicians as soldiers, and finally resolved to ac- 
commodate Grant as against McClernand, and Sherman was 
confirmed in the command. How excellent was the Com- 
mander's judgment in appointing him later history has 
shown; for, next to Grant, Sherman stands preeminent 



THE LOCATION OF VICKSBURG. 



153 



among the Federals as a commander and a natural leader 
of armies. Unfortunate in his first expedition, he won 
success afterwards. 

Vicksburg and Port Hudson were the northern and 
southern points of that part of the Mississippi river still held 
by the South, the Federals having pushed their way north 
from the Gulf as far as the latter city, and, as aforesaid, 
south as far as the former. The eastern and western por- 
tions of the so-called Confederacy, naturally separated by 
the great river, were held together, as it were, by this band 
between the two cities. It was Grant's purpose to cut the 
band, and to separate the eastern part from the great store- 
houses of the western. 

The city of Vicksburg, called " The Gibraltar of the 
West" because of its strong situation and great fortifi- 
cations, stood on the eastern shore of the river. It was 
important, for if it should fall. Port Hudson could be easily 
captured, all the intermediate points would be taken, and 
the connecting belt of two hundred miles of river would be 
cut through. The South saw its importance, and strove 
with all the arts of war to render it^impregnable. They 
made its capture the mightiest task that any western general 
should ever undertake. 

The strong current of the Mississippi flows in a general 
southerly course toward the Gulf, but at a point about five 
miles above Vicksburg it turns sharply to the northeast, as 
if to meet the stream of the Yazoo river, which flows into it 
from the northeast here; after forming a junction with 
the Yazoo, just above the city, it turns again and flows 
to the southwest till it reaches the line of its general 
course when it turns southward. Thus, a long slender 
tongue of land, from a half to two miles wide, was formed 



154 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

by the bend, whose surface was but a few feet above the 
level of the river. 

On the hills along the southeastern side of this bend 
was Vicksburg. North of it the flat lands between the 
Yazoo and the Mississippi stretched away for hundreds of 
miles; east and south of it the hilly lands of northern Miss- 
issippi stretched away to the Big Black river, which emptied 
into the Mississippi a score of miles south of the city. The 
bluffs rising from the Yazoo to this high land were very 
steep and rugged, and capable of easy defence. To the 
north and west the city looked out upon and was protected 
by immense tracts of river and swamp, while in its rear were 
hills and rivers capable of being turned into strong defences. 
Its batteries swept the rivers, its lines of intrenchment and 
forts covered the interior. 

It was impossible for gunboats from the river to elevate 
their guns so as to harm the city, on account of its height 
above the stream; it was equally hard to erect effective bat- 
teries on the land side, because of protecting hills. At 
Haines Bluff, north of the city, and along the Yazoo, the 
engineers had erected batteries, whose plunging fire could 
demolish any craft that should attempt to ascend that river, 
and the stream had been obstructed. From this point an 
extensive line of works inclosed the city — trenches, lunettes, 
forts, and various batteries — to the Mississippi, several 
miles below; and these were placed on the brows of deep 
gullies and ravines in most commanding situations. There 
were batteries along the shore, also, whose great guns 
threatened destruction to any craft that should attempt to 
pass. A garrison of several thousand men held the works, 
and it was Pemberton's duty to fall back to the city's support 
whenever necessary. Railroads connected it with Jackson, 



VICKSBURG CONSIDERED IMPREGNABLE. 



155 




MAJOR-GENERAL HENRV W. HALLECK. 

the State Capital, and other points in the interior. Such 
was Vicksburg, which the South boasted could not be taken 
In pursuance of the plan approved by Halleck, and with 
the meao-er forces under his command, Grant prepared the 
expedition against Vicksburg. He himself marched upon 
Holly Springs and La Grange (2nd Nov. '62), des.gnmg to 



156 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

attack Pemberton, who held his army in a strong position 
on the Tallahatchie river, and Sherman, after much unavoid- 
able delay, placed his troops on transports and descended 
the Mississippi to the mouth of the Yazoo. 

By a sudden flank movement the Federal commander 
forced the enemy from his position and compelled him to 
retreat. Grant pursued as far as Oxford. Pemberton 
would not accept battle, preferring to remain on the defen- 
sive, and knowing that his opponent's fighting power was 
growing less as his line of communication grew longer; 
for the Union army had not yet learned to move without a 
base from which to draw supplies, and to keep up its com- 
munications with its base strong bodies of troops had to be 
stationed at the chief points along the line, and other 
strong bodies to convoy the trains bringing supplies. So 
that, as Grant advanced southward he found the striking 
force of his army steadily diminishing, and soon his forces 
were inferior in numbers to those of his antagonist, who, 
being in a friendly country, was able to place all his troops 
in battle line. 

It was in vain that he called upon Halleck for reinforce- 
ments — all the troops which could have been sent him were 
sent elsewhere. Van Dorn, with several thousand men, was 
operating east of him and laying plots to break through his 
supply line. Pemberton had about thirty thousand men. 
The numbers of the enemy and their activity made Grant's 
position extremely perilous as he penetrated deeper and 
deeper into the hostile country. Pemberton's Fabian pol- 
icy was a good defence; but Grant's weakness in numbers 
alone saved him at this time from losing Vicksburg. And 
while Sherman was yet on the way down the river, (20th 
December) that happened which Grant had feared. 



THE SURRENDER OF HOLLY SPRINGS. 157 

Van Dorn suddenly appeared before Holly Springs, a 
chief depot of the Federal supplies, and demanded and 
received its surrender from Colonel Murphy, who com- 
manded the garrison and who was either a coward or a 
traitor. This same Murphy had abandoned luka to Price 
when that general appeared before it, as noted before; he 
had force enough at Holly Springs to have held it from Van 
Dorn for several days, had he attempted, and Grant could 
easily have rescued him. But his fatal action severed the 
Federal supply line, and Grant was compelled to retrace his 
steps and reconquer the place 

Pemberton seized the opportunity to hurry into Vicks- 
burg with a small force, just as Sherman hurled his army 
across the marshy fields at Chickasaw Bayou against the 
heights of Haines' Bluff. Sherman could not use more 
than half his troops; the hills were exceedingly strong both 
by nature and art; Pemberton's approach gave spirit to the 
garrison, and the result of the conflict was a severe repulse. 
The arrival of the bulk of Pemberton's troops a little later 
made the place impregnable to Sherman's assault. But, 
though a very small part of Pemberton's forces had arrived 
at Vicksburg, before the assault, the works were strong 
enough at the point of attack to have withstood Sher- 
man without any aid from those forces. The cutting of 
Giant's supply line had little if any, influence in defeating 
the assault; Haines' Bluff was impregnable. Sherman was 
not to blame; he could not test the works before the assault. 
McClernand arrived shortly after the repulse, and, being 
the ranking officer, assumed command of the troops. 
Sherman readily accepted the situation, though a soldier 
by education and experience, while McClernand had been 
a civilian until the war begun. 



158 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

McClernand and Sherman led the defeated army against 
Arkansas post, in Arkansas, and succeeded in capturing 
it and five thousand prisoners. Having performed this 
exploit, they led the army back to Napoleon, and thence, 
in accordance with Grant's imperative orders, to Young's 
Point, on the Mississippi river, a short distance above 
Vicksburg. McClernand was elated by his success, and 
because of this, and on account of his political friends 
who stood in the high places of the Government, he 
carried matters with a high hand, much to Sherman's dis- 
gust. He arrogated to himself powers alr^ost equal to those 
of the Commander himself, going even so far as to dispute 
with him as to the limit of authority of each, and laying 
himself liable to a court-martial for insubordination. 

Grant was a very patient man. He believed McClernand 
to be a brave, even if an ignorant soldier. He was tempted 
to relieve him, but he forebore, and solved all disputes by 
going to Young's Point in person and assuming command. 
He had resolved himself to lead the army down the river 
against Vicksburg, and this procedure was in consonance 
with his design. He soon reduced McClernand to his place. 

The following winter (1862-63) was, perhaps, the darkest 
period of the Rebellion to the Union cause. The Federal 
loss at Stone River, without proportionate success else- 
where, the terrible repulse at Fredericksburg, and the disas- 
trous battle of Chancellorsville, gave courage to the South 
and disheartened the North. Those of the Democratic 
Party in the northern states who were so rabid that they 
were denominated, expressively, "Copperheads," became 
bolder and more rampant, and the elections in the loyal 
states did not result so favorably for the Union cause as 
they should have. Secret societies of traitorous men, such 



DARK DAYS FOR THE UNION. 159 

as "The Knights of the Golden Circle," plotted and planned 
to overturn the National Government, strove to hamper the 
authorities in control of the enlistment of troops, and raised 
riots in various places. Men who, at this day, are prom- 
inent politicians, and whose loud boast is their eagerness to 
serve their country, were then cowardly and sneaking, 
afraid to join their nobler brethren of the South, who were 
bearing arms, but were content to enjoy the protection of 
the government which secretly they strove to harm. Dis- 
couragement, foreboding, distrust and anxiety, filled the 
hearts of loyal people; but, with all this, there was a dogged 
determination to fight till victory should come. 

Grant was one of those who believed that victory could 
be won only by long, hard fighting, but that it should be won 
at all costs and hazards. He never for a moment doubted 
the ability of the loyal soldiers to make head against the 
disloyal, when properly officered and combined in sufficient 
numbers to occupy the country they should be able to win. 
He recognized the fact that the present enemies, against 
whom he was directing his arms, were soldiers of the same 
race, equal in courage and ability; against them it would be 
folly to lead inferior forces, even under competent leaders. 

An army of fifty thousand men was gradually collected at 
Young's Point, and at other places north along the river. 
Continuous rains flooded the flat countries, causing the rivers 
to overflow their banks and rendering the roads impassable. 
The army, being encamped along the river banks on the 
levees, was thus placed as if upon islands, and its communi- 
cations were wholly by steamer with the surrounding coun- 
try. Grant studied the situation carefully. How to come 
at the city with reasonable chances of succeeding, was the 
question which he set himself to solve. 



160 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 




GRANTS OPERATIOMS 

ABOVE cVlCKSBURG 



In order to 
move infantry 
and cavalry, it 
was necessary to 
get upon dry 
land. The only 
dry land that 
seemed availa- 
ble and by which 
an approach 
could be made, 
was in the rear 
of Vicksburg. 
He had tried to 
come southward 
along the high 
ridges and hills 
east of the Ya- 
zoo and its trib- 
utaries, and had 
found it impos- 
sible with his 
small army. It 
would be mad- 
ness to attempt 
Haines' Bluff, as 
Sherman's dis- 
aster witnessed. 
He cast his eye 
to the high 
ground in the 
rear of the 



PLAN FOR CAPTURING VICKSBURG. ' 161 

Stronghold, allowed it to wander southward to the Missis- 
sippi at the mouth of Black river, saw that there the high 
lands touched the river, and, in his own mind, began to 
shape a plan. 

If he could but cross the river below the city, attain the 
high land and get around to the rear, then the city would 
fall. But the inclemencies of the weather, the overflow of 
the river, and the opposition he would be sure to meet, if he 
should leave other plans, already suggested or ordered from, 
higher authorities, without attempt to follow them, induced 
him to wait patiently. Meanwhile one of these suggested 
plans might succeed; and, if not, the army would be occupied, 
and the people of the north would be satisfied that idleness 
was not being indulged. He himself had little faith in the 
ultimate success of these plans; he saw truly that Vicksburg 
would not fall without stern fighting. 

The first of these plans, or schemes, was to dig a canal 
across the base of the narrow peninsula before Vicksburg, 
thus to create a new channel for the river, and cause it to 
leave the city inland and approachable by land from the 
west as well as from the east. This seemed no hard task. 
Indeed, the river has since changed its course, but not at 
man's behest. It was Halleck's idea; and some time pre- 
viously a ditch had been commenced. Grant did not believe 
the river would change its course, though he hoped to dig a 
canal large enough to float his transports through to the 
high ground below the city. Cyrus could turn the course of 
the Euphrates and enter Babylon, but the conditions were, 
doubtless, more favorable to his scheme than to this of 
Halleck's, though learned men said the idea was good. 
Again, the engineers who had control of the work had 
begun the northern end of the canal, at a point where the 
11 



162 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



>-i^+,.^^^-%^^v 




CUTTING THE CANAL. 



current whirled away in a great eddy; and if the ditch could 
have been completed, it is very doubtful whether the stream 
would have had force enough to have cut its way through 
even the loose soil of the new channel. 

But the work was begun, and prosecuted with great vigor 
until Pemberton, learning the Federal design, planted a 



CUTTING THE CANAL ABANDONED. 168 

battery on the south side of the bend in such a position that 
its shot enfiladed the ditch and drove out the workmen. 
Then the river rose, broke over its bank, and flooded the 
work, making it impossible to do further excavating. The 
scheme was then abandoned, it having been plainly demon- 
strated that no canal could be made here. But Grant did 
not cease effort. The first idea suggested another. 

At one time, no doubt, the Mississippi, or a large branch 
of it, had its course through Lake Providence and several 
long winding bayous and deep streams into the Red river, 
and thence back to its present course, a channel more than 
four hundred miles long. It may seem strange to many 
that the water-surface of the Mississippi is, at some points, 
higher than the surrounding country, it having, during a 
long course of years, by deposits of sand and mud brought 
down from the rich northern valleys through which it f^ows, 
slowly raised itself and its bed; but such is the fact. During 
the winter and spring rains it was accustomed to overflow 
its banks, and convert the surrounding country into lakes. 
But the people who inhabited the valley were not long in 
discovering the value of the rich deposits of loam left by the 
receding waters when the rains ceased, and they constructed 
great levees along the low banks, and sought to hold in the 
stream to its channel. In all ordinary seasons they were 
able to accomplish this, and only when there was an extra- 
ordinary flood did the great waters break loose. 

The river was high at the time Grant conceived the 
design of opening the levees, and letting the turgid waters 
into Lake Providence, hoping thereby to obtain a channel 
deep enough to float his vessels to the Red river. He 
set a part of McPherson's corps to the work of cutting the 
levee, but, having gone to explore a part of the proposed 



164 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

route in person, he became satisfied that a sufficient channel 
could not be made, and ordered the work to cease. Leaving 
the western side for the time, he next turned his attention 
to the eastern side, and studied the bottom-lands between 
the Mississippi and the Yazoo, hoping to find a practicable 
route to the high lands east of the last-mentioned river. 
Numerous bayous, creeks, and devious channels intersected 
this low land, some of them almost connecting the two 
rivers. It was thought that by cutting the levees at a point 
opposite Helena, Arkansas, a sufficient volume of water 
might be diverted from the great river into the swamps and 
bayous to deepen and connect them sufficiently to enable 
steamers of light draft to pass to the Yazoo. 

The cut was made (2nd Feb., 1863), and a mighty tor- 
rent rushed through into the swamps, submerging hundreds 
of miles of land, and forming a great shallow lake. It 
seemed that some success would follow, A small force of 
troops and several of the lighter gunboats and transports 
passed through and slowly felt their way to the junction of 
the Yalobusha and Tallahatchie rivers, which by their 
junction form the Yazoo; but here their progress was stopped 
by a small fort, erected by the enemy on an island in such a 
position that the fleet could not assail it with effect, and 
could not pass. The channel was so narrow that the boats 
could not turn so as to bring their guns to bear upon the 
fort, nor could a storming party be landed and advanced on 
account of the surrounding swamps. The fort was not 
more than a foot above the water's level, and, when news of 
this had been sent back to Grant, he ordered a new cut to 
be made in the levee, hoping thereby to raise the streams 
and flood the fort. But this effort was unavailing; and, as 
the Confederates were fortifying various points along the 



OPERATIONS UP THE YAZOO. 



165 



Yazoo and further obstructing its course, the attempt along 
this line was reluctantly abandoned. 

Still determined to try every plan that ojffered any hope 
of success during the winter, Grant next turned his atten- 
tion to the mouth of the Yazoo and Steele's Bayou. 
Haines' Bluff is on the bend of the Yazoo several miles 
above the mouth of the stream. Steele's Bayou entered 




BAYOU NAVIGATION. 



the Yazoo from the north at some distance below this bluff. 
One passing up the bayou would, after an exceedingly tor- 
tuous course, come to within one mile of the Mississippi, at 
a point about forty miles above the mouth of the bayou, 
then would turn off in an easterly direction to the Sun- 
flower river, with which it was connected by various sloughs. 
The Sunflower river flowed into the Yazoo. Admiral 



166 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Porter readily co-operated with him in all these attempts, 
and with part of his fleet ascended the Yazoo to the point 
where Steele's Bayou entered, thence passed up the bayou 
to the point where it approached the Mississippi, where he 
was joined by a small land force which had mat-ched across 
from the Mississippi. He succeeded in reaching a point 
about half a mile from the Sunflower river with his gun- 
boats; but was there stopped by obstructions in the bayou, 
and was exceedingly annoyed by the harassing fire of hun- 
dreds of sharpshooters, against whom his great guns were 
useless. He fell into such straits finally, that he was com- 
pelled to send back to Grant for help, saying that unless it 
came soon he would have to destroy his boats to prevent 
them falling into the hands of the enemy. Sherman, who 
was in command of the forces designed to co-operate with 
him, hurried forward by forced marches, and rescued the 
boats from their great peril. 

Attempts on the east side of the river were then 
abandoned, and Grant turned his attention once more to 
the west, seeking a channel by which to convey his army to 
a point south of the city. He resolved to open a channel 
from a point near Milliken's Bend through bayous and con- 
necting creeks to Carthage, Louisiana. The work was 
begun and promised greater success than any of his previ- 
ous attempts, when a sudden fall of the Mississippi lowered 
the waters in all the bayous and rendered all efforts fruit- 
less. 

So ended the preliminary operations, undertaken with 
the three-fold purpose of convincing the army and the peo- 
ple that such efforts could not succeed, of employing and 
keeping up the spirit of the army, and of passing the time 
until the subsiding of the floods would open a way to the 



THE CARE OF THE ARMY. 



167 



accomplishing of his ultimate plan. The rainy season 
passed. The great floods of water from the northern val- 
leys and hills went by, and the country along the river 
reappeared. 

The army, despite the fact that it had been surrounded 
for so long by water, and had been encamped on damp, low 
ground, was in reasonably good condition when the time 
came for operations in the field. Grant had carefully 




THROUGH THE SWAMPS. 



watched over the health of his troops. Charitable and 
patriotic organizations supplied the soldiers with many of 
the luxuries of life, and made them donations of all kinds of 
supplies necessary to supplement hard army fare and make 
it endurable. The Commander gave these organizations 
every aid in his power, placing at their disposal all his 



168 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

transports and railroads. He is reported to have remarked 
to a certain lady who said that she had observed evidences 
of scurvy among the troops, that it seemed that "Onions 
and potatoes were indispensable to the taking of Vicksburg." 
He established rigid rules of cleanliness and order among 
the troops, but was not, in matters of discipline, at any time, 
a martinet. 

His plain habits of dress, his unassuming appearance, his 
readiness to recognize a private as well as an officer, and his 
care for their welfare, endeared him to the rank and file. 
They recognized in him a man to be respected for his 
worth, not for his office. He was a man from among the 
people; as such, he gave himself no airs of superiority. The 
troops cheerfully undertook all that he appointed to be 
done, confident that success and safety lay in obedience 
to his commands. 

But, though the troops retained unbounded confidence 
in their commander, not all the people did. The news- 
papers inimical to the progress of the Federal arms were 
joined by many that supported those arms in throwing 
jibes and taunts at Grant, because, forsooth the hairbrained 
schemes of political generals could not be carried out, and 
Vicksburg taken, despite lakes, swamps, guns and brave 
enemies. They knew nothing of the plan which he was 
maturing all the time of this delay, the grandeur of which 
was to startle the nation. For Grant did not, till the time 
for action came, intimate his plans to any one, not even to 
Sherman, his friend and adviser. The people at large 
became restive. Even his most powerful friends in govern- 
ment and elsewhere became despondent. Loud-voiced 
enemies clamored for his removal. Men seemed to forget 
his victories at Donelson and Shiloh, and the great defence 



MURMURS AGAINST GRANT. 169 

of Corinth. But Lincoln, the President, judged him cor- 
rectly, knowing the immense difficulties of the campaign he 
was prosecuting, and stood by him despite the clamor. To 
some of those who officiously advised the silent command- 
er's removal, he replied, "I rather like the man. I think I'll 
try him a little longer." 

Halleck, too, having m the height of his power forgotten 
his fear of rivalry, and with true soldierly instinct, having 
recognized the difficulties surrounding Vicksburg, and not 
finding any man fitter to trust with the undertaking, sup- 
ported Grant during these days. 

Grant himself apparently paid no attention to the 
assaults of critics and politicians; knowing his own purpose, 
he believed himself right, and calmly allowed the clamor 
against him to rise without protest. He had not sought 
high commands; he had not sought honors; he could have 
relinquished his command with the same equanimity with 
which he had assumed it. He owed his place to no favor- 
itism; he was not obliged, therefore, to consult the wishes 
of any supporters. He stood alone on his merits; they sup- 
ported him. It was a belief, amounting almost to supersti- 
tion, with him, that one ought not to seek responsible 
positions, but ought to leave to Providence the choice of 
those to fill such positions. And when one studies the 
rise of Grant to the supreme power in the nation, it becomes 
apparent that he acted on this faith, that his ambition was 
to do his duty leaving the results to themselves. 

One sees, upon examining the map of Vicksburg and 
surroundings, a triangular space, with the city at the north- 
western apex, and with the cities of Jackson and Grand Gulf 
at the eastern and southwestern apices respectively. The 
Mississippi river bounds the western side of this triangle. 



170 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



and the Big Black river runs diagonally from the north side 
through to the vicinity of Grand Gulf, where it empties into 
the former river. 

Grant's plan, simply stated, was to gain a footing on the 
high ground at or near Grand Gulf, and from that point to 
fight his way northward to the rear of Vicksburg, and 
endeavor to connect at Haines' Bluff with the Union fleet 




CALHpUN 
BRd-WNSVIUCy-'" i "'""(^ »» 

-Q., v^bP'. .^..j,.;^^ .^J( TUQALO" ■ 



MAP OF VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN. 



above the city on the Yazoo, and lay siege to the stronghold 
from that side. In his mind he had laid out a number of 
possible ways to gain that point, the choice of a final route 
to be determined by the circumstances of the field and the 
movements of the enemy. 

There was an alternative plan, the one which he imparted 
to Halleck, which embraced the seizure of Grand Gulf, and 
cooperation with General Banks, who was ascending the 



GRANT S PLANS. 172 

Mississippi, to attack Port Hudson. His ultimate design 
of fighting his way northward to the rear of Vicksburg, 
he imparted to no one. His best officers did not approve 
the alternative plan, because it was, in effect, placing the 
enemy's stronghold between the army and its connections 
with the loyal states, hitherto an unheard of idea. Sherman 
wrote his commander a long letter, giving his views ad- 
versely to the plan, but without effect. 

Grant's first step would be the most critical. The first 
march would be down the river, along the levees and roads, 
to a point opposite Grand Gulf. But it would be useless to 
march troops to that point unless transportation could be 
provided to ferry them across the river. He designed to 
have as many vessels as possible run by the batteries of 
Vicksburg, and to act both as ferries and blockaders. 

In order to distract the enemy's attention Grant inten- 
ded that Colonel Grierson with a strong cavalry force, 
should march from La Grange, Tennessee, southward in the 
rear of Vicksburg, and destroy railroads and confederate 
property as much as possible 

The field into which Grant would move after crossing 
was broken, and better for defensive than for offensive oper- 
ations, it being a hilly country, with deep ravines, opening 
into deeper creeks and rivers, with heavy forests and under- 
brush here and there, without good roads, and with many 
other natural obstructions to an invasion. But it was, never- 
theless, a rich country, its farms bearing great quantities of 
grain, hay, and other produce, besides being filled with 
herds of cattle and swine. He noted all of these matters, 
and conceived the idea of making the country feed the 
army, so that the latter would not be compelled to depend 
upon its connections. 



172 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Having formulated his plans, and having Halleck's con- 
sent to the movement on Grand Gulf, Grant collected his 
army at Milliken's Bend, and thoroughly organized it for the 
expedition. Provisions M^ere gathered, ammunition was 
carefully prepared, the troops w^ere brought into a high state 
of discipline, and, in fact, all that a careful soldier could pro- 
vide was provided. The winter rains ceased; the turgid 
river subsided; its banks reappeared from the flood. The 
earth resumed its ordinary appearance as in summer. The 
time was come for the beginning of the great expedition. 

Admiral Porter readily entered into Grant's plans, and 
prepared his fleet with great vigor for undertaking the pass- 
age of the Confederate batteries. A call was made for 
volunteers to man the transports designed for carrying sup- 
plies, and for ferrying troops across the river below the city. 
Great numbers responded, familiar, by reason of their pro- 
fessions, with machinery and navigation. Meanwhile (29th 
March, 1863), McClernand was directed to move by any 
practicable route to a point opposite Grand Gulf, so that he 
might be ready, as soon as the boats should pass the city, to 
cross over and assail Grand Gulf. As he found the roads 
in an almost impassable condition, it was a fortnight before 
he could arrive at the designated point. Roads had to be 
explored, creeks and bayous had to be bridged, swamps had 
to be filled, and roads made across them; ways had to be 
cut through dense forest and canebrake, and many other 
great impediments had to be overcome. But, with immense 
labor, this corps finally appeared on the river at the point 
indicated. 

Porter's task was the most perilous. His ships would be 
exposed to the enemy's batteries for several miles of the 
proposed run; but he trusted that, with the aid of darkness 



RUNNING THE BATTERIES. 173 

and a swift current, he would be able to go by without much 
harm. He designed with his gun-boats to engage the bat- 
teries while the transports fled swiftly by in the darkness. 
The unarmored steamers, or transports, were piled high on 
the decks with cotton bales, grain and hay, while to them 
and in tow large barges of provisions and supplies were 
fastened. Eight gun-boats and three steamers, with several 
barges, were selected for the attempt. The distance to be 
traveled from the starting point to a point out of reach of 
the enemy's guns below, was about fourteen miles. 

Pemberton was watchful and suspicious. Fearing that a 
night attack might be attempted from the river, or that the 
Federals would attempt some scheme to cross the peninsula 
before the city, he had caused several huge piles of debris 
to be made ready upon the river shore for firing at a 
moment's notice. As the time for opening the campaign 
approached and signs of increased activity were seen in the 
Union camp, he caused greater vigilance to be observed, and 
projected several schemes for ascertaining his enemy's in- 
tention. 

There came a night (i6th April) , dark, gloomy and damp; 
and, all things being ready, the order was given for move- 
ment. Grant accompanied the vessels to a point from 
which he might obtain a view of the lights of the city, and 
on a transport anchored in mid-river, watched the splendid 
scene that followed. The devoted vessels moved away into 
the darkness, silently hugging the western shore of the 
river. 

For an hour all was silent. Then the watchful sentinels 
perceived the dark bodies of the vessels and gave the 
alarm. At once the gunners in the city sprang to their bat- 
teries and opened fire. The torch was applied to the piles 



174 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



of debris on the shores, and the ruddy flames threw a 
weird glare over the scene, lighting up the clouds of 
smoke bursting from the batteries, showing the dim out- 
lines of the swift steamers and the heavy bodies of the gun- 
boats. The thunder of the great guns was incessant. 
Showers of shot were poured upon the vessels. The gun- 
boats replied warmly, and the thunder from the hills was 
rolled back by the thunder from the waters. For two hours 








Copyright 1868, Harper & Bro3. 



From Harper's nistorr of Civil War 



RUNNING THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES 



and a half did the weird battle continue, the thunder mov- 
ing steadily down the river as the fleet passed down. The 
gun-boats were but little injured. The transports were all 
more or less disabled and one of them was abandoned. 
Some had their machinery broken. But the greater num- 
ber escaped with injuries that could be easily repaired. 
The fleet passed beyond the reach of the batteries; the 
mighty roar of the cannonade ceased; the bonfires burned 
out and darkness fell upon the scene. Grant returned to his 



Sherman's movements. 175 

tent, satisfied lhat the passage had been a complete success. 

McPherson's corps had been advanced on the track of 
McClernand's, and Grant, whose presence was urgently 
requested by several officers who were not at all satisfied 
that McClernand should lead, started also for the front as 
soon as he could arrange matters In the camp. Sherman's 
corps was left for the present at Young's Point, and Its com- 
mander had orders to lead it up the Yazoo and make heavy 
demonstrations against Haines' Bluff, so as to call Pember- 
ton's attention to that point and away from Grand Gulf. As 
soon as the first two corps should cross below, Sherman was 
to follow their path with all haste. 

This plan was carried out to the letter. Pember- 
ton was so deceived that he believed at one time that 
Grant's movements down the river were but a ruse to draw 
him from Haines' Bluff, which would be the chief point of 
assault. Nor was he undeceived until the Federal cannon 
were making merry music before Grand Gulf. Grant found 
that McClernand had consulted his own wishes, and, though 
iVdmlral Porter had offered the immediate use of his boats, 
had hesitated to cross over to attack Grand Gulf, and the 
garrison had Improved the time to prepare for a stout resist- 
ance. 

It was at Porter's earnest solicitation that Grant came at 
once to the front, riding forty miles on horseback without 
alighting, though he was not at all physically well. He found 
that McClernand had driven the enemy out of the hamlet 
of Richmond, and had occupied New Carthage. This point 
was several miles above Grand Gulf. Grant eagerly exam- 
ined the opposite shore for a suitable place to cross, but the 
high ground was so far from the river, and swamps Inter- 
vened to such an extent, that he concluded to pass further 



176 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



down and seek a landing nearer the city. He then led the 
army to Hard Times, a village opposite Grand Gulf. Here 
he prepared to attack, while at Chickasaw Bayou Sherman 
was threatening an assault. The expedition was well under 
way and now approaching its most critical point. 

The plan of reduction of Grand Gulf was simple. Porter 
deemed himself able with his gunboats to reduce the bat- 
teries to silence, though Grant doubted his ability to do so; 
and, when the batteries should be silenced, Grant, with ten 
thousand picked men ready on transports, designed to cross 




FLEET ATTACKING GRAND GULF. 



over and storm the works. Porter overrated the strength 
of his fleet and underrated the strength of the batteries. 
Grand Gulf was situated somewhat similarly to Vicksburg. 
There was a similar bend in the river, a stream emptying 
into it north of the city, and a peninsula in front of it. But 
its batteries were not so well protected and did not have as 
sweeping range. Another fleet of transports and barges had 
succeeded in passing Vicksburg (22nd April) , thus furnish- 
ing supplies and means for ferrying a large force across at 
one voyage. 



THE FLEET PASSES GRAND GULF. 177 

All being arranged, Porter gallantly led his gunboats 
against the batteries (29th April) , and for six hours poured 
a tempest of shot and shell upon them. The enemy replied 
with spirit. Little impression could be made by the bom- 
bardment, owing to the height of the position of the city 
batteries. It became evident that on the river side, Grand 
Gulf was not inferior to Vicksburg in strength. At mid- 
day Porter gave up the attempt, and withdrew. Grant at 
once went on board the flag-ship and conferred with the 
Admiral. Several of the sailors and marines had been killed 
and a number wounded. The Admiral was satisfied that he 
could not reduce the city. 

Grant suggested that he run the batteries with the whole 
fleet during the coming night, while he himself should lead 
the army several miles further down by land to a point 
opposite Bruinsburg, Mississippi, from which place, a slave 
had informed him, a good road led out to the high ground 
which he was striving to reach. The Admiral assented. 
The ten thousand troops were landed and the army was 
ordered to march. At night the fleet passed the city with- 
out notice, and met the army at the point indicated. Immed- 
iately as many of the troops as possible were embarked, and 
the fleet stood away swiftly to the landing at Bruinsburg, 
where it arrived before the surprised Confederates could 
guess the intention of their foe. Disembarkation was 
easily effected and Grant soon trod the high ground which 
he had so long attempted to win (30th April). He felt that 
half of the campaign was successfully accomplished. 

All haste was made at the landing. The troops were 

formed into column and hurried to the hills two miles from 

the river, it being the design to seize the roads through them 

and get a position at least equal to any that an opposing 

12 



178 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

force could secure. The transports were sent back in haste 
after the remainder of the army, and swift messengers were 
dispatched to Sherman ordering him to come with all speed. 
Grant personally superintended the debarkation. There 
was no confusion. 

The Commander here displayed the intense energy that 
was in him, but which was generally well concealed under a 
calm exterior. He was determined that no delay should 
destroy the effect of his ruse. He had outwitted the Con- 
federate general; he would retain his advantage. He 
caused two days rations to be issued to the troops as they 
marched out of the boats and towards the hills. No 
time was allowed to take account. Within two hours after 
the first transport touched the Mississippi shore, the feet of 
the foremost regiment were treading the roads through the 
hills on their way toward Port Gibson. 

Grant was nov/, one might say, in the enemy's coun- 
try. The strength of the army, when the three corps should 
be united, would somewhat exceed thirty-three thousand 
men. The active forces opposed to him, though scattered, 
amounted to nearly double that number. His immediate 
task was the reduction of Grand Gulf; and as Port Gibson 
occupied a flanking position on the roads leading into that 
city, it was to be the first object of attack. Ten thousand 
men composed the garrison of these two points, and more 
than half of this force was already hastily advancing from 
Port Gibson to intercept the Federal march. 

The hostile forces met about five miles from the town, 
McClernand commanding the Federals, and Gen. Bowen the 
Confederates. A sharp collision occurred, but the night was 
so dark that both parties abstained from a general battle 
until the daylight of the next morning should aid them. 



BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON. 179 

During the night, the Commander completed his duty of 
transferring McPherson's corps from the west side of the 
river, and sending it after McClernand's corps. A small 
force was left at Hard Times on the western shore to guard 
it until Sherman should come, thus preserving connection 
between the corps. Grant passed the night, or rather a 
small part of it, reclining on the ground with the troops; 
but, early in the morning he hurried out to the battle field, 
where already the boom of heavy guns told that the cam- 
paign had opened in earnest. 

As it happened, the enemy had obtained a good defen- 
sive position. The ground was very rough, the hills and 
deep ravines being covered densely with trees and under- 
growth. The road forked just before reaching the field of 
battle, the forks continuing along two almost parallel ridges, 
about a mile apart, and with a deep ravine between, grown 
full of a matted jungle of vines, creepers, bushes and trees, 
almost impenetrable to man. Across these two roads and 
the ravine, and into the woods on either side, the Confeder- 
ate line was drawn. The only points of attack that McCler- 
nand could perceive were where the roads intersected the 
enemy's line; and, dividing his forces, he sent a part along 
each road to the assault. But the Confederates, though 
numerically inferior, were able to concentrate their troops 
along the roads so that they opposed a strong front 
to the attacks, and successfully held their ground. The 
battle raged fiercely. Grant presently arrived on the field 
and for a moment studied the situation. McPherson's 
advance also came up, and part was sent to reinforce the 
troops on each road. 

Grant now assumed personally the direction of the 
battle. Knowing that he had the largest force, he sent a 




1^0 



CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON. 181 

brigade to the left so far that it extended beyond the Con- 
federate right. This was then faced to the right, and directed 
to attack the enemy's flank. A deep ravine protected their 
right, but the Federals struggled through the undergrowth 
in it, ascended the hill and turned the position. At once, 
Grant ordered a general assault along the road at the left. 
It was gallantly made and the enemy was driven in haste 
from the field. 

Meanwhile McClernand, believing that numbers alone 
would win, although only a part of his force could be 
engaged, owing to the nature of the ground, was demanding 
reinforcements, and declaring that without them he could 
not hope to succeed. But when the Confederate right was 
driven from the field, the left also gave way and hastily 
retired toward Port Gibson. Pursuit was made to a short 
distance from the town, but was stopped by the approach of 
night. The first victory of the famous campaign was won. 
The forces on the field were unequal, the enemy having not 
more than six thousand men. Grant having nineteen thou- 
sand; but not more than half of this force was engaged. 
The losses were heavy compared with the numbers fighting; 
the Confederates losing fourteen hundred men, the Fed- 
erals eight hundred and fifty. Grant was well pleased. 
Success imparted a fine morale to his troops. 

Port Gibson was evacuated during the night, and the 
bridge across the south fork of Bayou Pierre destroyed. 
The Federals at once seized and occupied the town, and 
began quickly to rebuild the bridge. This was completed 
during the day, and pursuit was made to the bridges of the 
north fork of the bayou, which were also found destroyed. 
Grant believed that the easiest way to reduce Grand Gulf 
was to threaten its communications with Vicksburg. He 



182 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

set his men to work rebuilding the bridges over the north 
fork. These were soon finished and the troops crossed 
(2d May), and pushed on to Hankinson's Ferry on the Big 
Black River. Several lively skirmishes were had, the enemy 
seeking to delay the bridge building and the crossing of 
the streams; but it was obvious to Grant that they were 
only seeking to cover the retreat of the garrison of Grand 
Gulf. He then sent a strong force from the neighborhood 
of Willow Springs directly toward Grand Gulf, and found 
it deserted (3d May) . 

He at once entered the city. It was the third day after 
the crossing of the Mississippi. He had not occupied a tent 
since the crossing, but had slept on the ground at night, and 
had been in the saddle almost constantly during the day. 
He had personally directed the movement of the various 
divisions, and had superintended the building of bridges and 
the movement of the trains. He found the city deserted. 
The enemy had gone, leaving only a few guns. Porter's ves- 
sels, which had moved up to Grand Gulf, were at the quay. 

Here he received a letter from General Banks, stating 
that the latter would not be able to move, as contemplated, 
against Port Hudson for at least -ten days, and then only 
with an inferior force. This, in Grant's opinion, would be a 
delay fatal to both expeditions, and really forced him to 
accept the alternative plan that he had already formed of 
moving against the rear of Vicksburg. He knew that the 
Confederates were gathering in force at Jackson, and that 
if Pemberton should be allowed to concentrate his forces, 
the combined army would far outnumber his own. To 
thrust himself between the hostile detachments, to strike 
each in detail, was the plan that now possessed him. He 
had thought long over such possibilities. 



184 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

He did not hesitate a moment what course to pursue. 
He was busy several hours writing dispatches and orders to 
Banks, to Sherman and to his other corps commanders. He 
wrote also a dispatch to Halleck relating his actions and 
his proposed undertaking. His design was neither more 
nor less than to cut off his own communications with the rear, 
to hurry Sherman up to the fore, and to march with all his 
troops in a compact army, first, against Jackson, and, second, 
against Pemberton or Vicksburg. He allowed himself no 
rest; but, as soon as he had finished his writing, he started, 
though it was midnight, for Hankinson's Ferry, turning 
his back to the Mississippi and to his communications with 
friends, and his face toward the enemy and the country 
through which he should lead the expedition. He imme- 
diately issued orders for distributing three days' rations to 
the troops. Foragers were sent out into the surrounding 
country to collect provisions, horses, mules and all kinds of 
vehicles, and presently the camp was filled with every des- 
cription of country produce and supplies. 

Sherman came down in three days and crossed at Grand 
Gulf. He had left Blair with a division to guard Milliken's 
Bend depot; but Grant sent for this division, at the same 
time directing troops from farther up the river to take Blair's 
place. Blair was further directed to bring with him the 
army train, consisting of more than two hundred wagons. 
Meanwhile the troops in the field were kept busy foraging 
and making demonstrations across the Big Black towards 
Vicksburg, in order to deceive Pemberton and cause him to 
remain at or near his stronghold. Sherman having arrived, 
the order to march was given, and the corps were set in 
motion on parallel roads towards the northeast, the imme- 
diate design of the Commander being to interpose his army 



FORAGING. 185 

between Jackson and Vicksburg. In the marches that 
ended only with the position behind Vicksburg, the stu- 
dent of wars finds the greatest regularity and precision. 
The Federal army moved like a machine, guided by the 
hand of a master mechanic. Grant issued orders for and 
directed every step of the troops. His mind grasped the 
whole situation; it acted with perfect confidence and readi- 
ness. So exact were the directions given, and so true 
obedience did they receive, except in one instance, that 
Grant knew at all times the exact position of every division. 

The train on which the army depended for its supplies 
was a heterogenous collection of horses, mules, cattle, 
wagons, carriages, carts and other vehicles found on the 
farms through which they were passing. It was divided into 
sections, a part following each corps. Regular foraging 
parties swept the country along the route of all the live 
stock, good for provisions or for beasts of burden, and of 
grain, hay and other articles that an army could use. Far 
out to the left and right scouts rode and watched, while 
strong parties explored the roads in the front and reported 
the best routes. The army was facing the northeast, with 
its left wing resting for the first few days on the Big Black, 
while its right diverged towards Jackson. On the fourth 
day Sherman and McClernand were at Fourteen Mile 
Creek, and McPherson was approaching Raymond on the 
direct road to Jackson, (12th May). 

Before Raymond, the Confederates under General 
Gregg, advancing from the Capital, were encountered. 
The enemy numbered five thousand men. McPherson at 
once attacked with General Logan's Division, and after a 
sharp engagement drove Gregg from the field. Gregg lost 
more than eight hundred men in this battle; McPherson, 



136 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

half as many. The latter immediately occupied Raymond 
and notified Grant of his victory. The Commander at once 
directed the heads of his corps towards Jackson, drawing 
his left wing under McCIernand rapidly in upon the center, 
directing his center under Sherman to proceed to Raymond 
and thence upon the Capital, and the left under the victor- 
ious McPherson to a point northwest of Jackson to intercept 
the enemy, should they try to form a junction from the city 
with Pemberton in that direction. McPherson was directed 
to this point because he was the nearest to it of all the corps 
commanders, and haste was desirable. 

Thus the left wing became the right, the right wing 
became the center, and the center became the left, and all, 
if they should arrive at their destination, would form a 
semicircle on the north, west and south of the doomed city. 
McCIernand, however, was not required to make haste, his 
duty being to keep within supporting distance of the other 
corps, and to watch Pemberton that he should not attack 
the Federal rear. Grant judged that two corps could easily 
reduce the city. It was also the Commander's design to 
have McCIernand about a day's march in the rear, in order 
that, when the city should fall, he could be counter-marched 
towards Vicksburg, thus becoming the van, and be able to 
seize in advance of the enemy, any advantages that should 
present themselves. The plan was perfect from a mili- 
tary point of view. At the same time. Grant wholly cut his 
communications with Grand Gulf, and began to live entirely 
off the country. 

Jackson, the State Capital, is situated on the west side of 
Pearl river, and in a hilly region. Extensive fortifications 
had been thrown up, extending in a semi-circle, at a distance 
of about two miles from the city, from the river on the north 



THE ADVANXE ON JACKSON. 



187 



around westward to the river on the south. A second line, 
nearer the city, had also been erected. The position was 
not naturally of great strength, but it was capable of defence 
with a sufficient garrison. Eleven thousand troops occupied 
the place, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, 
who had very lately been transferred from the east to chief 
command in the Mississippi Valley. Being new in the com- 
mand, and being surprised at the rapid and unexpected 
movements of his foe, he was not prepared for a stout 



tA\,.^ 




\ 










Crocker's charge at jackson. 



resistance. He ordered all his troops to.^e concentrated as 
rapidly as possible at Jackson, but not all could come up, and 
Grant had already interposed between him and Pemberton. 
McPherson's column had quickly reached and taken pos- 
session of the railroad leading to Vicksburg, and had made 
connections on his right with Sherman (13th May), and the 
Union troops were already skirmishing with the Confederate 
outposts. 



188 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

A simultaneous attack of the two corps was arranged. 
Grant was with Sherman, and directed the operations. 
Both corps moved promptly, but, as a heavy rain was falling, 
(a.m., May 14), their progress was slow. Shortly before 
noon they came within striking distance. The sun came out 
from the clouds just as the word was given to attack, throw- 
ing his beams cheerily on the bright bayonets — a happy 
presage, as it were, of the issue of battle. McPherson's 
corps struck the outer line of works first, and his line of 
gleaming bayonets went over them like an avalanche, carry- 
ing all before them. The Confederate left fled to its second 
line of works. Sherman found a more difficult task. A 
small stream and a guarded bridge stopped him for some 
time, but he was able, finally, to cross, and, by alternate right 
and left flank attacks, to drive the enemy to the second line 
of defence. Soon the several divisions formed a continuous 
line from north to south of the city. As the works before 
Sherman did not seem weak enough to warrant an assault 
Grant sent a body of troops to feel the enemy towards 
the Pearl river on the south side. 

But Johnston was already evacuating his entrenchments, 
leaving only a few hundred gunners to man the cannon, and 
keep the Federals in check while he made good his retreat; 
so that, when this body arrived near the river, it found the 
enemy leaving, and at once entered the lines, taking the 
gunners in the rear, and compelling their surrender. 
Seventeen heavy guns were captured, with some prisoners 
and supplies. Johnston, however, had placed the river 
between himself and his foe, and was rapidly retreating 
towards the northeast, designing to pass northward around 
the Union right, and form a junction with Pemberton. He 
had sent orders to the latter to move northeastward, so as 



GRANT ENTERS JACKSON. 189 

to meet him at some point north of Clinton, a town a few 
miles northeast of Jackson. 

Grant, however, was persuaded that such would be the 
plan, and was already issuing orders for a retrograde move- 
ment upon Vicksburg, along the railroad, designing to cut 
off Pemberton's march, and keep between him and Johnston. 
The Commander entered the capital amidst the smoke of 
burning stores, which the retiring army had fired, and made 
his headquarters in the Capitol building. His army had 
lost only three hundred men before the city, while the 
enemy had lost nearly nine hundred, besides guns and sup- 
plies. Jackson was well known as a depot of supplies for the 
Confederate government, and contained several factories, 
which manufactured cloth and other supplies for the use of 
their armies. As the Commander did not design keeping 
the city, but desired to cripple the enemy's resources as 
much as possible, he ordered these factories to be burned, 
and Sherman w^as designated to attend to the work of 
destruction. Grant slept that night in the same quarters 
that Johnston had occupied the previous night. 

General Pemberton, who had been deceived by Grierson's 
cavalry raid until too late to prevent a landing by Grant, 
had crossed the Big Black river, and moved southward, to- 
wards Grant's supply line, believing that should he cut this, 
the Federals would be compelled to retrace their steps; 
but, as Grant had severed his supply line of his own volition, 
Pemberton could not find it. He hesitated about obeying 
Johnston's order to move toward Clinton, and by his hesita- 
tion gave the daring Union Commander time to move in 
between him and Johnston. He then received a more per- 
emptory command to move northward, and turned his col- 
umns toward Edward's Station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson 



190 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Railroad, designing to move thence through Bolton. One 
of Johnston's dispatches to Pemberton was brought to Grant 
on the same afternoon that he occupied Jackson, and his 
orders were issued at once for the intercepting movement. 
A courier was dispatched with all speed to McClernand, 
with orders to turn the head of his corps upon Bolton, and 
to move with all speed. Also Blair, who was coming rapidly 
up from Grand Gulf with the trains, and who had arrived 
near the rear of McClernand's corps, was directed with his 
division toward Bolton. Also McPherson was directed to 
turn his corps toward the same point as early as possible on 
the following morning, and Sherman was directed to follow 
McPherson as soon as he should have completed the destruc- 
tion of the factories, the roads and bridges leading out of 
Jackson, and the work of rendering the city totally useless 
to the enemy as a depot. 

Haste was the watchword of the hour. And there was 
need of haste. Pemberton and lohnston, with combined 
armies, would number nearly fifty thousand men to oppose 
his small, but intrepid band; odds that he did not desire 
to face in one battle. He was not, indeed, aware of the 
true numbers of his enemies, supposing them to be much 
less; but this made him none the less desirous of keeping 
them separated. 

And now appeared the wisdom of having McClernand's 
corps one day's march nearer Vicksburg than the others, 
for one division of it marched into Bolton just as the 
enemy's cavalry was about to take possession of the town 
(May 15). The third side of the triangle was now being 
traversed, and the Federals were well on their way. The 
night of this day saw all the corps rapidly approaching one 
and the same point, while the Confederate columns were 



BOLTON. 191 

also moving upon that point. A collision was inevitable. 
Grant himself moved toward Bolton during the day, but did 
not reach the front till next morning (i6th). This place 
being occupied, he directed the foremost divisions to march 
slowly towards Edward's Station, but to avoid a battle unless 
certain of success. 

Pemberton had not supposed that Grant was so near 
him, and was astounded when his vanguard of cavalry met 
a decided check at Bolton. A portion of his troops was 
several miles south of Edward's Station, and he was com- 
pelled to march them a part of the night so as to concentrate 
them at a point known as Champion Hill, an elevation 
between Edward's Station and Bolton, where he determined 
to abide the issue of a battle. Thus the main hostile armies 
were brought face to face. 

From some workmen on the railroad, who had seen 
Pemberton's army on the march. Grant learned that the 
force before him numbered between twenty and thirty 
thousand men. The Union force near Bolton numbered not 
more than half that many. Grant, therefore, dispatched 
orders to Sherman to come up from Jackson with all speed, 
not desiring to risk battle with so small a force, unless under 
favorable circumstances. The position occupied by the op- 
posing armies was, however, so close that a battle was al- 
most unavoidable. General Hovey, with one of McClern- 
and's corps, was, at the right, advanced from Bolton, with 
McPherson supporting him, while the rest of McClernand's 
corps occupied the roads further south leading up from 
Raymond toward Edward's Station, and was not connected 
with the right wing, even by a skirmish line. Grant's 
orders contemplated an immediate junction of the two wings 
in the morning; but as his orders were not obeyed, the 



192 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

junction was not effected. Pemberton had chosen an 
advantageous position. His left wing occupied the high 
ridge of Champion Hill, which comes to an abrupt terminus 
at the north where the road from Bolton Station toEdward's 
Station touches it, and which is skirted on the north and 
east by a deep ravine. The top of the ridge was thickly 
wooded, but the sides were open and partly under culti- 
vation. The western side sloped down gradually to the 
small valley along Baker's Creek. The centre of the Con- 
federate line extended southward along the ridge and 
across the road to Edward's Station, and the right occu- 
pied a position still further south in heavy woods. The bat- 
tle occurred along the face of and around the northern end 
of the hill, the chief struggle being at the north east angle 
where the Bolton road ascended. This road had been cut 
deep into the face of the hills by continuous use and work, 
and thus had become a natural ditch which the enemy 
utilized to good advantage. Heavy batteries were placed 
so that they commanded all open approaches. Support- 
ing them, long lines of infantry lay in the woods along the 
ridge, facing north and east. 

Grant's plan contemplated an advance along the Bolton 
road with heavy force, and later developed into a flank 
movement against Pemberton's extreme left. He believed 
that time would be the chief factor in the contest before 
him; delay would allow Johnston time to come up to Pem- 
berton's aid. By night Sherman would be on the field to 
reinforce him, if the battle should prove too strong for the 
force with him. He did not believe that all of Pemberton's 
force was on the field. 

Boldness was the best policy; the advantage of momen- 
tum would lie with the assailant. Therefore, Hovey was 



TlIM 




194 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

advanced slowly in the morning (i6th May), with McPher- 
son supporting him, the slowness of the advance being for 
the purpose of allowing McClernand to close up from left to 
right. Hovey's men, drawn across the road at right angles, 
slowly moved up to the base of the hill, driving the oppos- 
ing skirmishers before them. McPherson deployed to the 
right and left, extending the line southward so as to meet 
McClernand's right when he should appear, and northwest- 
ward so as to flank the enemy's position. But McClernand 
did not appear. Having moved up to within two miles of 
the ridge he was halted and held at bay by a line of skir- 
mishers, and there he frittered away many precious hours 
studying the position and seeking a point of attack. The 
orders of the Commander remained unheeded, while the 
sullen roar of guns further north told of the heavy struggle 
in progress there. Eleven o'clock came, and Hovey had 
passed the ditch at the base of the hill, and was permitted 
by the Commander to try for the batteries above him. The 
scattering, intermittent fire of skirmishers deepened into the 
din and roar of a battle, and the fight was soon general 
along the north and east faces of the hill. 

Grant had now grasped the situation, He saw that the 
Confederate left, occupying the spur of the hill, had a val- 
ley both in front and rear, as well as at the north. He 
extended his right around the north end of the hill, pushed 
a force south along the west side, and thus was about to take 
the enemy in flank and rear. It was the simplest plan that 
could suggest itself. Only McClernand's lack of energy, or 
heedlessness of orders, prevented the total destruction of 
Pemberton's army. For, while Hovey was pressing hard 
along the Bolton road and up the face of the hill, Logan, of 
McPherson's corps, passed far around to the rear, and actu- 



CHAMPION HILL 195 

ally was in possession of that road between Pemberton and 
Edward's Station. But Hovey was not strong enough to 
hold his own before the overwhelming forces which Pem- 
berton brought up from his right and center, and massed to 
oppose him. He was driven back several times, and finally 
forced to the ditch at the base. 

Grant was reluctantly compelled to reinforce him from 
McPherson's corps, and to withdraw Logan so as to shorten 
and strengthen his battle line. He was not aware how far 
Logan had really proceeded southward, or he might have 
risked Hovey's success to have brought Logan against the 
Confederate rear. Yet the withdrawal directly brought the 
victory. For Hovey and Logan, with massed regiments, 
went up the hill, since called the "Hill of Death" because of 
the slaughter then made, in the face of a terrific storm of 
bullets that struck every third man. They reached the bat- 
teries, struggled hand-to-hand with the gunners, and rushed 
upon the infantry and drove it from the field in utter rout. 

The Commander stood watching this grand charge of 
his troops with a feeling of awe and exultation, that for a 
time threatened to break his usual calmness, and render him 
one of the most excited of all who saw it. At once the order 
went forth for a general advance of the whole army, and 
with shouts of victor}^ the lines swept up and over the hill. 
A panic seized the enemy. It melted away from left to 
right and fled into the woods southward and westward, and 
along the road to Edward's Station, in worse panic than had 
seized the Federals at famous Bull Run. The victors 
pressed after, capturing many prisoners. Grant himself led 
the pursuit, determined, if possible, to make the battle 
decisive in effect, and night found him six miles or more 
beyond the field. 



196 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

With about fifteen thousand men engaged he had driven 
nearly twice as many enemies from the field, — a field very 
strong for defence by natural advantage. It had been won 
by ceaselessly assaulting the salient point, the north-eastern 
spur of the hill, in effect bringing the whole weight of 
attack upon the Confederate extreme left. In its results, 
it was perhaps the most important and decisive action of the 
war thus far, because it destroyed the possibility of Johnston 
and Pemberton forming a union, broke the spirit of the lat- 
er's army, and led to the downfall of Vicksburg and the 
opening of the Mississippi river. The immediate results 
were as great. The enemy lost six thousand men; the 
Federals only two thousand four hundred. A part of 
Pemberton's army was cut off from the main body by the 
rapidity of pursuit and flight. It fled southward through 
the woods, and after making a wide circuit succeeded later 
in joining Johnston. Thirty cannon, a large number of 
small arms and quantities of supplies of various kinds, fell 
into the victor's hands. 

The victory was complete. The destruction of Pem- 
berton's army would have been total had McClernand 
obeyed orders, engaged the force in his front so as to have 
held them from reinforcing their left wing with troops from 
right, and center, and thus made it possible for Logan to 
have held the road by which Pemberton finally retreated, 
and which was once in his grasp. It is not easy to see how 
any part of the defeated army could then have escaped in a 
body. Vicksburg would have fallen there; and long months 
of labor, much outpouring of blood and treasure, and further 
battles would have been prevented. 

Grant was greatly tempted to relieve McClernand at 
once, but refrained, because he did not thoroughly understand 



THE PURSUIT OF PEMBERTON. 197 

why the general had delayed, and because he believed him 
to be a brave soldier, whose place would not at once be 
easily filled. The Commander was also a patient man, slow 
to anger and willing to overlook mistakes. He attributed 
his subordinate's fault to a too great caution in performing 
orders, and a too great reliance upon his own judgment, 
which was not the best. For the time, therefore, he 
refrained from summary proceedings; but he remembered 
this fault later when a day of reckoning came. The victory 
was so great, the occasion one for so general a rejoicing, 
that he forebore to mar its completeness by letting his anger 
fall upon one of his chief captains. That night the Com- 
mander reposed on the damp earth among his tired troopers, 
conscious that the third step in the capture of the strong- 
hold was well taken, and determined that on the morrow he 
would burst over the last barrier between him and the goal. 
Pursuit was resumed next morning (17th May), before 
daylight. Grant directed Sherman, who had arrived at 
Bolton during the preceding evening, to turn the head of 
his column northward towards Bridgeport on the Big Black, 
to seize that point and cross the river there. Blair, with 
the train and with a pontoon bridge, was directed to join 
Sherman there, and aid him in crossing. This movement 
was ordered with a double purpose. First, if Pemberton 
should bar the way immediately before the main Federal 
force, Sherman could, b}^ crossing above, be brought down 
upon the Confederate flank and rear, thus forcing the latter 
to retreat. Second, it was in pursuance of his plan of con- 
tinually thrusting a force between the two opposing armies 
and preventing a junction, and also, the Commander desired 
to prevent the escape of the force from Vicksburg by a 
route northeastward. 



198 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Grant did not desire the city so much as he did the total 
destruction of its garrison. It was not at all a dangerous 
plan to divide his forces in view of the fact that he had 
vanquished the foe immediately in his front with a half of 
his own army. As he had expected, the enemy was found 
guarding the approaches to the bridges over the Big Black, 
not more than six miles from the point where pursuit had 
ceased on the preceding night. Between four and five 
thousand of them were on the east side, occupying a fortifi- 
cation of trees, cut so as to form an abattis, and breast- 
works of cotton bales and earth. The river just above 
their position made a sudden turn to the west and south, 
forming a shallow peninsula by returning, further down, to 
its general course. Across the peninsula was a swale, or 
shallow bayou, once the bed of the stream but now a wide 
ditch filled with reeds and undergrowth, while along its 
banks some large trees had stood. Two or three feet of 
water was in the deserted bed along its middle course, but 
the water was deeper where it opened into the river. 
The greater part of fortifications were on the west side of 
and along this swale. The whole peninsula was very low 
and commanded by the heights on the west side of the Big 
Black, where some batteries had been placed. 

Grant, as he critically surveyed the position, was 
reminded of its similarity to that of the Mexicans at Resaca 
de la Palma, or of the Americans under Jackson at New 
Orleans in the war of 1812, who behind cotton bales met 
and turned back an invader. The Confederate line was 
strong; but, unfortunately for it, a space at the north end of 
the deserted bed, where it entered the river, had been left 
without fortifications, the enemy trusting much to the depth 
of water that was thought to be there. 



HAP or BATTLEriELD Of 

BG BLACK mVER BRJOGS 
ni2Sl55IPPI 




199 



200 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Grant observed the oversight, and proceeded to take 
advantage of it. He massed a force and sent it against the 
unprotected place, vi^ith Lawler, a brave young officer, as its 
leader. He then deployed a strong line of infantry before 
the works and placed batteries as if he meant to attack 
along the whole front. McClernand's corps, except 
Hovey's division, was given the task of dislodging the 
enemy, and the remainder of the troops were massed in a 
thin wood at the rear in such position that they could be 
sent forward to aid if necessary. Thus, each part of the 
the army was made to do its share of the fighting, and the 
part that had fought on the preceding day rested on this 
day. 

Grant had completed his dispositions, and had given the 
word to General Carr, who commanded the right of the 
battle line, to advance Lawler to the assault, when an 
orderly rode up and placed a dispatch in his hand. It was 
from General Halleck, the first orders he had received since 
leaving Grand Gulf, and it directed him to return with all 
haste to the Mississippi and to co-operate with General 
Banks down that river. Grant signified his intention of 
reaching the river at another point than Grand Gulf, and 
when the messenger urged him to obey the order, replied 
that Halleck would not have issued that order if he had 
known the condition of affairs. Hearing shouts he turned 
away, and saw Lawler with his coat off, leading his brigade 
gallantly across the bayou; and a little later saw the enemy 
flying to the river. At the same time, those of the Confed- 
erates who had been left to guard the bridge, set fire to it 
and retreated. As it had been prepared for burning the 
bridge blazed up at once, and a part of the fugitives on the 
east side who could not cross, were captured, or were 



THE ARMY ARRIVES BEFORE VICKSBURG. 201 

drowned as they attempted to swim the stream. About two 
thousand of the Confederates were killed, wounded or 
captured. The remainder fied towards Vicksburg in hot 
haste. The Federals lost not more than three hundred men. 

Luckily for those who escaped from the battle of Black 
River Bridge, the river was not fordable; and, the bridge 
having been destroyed, they found time to escape before the 
Federals could cross. But Grant was not to be stopped by 
this river, having passed a greater. Like Caesar of old, but 
in less time, he caused his troops to build three bridges by 
which to cross. One was constructed of trees felled and 
floated together like a raft, over which branches and other 
materials were piled until a smooth surface was formed. 
Another was made by felling trees so that they would fall 
out into the stream, their branches supporting others laid 
across them and all forming a tottering bridge for the pass- 
age of troops. A third was of cotton-bales. The various 
divisions of men to whom the work of building was intrusted, 
emulated each other, and by nightfall were on the western 
shore ready to take up the final march upon the city. 

Grant dispatched an order to Sherman, who had reached 
Bridgeport, to advance directly from that point towards 
Vicksburg. So that on the following day (i8th May), all 
the corps were bearing down upon the doomed stronghold, 
and the grand combination of movement through which they 
had so rapidly passed, was closing successfully. Soon they 
arrived in sight of the fortifications in the outskirts; soon 
from the hills a view of the Mississippi, the Yazoo, and the 
flats where they had worked so many weary months, burst 
upon their view, and a mighty shout went up, as of old when 
Xenophon's ten thousand Greeks feasted their eyes with 
sight of the longed-for sea. 



202 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The Commander, as he stood on the heights of Haines' 
Bluff, where he had longed to stand, the heights which had 
hitherto resisted all efforts to capture them, and as he gazed 
silently out upon the wide panorama spread out to the 
northward and westward, and the city on his left, realized 
the joys of fulfilled anticipations, the rewards of victory 
wrested from an unwilling fate. And Sherman, more dem- 
onstrative than his friend and commander, as he gazed down 
from heights before which he had seen so many brave men 
die in vain, impulsively exclaimed: "General,! did not 
believe you could make the expedition a success; but it is a 
success! It is one of the grandest campaigns that shall ever 
be told in history!" Sherman was right in his judgment. 
His opposition to the plan had been open and frankly 
expressed, before the expedition started; now, his approba- 
tion was just as frank. Sherman was a soldier whose 
opinion carried with it the weight of scholarly authority. 
To his death, a very recent affliction to this nation, he 
retained his expressed opinion of this campaign. 

Thus, we have seen the army start out on the expedition 
one month only before, cross at Bruinsburg, march nearly 
two hundred miles, fight five battles, and gain as many vic- 
tories, conquer armies twice as numerous, if combined, 
defeat, rout, and shut up one army larger in numbers, and 
all with a dash and a faultless movement that won the 
admiration of the world. The triangle had been bounded, 
the foothold in the rear of Vicksburg was assured, and the 
heroic army, triumphing over odds and natural difficulties, 
emerged from the mystery that had surrounded it for more 
than a fortnight, and flaunted its torn banners from the 
heights of Haines' Bluff, the longed-for goal. And while to 
the valor of the troops and the efficiency of the officers 



TO GRANT BELONGS THE CREDIT. 203 

much of the glory for the success must be allowed, to Grant 
belongs the major share; in hun was success made possi- 
ble and real. For he, against the advice of such soldiers 
as Sherman and Halleck, undertook the task, assumed 
the whole responsibility, personally directed the field move- 
ments of the army corps, as well as laid out the grand 
plans, conceived the ideas, and executed them, invented 
the expedients, unerringly calculated times, distances, and 
effects, and, by infusing a spirit of supreme energy into 
all, made possible to accomplish what to able soldiers 
seemed rash and impossible. 

Perhaps the success of no campaign of this whole war 
was due so much to the efforts of one man as this to Grant. 
The clearness of his judgment, the originality of his methods 
of campaigning, the systematic movements of his corps, the 
swiftness of his marches, the ability he exhibited of striking 
in detail the enemy, and the masterly skill he displayed in 
fighting the battles of this campaign, mark him the equal of 
any soldier that has ever lived. Alexander, Ccesar, Han- 
nibal, Bonaparte, Wellington, Moltke, Grant, all exhibited 
the same qualities of generalship, and the last-mentioned 
won his right by this campaign to be counted one of this list 
of the great in arms. Nor did his latter campaigns detract 
any from his glory. This campaign has been likened by 
some to Napoleon's Italian campaign, but Napoleon's battles 
were fought against troops inferior to his own, while 
Grant had to contend with men of like metal with his own. 
Moltke won his battles because of the overwhelming num- 
bers he was able'to concentrate upon the enemy, and the 
machine-like movements which his disciplined armies exe- 
cuted. Grant won here with an army, good in discipline, 
to be sure, but raw in campaigning, and only a part of it 



204 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

ever in battle. This was, possibly, his greatest campaign. 

Thus far, the Union losses had been comparatively small, 
not more than seven hundred having been killed, and about 
three thousand five hundred otherwise disabled or lost. 
The army was in excellent spirits, though very worn and 
exhausted. The enemy had lost four times as many men, 
besides their arsenals of supplies and mills at Jackson, and 
were much demoralized. Grant supposed that but a small 
body of troops had been left in Vicksburg when Pemberton 
had come out to meet him in the field, but he was deceived. 
So that when (iQth May) his lines were being drawn close 
around the defenses, a sharp conflict sprang up, and he 
ordered a strong assault to be made, hoping to break 
through Pemberton's lines before his troops should recover 
courage, he met a stout resistance, and was able only to 
secure an advance position. But still determined, if pos- 
sible, to win by a general conflict, he prepared for a sterner 
assault, and spent two days refitting, resting, placing bat- 
teries, laying plans, and generally making ready. 

Several reasons urged him to a general assault. First, 
he supposed that Pemberton's forces were inferior and 
demoralized, when, in fact, they were equal in number, and 
a part of them had not yet met him in the field, having 
performed garrison duty while their comrades were enduring 
defeat after defeat. Second, and, perhaps, the chief reason, 
Johnston, with a constantly increasing force, was moving up 
from the east, and might at any moment attempt to raise 
the siege by attacking him in the rear, thus placing him 
between two fires. Third, the troops were confident in 
their ability to carry the works by storm, and their officers 
were as eager, and if not allowed to try, they would not 
endure the labors of a regular siege with patience. Fourth, 



206 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



warm weather was coming on rapidly, and it might cause a 
greater mortahty than a battle would. Fifth, large rein- 
forcements would be absolutely necessary to the prosecution 
of a successful siege, and these would be slow in coming. 

There were many cogent reasons to warrant an assault 
of great vigor. But Grant was not confident that it would 
succeed, his forces being too small to cover the front of so 




From Harper's Hiatory of Civil War 



THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 



Copyright ISS5, H»r;er & Bm. 



extensive works, and at the same time concentrate sufficient 
striking force at salient points though his generals were. 

Having decided that an assault was advisable, he laid 
his plans accordingly. His corps were now in the following 
order: Sherman at the right, resting his right flank on 
Haines' Bluff with the extremity of his right wing further 
down on the heights of the Yazoo towards the Mississippi; 
McPherson's corps at the centre, covering the roads from 



REASONS FOR AN ASSAULT. 207 

the Big Black to the city; McClernand's corps occupying the 
left, and attempting to guard the south and south-eastern out- 
lets. The Federal line was nearly fifteen miles long, the 
defence line not more than seven. Consequently it was an 
exceedingly hard matter to mass enough force at any one 
point on the Union side, to insure power to break through 
the defences, especially when it is also remembered that 
the garrison was at this time as large if not larger than the 
besieging army. 

Grant hoped that by massing a part of each corps on the 
weakest points that could be found in the defences, and 
making a general assault along the whole line to prevent 
the enemy from massing to resist, breaches might be made, 
a part of his troops introduced within the Confederate 
lines, and the city compelled to surrender. In order to 
weaken the fortifications as much as possible, he directed 
his batteries t-o bombard them, and obtained Porter to assist 
with his gunboats in the bombardment. In order that the 
assault might be made with uniformity, he appointed the 
hour of ten o'clock {226. May) for it and caused all the 
generals to set their watches with his own so that no mis- 
take could happen. The corps commanders were directed 
to have their troops advance in columns of platoons 
wherever the ground would permit. 

The lines of defence were exceedingly strong. Begin- 
ning at the north side of the city at the shore of the Missis- 
sippi, they ascended the bluff eastward then turned south- 
east and curved in a wide arc to the southwestward again, 
touching the river about three miles below the city. The 
outer line was about seven miles long. Several inner lines 
and parts of lines had been erected to which the enemy ulti- 
mately retired, shortening the length to three miles. The 



208 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

fortifications followed as far as possible the crests of ridges, 
the brows of deep rain-washed ravines, and the steep sides 
of deep hollows, and the various sections were so arranged 
that concentric fires from several portions of the lines at 
once could be brought to bear on one approach. Upon the 
summits of knolls and knobs had been erected earthworks 
— bastions, redoubts, lunettes and breast-works. Two hun- 
dred heavy guns were mounted along the lines, and thirty- 
five thousand men lay behind them. 

During the night preceding the assault Porter's gunboats 
rained shot and shell upon the city and its fortifications, 
compelling the inhabitants to seek shelter in cellars and 
caves, and when morning dawned the Federal land-batteries 
joined in the bombardment. The rattling fire of sharp- 
shooters also arose, and the fire was so hot that the Confed- 
erate batteries made little response, their gunners lying under 
shelter. Some of the Federals supposed that the opposing 
batteries were silenced, but, with some exceptions, they were 
not harmed. 

Ten o'clock came. The batteries ceased firing, the long 
lines of troops leaped from their trenches and dashed 
towards the opposing fortifications. Their formation was 
preserved but a short time, owing to the nature of the 
ground over which they had to pass. Brush, trees, ditches 
and ravines lay in their way, but they gallantly pushed up 
to the hostile lines. The Confederates then arose from 
their concealment and poured a withering fire upon them. 

The carnage was terrible. The assailants, exasperated 
by their punishment, struggled up to the very muzzles of 
the guns, and, at some places, broke over the lines; but they 
were not strong enough to make good their advantage. The 
enemy fought gallantly, hurried reinforcements to the most 



THE ASSAULT A FAILURE. 209 

threatened places, and repulsed the Federals with vigor. 
An diour of battle passed. Grant became convinced that 
the task was too great for his small army and ordered the 
retreat to be sounded. But now McClernand from the left 
reported that he had won a decided advantage, and said 
that with reinforcements he could break through into Vicks- 
burg. He repeated his statement a little later and asked 
for aid. Grant, thinking there might be a chance of success, 
sent all the reinforcements at his command and in aid 
ordered the assault to be renewed along the whole line. But 
McClernand was mistaken and overrated his success. The 
renewed assault brought no other result than a greater 
loss of men. The army retired slowly to its entrench- 
ments, though at some points retaining advanced positions 
which they were presently able to use to advantage. Three 
thousand men had been lost, and little had been gained, 
except the knowledge that the garrison of Vicksburg was 
very strong and capable of making a long resistance. It can 
not be ascertained what Pemberton's loss was, but it was 
large. Grant was convinced that it would be necessary to 
undertake a regular siege. 

The position of the Union army was peculiar, in this 
war heretofore without a parallel, and almost without par- 
allel in all history. It was besieging an army in a city while 
another hostile force threatened its rear. Julius Caesar was 
in a like position at one time, but his enemies were bar- 
barians. Grant at once asked for and obtained large rein- 
forcements. During the month following his appearance 
on the bluffs in the rear of the stronghold, his army was in- 
creased to seventy thousand men. The Government was 
not slow to recognize the necessity of holding his position at 
all hazards; the people of the loyal states were sounding his 
14 



210 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

praises from one land's end to another, and to the successful 
all things work well. Immense quantities of supplies were 
poured into the camp, and the soldiers who had lived a fort- 
night or more off the country now received their regular 
provisions. 

It is related by Grant himself, that on one occasion 
as he was riding through a portion of the camp, a soldier 
shouted "Hard Tack!" The cry was at once taken up by 
the soldiers near by, but was changed to cheers when the 
Commander told them that a supply line was then nearly 
completed across the Yazoo flats and Chickasaw Bayou, 
where transports with provisions were already stationed. 
The cheering alarmed the enemy who supposed an assault 
was contemplated, and they opened fire, adding the roar 
of guns to the rejoicing. Within a very few days after the 
investment began, the camp was plentifully supplied with 
victuals necessary for the subsistence of a large army. 

The matter of obtaining sufficient supplies being satis- 
factorily settled, Grant bent all his energies to the raising 
of sufficient fortifications to envelope the city and its garri- 
son. It was necessary to provide a double line, one facing 
Vicksburg and the other towards the east, whence John- 
ston might come. A strong camp was formed at Haines' 
Bluff. There was no regular engineer corps with the army 
and few men who understood engineering. Grant himself 
was therefore compelled to take personal direction of the 
raising of works, while all his educated officers worked 
cheerfully with their troops at the trenches. 

In a remarkably short space of time, miles of frown- 
ing embankments sprang up around the doomed city. 
Siege giins were lacking. Porter loaned Grant the use of a 
battery of heavy guns from the fleet. The latter did 



THE CAMP FORTIFIED. 2ll 

not lack inventive genius. He caused the boles of large, 
tough trees to be hollowed out and around them heavy 
iron bands to be placed, and these rude mortars were used 
to throw shells into the enemy's camp. Various other 
methods, first used perhaps in this war, and possible only 
with an inventive race like Americans, were tried with 
good effect. The works, day by day, were pushed gradually 
nearer to the lines of defence by mines, ditches, covered 
ways, approaches, and by every means suggested by ancient 
or modern warfare, that could be applied. 

The camp around Haines' Bluff was made almost 
impregnable and large enough to hold forty thousand men 
For here, In case of disaster, Grant was determined to rally 
his forces and hold at all hazards a footing on the bluffs. 
Another strong line of works was erected from Haines' 
Bluff southeastward to the Big Black river, and when 
sufficient reinforcements had arrived, this line was placed 
under command of Sherman with a strong force, who 
had orders to send out scouting parties as far as Bolton 
to watch Johnston, and, If a favorable chance should 
offer, to attack him. Strong guards were placed at the fords 
and bridges across the river, and every other precaution 
that genius could suggest was adopted. It soon became 
Impossible, from a military point of view, for Johnston to 
materially injure the Union army. 

While the fortifications were being raised, constant skir- 
mishing was maintained between the hostile parties, some- 
times approaching the proportions of a battle. By constant 
practice, the riflemen became so expert that should the 
handsbreadth of an enemy's body appear for an Instant over 
the works. It would receive a dozen bullets. The breast- 
works were rude In construction. A ditch, with the earth 



212 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

from it thrown out on the enemy's side, a log or two, and 
some sand bags piled on top of the embankment, with 
small openings between for loop-holes, afforded protection. 
These were works peculiar to American warfare. 

The fleet and the land batteries kept up an almost con- 
stant bombardment. The miners and sappers, by traverses, 
tunnels and ditches, approached to within two hundred 
yards of the defences at various points. At one or two 
places, during the last da^^s of the siege, the lines were 
scarcely thirty yards apart. Pemberton countermined, with 
the purpose of discovering the Federal approaches. In a 
short time. Grant was able to advance his left wing from 
the vicinity of Warrenton where it had first rested; the line 
was thus shortened several miles, and all communication, 
which had heretofore been kept up by spies who had passed 
through the marshes along the banks of the Mississippi at 
night, was closed. 

Presently (i6th June) the army had increased to the 
number of seventy thousand men. Grant now contem- 
plated sending out Sherman with an independent army to 
attack and destroy Johnston's army, but a suitable op- 
portunity did not occur. His orders to all officers were, 
that they should attack in force whenever opportunity 
offered, to accept battle as often as it should be offered by 
the enemy, and to press forward against the defences with- 
out relaxing effort for a moment. Thus with the city 
closely beleagured, with his scouts and foragers ranging the 
country scores of miles around, the chances of success were 
growing daily. 

The national government now approved his every sug- 
gestion. To Banks writing for help from Port Hudson, 
which he had at last besieged, he replied that the fall of 



m'clernand relieved of command. 213 

Vicksburg must first occur. For with its fall, that of Port 
Hudson would surely follow. 

An incident occurred during the early part of the siege 
that well illustrated the firmness of the commander. A body 
of colored troops guarding Milliken's Bend depot, being 
among the first colored troops enlisted and not acknowledged 
as combatants as yet by the Confederates, was attacked by 
a force of the latter, and though they gallantly repulsed the 
assailants, some of them were captured. The captors 
ordered the prisoners to be shot. Grant sent word to the 
captors, that for every colored soldier slain by them, he should 
order one Confederate prisoner killed. They knew he would 
keep his word, and no negroes were executed. 

Strict discipline was maintained among the besiegers. 
The regulations were laid upon officer and private alike. The 
day of reckoning came with General McClernand, against 
whom in the commander's mind the remembrance of various 
insubordinate and unsoldierly actions remained. McCler- 
nand committed an unpardonable sin in military ethics. He 
issued an address full of flattery to his corps, arrogating to 
himself and it the chief glory of the campaign just past, and 
caused the address to be published throughout the country 
for political purposes. This was contrary to the regulations, 
as Grant had not seen the address before it was issued and 
had not approved it. The other corps commanders were 
naturally indignant and complained to Grant, who at once 
relieved McClernand of command. General Ord (i6thjune) 
was placed in command of the corps. 

At several points near the Jackson road, the besiegers 
had pushed their sappers up to within a few yards of the 
enemy's lines. Nothing better illustrates the nature of 
this war than the conduct of the combatants toward each 



214 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGiNS OF GRANT AND LEt?. 



Other. At one moment, meeting between the lines, they 
were chatting, laughing and joking, as neighbors and 
friends, a mutual understanding being had between them 
that war should be waived for the time; at the next 
moment, due warning having been given by either side, 
they became enemies again, and with all the keenness of 
hunters sought to take each other's lives. Nor were these 



,^^ >- .^t: 




BLOWING UP A FORT AT VICKSBURG 



breaches of discipline ever reported by the minor officers 

> 

and we have no record that evil came to either army, or 
that important plans miscarried because of these friendly 
conversations. 

The Federals at one point mined under a knoll upon 
which was a small earthwork, charged the mine heavily 
with powder, and literally blew the top off the knoll. A 



HUNGER PREVAILS IN THE CITY. 215 

charging party rushed Into the breach and sought to break 
through a second Hne of works which the wary Pemberton 
had caused to be raised, but could not. A bloody contest 
with hand-grenades, lighted shells and musketry occurred. 
The assailants could not remain in the breach without ter- 
rible loss and soon withdrew. But this .failure did not pre-* 
vent them from continuing their mining operations. They 
projected a system of covered ways, designed to run under 
the enemy's lines and to be opened later simultaneously, 
through which a column of troops four abreast might rush 
and gain a footing inside the defences. Another mine was 
exploded, destroying a redan and killing a number of its 
garrison. Had not the city surrendered when it did, the 
assault through the covered ways would have been 
attempted. 

But a mightier enemy than powder and shot had long 
since attacked the beleaguered host. Hunger began to 
weaken the devoted thousands. All communication with 
the outside world having been cut off, no supplies either of 
food or of ammunition could be sent into the city. The 
only hope of relief lay in the army under Johnston, and 
Grant's industry, in bringing up troops and raising fortifica- 
tions, lessened that hope day by day. First, all the meat 
and bread gave out; then the short rations failed. Horse, 
and mule meat, and even cat and dog meat were used; but 
these also gave out and, when surrender happened, the 
men were starving. 

Discouragement added to the weakness of bodies 
enfeebled by hunger. Pemberton proposed to cut his way 
out, but the soldiers could not be persuaded to try so des- 
perate an expedient. They had tested the powers of the 
Northern army in more than one battle and had no desire 



216 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

to test It again in the open field. Their courage was kept 
up for a time with promises that Johnston would soon fall 
upon Grant's rear and compel him to raise the siege. But 
after they were cut off from all communication with the out- 
side world, this hope faded away. A design was formed of 
constructing a number of boats by means of which to escape 
across the river into Arkansas, and some rude craft were 
made; but Grant suspected such designs and provided an 
obstruction to that line of escape by sending a strong body 
of troops to fortify a series of works across the neck of the 
peninsula, while on either side of it the sombre gunboats 
patrolled and watched. 

Meanwhile the inhabitants of the unfortunate city suf- 
fered much. The constant dropping of shot and shell upon 
and among the houses drove them into caves and cellars 
dug in the hill-sides. Without provisions, without sup- 
plies of ammunition sufficient to have resisted a prolonged 
battle, and without hope of relief, the garrison, though 
strong numerically, trembled and murmured when it was 
rumored that Grant would order a strong assault to be 
made on the approaching Independence Day. The mur- 
murs reached the ears of the subordinate officers and spread 
through them to the head of the garrison. Pemberton at 
once addressed a note to his chief officers asking their 
advice in the emergency. It was advised that surrender 
was inevitable. Accordingly, he resolved to treat with the 
victor for terms. 

A flag of truce, with a message, then came to Grant 
from the Confederate Chieftain, demanding the terms 
which would be given his army should he surrender Vicks- 
burg (3d July). Grant replied that he would treat the 
captives as prisoners of war and allow them to parole. 



CONFERENCE OF THE COMMANDERS. 



217 



General Bowen, the bearer of tne message, believing that 
Pemberton would not accept these terms unconditionally, 
and desiring greatly that the surrender should be consum- 
mated, suggested that an interview between the command- 
ers might lead to an understanding. Grant consented to 
the idea und Pemberton came out of the city to a confer- 
ence. 

They met beneath a tree, afterwards famous because of 
the meeting, and discussed the conditions. The tall form 




THE SURRENDER OF PEMBERTON. 



of the Southerner and his dark gloomy face contrasted 
strongly with the medium form and open countenance of 
the Northerner. Pemberton was in full dress; Grant was 
very plainly clad in a soldier's uniform with only his sword 
to mark his rank. The soldiers of both armies stood upon 
their works and breathlessly watched their chieftains' move- 
ments. Pemberton inquired what terms would be granted. 
The victor said the terms had been mentioned in his former 
message. Pemberton thereupon, turned away, saying it was 



218 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

no use to talk longer. Grant said, laconically, "Very well" 
and turned to his army. But the officers who had accom- 
panied Pemberton were eager to bring about the capitula- 
Uon, and suggested that they hold a conference as to terms 
with the officers accompanying Grant. Grant assented, 
saying he would not, however, be bound by any agreements 
they might make. 

The terms that were then suggested were at once disap- 
proved by him and the conference came to an end, he 
stating that he would, later, send Pemberton his ultimatum. 
In the afternoon he sent a note containing the following 
terms: The garrison to become prisoners of war; the pri- 
vates to retain only their clothing, the officers their side 
arms in addition and one horse each, and all to be paroled 
until exchanged. Pemberton accepted the terms, obtaining 
a modification, however, that the troops should be allowed 
to march out of their trenches and stack arms in front of 
them. White flags were displayed in token of submission 
and the Union troops fell to rejoicing that their trials were 
rewarded by the greatest success during the war. 

On the next day (4th July, 1863) the capitulation was 
consummated, and an army of prisoners bowed to the flag 
of the Republic. It was the magnificent ending of a mag- 
nificent campaign, which placed the silent Commander 
among the first captains of the world. But the troops, at 
the suggestion of their humane general, forbore to rejoice 
openly before their captive brethern. It was a solemn, 
silent scene, this act of surrender. The long lines of blue- 
coated men stood before their trenches in silence, while the 
garrison marched out of their works, stacked arms before 
them and marched back again. Then a division marched 
into and took possession of the city, and the Stars and 



THE TROPHIES OF VICTORY. 219 

Stripes were soon floating over the public buildings. 
In this forbearance, one sees the tenderness and gentility 
of Grant's heart, novv^ to the conquered showing the 
feeling of a father, which at other times to the hostile was 
as hard as flint, and as unyielding in battle as though of 
steel. 

Thirty-one thousand prisoners, one hundred and seventy 
cannon, sixty thousand small arms, and a large quantity of 
ammunition were surrendered. This was the largest num- 
ber of prisoners taken at one time in any war, up to that 
time. Napoleon at Ulm captured a less number. Grant 
entered the city quietly, saluted Pemberton whom he saw 
seated on the piazza of a dwelling-house and who returned 
the salute stiflly, but did not deign to exercise the courtesy 
of rising to his feet, and went on to meet Porter and his 
gallant sailors, who, not knowing the injunction of silence 
imposed, greeted him with salvos of artillery. 

The Commanders of the land and the water forces 
might well shake hands heartily, for never had two worked 
together better for a common end than they. Admiral Por- 
ter deserves much of the glory of bringing this campaign to 
a successful issue. 

One bright page in the dark record of this fraternal 
strife remains to mark the knightly deeds of true soldiers 
and men. For, instead of exulting over their captives and 
using them harshly, the troops imitated the gentle example 
of their Commander and shared their rations with the half- 
starved men, using them as brothers and fraternizing with 
them. But if the victors on the field refrained from openly 
rejoicing, the people of the northern states did not, but rang 
all the bells, held mass-meetings, and lauded the hero and 
his gallant soldiers to the skies. Enmity was silenced and 



220 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

treason was abashed and disheartened. Those first days of 
July were unfortunate days for the Southern cause. The 
fall of Vicksburg was only equalled in this war in its 
decisive effect by the defeat of Lee and his army on the 
bloody field of Gettysburg. And while Grant was entering 
in triumph the captured city, Lee, disheartened and leading 
a shattered army, was rapidly retreating from the field 
where lay all his supreme hopes. So striking was the con- 
trast, that perhaps it will never be again repeated. The 
sky of the Union, so long darkened, was gaining light; that 
of the Confederacy was darkening. 

Grant, in the midst of all this praise heaped upon him, 
did not forget his usual calmness, did not glory in suc- 
cess, but turned his thoughts to further campaigns. The 
following brief message acquainted Halleck with the 
official news of success: "The enemy surrendered this 
morning. The only terms allowed are their parole as pris- 
oners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to 
us. It saves several days in the capture and leaves troops 
and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman 
with a large force moves immedig.tely upon Johnston, 
to drive him out of the state." Here is no boasting, 
no rhetorical flourishes, no long list of glories won — only 
the simple fact of surrender, the terms given and the rea- 
sons for them, and the statement of the immediate, ener- 
getic movement of Sherman about to be made. It was a 
model report. Grant seldom, if ever, gave his reasons for 
an action, unless the same were officially demanded; but, in 
this case, he knew Halleck would blame him, and he antici- 
pated censure before it could be given. Halleck replied to 
the dispatch, blaming him for allowing parolment, because 
he said the prisoners would at once rejoin the other South- 



SHERMAN ADVANCES AGAINST JOHNSTON. 221 

ern armies despite their paroles. Grant had no fear that 
such would be the result generally. For so eager were the 
Confederate soldiery to return home, that they would have 
deserted in large numbers before being paroled, could they 
have escaped through the Union lines, and Pemberton even 
asked Grant for a guard after the parolment was concluded 
to compel the captives to go to the exchange camp, a 
request which was not granted. After the long lines of cap- 
tives had passed out of the city, between double cordons of 
troops, and after they were beyond the reach of Federal 
guns, great numbers did leave and go home, and Pember- 
ton arrived at the exchange camp with the mere remnants 
of his once fine army. 

As indicated in his despatch to Halleck, Grant had at 
once issued the order to Sherman to proceed against 
Johnston. Sherman immediately crossed the Big Black, 
concentrated his forces upon Bolton, and rapidly approached 
the enemy's position. But Johnston, having not more than 
twenty-four thousand men, was not in a condition to oppose 
him, and fell back rapidly to Jackson, where he attempted 
to make a stand. Here Sherman closed in upon him, be- 
sieged him five days, and compelled him to evacuate the 
city a second time. Pursuit was not made to any great dis- 
tance, but the troops leisurely completed the work of 
destruction which they had begun when formerly here, and 
also destroyed the railroads and bridges for many miles east- 
ward and southward of the city. Sherman then leisurely led 
his force back to Vicksburg, and the operations in and 
around that city were ended. 

The total Federal loss, from the start at Milliken's Bend 
to the return of Sherman from this expedition, was about 
nine thousand men. The Confederates lost during the same 



222 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

campaign about fifty thousand, an army of no mean pro- 
portions — greater than that with which Grant started — 
besides the control of the Mississippi river. Five victories, 
thirty-seven thousand prisoners, seventy-five thousand stand 
of small arms, two hundred cannon, and all the numerous 
supplies accompanying, were taken, and ten thousand of the 
enemy were killed or wounded. Besides all these. Port 
Hudson surrendered to General Banks, together with six 
thousand prisoners, when news of the surrender of Vicks- 
burg was received, a second victory due to Grant's work. 
Now the Confederacy was cut in twain. The supplies of 
beef and corn, that came up from Texas and the western 
states, were cut off from the eastern armies. The South 
was divided ; each portion could now be crushed in detail. 
The suppression of the Rebellion was assured. 

Grant was eager to undertake further labors for his 
country, and, while the head of the government was seriously 
debating where to place him, he turned his thoughts toward 
Mobile, the strongest Confederate city on the Gulf of 
Mexico, and suggested that he and Porter should be sent 
to reduce it. With his magnificent army of seventy thousand 
men, fresh from victory and excellent in discipline, he was 
confident that nothing could oppose, successfully, his pro- 
jected march through the heart of the Confederacy. But 
Halleck disapproved the plan, at the same time taking a 
part of the army and sending it to Rosecrans in Tennessee, 
and directing Grant to cooperate with General Banks in a 
minor expedition up Red River, in Louisiana. 

Grant, without uttering a word of protest, obeyed, and 
went to New Orleans, in order that he might confer with 
Banks. Here, while he was reviewing troops, his horse un- 
fortunately fell, crushing and bruising the general's leg 



CHICKAMAUGA. 223 

severely. For twenty days he was bedfast, and at the end of 
that time, having to return to Vicksburg, he caused himself 
to be conveyed on board a steamer and taken there. He 
slowly recovered, and was presently able to move around 
camp with the aid of crutches. 

During this enforced idleness, no greater cares than the 
control of an army in camp, and the civil administration of 
the affairs of a city, so far as military rule extended, troubled 
him. He gave his attention, as ever, to the small troubles 
of the soldiery, and various stories are related of him, illus- 
trating how he became dear to the rank and file of the army. 
He had ordered that a nominal charge be made for passage 
on the river steamers and railroads, to all sick or other men 
allowed to go home on furlough. A certain captain of a 
steamer insisted on charging a higher rate, and the matter 
coming to the ear of the commander, he ordered the offender 
placed under arrest until he should obey his injunction. The 
soldiery, who were about to raise a riot against the captain, 
raised a cheer for their general and peaceably dispersed. 
This is but one instance of many showing his care over the 
smallest matters. 

Meanwhile, as if Providence had caused the accident 
which prevented the commander from going with Banks on 
the fruitless Red River expedition, events were happening 
that were surely paving the way for him to the supreme 
command of all the armies. Rosecrans had been out- 
generaled, caught in a precarious position by the fierce and 
astute General Bragg, and in the disastrous battle of Chicka- 
mauga, defeated and driven into Chattanooga. The enemy 
had then drawn their battle lines around him, hemmed him 
in, almost as in a cul de sac, and were threatening momen- 
tarily to pounce down upon him and capture, or annihilate, 



224 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

his army. From Lookout Mountain on the west, around 
southward in a wide arc to the northern extremity of 
Mission Ridge on the east, Bragg's troopers watched and 
waited, while the Federals, having no close connection with 
a railroad, and compelled to bring provisions and other sup- 
plies by a long, difficult mountain road, were slowly, but 
surely starving, and were, indeed, in great danger. 

The government was frantic with fear. Halleck saw the 
inevitable must happen. In the emergency but one name 
was on every man's lips, but one man could save the army, 
and Grant was called to the task. He obeyed the order 
calling him to Cairo (3d October, 1863), there to receive 
further orders, and, though still quite lame, he was on his 
way within a day after receiving the dispatch. 

At Cairo an order awaited him to proceed to Louisville. 
He continued his journey, and was joined on the way by the 
Secretary of War, Stanton, who bore an order consti- 
tuting him commander-in-chief of all the forces west of the 
Allegheny Mountains and east of the Mississippi river, ex- 
cepting the troops with Banks in Louisiana. It consolidated 
the various departments into one district, and gave him 
power to appoint his lieutenants; in fact, for the time being, 
giving him almost the power of a dictator in the district. 
He was directed to save the army at Chattanooga at any 
cost. He accepted the trust with confidence, and, being 
already familiar with the conditions before him, began to 
write and dispatch orders while the train carried him to the 
field. It had been his own idea to have these departments 
consolidated; perhaps it had been his dream to command 
the district thus formed; certain it was now that his idea and 
dream were realized. 

One order went to Rosecrans, at Chattanooga, relieving 



GRANT GOES TO CHATTANOOGA. 225 

him of his command, and directing his ablest lieutenant, 
General Thomas, to assume command, and to hold the place 
at all hazards. Thomas, the steadfast captain, replied lacon- 
ically, " We will hold Chattanooga till we starve ! " Another 
dispatch went to General Burnside, who, with a small army 
in East Tennessee, was thought to be in danger, to fall back 
into Knoxville, if necessary, supply himself with provisions 
and munitions, and, having fortified a strong position, to 
hold out till he should be relieved. To Sherman, at Vicks- 
burg, and Porter, commander of the fleet of gunboats, he 
directed an order to come with all speed and force available 
to the field, the one across country, the other up the Ten- 
nessee river. The commissary depot at Nashville was 
directed to forward to Chattanooga, by every means pos- 
sible, all the provisions it could gather. These were a few 
of the important orders that were sent out by him as he 
traveled to the scene of future operations. 

Having arrived at the end of railroad travel, he set out 
without delay on horseback across the hills to the city, and 
so difficult were the roads, that at places his escort was com- 
pelled to carry him in their arms, his lameness not permit- 
ting him to walk where his steed could not go. There is 
something strangely inspiring, deeply heroic, in the example 
of the silent commander; suffering intense pain, caused by 
the roughness of the way, borne upon the shoulders of his 
men at times, with his mind occupied with plans and schemes, 
and his soul weighted with the responsibility of saving a 
starving army, thus pushing on untiringly, and almost alone, 
to bring safety to the cause he so much loved, and to rescue, 
if possible, his comrades and his former veterans from im- 
minent danger. He arrived in Chattanooga v;et with rain 
and amidst a gloom, made deeper by the knowledge pervad- 
15 



226 



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CHATTANOOGA FROM 



227 




LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 



228 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

ing all, that the army was in sore straits. Though greatly 
fatigued, he did not retire to rest until he had heard reports 
from the various Lieutenants as to the immediate condi- 
tion of affairs. Already the fortunes of v^^ar were turning 
in favor of the Union at Chattanooga. 

Those chains of high hills and mounts known as Mission 
Ridge and Lookout Mountain, coming up from the south- 
west, with a valley between them varying from six to a 
dozen miles in width, end abruptly after crossing the north- 
ern line of the State of Alabama into Tennessee and 
are intersected by the current of the Tennessee River, 
which, coming down from the northeast, skirts the northern 
face of Mission Ridge, sweeps thence westward about two 
miles and again resumes its course to the southwest till it 
washes the steep and frowning face of Lookout, whence it 
bends away again to the northwestward, only, after several 
miles of turbulent course in that direction, to return to its 
general direction to the southwest, until finally it turns 
from this general direction, by a wide sweep, northward to- 
wards its mouth in the distant Ohio. 

Within the bend of the river, between the two ridges 
mentioned, and on the south side of the stream, Chatta- 
nooga nestles, guarded and shut in on all sides, except the 
southern, by high hills and rough mountains. The general 
height of Mission Ridge is four hundred feet; the height of 
Lookout is about twenty-two hundred feet, and the ridge 
far above the river where it touches the base of the moun- 
tain, is crowned by a perpendicular mass of rock thirty or 
more feet higher than the rest of the mountain, and this 
mass, known as, "The Palisades," served the enemy for a 
signal station. The river has the swift current of a moun- 
tain stream and is at this place about four hundred yards 



^9 




230 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEK. 

wide. Coming up from 'the south and skirting the eastern 
base of Mission Ridge, South Chickamauga Creek, a deep, 
wide stream, almost a river, flows into the Tennessee. Also 
a smaller stream, called Chattanooga Creek, meanders up 
the valley between the ridges and empties into the Tennes- 
see at the northern base of Lookout. 

By reference to a map, it will be seen that two adja- 
cent peninsulas are formed by the devious course of the 
river at this point. That on which Chattanooga City is 
situated is not long nor deep, but the land tongue west 
of it, running down to the base of Lookout Mountain, is 
narrow and long, and is known, generally, as Moccasin 
Point. Another and much larger peninsula, if one may so 
call it, is across the river west of Moccasin Point, A valley 
west of Lookout and between it and the Raccoon Moun- 
tains bears the appellation of Lookout Valley, so named 
from the mountain at its eastern side and the stream that 
wanders down its course to the Tennessee. The Union 
line of defence, beginning at the mouth of Chattanooga 
Creek, was drawn across the valley in an irregular arc, front- 
ing southward, to the mouth of Citico Creek, a brook about 
two miles east of Chattanooga. 

Bragg occupied Lookout Mountain in force, had a line 
almost parallel with, and at the distance of a mile or more 
from the Federal line, and also occupied Mission Ridge, 
which he had strongly fortified. By the occupation of 
Lookout Mountain he controlled the only railroad running 
through Chattanooga, and compelled the Federals to bring 
up their supplies by wagons over a rough mountain road, 
which, starting from the city, crossed the river to the north 
side, and wound its way around and over the hills on Mocca- 
sin Point. One branch crossed the river again at Brown's 




Copyright 186s, Harper & Bros. Pfm Harpers History of tbe War. 

231 MAP ILLUSTRATING BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA. 



232 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Ferry, and thence by various passes reached Bridgeport, 
the base whence the Federals drev/ their supplies. Another 
branch of the road pursued a course along the northern 
shore of the river from near Brown's Ferry, far around the 
bends and turns of the stream to Bridgeport, and it was by 
this route, sixty miles long, that the Union army had been 
compelled to bring up its supplies, while the actual distance 
between Bridgeport and Chattanooga in a straight line was 
about twenty-five miles. The Confederates had sixty 
thousand men, the Federals fifteen thousand less. In the 
strength of position and in the supplies of horses, cattle and 
ammunition on which an army depends for its effectiveness, 
Bragg's army was vastly superior. Indeed it was found 
that Thomas had not enough ammunition to have fought a 
battle lasting one day, nor provisions to last one week. 

Bragg thought himself sure of receiving the capitulation 
of the army before him without the expense of blood and 
treasure attendant upon a battle. He believed himself able 
to hold a force of double his numbers in a state of practical 
captivity. And in order that he might hasten the day of 
surrender, he sent his cavalry on raids to the flanks and 
rear of the Federals to capture and destroy their supply 
trains, and it now seemed that the day was not far distant. 
For Pemberton's army at Vicksburg was not in worse con- 
dition and want during the last week of its seige, than was 
the army at Chattanooga when Grant arrived on the scene. 

Early in the morning of the day after his arrival 
(24th Oct.), Grant, accompanied by Generals Thomas and 
Smith and his staff, took a complete survey of the ground. 
After viewing the position of the various divisions, they sur- 
veyed a route to Brown's Ferry across the neck of Moccasin 
Point and laid plans for a supply line to cross here and by 



grant's plan. 233 

passes through the Raccoon Mountains to connect with 
Bridgeport, thus to shorten the present route more than 
one-half. General Thomas already had in mind a plan to 
open this route similar to that adopted by Grant. General 
Hooker, with two divisions of troops, who had been hurried 
from the east to the aid of the beleagured army, had 
arrived at Bridgeport, and was awaiting orders. With a 
knowledge of the circumstances in mind. Grant's plan was 
soon formed. 

General Hooker was directed to cross the river at 
Bridgeport and come up to Brown's Ferry by way of Wau- 
hatchie. General Palmer, with a strong force from Chat- 
tanooga, was directed to march down the river on the north 
side until he should approach the town of Whitesides, 
where he should cross and take position in the rear of 
Hooker, as soon as the latter should have passed up to 
Brown's Ferry, so that he might hold the lines between him 
and Bridgeport. This maneuvre was ordered for the pur- 
pose of giving Hooker the use of all his command to strike 
the enemy if he should find it necessary, in fact to reinforce 
him in the most expeditious way. In conjunction with this 
movement, and at the same time, a third force, under 
General Smith, in two parts, one under General Hazen 
eighteen hundred strong to go by water, and the other 
twenty-two hundred strong to march by land, was directed 
to proceed from Chattanooga, surprise the enemy's pickets 
at Brown's Ferry, sieze a position south of the river and 
hold it till Hooker should come. 

The orders were accomplished to the letter. Hooker 
and Palmer moved on the same day (26th Oct.) ; and, when 
it was thought they were well on their way. Smith moved 
(27th). The Confederates were not expecting such an 



234 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

exertion of energy among the enemy. Hazen and his men, 
in large pontoon boats, dropped down under cover of dark- 
ness past Lookout Heights, and landing on the south shore 
at Brown's Ferry, easily captured the Confederate pick- 
ets. Then, while the boats rapidly ferried over those 
troops who had arrived at the opposite shore, Hazen 
fell to with ax and spade and raised a rude but effectual 
fortification. Hooker soon appeared in the valley. 

Bragg was much surprised. He had lost the vantage 
point before he knew what his antagonist's design was. 
But he then acted promptly and sent General Longstreet, 
who had lately arrived from the east with his corps, to 
attack Hooker and retake the Ferry. One of Hooker's 
divisions under Geary, had not yet arrived at the Ferry, but 
was encamped about three miles up the valley. Longstreet 
descended from the winding roads over the ridge of Look- 
out Mountain at night (28th Oct.), and made a sudden 
attack upon this division. Cxeary was on his guard however, 
and savagely struck back at his foe. A terrific combat 
ensued, at some points hand to hand, the wildness of the 
fight being increased by the deep darkness of the night, 
lighted only by musket flashes. Hooker immediately dis- 
patched Howard's corps to the aid of Geary. Directed by 
the roar of guns and cries of combatants, Howard's men 
rushed at double quick to the rescue of their comrades; but, 
while passing through a heavy wood, they were suddenly 
saluted by a crash of musketry from a hill at their left, 
where a line of Confederate infantry had halted. The Fed- 
erals were enraged, and, turning, charged this infantry 
fiercely, routing it and driving it in haste from the hill. 
Presently Geary and Howard were able to form a junction 
and the combat became more equal and more bloody. Long- 



LONGSTREET REPULSED. 235 

Street was unable to advance further and began to retire. 

A singular incident made the victory complete for the 
Federals. The teamsters of Hooker's wagon train, who 
were with Geary, frightened by the noise of battle, left their 
mules and horses and fled. Presently the shots began to 
fall among the animals, and the latter, frightened, stam- 
peded in a great body and ran away, and, as luck would 
have it, ran toward the enemy's battle line. Amidst the 
dire confusion and darkness, no one could tell what the rush 
of a great body of horses could mean. The Confederates 
imagined a body of Union cavalry was charging them. 
They broke and fled. The rout extended to the whole 
corps, and it abandoned the field. Silence soon reigned 
again, disturbed only by the groans of the wounded. 
Hooker lost about four hundred men in this sanguinary 
tight; but won a victory. It is estimated, by various authori- 
ties, that Longstreet lost many more; but his defeat con- 
sisted chiefly in notbeing able to regain possession of Brown's 
Ferr)^ Hooker posted his troops so well along the banks of 
Lookout Creek and fortified his position so strongly, that 
Bragg made no further attempt to drive him thence. 

Grant considered it necessary to hold Hooker at this 
point, though separated by the mountains and river from 
the main army, in order to guard the supply line, and to 
be in position to strike the foe on the left flank as soon as 
the proper moment should arrive. Then too, this military 
fault of dividing an army was in a great measure obviated 
by the construction of a strong pontoon bridge across the 
river at Brown's Ferry, and by the fact that Grant could 
much easier move reinforcements to Hooker's aid across 
Moccasin Point, than Bragg could move a strong body of 
troops through the narrow roads and difficult passes of 



236 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lookout Range. Also he would be ready within a few da3's 
to counteract any demonstration which might be made 
against Hooker by directing an assault against Mission 
Ridge. Taking all things into consideration, there was no 
military error here. 

The effect upon the army of this brilliant movement was 
instantaneous. Huge quantities of provisions and supplies 
of all kinds were moved up from Bridgeport by train and 
steamer to Brown's Ferry, where they could be carried 
easily to Chattanooga. Within one week after Grant arrived 
in camp, the arm}^ was well fed, well clothed and in good 
spirits. There was no more talk of retreat or of surrender. 
It was again the brave body that had sustained unmerited, 
though disastrous, defeat at Chickamauga. The genius of 
one man had suddenly transformed it into a power sufficient 
to crush the enemy before it. 

Grant well knew the strength of Bragg's position and 
that with the army now present with him, he would not be 
able to concentrate power upon any one or two points 
of his line sufficient to force it. He therefore anxiousl}/ 
awaited Sherman's coming and sent message after mes- 
sage to him urging haste. Sherman's force would 
increase his strength so materially that it would counter- 
balance the physical advantages which nature afforded the 
enemy. But bad weather and worse roads hindered Sher- 
man's movements so much that he fell behind the expecta- 
tions of his Commander. 

Meanwhile Grant occupied himself in arranging plans of 
attack, in refitting his army, and in causing the means of 
transportation of supplies to be improved. He directed 
Sherman to leave a large force of men to build an additional 
line of railway from Decatur to Nashville, in order that he 



LONGSTREET SENT AGAINST BURNSIDE. 237 

might have easier access to that base of supplies. His antag- 
onist now made a very foolish move, sending Longstreet 
with nearly one-third of his army to assail Burnside at 
Knoxville. Bragg trusted too much to the strength of his 
position. He designed holding his works defensively, while 
Longstreet could capture Burnside. He did not know that 
Grant was constantly receiving strength and expecting Sher- 
man with an army. He thought the Union Commander was 
too timid to venture an attack on his apparently Impregna- 
ble positions. He thought that, while he was awaiting the 
surrender of the army cooped up in Chattanooga, he would 
also destroy Burnside's little force. If he had ever possessed 
a chance of destroying the army before him, he lost it by 
this strange error. 

Grant saw the error and hastened to take immediate 
advantage of it. To make assurance of success doubly cer- 
tain, he still waited for Sherman, calculating that the latter 
would arrive before Longstreet could possibly reach Burn- 
side and overpower him. The National Government sent 
him dispatches warning him of Burnside's danger; he sent 
Burnside dispatches instructing him to hold out a few days 
and help should be sent him. Thus having two distinct 
armies to control and a third to bring up to the field, he was 
kept very busy, and all the latent powers of his genius were 
exercised. 

Sherman was still deiayed, however, by the rains and 
lack of transportation. Some have said that he did not 
exercise, during this campaign, that energy which he usu- 
ally displayed. It is true that his slowness delayed the Com- 
mander's plans several days; but Grant attached no blame 
to him. Grant watched the progress of Longstreet with 
feverish anxiety, heightened by the alarming dispatches 



238 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

received almost daily from the Government. In order to 
prevent Bragg from sending further aid to Longstreet and 
to force him to recall that general if possible, he instructed 
Thomas to make an attack on the north end of Mission 
Ridge, if he thought it could be done without much loss; 
but Thomas replied that he had no animals to draw his 
artillery and could not move. (7th Nov.) Longstreet's 
movements did not prove to be so rapid as had been feared. 
Grant still thought it best not to risk a repulse with the 
force present, and the order to Thomas was countermanded. 
Sherman finally reached Bridgeport (14th Nov.) with a 
part of his forces, but it was almost a week later when he 
was able to bring all his troops together and appear on the 
battlefield. Grant's plans were all laid. His main attack 
was to be directed against the northern end of Mission 
Ridge. He designed bringing Sherman by a route north of 
the river to a point opposite the place of attack, have him 
cross there and bear down with all his power upon that 
point. He ordered Howard, with a corps of Hooker's com- 
mand, to cross at Brown's Ferry and encamp behind the 
hills south of Chattanooga, there to remain until Sherman 
should arrive, when he was to cross into the city. Hooker 
was directed to be in readiness to storm the heights of 
Lookout Mountain and to force his way across the ridge 
between the upper and lower palisades. Grant, indeed, 
changed this part of his plan once, designing to bring 
Hooker into the city, and, having placed him on the right, 
direct him to cut off the enemy on Lookout from the 
remainder of Bragg's army, by penetrating the line at the 
eastern base of the mountain, and so through to Rossville, 
But on account of the rains having raised the river and ren- 
dered the pontoon bridge unsafe, he returned to his former 



grant's plan of attack. 239 

plan, which was really safer also, because in case Sherman 
should have failed to carry Mission Ridge, Bragg would 
have been able, with Hooker in the lines at Chattanooga, to 
have regained possession of the supply line at Brown's 
Ferry. 

To aid Sherman's movements, the Commander caused 
one hundred and sixteen pontoon boats to be carried across 
the country into North Chickamauga Creek and there to be 
concealed under guard till Sherman should appear. The 
attacks were to be made simultaneously at both wings so 
that the enemy might not concentrate troops on either. 
And if troops should be drawn from the center of the Con- 
federate army in such numbers as to materially weaken it, 
as could hardly fail to happen, Grant designed — and his 
design was afterward accomplished — to hurl forth the cen- 
ter of his own force under Thomas against the weakened 
point and stake the issue of the contest upon the result. 

His whole plan may be thus summed up: To roll back 
the Confederate wings by well sustained efforts, compel the 
enemy to weaken his center, get his own wings around into 
a position to flank Bragg and cut off his retreat, and finally 
with one mighty effort at the center to crush the army into 
fragments. How nearly he accomplished his object, history 
shows. 

As Sherman was now practically on the field, Grant set 
the day of attack {226. Nov.) and issued his orders. But 
Sherman, though striving by every means, to get his forces 
across the river at Brown's Ferry to their position north of 
the hills and of Chattanooga, could not bring them up in 
time. Nor did he get into position on the next day. But 
the dispatches were so urgent from the Government to save 
Burnside, now cut off from communicating with Grant, that 



240 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEB. 

in order that Bragg might be prevailed upon to order the 
return of Longstreet, the commander would wait no longer. 
He ordered Thomas to assault and carry the enemy's line 
in the plain at the foot of Mission Ridge. A secondary ob- 
ject was to be obtained by this order. For, if Thomas 
should assault first at the center, Bragg would be deceived 
and would not suspect the projected movements of Sher- 
man, and the latter would be unresisted in crossing to the 
south side of the river. 

Strange as it may seem, the Confederate General, 
though he could not but have known that large bodies of 
troops were moving about Chattanooga, lay quiet and un- 
suspicious. When Thomas drew out his regiments before 
their trenches, the enemy supposed he did so to parade; 
but, to his consternation, the long lines of blue-coats, after 
dressing their ranks with precision, swept across the space 
intervening between the lines at a charging pace, drove in 
the pickets and, with a great cheer, burst over the first 
line of works. The surprised Confederates incontinently fled 
to their second line nearer the ridge; the gunners sprang to 
their batteries and opened a fierce fire, and Bragg, greatly 
surprised, began to make dispositions to resist further as- 
saults from that direction. Heretofore the hostile lines — 
at least the pickets — had been hostile only in name. The 
outposts had met often between lines to gossip, to exchange 
newspapers, and to trade tobacco and liquor and other ar- 
ticles; now these idle days were past, and both sides 
prepared for a gigantic struggle. 

By this movement. Grant secured possession of a range 
of low-lying knolls and hillocks half a mile nearer to Mission 
Ridge, from which he could not only see the field on either 
side, but could see many of the movements that Bragg 



THE PONTOON BRIDGE LAID. 241 

would be likely to make in the coming battle. About one 
thousand men were lost on each side during this contest. 
Bragg was much deceived by Sherman's movements. His 
watchmen on Lookout had observed that general and his 
troops cross to the north side of the river at Brown's Ferry, 
but had not seen them after they disappeared in the hills. 
He supposed, however, that they had come into the city 
and taken part in the assault. Howard's corps, crossing 
into Chattanooga, aided in this deception. 

At nightfall (23d) , Sherman arrived at the point on 
North Chickamauga Creek appointed with part of his force, 
having been compelled by the breaking of the pontoon 
bridge at Brown's Ferry to leave Osterhaus' Division with 
Hooker. At midnight, while the great body of his army 
were sleeping as only weary men can sleep though in the 
midst of cold, damp woods and hills, and without tents, the 
one hundred and sixteen pontoon boats, under the general 
direction of General W. F. Smith, each carrying thirty 
armed men, floated silently down the creek into the Ten- 
nessee and adown it till they arrived at the mouth of South 
Chickamauga Creek. Here a part of the soldiers debarked 
and captured the Confederate pickets by surprise. Then 
the troops with their prisoners reembarked and floated 
down to the point selected for a landing. Here they again 
debarked, laid out a fortification, and with axe and spade 
rapidly proceeded to raise a defensive work. Then Sher- 
man, rousing the remainder of his tired men, led them 
down to the northern shore opposite, and while some of the 
boats were used to ferry troops across, others were rapidly 
placed in position for a bridge. 

Now began the second day's operations. Howard met 
Sherman as the latter stepped upon the southern bank of 

16 



242 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the river, and reported to him for orders. His troops 
formed the connecting link between the troops which Sher- 
man now rapidly transferred to the south side of the river 
and the troops of the center under Thomas, whose lines 
reached the eastern base of Lookout. Hooker, with the 
right wing, was in the valley west of Lookout, but early on 
this morning was preparing to march up the mountain side 
and turn Bragg's left. 

The Commander occupied Orchard Knob, a height about 
midway between Chattanooga and Mission Ridge, from 
which he could see by the aid of a powerful glass most of 
the movements of his long lines of soldiers. The Federal 
lines were almost thirteen miles long, stretching from the 
river on the left to the river on the right and beyond Look- 
out in a vast curve. Here were veterans from the eastern, 
the central and western armies; recruits from the north, 
east and west, — all amalgamated into one harmonious 
whole, and directed by the genius of one man. He had 
planned for a victory — how well he executed his plans, how 
wisely he had arranged all the parts of his array, the result 
shows. Over sixty thousand troops moved at his orders on 
this field. Opposed to them and strongly fortified behind 
mountainous bulwarks were about forty-five thousand Con- 
federates, intent only upon holding their ground. So 
strong was their position that Davis, President of the Con- 
federate States, who visited Bragg shortly before the bat- 
tle, considered it impregnable. 

The first movement upon tnis battle-chess-board was 
that of Hooker against the cloud-capped heights of Look- 
out. He had about ten thousand men, including Osterhaus' 
division of Sherman's corps. 

The day broke cold and damp, a drizzling rain and mist 



THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS. 



243 



filling the the air so that objects could be clearly distin- 
guished but a few rods. This mist was favorable to Hook- 
er's movements as it enabled him to march part of his 
divisions up the valley on the west side of Lookout Creek 
and to cross beyond the enemy's left unperceived. The 
Confederate pickets occupied the eastern bank of the creek 
in strong force, while riflepits and breastworks had been 
erected along the base and side of the mountain for the 
shelter of larger forces. The greater portion of the Con- 




HOOKER STORMING LOOKOUT. 



federates on Lookout were camped in a hollow on the 
mountain side, while a smaller force held the palisades and 
the slopes at the top. 

Hooker, having thus transferred a part of his foice to 
the east side of the creek, extended his right wing up the 
slope to the palisades, facing north, and easily flanked the 
force guarding the bridges and lower fords, and drove them 
back, thus enabling the remainder of his troops to cross with 
ease though under fire. Then the whole force, in an irregular 



244 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

line swung around on the mountain side. It was impossible 
to preserve any regular order or formation; but the various 
regiments vied with each other in the forward movement. 
The men climbed the steep sides of the mountain as best 
they might — trees, roots, rocks and vines enabling them to 
pull themselves upward, or to brace their scrambling feet. 

All the while the Confederate soldiery, hidden in the 
gloom of mist and trees, from every hollow and hill poured 
upon them a hot fire, but in vain. Slowly but surely they 
swarmed upward, and when a height was gained, or a space 
of level ground, there they halted to re-form. They soon 
reached the cloud line and fought in the smoke and mist of 
the encircling heavens. They reached the enemy's bat- 
teries, stormed them, captured some and drove the others 
back. 

To the anxious Commander's ears, as he stood on Orchard 
Knob straining every organ of sense to perceive the progress 
of his troops, came the rattling volleys of musketry, now and 
then broken by the deeper thunder of artillery, and some- 
times the mist, lifting and breaking away, showed for a 
moment to his vision the moving bodies of men, the flashes 
of guns, and the spouting smoke of battle. He noted the 
sound slowly drawing nearer and nearer around the summit 
of the mountain, and about noon a messenger announced 
that Hooker had gained the heights between the palisades 
and the river, and had made connections with Thomas' right 
wing at the m'outh of Chattanooga Creek. Grant was 
pleased. His line was now continuous, and victory was 
almost certain. 

But it was not without a desperate struggle that Hooker 
had been able to form this junction. The enemy had occu- 
pied an old road cut into the northern face of the mountain, 



Sherman's attack. 245 

the last point of vantage between Hooker and the Federals 
at the Creek. Hooker was obliged to concentrate every 
available man here, but, finally, carried it with a rush. By 
the middle of the afternoon he had rendered his position 
secure, and the battle at this part of the field lulled. 

Grant's battle line was now reduced to the length of but 
little more than six miles, as Sherman had also gained much 
ground. Hooker spent the remainder of the afternoon in 
strengthening his position, in taking several minor points 
from the enemy, and in generally preparing for a further 
advance. But Grant believed that Bragg would evacuate 
Lookout during the night, and turned his whole attention 
to the battle on his left. Here it had not gone so favorably. 
Sherman could not get all his troops across the river and 
into position before noon. The mist aided his movements, 
by concealing their numbers from the enemy. Grant had 
provided for any attack that might be made upon Sherman 
while crossing, by having forty or more of his heaviest 
cannon trained so as to protect the landing. But Bragg was 
so much confused by the fight with Hooker at his left, that 
he did not perceive the threatening movement on his right 
until it was too late to prevent it. 

Sherman drew his line of battle out almost perpendicular 
to the ridge he was about to attack, with his left resting on 
South Chickamauga creek, his center drawn across the 
ridge, and its right sweeping its western face, and connect- 
ing with Thomas in the plain below. Howard commanded 
his right. In this order his troops swept up the face of the 
ridge, and seized the summit of a hill somewhat detached 
from the remainder of the ridge. He met but little resist- 
ance, and by the middle of the afternoon had fortified the 
crest of the hill; while Bragg, wild with consternation, hur- 



24» 




GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN. 



CLOSE OF THE SECOND DAY. 247 

ried regiment after regiment to the brow of the crest oppo- 
site, and threw up breastworks to the right and left of it. 

Had Sherman continued to press forward, as Grant de- 
signed, he might have completed the victory on this day. 
But his troops were tired and somewhat disordered, and he 
was not fully acquainted with the ground. The Confed- 
erates made several fierce assaults, striving to regain their 
lost ground and to cover the new lines of defence in course 
of erection, and Sherman thought it best to thoroughly 
fortify where he was. He could not be driven from this 
position. The second day's battle closed. The Federal 
arms were thus far successful. 

It was a good day's work. Grant was satisfied that on 
the morrow he could either drive Bragg's army in rout from 
the field or capture it entire. His plan had been formed; 
he did not deviate from it. Hooker was ordered to cross 
the valley towards Rossville, if the enemy should be found 
to have evacuated Lookout during the night, but if they 
should still hold the heights in the morning, he was directed 
to break through their line on the east side of the mountain, 
and thus isolate those who should be on the mountain top. 
At all events, he was to get into Rossville at the earliest 
possible moment, throw his forces across Mission Ridge and 
into the rear and flank of the enemy, turn northward, and 
bear up to meet Sherman. Then, as soon as he should have 
reached the Ridge and obtained the flanking position, and 
while Sherman should be bearing down upon the Con- 
federate right with all his power, Thomas, with the centre, 
would be launched forth, and the retreat of the Confederate 
army having been cut off from the south and east by 
Hooker, and from the north and east by Sherman, while 
Thomas thundered upon it from the north and west, annihi- 



248 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

lation or surrender would be its certain fate. Grant calcu- 
lated that Bragg would mass on its wings to oppose Sherman 
and Hooker, and that his center would be most liable to 
break. 

This plan, magnificent in its conception and in the 
orders and preparations for its execution, could not have 
failed to reap the expected result, had it been carried out to 
the letter. But Hooker could not get into the required 
position in time. Grant spent almost the entire night in 
writing orders, receiving reports, and in advising his chief 
officers. He sent dispatches to the President, to Burn- 
side and others, advising them in a few words of his success, 
and promising to succor Burnside within a few hours. Then 
he retired to a couch and slept soundly. With the daylight 
he was out again at his post of observation. 

Hooker, as Grant surmised, found Lookout deserted in 
the morning, and at once set his forces in motion across 
the plain towards Rossville; but his progress was slow, and 
every step was contested by skirmishers left to impede his 
march. He found the bridges over Chattanooga Creek 
burned, compelling him to search for fords and to rebuild 
bridges for his artillery to cross. He was thus delayed four 
precious hours, hours that saved Bragg's army from total 
destruction or capture; and, when he did get over with his 
foot-soldiers, he had to leave his artillery till the bridges 
could be reconstructed. 

Sherman moved promptly, massing his troops at his left 
and center, and sternly assaulting the face of the hill oppo- 
site that upon which he had halted during the night. A low 
pass, under which was a railroad tunnel, intervened. His 
troops gallantly moved across the pass over the tunnel and 
up to the very mouths of the opposing cannon ; but the 



SHERMAN HARD PRESSED. 



249 



enemy had strengthened their position with works and bat- 
teries until it was impregnable. The face of the hill was no 
less than a fort in strength, with its ditches, barricades and 
breastworks, behind which lay thousands of brave men and 
from which many cannon belched death. Sherman's left 
wing, however, did not meet with so much opposition, but 
succeeded in driving the enemy back and captured the rail- 
road bridge over Chickamauga Creek, thus cutting off the 
source of Bragg's supplies and threatening to cut off the 
road by which his army could retreat in case of disaster. 
Nor could it be driven from its hold, although Bragg made 
strenuous efforts to do so. But the Confederates massed so 
heavily against Sherman's center and right that they were 
compelled to fall back across the pass. 

Grant perceived this retrograde movement and sent 
Sherman large reinforcements. Again Sherman pushed 
forward the center and again it was compelled to retire. 

Here the fighting was most desperate. Bragg sent 
brigade after brigade from his center and left to reinforce 
the right, until his forces there outnumbered Sherman's men 
two to one and it went hard with them to hold their own. 
The middle of the afternoon came. Grant waited patiently 
to hear the sound of Hooker's cannon toward Rossville, or 
to have a message concerning his movements. He sent 
messenger after messenger to hurry him forward. He not 
only wished to gain the victory, but to crush the opposing 
army, and he waited until Sherman's danger became immi- 
nent, and until the incessant crash of musketry and the 
boom of cannon, more rapid than the hurried beating of 
alarm drums, warned him that he must relieve the pressure 
there. 

The battle along the front of Sherman's line was terrific, 



250 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

savage, incessant, and full of slaughter. The veteran 
soldier was redeeming the delay of yesterday, w^hen he 
might have obtained the hill before him v^ithout such 
bloody efforts. 

Grant now ordered Thomas to assault the Confederate 
works at the base of the ridge and to halt when these should 
be taken and reform his lines. The Army of the Cumber- 
land had not taken part in the second and third days' battle, 
but had lain on its arms while other armies struggled with its 
old antagonist. Now, when the word was given, a kind of 
exalted frenzy seized every brave man. Their long lines 
swept up to and over the line at the base of the ridge, and 
up to and over the second line further up, Federal and Con- 
federate going over the works together, so intermingled 
that the gunners above hesitated to fire for fear of destroy- 
ing their own soldiers. Many captives were taken and 
marched off to the rear. 

But the assault did not stop here. The men scrambled 
up the side of the ridge, aided by grasping roots and pro- 
jecting rocks, and sheltering themselves behind trees and 
boulders. Now, the enemy threw aside caution and fired 
continuously down the slope, and so rapid were the dis- 
charges of their cannon that the rattle of small arms could 
scarce be heard. Sheridan, who afterward become famous, 
commanded one of the divisions leading this assault. So 
evenly did the soldiers of the four divisions press upwards 
that they burst over the last line of the Confederate works 
on the crest of the ridge simultaneously. 

Grant had watched the assault with mingled feelings of 
awe and apprehension; but when he saw the troops break 
over the enemy's lines, he felt that victory had come, and, 
mounting his horse, rode swiftly to the front. A panic 



252 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

now siezed the foe. They fled from the field. Those 
opposed to Sherman did not break as soon as the center, 
but fought until they were in danger of capture, when they 
retreated in disorder. Many prisoners were taken. Cle- 
burn's division alone remained intact and strove to protect 
the rear, making a halt about a mile in the rear of the 
battle field. But he was soon driven from this position and 
forced to continue the retreat. Night did not stop the 
pursuit. It was continued several days. 

Forty cannon, many small arms and other accoutrements 
were captured. The victory was complete, but the Southern 
army was not annihilated, as Grant had designed, because 
of the unforseen obstacles that prevented Hooker from 
effectually closing its line of retreat. So ended this the 
most elaborate battle, as Vicksburg had been the most elab- 
orate campaign, that Grant had planned. And so came 
Grant to the highest reputation of all the Generals of this 
war, and was enabled to step into the place held before only 
by Washington and Scott. 

But the Commander did not rest on his laurels. Sher- 
man and Hooker pursued the retreating army as far as 
Ringgold, picking up many prisoners and skirmishing 
heavily. Burnside was still in danger. Before the battle 
occurred, Grant had directed General Granger to be in 
readiness to set out the moment victory should be certain, 
to the relief of Burnside, who, with twelve thousand men, 
was now fighting Longstreet's twenty thousand at Knox- 
ville. Again he ordered him to march as soon as the battle 
was ended; and, supposing that he would obey promptly, 
the Commander accompanied the pursuers of Bragg some 
distance on the next day. But Granger demurred, excus- 
ing his delay by saying that his troops needed time to 
recuperate. 



SHERMAN RELIEVES KNOXVILLE. 253 

Grant then became of the opinion that Granger was not 
a man of sufficient energy to undertake the important mis- 
sion, revoked his orders, and directed Sherman, who was 
pursuing Bragg, to turn the head of his column towards 
Knoxville, ninety miles away and march to the relief of 
Burnside. That energetic soldier, not stopping to excuse 
himself because of the weariness of his troops, v;ho had 
done the most marching and the hardest fighting of all, 
obeyed, turned his columns to Knoxville, stripped his men of 
every impediment and trusting to his Commander to see that 
he was properly supported with provisions from the rear, 
marched in hot haste across the almost desert country, 
(27th Nov.). 

Grant sent couriers with letters to Burnside, commanding 
him to hold out to the last extremity and assuring him that 
Sherman would be with him very soon; and he contrived 
that a copy of this dispatch should fall into the hands of 
the enemy. Longstreet, in due time, captured the courier, 
read the message, raised the siege of Knoxville and re- 
treated into the mountainous regions of East Tennessee. 
The ruse was successful, and Sherman was not compelled 
to fight a second battle with his weary veterans. 

So ended the campaign at Chattanooga, and the Gordian 
Knot, that Rosecrans had allowed to tie his army to Chat- 
tanooga, was cut. Henceforth the Union army in the 
middle departments was superior in morale and power to 
all its opponents. It could well stop for a time to rest and 
count the cost. It had lost in this battle about fifty-six 
hundred men, of whom seven hundred and fifty were slain. 

Bragg lost over nine thousand men, of whom about six 
thousand were captives. He had not lost so many killed 
and wounded, because his troops lay behind works, while 



254 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND L,EE. 

the Federals assaulted in the open field. But the Con- 
federates lost more than men — they lost the prestige of 
courage. Their armies thereafter fought with bravery, 
indeed, in this part of the seceding territory, but only once 
took the offensive part of the contest. The Union gained, 
besides the immediate victory, the encouragement that 
always follows when a great victory raises a dispirited army 
to the plane of a conqueror. It also gave to all the Federal 
armies the guiding mind of a military genius, so that, 
thereafter, they moved as a unit to the destruction of the 
Confederacy. 

Grant deserved to rise by this victory, for, in the excel- 
lence of the combinations, which not only gave supplies to a 
starving and disheartened army within a week after he 
assumed command, but afterwards brought together forces, 
placed them in position, and, by one blow, drove the besiegers 
in rout from the field, this battle was not surpassed by any 
described in history. 

It has been said that this battle resembled the European 
mode of fighting more than any other contest of this war, 
and that the rules of strategy were more nearly observed 
than in any other. Napoleon, at Austerlitz, used similar 
tactics, but was not in as difficult position to maneuvre. 
The victory was gained against odds, for Bragg's army, in 
the position it occupied, was equal, according to the rules of 
war, to an attacking force of twice its numbers, or, in round 
numbers, to ninety thousand men, while Grant had but sixty 
thousand effective troops. Had Longstreet been present 
with Bragg — who committed an unpardonable error, 
though, it is said, by the direction of Jefferson Davis, Con- 
federate President, who considered himself a military 



WINTER MOVEMENTS. 255 

genius, of sending Longstreet away, on the eve of a battle, 
with nearly one-third of the army — the contest would have 
been much more stubborn, and might have been prolonged 
another day, but the result would not have been much dif- 
ferent. In some respects, this battle resembled the final 
campaign of the war. It was a combination of forces from 
three different armies into one, and, under Grant, the final 
movements of the forces that crushed the rebellion were 
guided by such combination. It illustrated a genius that 
could not only form and execute plans on the field of battle, 
but could also direct the movements of armies a thousand 
miles apart. 

Having rescued a beleaguered army from danger, and 
given the Confederacy the severest blow it had received 
since the surrender of Vicksburg, Grant established his 
headquarters at Nashville, the most central point of his 
district, and began to lay plans, looking to the fall of Mobile 
and Atlanta. He placed Thomas in command at Chatta- 
nooga, sent Sherman again to Vicksburg — at his own 
request — and ordered General Schofield to the command at 
Knoxville, in place of Burnside, who was sent elsewhere. 

During the winter, he visited Knoxville and organized 
an expedition to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee, but 
that general prudently retreated. Thus his army was scat- 
tered over many miles of territory, but the bulk of it 
was kept near Chattanooga to watch all the movements 
toward Atlanta, where General Johnston was in command, 
Bragg having been relieved. His request to be allowed 
to move against Mobile was again refused (7th Dec), and 
with good reason, for the President now dreamed of better 
things for his successful lieutenant. He turned his atten- 
tion to improving the railroads and other means of 



256 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

transportation, preparatory to the coming Spring cam- 
paigns. He sent Sherman into the heart of Mississippi, 
as far as Meridian, with a double object — to destroy Con- 
federate supplies, and to create a diversion in aid of Far- 
ragut, who, with his fleet, desired to attempt the reduction 
of Mobile from the sea. As a further diversion, he directed 
Thomas to move towards Dalton in force, and this was done 
also that the enemy might not combine against Sherman 
with all their forces in the west. 

Sherman swept through the state working destruction at 
every step. He entered Jackson (5th Feb.) for the third 
time, pressed on to Meridian without serious opposition and 
destroyed the railroads in all that part of the country. 
Then he returned to Vicksburg. Sherman estimated that 
fifty million dollars worth of property, useful in war, had 
been destroyed, though nothing was hurt that would not aid 
the enemy in continuing the war. This was one method, 
savage it is true, of destroying the sinews of war and of 
crushing out resistance. Various smaller expeditions were 
prosecuted, having the double object of injuring the enemy's 
resources and of keeping the Federal troops employed. 

The 25th day of February, A. D. 1864, marks the 
beginning of the death-struggle of the Confederacy. 
On that day a bill was passed by the Congress of the 
United States reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General of 
all the United States Armies, an office second only to the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, and above the power of 
the Secretary of War. Washington had alone held this full 
rank, Scott having been only brevetted to it; so that in fact 
Grant stood first after the Father of his Country in military 
honor and power. But Grant won this honor, not through 
the love and influence of friends, as Washington did, per- 



GRANT MADE LIEUTENANT GENERAL. 257 

haps, but by the ability he had exhibited, and because the 
great President, taught by the bitter experiences he had 
encountered in his deahngs with his generals, saw in him a 
man who would act, no matter what aid he received, and 
would not stop to excuse inaction and inability by asserting 
that he was not prepared, or was not supported, or was not 
strong enough, or who, when he did move with a great 
power would allow himself to be beaten and over-reached 
by an enemy inferior in numbers. 

Lincoln perceived in Grant's record an exhibition of 
genius that could not only fight battles, but could form 
great combinations, and could find in any emergency means 
to win victory. But, perhaps, the greatest consideration 
with the President was, that he could trust this man, know- 
ing, because he perceived it, that he was a leader and not a 
follower. "I do not know what your plans may be," he 
said at one time afterwards, "but I do know that whatever 
they are, you will do your best, and that is all I ask." 

So Lincoln nominated the Commander to the office 
created again by Congress. The Senate approved the nom- 
ination without dela3^ and Grant went to Washington to 
receive his commission (9th March) . For this was so high 
an office that its incumbent must needs be appointed thereto 
not only by the President, but the appointment must also be 
ratified by the august Senate. It made Grant virtually 
military dictator. To him all the military powers must bow, 
except the President, and that official being a civilian, would 
hesitate much before interfering with his orders. Orders 
issued from him directly to all officers, unless he chose to 
direct them through his lieutenants. The War Department, 
under the direction of a Secretary, a man of immense energy 
and powerful mind, but whose efficiency was injured much 

17 



258 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

by his ambition and self-respect, had heretofore interfered 
to such an extent with the generals in their campaigns, that 
much of the blame which attached to competent officers who 
failed ought to have been laid upon him. Even Lincoln has 
been -blamed without cause for his Secretary's errors. But 
Grant was in a position to stand against all such inter- 
ference now. 

He was now placed above Halleck, whose vascillating 
conduct towards him marks this otherwise capable officer 
with a deserved odium. Halleck's ambition had been satis- 
fied, in part, by having been raised to the highest command 
possible in the President to Hestow ; but the ill success of the 
armies in the field, and the aimless expeditions he ordered 
while he held this office, had injured his reputation much, 
and now he saw the man, whose victories at Donelson and 
Shiloh had raised him to power, step over and above him 
to an office that he could never deserve. 

The best of all praise that one could bestow upon another 
is that he deserves honor, so that honor comes to him, and not 
he to it through friends and adherents, wealth and position. 
Grant, we have seen, rose from the rank of a poor citizen, 
rich only in genius and sterling integrity, to the highest 
rank in the army. Enemies traduced him, but he main- 
tained silence and did not revile again. He went forward 
coolly, victoriously, and, it might be said, with contempt 
alone for those who slandered him. He had such faith in 
the Ruler of Battles, such faith in his own powers, that he 
could afford to keep silent. He believed at all times in his 
own success. And, in reviewing his career as studied thus 
far, one conclusion is forced irresistibly upon the reviewer, 
that he alone struck the effective, far-reaching blows — in 
western fields especially — that materially injured the Con- 



grant's honors deserved. 



259 




MAJOR GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET. 



lederacy, causing it to totter, blows from which it could not 
recover. Others, it is true, gained victories, but their influ- 
ence was local; his victories not only gained vantage ground^ 
but made it possible to retain it. It was a fitting climax 
that, stepping from Belmont to Donelson, striding from 
Shiloh to Vicksbusg, he should vault from Chattanooga into 
the high and important office that he now held. Having 



260 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

been intrusted with the fate of armies, he was now intrusted 
with the fate of a hopeful nation. How well he deserved 
preferment and won the title of "Savior of his Country" 
it has been seen in part, and still remains to be further 
proven. 

We now return to follow the career of the only man who, 
in this war, possessed the skill, ability and genius to cope 
with him. 



Book Ubvee. 



RISE OF LEE. 




l^lll MONG the man}' causes which aroused the dire 
wrath leading to the Great Rebellion, John Brown's 
raid upon Harper's Ferry in Virginia, was by no 
means the least. John Brown was an enthusiast. 
He had grown from an earnest abolitionist into a fanatical 
leader of bold men, who chose rather to break the law and 
die therefor, than to rest while the oppressed remained 
without aid. He had taken active part in the troubles 
incident to the admission of Kansas as a State into the 
Union, and had become imbued with the idea that the 
easiest way to free the slaves was to arm them and organize 
a servile insurrection. He believed, falsely, that if the 
spark of insurrection should be once lighted amongst this 
ignorant class, it would soon grow into a blaze that would 
consume the institution of slavery. He did not perceive 
that the slaves were too densely ignorant, allowed to remain 
so by the design of their masters, to know what they could 
do. They were not as the slaves of ancient times often 
were, the most educated class, and were not able to conceive 
or know what their rights were, or how best they could 
improve them. Only a few of them dreamed that they 



262 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



were born into the world for anything better than to labor 
for the comfort of the master, who, though exacting, was 
often kind to them, and whom they regarded as a sort of 
superior being to be worshipped and obeyed. 

With a score of men, as brave and devoted as himself, 
Brown seized Harper's Ferry (October, 1859), took posses- 
sion of the United States Arsenal, thus infringing the 
National as well as the State Laws, and issued a written 
manifesto to the slaves, calling on them to rise and join him. 

The manifesto aroused no 
slaves; for out of pure igno- 
rance, not knowing how to 
read it, nor understanding 
what it meant when read 
to them, they could not re- 
spond. 

The civil authorities of 
the State of Virginia took 
prompt action. Colonel 
- Lee, of whom we write, 
was then at home from the 
frontier on a visit, and was 
ooDTriehud V. rr • „• . . v ^. „ w callccl upoii to takc com- 

uopyngQiea. PromHarpers History of the Civil War. ' 

JOHN BROWN. mand of a battalion of 

troops and suppress the insurrection. He acted promptly, 
occupied Harper's Ferry, besieged Brown and his compan- 
ions in the Arsenal, and, after some parleying to persuade 
them to surrender, assaulted the arsenal, broke into it, de- 
spite the desperate resistance of its defenders, killed nearly 
all the insurrectionists, and took the rest prisoners. Brown 
himself being taken severely wounded. The fight ended in 
a massacre, the soldiers showing but little mercy, being not 




LEE OPPOSED TO SECESSION. 263 

only enraged by the valiant resistance, but also determined 
to wreak such dire vengeance on the insurgents that no one 
else would be rash enough to attempt a like venture. The 
severity of the punishment reflected no credit upon the com- 
manding officer, who was naturally of a humane disposition. 

Lee turned the captives over to the civil authorities, who 
speedily tried, condemned and hanged them for treason. 
Thus was he concerned in the first open bloodshed, the first 
contest between slavery and freedom, and, though then act- 
ing in accordance with the existing laws, yet on the side 
which he afterwards chose when a more formidable rebellion 
raised its hydra head against the flag. He returned shortly 
afterwards, with increased reputation among the people of 
his state, to his post on the frontier in the west. 

In the public discussions and political campaigns, leading 
to the election of Lincoln, Lee took no active part. His 
position on the outskirts of civilization, his remoteness from 
the stormy scenes of political strife, and his nature, which 
was averse to mingling in politics, for he was a soldier pure 
and simple, kept him from public notice. His sympathies 
were with the slave-power and the radical wing of the Dem- 
ocracy; but, having served so long under the national flag, 
and being a soldier of honor, he did not partake of the senti- 
ment of secession, and at one time wrote to a friend that he 
believed no greater calamity' could befall the nation than a 
secession of part of the States. Even then, we may pre- 
sume, he was debating within himself what would be his 
proper course, should a civil war ensue. 

His duty as a member of the United States Army, his 
oath as an officer and his honor as a soldier, pointed his course 
to be one of staunch loyalty to the National Government, 
but his sympathies were on the other side. He was 



264 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

called to Washington (ist March, 1861) by order of 
Gen. Scott, who was striving with all his great power to 
defeat the efforts of the Secretary of War to scatter the 
army and place the army supplies at the southern posts, that 
they might be the more easily seized when war should break 
out, and his advice was sought by the aged chieftain on many 
important occasions. South Carolina had already seceded, 
and many other states were preparing to follow the 
example. It can not be determined how Lee regarded the 
rebellious movements; but Scott reposed the greatest con- 
fidence in his loyalty, until he openly declared that he would 
follow Virginia. 

The Virginia Assembly was agitating the question of 
Secession; but it does not appear that Lee used any of his 
great influence, or aroused the influence of his friends, to 
oppose the movement. Instead of this, he listened to 
insidious proposals and promises of those who were most 
prominent in persuading the State authorities to pass the 
resolution of secession. He was promised the chief com- 
mand of the State troops in case it should pass; it was 
hinted, that, as Virginia would be without doubt the most 
powerful of all states of the new Confederacy about to be 
formed, her chief officer had a good chance of becoming 
the first officer in the new national army. It was represen- 
ted to him, that as Washington, of whose family he had 
become a part by marriage, had been the chief instrument 
in achieving the independence of the Colonies, so he might 
rise to be called the Father of this, a new country. One 
can not say what were all the considerations urged upon 
him; but much can be inferred. His ambition was aroused. 
He waited only till the State should pass the Ordinance of 
Secession to declare openly what he had secretly resolved. 



LEE RESIGNS HIS COMMISSION. 205 

Then (17th April, 1861), he informed Scott that he would 
'resign his commission in the National Army. Scott, who 
loved him both as a soldier and as a friend, pointed out his 
folly, reasoned with him, showed him the blackness of trea- 
son against a country that had never wronged him, and 
assured him that the National Government stood ready to 
honor with preferment her faithful soldiers. Other power- 
ful friends reasoned with him, but he was firm. 

He sent in his resignation on one day (20th April) , went 
on the next day to Richmond, and on the following d^^y 
accepted a commission as Major General and Commander- 
in-Chief of all the armies of Virginia, facts sufficient to show 
that he was sure of receiving such appointment before 
resigning his old commission. From the position of a 
Colonel in the National Army, he found himself transferred 
to the highest command which his state could give. An 
excellent soldier was lost to the Union; a natural leader of 
men gained to the seceders. The virtue of a patriot gave 
way to the promptings of ambition, and the importunities of 
relatives and friends, though it is said that when he finally 
decided to go with his state in her rebellion, Lee shed tears. 
And well he might, had he forseen the great calamities 
which his action afterwards brought upon his people, by 
continuing the war many months after all reasonable hope 
of winning had been lost to the Confederacy. 

One cannot but admire this man because of his genius 
and worth of character; but the facts in the case do not 
show that he was disinterested in thus abandoning the flag 
of his country to accept a command, higher at least in name, 
than the one he already possessed. Mistaken ambition and 
the forceful influence of birth and circumstance, urged him 
to this course. For Lee was neither ignorant nor a fool; he 



266 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

could not but see that the rebellion v/as raised in defence of 
a most pernicious system, that it v/as a gigantic conspiracy of 
men who were arhbitious to stand in the front ranks of the 
great, who were eager that the system, however pernicious, 
which made their wealth, should not be overthrown, and 
who scrupled not to overturn a government from whose 
offices they were about to be driven by the suffrages of a 
rising party. That Lee hesitated to desert his flag, that he 
wept because he did leave it, that he went through a great 
mental struggle before finally declaring himself, can not be 
used as an argument that he was moved to join the Confed- 
erates by wholly disinterested motives. 

Yet ambition is a very human attribute, and Lee can not 
be blamed for possessing a reasonable share of it. For 
Washington was a rebel though in a righteous cause, 
until by force of arms he became a freeman, and it was 
reckoned to him for patriotism. So, if the Confederacy 
had achieved independence, Lee would have perhaps stood 
in a place similar to that which Washington occupied. 
But Washington had a just cause, that of human liberty; 
while Lee's cause was that of an oppression infinitely more 
galling to the oppressed than the old colonists repelled. 
The true patriot cannot but mourn that so great a genius 
should have been exercised in so base a cause; that a 
soldier who might have won great and lasting renown in a 
righteous cause should exert his powers to defend so great 
an evil, to tear down the best government the world has 
ever seen and set up in its place a loose oligarchy, one of 
the worst, and to reintroduce in a measure the aristocratic 
institutions of the old world. 

The war now began in earnest, both sides waking to the 
rude reality that blood was to be shed. Lee was actively 



BULL RUN. 267 

engaged from the first in the work of mustering and train- 
ing troops for service, Governor Letcher, of Virginia, having 
called out the militia of the state, as he said, to preserve the 
soil of Virginia from the feet of an invader ! All the mills 
and foundries were set at full blast to turn out cannon and 
other arms and supplies for the use of an army. Like 
Grant, though in a more exalted position, Lee's first work 
was that of organization; and for this work he was well 
fitted on account of his energy and great military knowl- 
edge. 

The authorities of the seceding states having seized the 
greater part of the United States property, were in a much 
better condition for war than the government, at Washing- 
ton. Thirty thousand men were soon under Lee's com- 
mand, well equipped and eager for a battle. But he did 
not take the field as yet. Virginia was soon drawn into the 
Confederacy; and, though Lee retained command of the 
state troops and was kept by the Confederate President, 
Davis, near him as an adviser, he did not at first receive a 
command on the field. But he accepted a commission from 
the new government, thus acting contrarily to his openly 
stated intention, at first professed, that he would not draw 
his sword in this strife, unless in defence of the soil of 
Virginia. While he was in this position the great battle of 
Bull Run, so disastrous to the North, was fought, and the 
hopes of the South mounted high. (21st July, 1861). Lee 
became eager to take the field in person, but Davis, who 
recognized his powers as an organizer, retained him at 
Richmond several months. 

During the spring and summer of this year |^i86i), a 
sharp campaign had been prosecuted in Western Virginia, 
a part of the state of Virginia which had refused to go out 



268 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

with the rest of the state from the Union, but had on the 
contrary set up a new state-government of its own and 
applied to Congress for admission to the Union as a state, a 
request that was soon granted. General McClellan, a bril- 
liant young officer, soon to be raised to a high command, 
had so directed the small army under his command in that 
country that the Confederate Generals, Garnett and Pe- 
gram, had suffered at his hands. Rosecrans, another rising 
man, commanding under McClellan, gave them such severe 
treatment that they retreated through the mountains hito 
the more congenial territory of the old state. Then 
McClellan, raised by success and the favors of powerful 
friends to the command of the Army of the Potomac, 
recently defeated, left the field to Rosecrans, who stationed 
himself in an advantageous position and waited the pleas- 
ure of the enemy. Against him, Davis sent General Lor- 
ing: but he could not accomplish the adroit Generel's des- 
truction. Davis then gratified Lee's wishes and gave him 
command of all the forces opposed to Rosecrans, with orders 
to bring back the rebellious part of the state to its allegi- 
ance. (August, 1861). 

Lee at once proceeded to the field. He found his army 
divided into three parts — Loring with one part at Hunts- 
ville; Gilliam, with another near Cheat Mountain; and 
Wise with the third, in position on the Kanawha river. 
Opposed to these was Rosecrans with about seven thousand 
men, two thousand of whom were at Cheat Mountain under 
command of Reynolds, and the remainder with Rosecrans 
himself, moving along the Kanawha to attack Wise. Lee 
at once directed Loring to form a junction with Gilliam at 
Cheat Mountain, and laid plans to crush Reynolds and his 
little army before Rosecrans could return to his aid. The 



270 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

junction was duly accomplished (9th Sept.), and Reynolds 
was confronted with a force of eleven thousand men; but he 
did not flinch. He trusted to the strength of his position at 
the passes through the mountains. 

The Federal position, while difficult to assail, was yet so 
extended that it might have been easily turned. Reynolds 
was at Elkwater with the greater portion of his troops, and 
on the other side of the mountain, at Great Pass, Kimball 
was intrenched with six hundred men, distant from 
Reynolds by the road around the base of the mountain 
nearly a score of miles, but not distant more than eight 
miles across the mountain ridge. The top of the ridge was 
held by about three hundred men. Between these small 
bodies of resolute men were the rough, rocky sides of the 
mountain, cut by gullies and almost impassable to the foot 
of man. 

Lee studied the Union position carefully, going in person 
on the mountain to survey it, and incurring much danger of 
being captured. He saw that Reynolds' position at Elk- 
water guarded the junction of the various roads which came 
together here and passed over the lower ground at the base 
of Greenbrier Mountain and Cheat Mountain. He planned 
thus: He sent Jackson, one of his lieutenants, with two 
thousand men to invest Kimball at Great Pass; a second 
detachment nearly as strong, he instructed to climb the 
mountain, pass between Elkwater and the force on the sum- 
mit of Cheat Mountain and assail the latter in flank, and, 
after capturing or driving it away, to proceed to the rear of 
Elkwater, where also Jackson was to come by a road around 
the rear of the mountain as soon as he should dispose of 
Kimball. He himself, with the remainder of the army, 
would assault Elkwater in front and endeavor to flank the 



LEE REPULSED. 271 

position, but this assault was to be delayed until the other 
detachments should come up against the rear of Reynolds' 

men. 

This plan was too complicated, and needed far more 
experienced officers to lead it than Lee commanded, to 
render it feasible. Nor did he well know what number of 
troops the hostile army contained, supposing that the main 
Federal force was before him. His plans utterly failed. 
Jackson confronted Kimball, but did not attack him, doing 
only some light skirmishing. The force sent against the 
men holding the summit of Cheat Mountain climbed slowly 
up until the gallant three hundred perceived it, and fiercely 
assaulted the van in a steep place, when it turned and fled 
down the mountain, though five times greater in num- 
ber than those who pursued. Here Colonel Washing- 
ton, a descendant of the family of the great Washington, was 
slain, a sad end and one not at all like that of his illustrious 
ancestor. 

Reynolds, hearing the firing, sent reinforcements to the 
aid of the three hundred; but the reinforcements found 
them gathering up the muskets and knapsacks which the 
fugitives had thrown away. Lee did not succeed before 
Elkwater. He moved a heavy force up in front of the 
Federals and placed batteries. The Union cannoneers out- 
shot his gunners however, and drove them away, while the 
flanking party which Lee sent around to cooperate with the 
other detachments was so fiercely resisted that it beat a 
hasty retreat. Altogether the Confederate forces were 
repulsed everywhere and forced to leave the field. They 
withdrew towards Meadow Bridge, where Lee ordered his 
forces to concentrate. In his operations against Reynolds, 
Lee had eleven thousand men, his enemy about two thou- 
sand. 



272 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Several reasons are adduced to account for this failure 
of his first campaign. The plan w^as too complex; the 
ground was difficult to pass over with the precision required; 
Jackson failed to act with energy; the assailants had a false 
idea of the enemy's strength; the boldness of the Federals 
gave them the superiority, and various minor reasons. Be 
these as they may; certain it is that Lee's first battle and 
first campaign, in which he commanded as chief, unlike those 
of Grant, were failures. For while the losses on both sides 
were small, the moral result was very great. Four hundred 
men were killed, wounded or taken prisoners The Con- 
federate authorities blamed Lee much more than he de- 
served, for there were many great obstacles to overcome of 
a physical character rendering his task immense. No doubt, 
he ought to have made a concentrated attack on Kimball 
and thus to have flanked the Union position, or he ought to 
have assaulted Reynolds in force; but as he did not know 
the exact strength of his foe, he could not be certain of 
success. 

Rosecrans troubled his opponents on the Kanawha very 
much. When Lee began to concentrate forces at Meadow 
Bridge, Rosecrans also ordered all his forces to be concen- 
trated and led them to a strong position near that of Lee 
(gth Oct.) For a time it seemed that a general battle was 
imminent. Lee's position was upon a spur of the mountains, 
which he caused to be well fortified, so that it soon became 
very strong. Rosecrans occupied the crest of a ridge oppo- 
site and intrenched his camp. The Union army was about 
twelve thousand strong. Lee commanded about twenty 
thousand men, but he deemed it imprudent to assault Rose- 
crans' position; while the latter, having the smaller army, 
did not care to risk a fight in the open field, and awaited 



REASONS FOR LEe's FAILURE. 273 

attack. Both generals warily studied the other's strength 
and looked for a favorable chance to strike a blow. Lee 
did not assault and his antagonist, hoping to draw him out, 
retreated a short distance and took up a new position. But 
Lee became convinced presently that he could not accom- 
plish the defeat of his enemy, who, it must be said, was not 
unlike him in warlike genius and methods. 

Lee was an engineer of great experience; he probably 
knew as well how to overcome the natural difficulties of a 
battlefield as did any officer in the Confederate armies, but 
for some unexplained reason, he decided that he could do 
nothing chasing mountaineers, and caused his army to 
retreat. Nor did he halt till he was well into the borders of 
old Virginia. He was immediately relieved of his command 
by the irate President and directed to assume the duty of 
raising coast defences along the Atlantic shores. Here it 
was thought, and with reason, that his qualities as an 
engineer could be employed to the best advantage. 

The total failure of his first campaign took him from the 

active service of the field and consigned him to what might 

have been termed underserved oblivion. But if one seek 

an explanation of his conduct in this campaign, it may be 

found in the fact that Lee's genius was not of the inventive 

order — it could copy, or execute a given plan, well, but 

could not find expedients to overcome unexpected barriers. 

He was not an invader; he was a defender. Another reason 

may have been that he was not familiar with, and had not 

command over, the chief subordinate officers under him, 

some of whom were doubtless jealous and careless. 

Another reason, and that given by Lee's apologists, was that 

a heav}' rain storm arose during the operations at Cheat 

Mountain and so dampened the powder and arms of his 
18 



274 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

troops that they could not do battle; but, as the storm also 
fell upon the Federals, this reason is not sufficient. His 
• genius, however, vi^as only sleeping. 

Lee's peculiar talents and excellent education were well 
suited to his new field of operations. He went to Charles- 
ton, S. C. (Nov. 1861), and entered upon his duties with 
great industry. The maps showed an irregular line of coast, 
dotted along with Islands, and broken by peninsulas. On 
the most exposed points, at the entrances of harbors and 
mouths of rivers and along the principal roads, forts were 
erected. Two general lines of defence, one along the sea- 
shore and the other at a distance of from ten to twenty 
miles inland, he caused to be erected, the fortifications being 
placed, of course, at the points in the general line which 
would be most likely to be assailed in case of invasion. 
And especially at the mouths of the Stono, the Edisto and 
the Cambahee rivers, and in and around the City of Savanna, 
were strong works raised. He established his headquarters 
near the Coosawatchie, not far from Savanna, going thence 
as occasion demanded to the various divisions of his work. 

The fortifications raised by him were strong towards the 
sea, and could have offered long resistance to invaders from 
that direction; but when Sherman, during the last great 
campaign, moved up to their rear from the interior, they 
fell without much resistance. Like all other fortifications of 
like nature, they could not resist when cut off from their 
source of supplies. 

Lee was thus employed during the four months of his 
retirement, if one may so denominate it, from the active 
duties of war. But his former reputation and his host of 
influential friends and connections weighed much with 
Davis, the Confederate President, who also knew Lee's true 



LEE IN CHIEF COMMAND. 275 

worth, and he was recalled to Richmond (March, 1862) to 
aid in organizing recruits. Here his life was almost that of 
a civilian, but he rendered great service to Davis in the 
mustering and forwarding of troops to the front, and often 
gave advice with regard to the conduct of the war. His 
counsels, especially with reference to the losing campaign 
that Johnston was then fighting with McClellan, who seemed 
to be irresistibly approaching Richmond, marked him as a 
man proper to be intrusted with the grave command of 
those troops when it should be seen that Johnston would 
fail. He was of high rank, of commanding presence and 
great personal magnetism, and possessed of the military 
knowledge which other officers, then at Davis' disposal, did 
not have. 

And now, m one of the most discouraging periods of the 
Rebellion, he was called upon to display his power. Grant 
had taken Donelson, and was threatening to march irresist- 
ably to the Gulf. McClellan had pushed Johnston back across 
the Chickahominy, and the roar of his guns could be heard 
sullenly echoing in the streets of Richmond. Then (31st 
May), Johnston, in a desperate attempt to overcome the 
isolated left wing of the Federals at Seven Pines, fought a 
bloody battle with but little success, and fell seriously 
wounded on the field. On the following morning, Lee was 
directed to assume command of the fallen leader's army and 
save it. 

When Lee assumed command, the battle was virtually 
at an end. The Federals had suffered such a rebuff that 
they did not feel disposed to hazard a renewal of the con- 
flict, and Lee, being new in command, did not feel like 
plunging at once into a new struggle that might end unfavor- 
ably. His battle line extended from the neighborhood of 




KASTEKN VIRGINIA. 



p276 



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 277 

New Bridge, on the Chickahominy, which his left wing 
touched, to the vicinity of Drury's Bluff, on the James, but 
the bulk of the army was between Seven Pines and Rich- 
mond. Against the advice of his subordinate officers, he 
resolved to hold the present position. To retreat toward 
Richmond would enable the Union general to throw all his 
army across the Chickahominy and lay siege to the city. 
He was confident that from behind intrenchments he would 
be able to hold his own, and it was better, at this critical 
time, to present a bold front to the enemy. He seems to 
have thoroughly understood McClellan's policy. He strove 
by every means to deceive him with regard to the real 
strength of the Southern army, and he succeeded so well 
that McClellan did not dare make an}' further forward 
movement, but halted, and called loudly for reinforcements. 
While the Federals quarreled and complained, Lee was 
busy reorganizing his army, and turning it into that splendid 
fighting machine which, thenceforth, it proved to be. He 
divided it into six divisions, and placed an experienced 
general over each. Longstreet, of whom much will appear 
later, had the extreme right division. Next to him, and 
in order towards the left as named, were Huger, D. H. 
Hill, Magruder, Whiting and A. P. Hill, who commanded 
the extreme left. An independent division, later under the 
orders of Lee, but now moving independently, was that of 
General Jackson — afterwards famous as "Stonewall Jack- 
son" — who was at this time operating in the Shenandoah 
Valley, with the object in view of so threatening Washington 
that no reinforcements could be withdrawn from the vicinity 
of the National Capitol to send to McClellan. His total 
effective force soon amounted to about ninety thousand men, 
including Jackson's command. McClellan, his antagonist, 



mcclellan's position. 279 

had about one hundred and fifteen thousand, but not so 
effective, because about twenty thousand were unfit for duty 
on account of sickness, owing to their position along the 
swampy banks of the river. 

Lee, beHeving that he now had an army upon which he 
could depend, began to seek an opportunity of striking a 
blow. His genius, hitherto quiet, suddenly blazed forth. 
McClellan, after the battle at Seven Pines, had transferred 
the bulk of his troops to the south side of the river, and they 
now lay out toward Richmond. But he had left General Fitz 
John Porter with about thirty thousand men on the north side 
of the river, with his van pushed out towards Mechanicsville, 
for the avowed purpose of protecting his supply line, con- 
necting him with White House, his depot on the sea-shore. 
Thus a part of the army was separated from the main 
body by a stream very difificult to cross, a military error 
which one cannot well explain for McClellan, who cer- 
tainly knew the rules of war, if he did not apply them. 
McClellan should have acted on the offensive, and with 
energy, and could have probably penetrated to Richmond 
three weeks before Lee was ready to move; or he should 
have changed his base to James river when he could have 
done so without loss; or, if he had desired to wait, at all 
events, he should have kept his army on the north side of 
the Chickahominy until he was ready to advance. 

Lee saw the error and was resolved to take advantage of 
it. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, has in his 
history of this magnificent campaign, claimed that he sug- 
gested the plan of calling Jackson to aid and falling upon 
McClellan's detached right wing beyond the river; but this 
is doubtful. Lee sent out Stuart, his cavalry commander, to 
reconnoitre; and that bold chieftain, crossing the river above 



280 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 




13^ ■■ 

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN. 

the Federal position, passed between it and the sea and came 
back to Richmond, crossing the Chickahominy south of the 
enemy's camp, thus having made a complete circuit. Lee 
sent orders to Jackson to make a feint towards the north in 
the Shenandoah, and then to withdraw with all speed and 
silence, and march straight upon Mechanicsville to join the 



THE PLAN OF ATTACK. 281 

Other divlsons which, on an appointed day, would cross to 
assail Porter. Haste and silence were the orders imposed. 
Then he caused his troops to maneuvre before the Federals 
near Seven Pines and along the front of their left, as if he 
would assail them in force, and sharp conflicts were brought 
on several times. McClellan did not penetrate his design 
until too late. Lee further increased the deception by dis- 
patching Whiting's Division towards the Shenendoah Valley, 
openly, and Washington was much alarmed; but Whiting 
who, during the day marched awa}^ in that direction, coun- 
termarched at night and retreated. 

The immediate plan of action was simple. Jackson, 
coming down from the northwest, was to fall upon the right 
flank and rear of the Union position at Mechanicsville, and 
as soon as the enemy should leave the entrenched position 
there, was to be joined by all the Confederate divisions 
except those of Magruder and Huger, who were directed to 
hold the lines In front of McClellan's main force, with about 
twenty-five thousand men. Lee here committed an error in 
withdrawing so man}- men from the front of the main army 
of the enemy; for, had McClellan chosen, he could have 
easily overwhelmed the comparatively small force left there 
and cut off Lee from his camp and capital. But Lee trusted 
to McClellan's inaction and excessive caution, and did not 
trust in vain. Lee designed bringing to bear upon Porter a 
torce of about sevent}' thousand men. Accounts and esti- 
mates of the respective strength of the two armies differ so 
greatly that the student has great difficulty in determin- 
ing how many men were really moved, but that number 
seems to be based on the best authority. 

The flank movement, by which Lee was to win his first 
laurels in this war, was presently begun (26th June) . The 



282 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

General supposed that Jackson would arrive on the field 
some hours sooner than he did. The design was that as soon 
as the sound of Jackson's cannon was heard, the troops 
under the Hills, Whiting and Longstreet, should assault the 
Federal position at Mechanicsville in front. But, thinking 
himself able to carry the Union position here with the force 
at hand, he assailed it at once, without waiting for the sound 
of Jackson's cannon. He crossed Meadow Bridge without 
opposition and gained a point opposite the enemy's works; 
but there his progress stopped. The Federals were com- 
manded by Generals McCall, Reynolds and Seymour, and 
were about seven thousand strong; but they were behind a 
stream whose steep banks afforded much protection, and 
could be reached only by narrow roads, cut down through the 
banks and over bridges which had been partly destroyed. 

A. P. Hill, with fourteen thousand men, led the assault, 
attacking at a point known as Beaver Dam, not far from 
Mechanicsville. The Federal cannon were so well placed, 
and so well served, that the assault was repulsed with 
dreadful slaughter. The Confederate loss amounted to 
more than three thousand men. The attempt was 
abandoned. The Union troops lost about three hundred. 
It is said, that this was a useless slaughter of Lee's troops; 
that he could well see the almost impregnable strength of 
the enemy's position; that he maintained the attack when 
it was seen to be hopeless, but that he did so because Presi- 
dent Davis was in the field with him, and he desired to 
exhibit energy. But one cannot believe, after studying the 
life of this man, that he would be moved by these considera- 
tions; rather, one would believe, that the small number of 
the enemy and the great number of his army, coupled with 
the impetus of assault, would overcome the obstacles of 



MCCLELLAN WITHDRAWS TO GAINES' MILL. 283 

nature and the enemy as well. It was an error of judgment, 
for which he paid the usual dear price. However it may be, 
the fight at Mechanicsville ended in a repulse. Lee 
directed the attack in person. 

McClellan, who was now informed of the heavy force 
operating against his extreme right wing, made the mistake 
of withdrawing the forces at Mechanicsville from their 
intrenched position to a place near Gaines' Mill, instead of 
causing Porter to advance all his forces to their aid, and 
sending reinforcements from the south side. But he ex- 
cuses this mistake by saying, that it was necessary to draw 
the troops back, because there they were too much "in air," 
while at Gaines' Mill he could much easier reinforce them 
from the main army, and also as a further reason, that he 
had already concluded to depart to the James River, and 
had left Porter there only as a guard to his rear and the 
trains from White House. But if he had intended moving 
to the James he ought to have withdrawn Porter entirely 
and left strong guards at the river fords and bridges. 

During the night the retreat from Mechanicsville was 
accomplished without loss; a new position was chosen near 
Gaines' Mill. Porter's left rested on the Chickahominy; 
his right was somewhat protected by swampy ground. The 
position was not a good one, because it added little to the 
strength of the troops by natural advantages. On the 
eastern slope and the ridge of a hill rising from a small 
dry ditch at its base, Porter had hastily thrown up three 
irregular lines of breastworks, facing northwest, and had 
planted his batteries on the crest of the ridge so that they 
might sweep all approaches. Towards the right, the hill 
was less steep than at the left and gradually merged into a 
plateau, on which the Union right wing was refused and 



284 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 




Oopyrlgbt 1868. Harper « Broa. From Harper'a Pictorial Biator;- of *ba Civil War 

MAP OF REGION NEAR RICHMOND. 

faced northward to meet any flank attack. In front of this 
position and beyond the bed of a rivulet were opposing hills 
covered with woods, behind which the Confederates could 
maneuvre in safety. 

During the night, Jackson and his tired veterans 
approached, and Lee was able to confer with his great lieu- 



BATTLE OF GAINES' MILL. 285 

tenant. Lee naturally supposed that McClellan would 
desire to protect his supply line with White House and 
would therefore extend his battle-line towards the right. 
He did not guess McClellan's present intention. It was 
therefore arranged that Jackson should proceed towards 
Old Cold Harbor, northeast of Porter's position and turn 
and fall upon the Federal right flank. Longstreet was 
placed in the right; A. P. Hill and D. H. Hill occupied the 
centre and left, Jackson being at first detached from the 
main line. After it was found that McClellan had not 
arranged to protect his line with White House in the direc- 
tion of Old Cold Harbor, Jackson, who had moved near that 
point, was recalled and placed at the extreme left. The 
best authorities state that Lee sent to battle here between 
sixty and seventy thousand men. 

It was noon before the battle began. Lee, after recon- 
noitering the ground, ordered his centre to assault first. 
He resolved not to wait for Jackson to attack on the right. 
The Hills swept forward, but, as soon as they emerged from 
the woods on the ridge opposite the Union batteries, they 
were met by a murderous cannonade, which shook and 
shattered their line and compelled it to fall back. Then 
Longstreet, after forming behind a hill at the right, sought 
to push over the enemy's lines before hirn by a sudden 
dash; but when his men reached the rivulet at the base of 
the hill they were broken and compelled to retire to shel- 
ter. 

Lee now perceived that McClellan had not extended his 
line towards Old Cold Harbor to protect his communica- 
tions with White House, and sent orders to Jackson to return 
and fall upon the Union right flank. The battle along the 
centre and right became very heavy and continuous. The 



286 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

enemy's cannon were worked with dreadful effect and 
swept back the infantry as often as it emerged into range 
from the protection of woods and hills. Once or twice the 
assaulting lines reached the base of the hill on which the 
batteries were placed, but here they met a withering fire 
from the infantry and were compelled to retire. 

Jackson, having proceeded some distance, was not able 
to join in the battle until late in the afternoon; and until he 
came, the attacking army received decidedly the worst of 
the affray. McClellan had, meanwhile, sent reinforcements 
to Porter amounting to ten thousand men, which arrived in 
time to take part in the battle, and others which did not 
arrive in time; but, owing to the distance and the fact that 
no proper precautions had been taken to have supports 
near, not enough could be brought up to save the day. 
Jackson now appeared on the field and soon massed his 
division against the extreme right of the enemy. Lee 
placed every available man in line, contracting his other 
divisions toward the right in order to give place to Jackson 
and to strengthen his own centre and right which were 
much shattered. 

Then a series of terrible assaults were directed, first 
against the Union left, then against their right, and again 
at the centre. Jackson's heavy lines could not be resisted 
by Porter's weaker right wing and it began to give ground. 
Porter then transferred every available man to support his 
right, trusting to his artillery, which was mainly in the fore 
of his centre and left to protect that part of the field. For 
several hours he gave the assailants a bloody fight. His 
ammunition gave out late in the evening. He had hand- 
led his men so well that for five hours they had resisted 
twice their number and when his ammunition failed he 
retired in fair order from the field. 



PORTER FORCED TO RETIRE. 



287 



The blow that caused the retreat was delivered by Long- 
street's Division, which, being reinforced heavily, rushed 
across the ditch to which they had hitherto come in vain, 
and up the hill, driving the thin lines from their batteries, 
capturing the greater part of the cannon, and finally caus- 
ing the whole Federal force to retreat in haste from the 
field. A charge of about five hundred cavalry launched 
against the victorious lines could not hinder their progress. 
It was quickly repulsed. The victors pressed after the 




CHARGE AT GAINES' MILL 

retiring troops until darkness came, and with it the rein- 
forcements sent by McClellan, ending a struggle noted for 
Its obstinacy and slaughter. The battle lasted only five 
hours, but in that time about nine thousand Confed- 
erates and seven thousand Federals were killed or 
wounded. The victory was with Lee, but at a fearful sacri- 
fice; and It was not decisive. McClellan had already begun 
preparations to transfer his base of action to the James 
river. During the night. Porter was able to withdraw his 



288 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



Fruni Harper's Pictorial History o( the Civil War, 




tired and decimated 
ranks to the south side 
of the Chickahominy 
without further loss. 
The result of the 
movement, while it 
did not affect McClel- 
lan, as had been hoped 
by Lee, was of great 
benefit to the cause of 
the Confederacy and 
to Lee's reputation. 
The general supposed 
that he had ruined 
his antagonist's plans, 
and that he would 
beat a hasty retreat 
towards Williamsburg 
by the lower fords of 
the Chickahominy. 
Jackson's division 
was, therefore, pushed 
southeastward, so as 
to cut off this move- 



Copyright 1868. Harper i Bros. 
POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS, JUNE 2$ TO JULY I. 

This plan indicates, in a general way, the positions and 
movements of the armies from June 25 to July I : m e 11 t. IJ U t he WaS 

A. A. Union position at Mechanicsville, June 26. 1 1 • 1 

Cold Harbor. June 27. deccived, and his de- 



B. B. 

c. c, 

D. D 

E. E 

F. F. 



ception gave McClel- 



Savage's Station, June 29. 

Frazier's Farm, June 30. 

Malvern Hill, July i. 
i". r. i> » Harrison's Landing, July 4. . 

G. G. Union intrenchments before Richmond; a, Keyes; Jg^j-j sucll 3. Start lU tuC 

6. Heintzelman; c, Sumner; d, Franklin. 
H. H, PorterandMcCall, after crossing the Chickahominy. j.^^^^ wllich followed 

Jackson's and D H. Hill's march. - , 

Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's march. tOWardS the J a 111 e S 
Magruder's and Huger's march. 

> •«■ > ■*• > Holmes's and Wise's march. riVer, that he WaS UOt 

The retreat of the Union army was by the same line as , , rnnrpntral-p his 

Jackson's march, after crossing the Chickahominy. aUlC tO COUCCULI clLC liia 



WHITE OAK SWAMP. 289 

forces for an assault that would have given promise of 
success. McClellan made all haste towards the James 
river, at Turkey Bend, placing his train in advance on his 
left, so that his army would shield it from attack, and 
leaving Generals Sumner and Franklin to cover the retreat. 
Lee was soon informed of the movement; he recalled 
Jackson, and transferred all his troops in haste to the south 
side of the river. 

• Then began a succession of battles extending over a 
distance of thirty miles, Lee endeavoring to strike McClellan 
in flank and to cut his army in pieces. Magruder, during 
the evening of the first day's retreat, and before Lee had 
yet crossed the river (29th June), attacked Sumner and 
Heintzelman at Savage's Station, and gave them a fierce 
battle. He was beaten off, and night ended the conflict. 
During the night the rear guard of the retreating army fell 
back into and across White Oak Swamp. 

Next morning the whole Confederate army was march- 
ing swiftly southward in pursuit. Lee instructed Jackson to 
follow the enemy through the White Oak Swamp, and 
Longstreet and the Hills to hurry by a converging road, but 
almost parallel and west of the roads taken by the Federals, 
towards the James, and endeavor to cut into their line 
of march at or near Glendale. He himself accompanied 
the latter force. The remainder of his army followed and 
brought up his trains. 

Jackson found the enemy strongly posted beyond and 
in the midst of the swamp, with a creek for a defence, the 
only approach being along a narrow road, which their 
cannon swept. He endeavored several times to carry the 
position by assault, but a murderous, concentrated fire from 
the Federal guns slaughtered his troops and drove them 

19 



290 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 




back. He then sought to 
find a road by which to 
flank the position, but 
could not, and it was not 
until after the battle of 
Glendale gave the Fed- 
erals a chance to retreat 
that he was able to press 
through this pass. Mean- 
while, Lee, with the other 
divisions, made swift pro- 
gress, but he found the 
enemy prepared to re- 
ceive him when he emer- 
ged upon the fields of 
Glendale and Frazier's 
Farm. He had twenty 
thousand men with him, 
and was confronted by 
nearly the same number. 
The Federals were 
drawn up in the form of 
a great arc, with their 
artillery posted advanta- 
geously. Lee impetu- 
ously hurled his troops 
against this arc, but for 
a long time could not 
shake it. Neither party 
sought the shelter of 
breastworks or hills; it 
was a battle where man 



BATTLE OF GLENDALE. 291 

Stood against man, gun against gun, in the open field. The 
attacks were repulsed several times. Lee then gathered his 
troops for a final effort, massed at several points, and 
launched them forth with a rush. The rush carried them 
across the open space, which the Union cannon swept with 
terrific power, and into and among the batteries. A hand- 
to-hand fight then occurred. The Federals recovered from 
the shock and charged in turn, recaptured the batteries, and 
drove the assailants back in confusion. The confusion 
became so great among his troops, that Lee then deemed 
it advisable to withdraw from the contest. 

Several good authorities have stated that had McClellan 
allowed his troops to pursue now, as their gallant Division 
Commanders desired, the Confederate forces here would 
have been routed. But McClellan was intent upon reaching 
the river safely, and would hazard nothing. He was con- 
tent to have beaten off his pursuer for the time, and during 
the night he succeeded in withdrawing his army intact from 
its dif^cult position, and concentrating it on Malvern Hill, 
on the banks of the James river. 

Lee had made a great mistake in dividing his army and 
sending almost half of it with Jackson to be held at bay all day 
in White Oak Swamp. Had he sent a small force to pursue 
into the swamp, and thus have deceived the enemy, he could 
have hurled at least fifty thousand men upon McClellan at 
Glendale and have doubtless broken his army in pieces. 
His mistake here saved McClellan's army. He was enraged 
at the thought of the enemy escaping with so little harm, 
and he gathered all his host during the night and forenoon 
of the next day to make a final effort to crush him at this, 
his last stand. 

Lee gathered his army together near the bloody field of 




■m« 



^^^«.>^itMfo€ifife^li' ^" 




p29J 



BATTLn OF 




frazier's farm. 



p293 



294 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 



Glendale, and gave instructions to his generals. Jackson 
was ordered to proceed by a road that would bring him to 
the northern face of Malvern Hill; the other Division Com- 
manders were directed to proceed by a road that would 
bring them to the west and northwest of the hill. But two 
divisions were held back as reserves, to be sent where 
required, as soon as the General should determine where 




BATTLE OF MAI.VERN HI Li- 



the attack would be directed. Lee desired to attack 
McClellan before he could intrench a camp; but he 
prudently did not permit a battle to be begun before all his 
troops should be on the field. Shortly after noon the divi- 
sions arrived before Malvern Hill and under the cover of 
woods were formed for battle. Batteries were placed and 
opened fire upon the Union position in answer to the bat- 
teries that continually threw shells into the woods among 
them. 

Lee found an extremely difficult task before him, one 
that was impossible to accomplish and therefore an error on 



BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 295 

his part to attempt. Malvern Hill was a high, rounded knob 
of land, rising precipitously from the James River, but slop- 
ing to the north and west more gently. At the west side the 
ground descended so near the water's level that the gun- 
boats, which had arrived some time before, were able to add 
a cross fire to the Union batteries on the hill, and materially 
aided them in the battle. McClellan well understood how 
to handle his troops in a defensive action. His infantry, in 
heavy massed array, stood in a vast semi-circle, from the 
river on their left far around to the northeast side of the 
hill, and facing west and north. His numerous cannon 
frowned from the crest and sides of the hill. His men 
were resolute and eager for the affray. 

The first days of the month of July seemed fraught with 
misfortune to Lee; for this day (ist July) , and later at Gettys- 
burg, they brought him bloody defeats. Before him stood 
more than eighty thousand veteran troops, with three hun- 
dred cannon, and a fleet on the river at hand. He had about 
the same number of troops, but he had not the cannon and 
the fleet to aid him. Numbers, position and unavoidable 
delays, were against him; yet he cooly prepared to engage 
in the struggle. For if he could destroy this army, now 
brought to bay, he believed that the Federal Government 
would give up the struggle and admit the independence of 
the Confederacy. Therefore he gave his officers to under- 
stand that they must win if at all possible, and no excuses 
would be accepted for failure except those that were appar- 
ent. Some have said that several officers caused their men 
to mix gunpowder in whisky and drink the mixture to ren- 
der them bold and furious. Be this fable or not, the assaults 
delivered by the Confederate divisions have scarcely ever 
been parallelled in history for headlong dash and fury. 



296 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lee made a mistake In regard to the signal for battle 
that he never afterwards repeated. He directed his divis- 
ions to stand in readiness until the shouts and din of battle 
caused by the charge of a brigade of Huger's division 
should be heard, when the whole line was to advance at 
once to the assault. But through some mistake and before 
the other division was in position, Jackson directed the 
attack to begin, and part of his division moved forward. It 
was almost immediately driven back by the terrific fire of the 
Union batteries, which smote and crushed every gun that 
accompanied the troops In their forward movement and 
carried away whole files of soldiers. But the sound of bat- 
tle, owing to a contrary wind and the noise of the opposing 
batteries and the gunboats, could not reach the ears of Lee, 
or of his generals who stood waiting. 

It seems. If one may judge by the various assaults that 
were then made and their disconnected and rash nature, 
that Lee did not from this time conduct the fight, but 
allowed his generals to fight at will. Magruder sent out 
three different storming parties, endeavoring to take an 
opposing battery, but the parties consisted of single regi- 
ments, and, being unsupported, v/ere easily repulsed. It 
was late In the evening before the Hills got into action and 
strove to break the Federal left, when the battle became 
general. It was exceedingly fierce, bloody and unrelenting 
in Its nature. McClellan, watching the various assaults as 
they came, was able to hurry reserves from one threatened 
point to another and to beat back with horrible slaughter 
every attempt. 

The hard struggle lasted about three hours, during which 
the woods and hillsides were strewn thickly with the dead 
and wounded. At no time, however, was the whole force of 



LEE DEFEATED. 297 

either side engaged in battle. Beginning at the Confederate 
left center, it veered to and was hottest along the right. At 
some points, the assaulting parties were able to cross the 
open fields in front of the Pederal batteries and to struggle 
up almost to the mouths of the guns. Here the fighting 
became close and deadly. Regiments that went into it with 
full ranks lost more than half their numbers. And to the 
hail of death that smote them in front was added the terror 
of the huge, shrieking shells from the fleet, which fell among 
them, richochetting, bursting and scattering death along 
their battle lines. 

The Southern soldiery on this day certainly sustained 
their reputation as American troops, though their cause was 
not worth their efforts. But endurance and bravery cannot 
always last; and Lee's soldiers became at last convinced 
that nothing but death awaited them on that fatal hillside. 
Confusion sprang up among them, and when the last assault 
was delivered, just as darkness was falling, and was repulsed, 
the troops could not be rallied, but fled into the woods and 
could not be re-formed. 

The battle ceased. The mad attempt to storm an almost 
impregnable position, guarded by a superior and desperate 
enemy, had failed, and Lee drew off his army, shattered and 
dispirited. He expected to be pursued in turn, and caused 
every exertion to be made to guard his retreat. But he was 
not disturbed. McClellan was satisfied to have decisively 
repulsed his assailant, and was not willing to hazard success 
by a pursuit through a dark and unknown forest. The Con- 
federate generals therefore halted their troops at a distance 
of two or three miles, leaving a strong skirmish line near 
the Federal position, and worked with great energy to 
re-form their broken battallions. 



298 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Competent critics have claimed that had McClellan 
alloMred his troops to advance at this time, Lee's army would 
certainly have been entirely defeated, instead of suffering 
only a decided repulse. Be that as it may, McClellan was 
not further molested, and leisurely retreated next day to 
Harrison's Landing, further down the river, where he 
caused a large camp to be fortified, and where he rested 
from the campaign. Lee fell back also to the fortifications 
in his rear, and settled down to rest and recruit, satisfied 
with the exploit of having compelled his opponent to hasten 
the raising of the siege of Richmond and to move off to a 
safer distance. 

The series of battles beginning with Mechanicsville and 
ending with Malvern Hill, entailed a loss upon the Union 
army of about fifteen thousand five hundred men; upon 
Lee's army of almost twenty thousand, the greater loss, 
of the latter being due to the fact that in almost every 
action it was the assailant and was unprotected by breast- 
works, while the Federals in two or three of the contests 
fought from behind works. 

Lee was able to present his government with about fifty 
captured cannon and six thousand prisoners. But despite 
the larger losses which his army sustained, Lee doubtless 
came off victor in the long contest. He suffered three 
decided repulses — at Mechanicsville, Glendale and Malvern 
Hill — but he gained a decided advantage at Gaines' Mill; 
was not repulsed from the field at Savage's Station and 
White Oak Swamp; and, because he acted the part of pur- 
suer, while the Federals retreated before him, he gained 
that moral advantage, which a victor reaps, when left in 
possession of a contested field. But this advantage was due 
more to the halting policy of his opponent than to his own 
exertions. 



THE RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN. 299 

McClellan's army could and would have followed him 
into Richmond on the morning after the fight at Gaines' 
Mill, or on the day following the struggle at Malvern Hill. 
Lee was the more astute general. He could not fight a bat- 
tle better than McClellan, and perhaps not so well, if taking 
the part of aggressor, but he knew how to take advantage 
of the result of a battle much better, and did not despair, 
w^hen once repulsed, of his ability to win in another contest. 
He simply outgeneraled McClellan in this short campaign, 
so far as grand strategy was concerned, but he failed to 
make the combinations necessary on the battle-field to win 
victory, and he erred at Malvern Hill in joining battle at 
all. He deceived McClellan as to his number of troops; he 
struck the Federal right wing and broke it; he drove the 
enemy from his position, and followed him to a new posi- 
tion; he reaped the advantages of a victory, while suffering 
the immediate results of a defeat. 

The result of the campaign settled his future position. 
He had turned the tables upon the enemy and had driven 
him away from the capital, a task that other generals had 
failed to do; he had gained the trust of his army, of his 
government, and the fear of his enemy, and his position as 
leader of the Confederate army was assured. Secure, 
therefore, in his position, he prepared for greater deeds. 
His army had been so much shattered b}^ the seven day's 
campaign through which it had passed, and the present 
arrangement of having it divided into six or seven divisions 
made it so difficult to combine in its movements, that he 
re-formed it. He divided it into two corps, and placed 
Jackson and Longstreet in command of them respectively. 
He called for and obtained recruits enough to fill again his 
ranks, and the army soon amounted to ninety thousand 



300 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

men fit for service. He also reorganized his artillery ser- 
vice and made it very effective. 

A month passed without action. Lee's enemy on the 
James made no attempt to advance, but was continually 
calling upon the Federal Government to reinforce his army. 
Having completed his reorganization, Lee looked about 
him for work. It would be madness to attempt the Federal 
camp at Harrison's Landing; but a way to compel its evac- 
uation was found. 

In conjunction with the Government a plan of action was 
formed. It was believed that if the City of Washington 
should be seriously threatened, McClellan and his army 
would be recalled to its defence. The idea was true, and 
action was begun by sending Jackson with his troops on a 
swift march northward (ist August, 1862), Lee believing 
himself able, if McClellan should advance upon him, to hold 
the fortifications before Richmond with half of his army. 
But he did not believe that McClellan would assault him; 
he thought that as soon as Jackson should appear on the 
Rappahannock, the Federal Government would take fright, 
and recall the Army of the Potomac. Then he designed 
to make all haste to join Jackson, and with reunited army to 
fall upon the Federal army in Northern Virginia, which 
McDowell had hitherto commanded for the defence of 
Washington, but which had recently been placed under the 
command of General Pope, a young officer of ability, who 
had made a name in the west. As he designed, so it hap- 
pened. Jackson appeared on the Rapidan River, and 
almost fell upon the Federals before they were aware of his 
approach. 

Great consternation was aroused at Washington. Mc- 
Clellan was recalled. Lee was informed of the design to 



BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 801 

abandon Harrison's Landing; and, waitingonly long enough 
to be certain it was no ruse, but that McClellan's army- 
was embarking on ships for the Potomac, he threw aside 
every impediment and rushed away to the north to join 
Jackson and crush Pope. 

Jackson crossed the Rapidan and attacked seven thou- 
sand men under Gen. Banks, at Cedar Mountain (loth Aug) . 
A fierce battle ensued, which at times threatened to end in 
the rout of the Federals; but by most obstinate fighting and 
excellent generalship on the part of Banks, they were 
enabled to hold their ground till darkness relieved them. 
During the night General Pope arrived on the field bringing 
reinforcements, and when morning dawned Jackson beat a 
hasty retreat to the south side of the river, and anxiously 
awaited the arrival of Lee. He left more than a thousand 
men dead or wounded on the field, but he had inflicted 
double that loss upon the Federals. Lee soon appeared and 
the Grand Army of Virginia, as it was now known, was con- 
solidated. It numbered on the field, without counting the 
strong garrison left in the works at Richmond, eighty-five 
thousand men, in excellent condition, well equipped and 
eager for action. 

Lee studied the field before him carefully. His plan was 
soon formed. He would attempt to get between Pope's 
army and Washington, or at all events to bring him to an 
immediate battle. Pope had about forty-five thousand men 
with him and was in no condition to meet his great enemy; 
but he made a brilliant retreat, and crossed the Rappahan- 
nock River without loss. Then he blockaded the fords and 
posted his army so that when Lee appeared on the south 
bank, he was fain to stop and consider how best to cross 
without danger of repulse. Lee desired to fall upon Pope 




Copyright 1868. Harper » Bros. 



From HaiiitiB Piciorial UisUrj ofihe Civil War 
MAP OF CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. p302 



Jackson's movement. 303 

before the army of McClellan, which was hurrying to the 
field, could arrive and form a junction; but Pope was vigi- 
lant and so effectually guarded all approaches to the river 
crossings that he could do nothing better than seek a cross- 
ing higher up stream. 

The opposing armies camped in view of each other 
several days, while their batteries thundered sullenly across 
the stream. Lee moved upstream, along the south bank. 
Pope, fearing that his opponent, by reason of his numbers, 
would be able to cross above and take him in flank, exten- 
ded his right wing northward towards Warrenton, so as to 
cover the space between the spur of Bull Mountains near 
that town and the river. But Lee had conceived another 
plan, and designed flanking Pope's army if possible. He 
crossed the river and ordered Jackson to march quietly 
northward up the Blue Valley west of Bull Mountains, until 
he should arrive at Thoroughfare Gap, which he was to 
seize, march through and strike Centreville in the rear of 
Pope, and bring him to a battle. Meanwhile he designed, 
by threatening an attack on Pope at Warrenton, to hold him 
there until he should learn that Jackson had penetrated the 
plain east of the mountains, when he would march with all 
speed to join him. 

It is not easy to say why Lee did not instruct Jackson to 
march down upon the rear of the Federal army, while he 
himself should attack it in front; but his design seems to 
have been instead to throw himself between Pope and 
Washington with power enough to fight a battle. He made 
the great mistake of dividing his army in the face of an 
enemy; and, had Pope's lieutenants acted with reasonable 
energy in the rapid movements that followed, he would 
have suffered the loss of Jackson's whole corps, without rea- 



304 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

sonable doubt. For as soon as Jackson, after forcing the 
Gap, had passed down into the plain toward Manassas Junc- 
tion, Pope, though astounded at the bold maneuvre, joyfully 
set his army in motion against him, exclaiming that now he 
would "bag" the whole corps. He sent orders to the gen- 
erals bringing up the reinforcements to his army to concen- 
trate rapidly upon Gainesville, where all would form a junc- 
tion; and, leaving General Porter at Warrenton with instruc- 
tions to follow him as soon as Banks, who was coming with 
the left wing toward Warrenton, should arrive, he hurried 
towards the rendezvous. Lee had now disappeared from 
before Warrenton, leaving Pope free to act. The Federal 
General ordered a detachment to sieze and hold Thorough- 
fare Gap, which was done, and Lee's progress was there 
stopped. 

It was Pope's design to push his left wing northward 
between Jackson and the mountains, through which he had 
come. To that end he bent every energy. But his subor- 
dinate officers, especially those who had come from McClel- 
lan, did not act with the requisite energy. Jackson was 
warned of the Federal approach and retreated toward the 
north, intending by a detour to place himself in communica- 
tion with Lee. At Bristoe Station (27th Aug.) a sharp 
action occurred between the Federal advance and his rear, 
and Jackson retreated to Broad Run, thence byway of Cen- 
treville, striving to overreach the Federal left which was 
being continually extended northward. 

Pope now thought that as he had interposed between 
Jackson and Lee, Jackson would march northward to Aldie 
Pass in the Bull Mountains, and endeavor by that route to 
rejoin Lee. He therefore marched directly upon Center- 
ville, without further extending his left wing, and Jackson, 



Jackson takes position at groveton. 



305 



seizing the opportunity, marched by a detour around it and 
posted himself near Sudley Springs and Groveton, not, how- 
ever, without suffering an attack from the extreme left brig- 
ade of the Federals which was still partly interposed. Jack- 
son, seeing that he could not escape without a battle, and 
hoping to hold his ground till Lee should appear, whom he 
expected every moment, chose a strong position behind an 
old railroad embankment, and near the old Bull Run battle 
ground, and, facing his corps east and south, waited devel- 
opments. 




MOVEMENTS OF AUGUST 28-30. 

Pope now realized that he had been outwitted, and 
turned all the heads of his columns directly upon Jackson's 
position and strove to concentrate sufficient power to crush 
him. Haste was necessary, but it seemed impossible to 
bring his various divisions on the field. 

Meanwhile Lee was fretting and storming at Thorough- 
fare Gap, stopped in this crisis by the small but resolute 
band of Federals which had taken possession after Jackson 

had passed. He Avas unable for many precious hours to 
20 



306 ■ THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

force a passage; but at last was shown a path by which suf- 
ficient force was sent across the mountain to assail the 
defenders of the pass in the rear and compel them to flee. 
He then marched through in hot haste, and guided by the 
sound of Jackson's cannon, who was now engaged in a des- 
perate battle against odds, hurried to the field of action. 
Jackson had not long to wait the coming of Pope. The 
Federals appeared (p. m. 29th Aug.) ; and, though only a 
part of the army was present, bore down upon him. 

The battle soon became bloody and close. Jackson well 
sustained his reputation of standing as firmly as a stone 
wall, but the weight of Federal numbers told, and his left 
wing was driven steadily back. But his right and center, 
being better protected and less assaulted, held its own. He 
wished for night, and fought only in hopes that he might 
hold out till darkness should relieve him. And now, could 
Pope have brought all his power to bear, no doubt Jackson 
would have been overthrown. But his orders to his chief 
subordinates were not obeyed, especially by General 
Porter, who, though hitherto he had shown himself a very 
competent officer, failed either to construe the orders 
rightly or to obey when he did understand them. Porter 
did not move up and attack as ordered. Because of this 
lack of obedience, he was afterwards court-marshaled and 
dismissed from the service of the army. Jackson was able 
to hold his own till evening came, and with it, Lee and 
Longstreet. 

The hostile armies rested till noon of the next day, but 
the generals employed their time in arranging their troops, 
in reconnoitering each other's positions, and in placing bat- 
teries. Lee finally assumed a position, with his wings 
forming a shallow obtuse angle, the angle opening towards 



BATTLE OF GROVETON. 



307 



the Federals and occupying a series of low hills. Jackson 
still held the embankment along the deserted railroad, 
while Longstreet's lines extended southward across War- 
renton Turnpike. In front of them was a small valley, 
through which ran a rivulet, and on the hills beyond was 
posted the Federal array. The stream was Young's Branch 
of Cub Run, and its banks were, on that day, dyed a deep 
red from the blood of the fallen. Longstreet's center lay 
in and near Groveton, and there his batteries were placed 




THOROUGHFAR3 GAP. 



in such a manner that they could inflict an enfilading fire 
upon any column that should attempt to cross the rivulet 
and assault the left. 

When all available troops were assembled by both sides, 
Lee had fully sixty thousand infantry in line, while Pope 
had forty thousand. Pope was bold, however, to rashness, 
and was resolved to give battle. He waited till afternoon, 
hoping that Lee would begin the battle by attacking him, 
but as he did not, he attributed it to his lack of confidence. 



308 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and directed his right wing to assault Jackson's corps. 
Here he massed, and assaulted with such energy that Jack- 
son's tired troops were driven back, and in a fierce hand-to- 
hand struggle were decidedly worsted. 

Lee at once hurried up reinforcements, and the battle 
was restored. He also ordered Longstreet to fall upon the 
Federal left, weakened to mass their right, as a counter- 
movement. Longstreet's long lines dashed forward and 
drove back the enemy, who were not strong enough to 
resist the impetus of his veterans. Then Pope drew off 
part of the troops who were pressing Jackson to strengthen 
his left, and his whole force was obliged to retire. The 
battle raged with terrific violence till night caused a ces- 
sation of hostilities, and it was only by the greatest exertions 
that Pope could keep his army from leaving the field in 
rout. Night alone saved him from another disaster similar 
to the famous Bull Run fight. 

The Federal army was in great distress. Its commander 
had dearly learned the folly of attacking a superior power. 
He ordered a retreat to Centreville, leaving his opponent 
victorious and in possession of the field. But the victory 
cost Lee about nine thousand men. Pope's loss was some- 
what more. Both Generals called for reinforcements. Pope 
on the day following the battle received twenty thousand 
additional troops, which, had they come up on the preced- 
ing day, might have changed the result of the contest. Lee 
snatched this victory out of the jaws of defeat. Jackson 
was decidedly beaten at evening of the first day; and, had 
not Lee arrived on the field as he did, he would have been 
driven from it. 

The master stroke of the battle was the assault by Long- 
street, when the Federal left had been weakened to 



POPE RETREATS TO WASHINGTON. 309 

Strengthen the right. The battle was well directed and Lee 
won for himself here deserved' renown, though his numbers 
and the faults of his enemies made success certain. Hav- 
ing rested his army a day, buried the dead and cared for 
the woanded, he sent Jackson towards Chantilly to threaten 
Pope's communications. This compelled Pope to fall back 
to that point, and at a place called Ox Hill, parts of the hos- 
tile forces again met (Sept. ist), and though it w^as almost 
nightfall, rushed to battle. A terrific thunder storm low- 
ered over the field of battle, adding the boom and rumble 
of heaven's artillery to that of earth. The struggle was 
between the vanguards of both armies and w^as exceed- 
ingly fierce. Night ended it. Pope continued his retreat 
and did not again halt till under the shadow of the fortifi- 
cations at Washington. The sound of Lee's cannon could 
be heard at the Capital. Thus in the short space of three 
months, Lee had not only driven a hostile army from its 
camp in sight of his Capital, but had brought his own army 
almost within sight of that of the United States itself. 

It is seldom in war that such sudden changes, casting 
dow^n a victor and raising the conquered to his plane, hap- 
pen. In producing the change, Lee showed great wisdom 
and consummate skill, working on the fears and dissen- 
sions of the Federal Government and its generals, and 
bringing success out of defeat. It is true that his victories 
were gained over inferior forces; but, that he w^as able to 
strike these inferior forces in detail and with the requi- 
site force, was an evidence of ability. The combined 
Federal armies, had they been united before he fought 
them, would have outnumbered his own army; he took 
advantage of their lack of combination and profited thereby. 
T\vice — even thrice — he had committed the error of divid- 



3lO THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

ing his army; thrice did he escape the ill effects of such 
action by reason of the dullness or dissensions of his ene- 
mies. But he counted on the lack of cohesion and bril- 
liancy of his opponents, when considering the advisability of 
measures. One opinion only can be entertained of this 
campaign, — it was brilliant, well executed and decisive. 
Pope's army was much shattered when it retreated to Wash- 
ington. 

Encouraged by his success, Lee now formed a plan that 
would perhaps jeopardize his cause, but, if successful, would 
lead quickly to a compromise between the National and 
Confederate Governments. It was nothing less than an 
invasion of the loyal states. His success had made him bold. 
His ambition assumed a wider scope. He believed that the 
people of the state of Maryland sympathized at heart with 
his cause and would rise if given the hope and promise of 
protection. Also the devastation caused by war would be 
carried into the enemy's country. Virginia would be given 
rest, and supplies of all kinds could be collected from the 
loyal territory. He communicated his plan to Davis, Presi- 
dent of the Confederacy, and received his approval. 

He at once set his army, numbering about sevent}^ thou- 
sand effective men, in motion towards Leesburg on the 
Potomac River, crossed there (6th Sept.) and marched 
slowly to the city of Frederick. It was a strong army. For, 
though some of the troops were barefooted, they were well 
armed, well disciplined, and commanded by competent 
leaders, and were full of faith in their General, and eager 
for action. 

Lee at once issued proclamations assuring the people of 
Maryland he came to help them, calling upon them to rise, 
throw off the grievous yoke of the Federal Government 



312 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and join themselves to his army, promising them aid and 
protection. But to his surprise there was no response. The 
people of Maryland had felt no grievous yoke; they loved 
the National Government and the National flag, and did 
not desire to join his army. So that few recruits answered 
his stirring call, and he closed his recruiting lists in disgust. 
Here he remained a few days to note the effect of his pro- 
clamation and to watch the movements of McClellan, who 
had been restored to full command of the united eastern 
army, and who was preparing in hot haste to follow the 
invader's steps. 

The Federal army, consolidated, numbered about one 
hundred thousand men, but many of the men were raw 
recruits, hurried in this emergency to the defence of the 
Capital. Ere Lee was aware of the strength of his oppon- 
ent, or of his movements, McClellan had arrived within 
twenty miles of him. Lee then hastily formed a design of 
moving his army into Western Maryland, taking possession 
of the mountain passes, opening communications with Rich- 
mond by way of the Shenandoah Valley, drawing the Fed- 
erals into that hilly country, and, perhaps, fighting a battle. 
He had supposed that the advance upon Frederick would 
cause the evacuation of Harper's Ferry; but this did not 
occur. Believing it to be necessary, or, at least, important, 
to possess this point, and further believing that it would be 
surrendered on call, he now dispatched Jackson to proceed 
by way of Martinsburg against it, while Longstreet was 
directed to move westward through the passes of South 
Mountain. Small forces were sent against Loudon and 
Maryland Heights to cooperate with Jackson. 

Lee thus again committed the error of dividing his forces 
into parts, almost in the presence of the enemy; and, had 



SURRENDER OF HARPER S FERRY. 



813 




MAP OF THE INVASION OF MARYLAND. 



the cowardly commander at Harper's Ferry, Miles, held 
out a day or two longer, even after Jackson had closed him 
in, there can be but little doubt that the Confederate army 
would have been irretrievably lost at Antietam. As it was, 
it suffered, in consequence, the worst handling that it had 
hitherto experienced. 

Shortly after Lee left Frederick, McClellan arrived, and 
was so fortunate as to capture a copy of the order that Lee 
had issued for his present movements. He at once issued 
orders to take advantage of this fortune, and his corps were 
directed towards Middleton, where his vanguard struck the 



814 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



rear of Lee's army (13th Sept.) and drove it out of the 
town. Lee's main body was now at Hagerstown; but when 
he perceived that it was his opponent's intention to pass 
between him and Jackson, he made feverish haste to repair 
his error. He dispatched all the troops at hand to retake 
and hold the passes through South Mountain. 

Two roads branching from Middleton pass westward 
across South Mountain, the northern, to Boonsboro, cross- 
ing at Turner's Gap, the southern, to Jefferson, by way of 




^nABTINiSURG 



FROM 

FREDERICK 

TO 

AWTl ETAM 



Crampton's Gap. These passes are about six miles apart 
and are connected by a ridge, accessable in many places to 
foot soldiers but impassable to trains. Lee sent orders to 
McLaws at Loudon Heights to move with all haste and 
sieze Crampton's Gap. McLaws did so at once and obtained 
possession a short time before the Union army arrived. 



TURNER S GAP. 



315 



McClellan here exhibited a slowness that eventually lost 
to him the decisive victory seemingly within his grasp; 
for, by seizing this Gap, and pushing his troops across into 
the valley west of the mountains, he would have separated 
Lee from Jackson, and could have kept them separate by 
moving westward as Lee should move. McLaws succeeded 
in holding the pass until reinforcements arrived. D. H. 
Hill with his division, also was successful in first reaching 
the mountain pass at Turner's Gap, and the rest of the 
army with Lee was soon in condition to support him. 

Thus McClellan found his energetic antagonist in posses- 
sion of the coveted passes and the ridge connecting them, 
when he arrived, and saw that he must force them. He 
first advanced against Turner's Gap, driving before him the 
small body of troops left at Catochin creek as scouts, who 
fought desperately, endeavoring to delay the enemy until 
Lee should have time to countermarch a large -force to hold 
the mountains. These succeeded in delaying McClellan 
somewhat; but the bulk of the Federal army was soon 
before the passes, and their commander was anxiously 
studying how best to attack and clear them. Batteries were 
placed by both parties and an artillery duel raged several 
hours and until afternoon. 

McClellan now learned that the force which had been 
sent against the lower pass had by this time arrived in 
position, and as soon as communications were thus estab- 
lished he gave orders to assault. Lee believed that the 
heaviest assault would fall upon his troops at Turner's Gap, 
and hence placed the bulk of them there; but, having to 
hold so long a ridge, and not knowing precisely where his 
adversary would strike, he was not able to mass heavily at 
any one point. He sadly felt the need of Jackson's presence 



316 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



with that part of the army near Harper's Ferry, but ^vas 
determined to hold out against the overwhelming numbers 
that McClellan v^as hurriedly concentrating, until his great 
Lieutenant should come. 

The attacks came at about the same time at both Gaps, 
and with much vigor. McLaws fought desperately to hold 
his position at Crampton's Gap, but with failing efforts. 
Franklin, the Federal Commander at that point, was a 
general of no mean ability, and he directed his troops so 
well that the Confederates were pressed steadily back to the 
crest of the mountain, and finally, at evening, forced to beat 




turner's gap and boonesboro. 



a hasty retreat down the western slope. But the battle at 
Turner's Gap was more hotly contested, and it was doubtful 
for hours whether McClellan would be able to force a 
passage. Longstreet placed his men carefully, and gave 
him a stubborn battle. 

The key to the pass was a knob of the mountain lying at 
one side, with two ridges parting from it towards the south, 
with an ever-deepening gorge between. The Federal artil- 
lery compelled the enemy to seek cover in this gorge, and 
an assault drove them still further along its ridges. But the 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 317 

battle here and all along the sides of the pass was very stub- 
bornly contested. It was here that Cavalier and Roundhead 
met again — descendants of those who met on the gory 
fields of England, when the iron Cromwell shook a king 
from his throne. Bayonets were used and muskets were 
clubbed. The Confederates fought stubbornly, but numbers 
and zeal overbore them ; for McClellan crowded his 
regiments up the hill, and the troops were maddened at 
former defeats and desirous of retrieving their honor. And 
when darkness came, the Confederate General saw that all 
his positions were untenable, and ordered Longstreet to 
retire to the west side of Antietam Creek to a position 
that he had been examining with an eye to this emergency. 

Here, during the hours of darkness, the General and his 
officers worked industriously to get the troops into proper 
position, believing that on the morrow the battle would be 
upon them. He had lost three thousand men on South 
Mountain, but he was by no means discouraged, and did not 
at all consider himself vanquished. He resolved to hazard 
another battle. 

Several reasons induced him to this course. He was 
loth to quit Maryland after issuing his proclamation of pro- 
tection, and after having been victorious in the late battles 
in Virginia; he believed himself able to hold out until 
Jackson, who was already closing the surrender of Harper's 
Ferry, should arrive, when he hoped to be able to win a 
victory, and he did not believe that McClellan's army was 
as strong as it really was ; also, the position which he had 
chosen seemed to warrant his intention. Nevertheless, it 
was a gloomy night to him and his troops. They had been 
driven from the strong passes of the mountain, and had lost 
confidence somewhat. But, to the surprise and delight of 



318 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

Lee, he was not attacked on the following day. His enemy 
was cautious, having an army but recently consolidated from 
various armies, recruits and garrisons, part of which had 
never been in battle, which it was necessary to get well in 
hand before placing in battle, and believing that Lee's army 
was double its actual strength. 

McClellan's delay saved the Confederate army from 
total destruction. Jackson was able to conclude the capture 
of Harper's Ferry, and was now rushing to the aid of his 
chieftain with the greater part of his troops, while a small 
body followed with the prisoners and captured supplies 
taken from the arsenal. The field on which the battle of 
Antietam was fought was peculiarly well adapted to 
defensive operations. Lee's choice of a field to make a last 
stand upon was the best that could have been found in the 
vicinity, showing well the nature of his ability. 

The Potomac river, coming from its general north- 
westerly course, bends at a point about three miles above 
the village of Sharpsburg, towards the southwest, and b}' a 
wide sweep comes back to its general course again at a 
point below the village, where Antietam creek flows into it. 
As the creek also comes from the northwest, it forms with 
the river an isthmus, having the neck at the north side. 
Bluffs, at some points high and steep and at others lower, 
rise abruptly from the mouth of the creek, follow its course 
northward until past Sharpsburg, then trend away westward 
to the bend of the river first mentioned. Upon this ridge of 
bluffs and the high table-land which lay between its edge 
and the river at its rear, Lee chose his position, and posted 
his troops, facing east and north, along the brow thereof, 
leaving strong guards at the fords of the creek and the 
bridges. The creek was deep and impassable, with steep 



lee's position at antietam. 319 

banks near Sharpsburg, and was spanned by three bridges, 
one crossing east of Sharpsburg, another southeast, and still 
another northeast, while further up were several points 
which could be forded. 

Lee's position was chosen so that his right wing guarded 
the approaches to the lower bridge, his center, the middle 
bridge, while his left centre and left wing followed the trend 
of the bluff away from the creek, and nearly across to the 
Potomac river. Thus his lines assumed the shape of a vast 
arc, with the cord drawn through Sharpsburg, where he 
placed his headquarters. The greater part of Longstreet's 
corps occupied the centre and right, and Jackson's corps the 
left, but the various divisions of the corps became so divided, 
being sent here and there as emergency demanded, that no 
distinct separation of the corps was possible ; but after 
Jackson arrived, he commanded the left wing and left 
center, generally, and Longstreet the centre and right. 
Lee, however, personally directed the movements of the 
various divisions. Intrenchments were thrown up, stragglers 
brought into line, and batteries placed in position. The 
artillery was so placed that it not only swept the bridges, 
but all the open ground where it was probable the Federals 
would appear. 

Authorities so differ as to the numbers in each army, as 
they now stood, that it is impossible to be exact; but the 
probable strength of the effective forces on the first day of 
the battle was as follows: Lee had at least forty-five thou- 
sand men in line; McClellan had sixty-five thousand whom 
he could send to battle. The wounded, sick and missing of 
both armies would probably have swelled each twenty- 
thousand. Lee received from Jackson before the second 
day between ten and twenty thousand men; and McClellan 



320 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

received a like number from the rear divisions of his army 
which then arrived on the field. Partisan writers, with little 
regard to truth, but more for effect, have increased or 
decreased these estimates, as their wishes declared, even 
one half. But the numbers given above are based on author- 
ity least likely to be biased, and from careful estimate. 
The effective force of an army differs in many cases 
widely from the actual numbers as shown by lists. 

The disparity of numbers was balanced by position and 
the fact that Lee stood entirely on the defensive, while Mc- 
Clellan assumed the offensive from the beginning. For as 
the sequel will show, Lee was able with a nominal force to 
hold the bridges in front of his right wing and the bluffs at 
the centre, while he massed three-fourths of his army along 
his left centre and left wing, where the main battle was 
fought. Hence may be seen how excellent was Lee's choice 
of positions, a choice which redounds as much to his credit 
as a general, as the gaining of a victory would have done. 

He placed an exceedingly hard task for his opponent. 
But had McClellan not committed his usual fault of waiting 
too long, even this excellent judgment, in view of the final 
result of the battle, could not have saved the army from 
destruction. For had McClellan hurled his masses upon 
the Confederate army during the day after the battle on 
South Mountain (15th) as he did on the two days following, 
Lee, deprived of the strength of Jackson's veterans, could 
not have possibly held his position; for even with Jackson's 
aid, he was able only to beat off his adversary long enough 
to make good his escape across the river. It may be said 
that Lee and McClellan were equal in ability and the 
knowledge of war, but that Lee exceeded his opponent 
in energy. Both made mistakes; but Lee could the sooner 



" FIRST day's battle. B21 

rectify an error of his own, and was more rapid to take 
advantage of the errors of others. 

McClellan spent one day in arranging his troops and 
batteries, and the half of another in getting his right 
wing into position. He planned to attack the Confed- 
erate army at its wings, to take the bridge at Lee's right 
front and to turn his left north of Sharpsburg. Lee noted 
the crossing of the Federal troops over the creek to attack 
his left wing and sent Hood's division to an advanced 
point half a mile north of the main line. General Hooker, 
known familarly as "Fighting Joe," led the right of the 
assailants and advanced against Hood late in the afternoon 
(i6th). McClellan also caused his batteries to open along 
his centre and left, and from the hills east of the creek 
poured a storm of shot upon the Confederate lines. 

Lee's batteries answered with spirit and a heavy artil- 
lery duel raged several hours. The shock of the Federal 
assault was bravely withstood by Hood, but it overbore him 
and drove him back to the main line. Nevertheless, as Lee 
intended, it delayed the general battle till next day, and 
gave Jackson's troops time to get into position. During the 
night both generals, forseeing that the fight would be 
heaviest along the lines where Hooker had attacked, 
brought their reserves and massed in that direction. Night 
fell over the scene and the soldiers lay down on their arms, 
believing that the morrow would see the most terrible con- 
flict yet fought in the war. 

Lee remedied the weakness of Hood's division by order- 
ing it to the breastworks and sending a part of Jackson's 
troops to the front. But the Federals were up and into bat- 
tle early in the morning, and succeeded in driving their 
enemies back some distance further. The latter were 
21 



322 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

joined, however, by further reinforcements, and returned to 
thj struggle with such power, that the Federal advance was 
stopped. A bloody carnage ensued, such as has hardly been 
paralleled in war. The struggle was deadly, incessant and 
terrible. Whole ranks of troops fell dead at the discharge 
of the batteries. The lines came together with the shock of 
whirlwinds, the troops were mingled, clubbed muskets were 
used, and the powder of the guns flashed in the faces of the 
soldiers. Hooker's men could not withstand the terrible 
force of Jackson's veterans, who, caring not for death, threw 
themselves upon the assailants with frenzied violence. For 
the Confederate soldiers knew, as did their commanders, 
that the triumphant advance of Hooker must be stopped or 
the day would be lost, and with it, perhaps, the army. 

The battle lines were literally torn to pieces, and disor- 
ganized, broken and fearfully decimated. Hooker was 
wounded and taken from the field. With his departure the 
Federal advantage ended, and their lines fell back. The 
Confederates rallied, re-forming as best they could, and fol- 
lowed, regaining all the ground they had lost. Then the 
Federal General Sumner, having crossed the Antietam with 
his corps, hurried forward, opened his ranks to allow 
Hooker's men to pass through, closed up again while they 
re-formed and pressed after him, and joined battle with the 
triumphant foe. Back over the bloody field the Confeder- 
ates were again pressed, contesting every foot of ground, 
and submitting only to numbers. 

The Federals had not attacked Lee's right, so he drew 
now almost every man from that part, leaving Longstreet 
barely four thousand men to hold the lines and guard the 
bridge, and concentrating all his powers to check Sumner's 
advance. And now had Burnside, to whom McClellan had 



SUMNER S SUCCESS 



323 




THE STONE BRIDGE AT ANTIETAM. 



assigned the task of taking the bridge east of Sharpsburg 
and assailing Lee's right attacked with all his power, Lee 
would have been lost. For Sumner, having the remnant 
of Hooker's men, and his own magnificent corps, was almost 
irresistible. The first line of Confederate works was passed 
over and taken. The Federals pressed in as far as Dunker's 
Church, a mile in the rear of the first Confederate position; 
but here they fell into some confusion, and Sumner, think- 
ing it better to hold his ground, ordered a halt. But his 



324 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

left under Franklin penetrated as far as the Piper house, 
well in sight of Sharpsburg, and would have penetrated 
further, had not Sumner issued the orders to halt and hold 
the ground. 

At noon, or shortly after, the battle lulled on Lee's left, 
and he was able to turn his attention to his right, where 
Burnside was struggling for the bridge over the creek. He 
congratulated himself in having a respite from the terrible 
contest at the left, giving him the opportunity of beating 
off Burnside's assault. And while Jackson was engaged 
with the officers, who that day fought under his directions, 
in re-forming the left wing, Lee hurried every available 
man of his reserves to the aid of Longstreet. Burnside suc- 
ceeded by great efforts in passing the bridge and ascending 
the hill almost to the village; but reinforcements enabled 
Longstreet to check him and at last to drive him back 
again almost to the bridge. Longstreet was unable, how- 
ever, to retake the bridge. 

Night closed the battle. Lee was in a critical position. 
His army was too much disorganized to allow him to retreat 
without loss during the night. He did not yet acknowledge 
himself beaten, having forty thousand men that he could 
put in line. He drew back his left wing to a line nearer the 
village, intrenched it well, and shortened it as much as the 
condition of the ground would permit, so as to bring it to a 
greater heft. He still held the line at the centre, and 
along his right with the exception of the bridge. But he 
had lost much ground and the prestige of victory. He had 
lost many cannon, nearly two thousand prisoners and 
ninety-five hundred killed and wounded. 

The Federal loss was greater in killed and wounded by 
fifteen hundred men, but they were better able to lose men 



lee's retreat. B25 

than he. Many of his regiments had lost organization and 
had to be consoHdated with others. But he was not yet 
conquered and would have given a hard battle on the next 
day had the Federals attacked him. To his surprise and 
delight, McClellan did not order an attack, considering his 
right wing too much shattered to warrant it without re- 
formation and strengthening, and desiring to await the 
arrival of fifteen thousand new troops on their way to join 
him. 

Lee, seeing that he was allowed to rest, laid plans for a 
rapid retreat across the Potomac, much doubting his ability 
to cope with the Federals another day. That night (i8th- 
19th September) he quietly and swiftly abandoned his lines, 
marched to Shepherdstown, and crossed into Western 
Virginia, without further loss or battle, save that when 
McClellan, surprised, saw his enemy was gone, sent a small 
force of cavalry to pursue, there was a conflict with the rear- 
guard near the crossing. He conducted his army to Win- 
chester, and there halted to rest and to observe the 
movements of his enemy. The Federal army did not 
pursue, but allowed him to rest. 

Thus ended Lee's first ill-fated campaign. The success 
he had won at Sudley's and Chantilly was more than 
counterbalanced by the misfortunes at South Mountain and 
Antietam, for he was undeniably defeated in both the latter 
actions as much as Pope had been at the former, and with 
armies whose numbers were not more disproportionate. 

He lost in the campaign about one-third of his army 
in killed, wounded, prisoners and missing, and the re- 
mainder was much shattered. The National Government, 
whose President had vowed that if Lee was driven out of 
Maryland he would issue the Emancipation Proclamation, 



326 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

carried out his vow, and now gave notice of the issue of that 
great paper which would put an end to the system for which 
Lee was battling. To the Union, this was a victory of great 
consequence, though not at all decisive ; to the Confederacy 
it was a hard blow, a defeat, a scattering of all the great 
hopes that Lee had cherished of raising the people of 
Maryland and carrying the war into the enemy's country. 

That Lee felt bitterly the failure of his expedition can 
not be doubted. His grief was exhibited in his carriage, in 
the gloomy expression of his countenance, and the serious 
manner with which he executed business. His biographers 
all speak of his discouragement at this time. Some writers 
have even denominated him morose, but he was not morose 
naturally, being, generally, a quiet, courtly gentleman. 
About this time, also, death carried off his young daughter, 
casting a deeper gloom over his heart. Nevertheless, he 
sought to counteract the discouraging effect of his ill-success 
by issuing an address to his troops full of gratulation, 
because they had been able to beat off an army of greater 
numbers, seeking thus to turn their minds from the gloomy 
fact that they, flushed with victory, an army of veterans, 
had not been able to stay on loyal soil more than a fort- 
night, but were beaten and driven out in haste by the very 
army over which they had lately triumphed. 

Perhaps Lee saw at this time the immense power that 
the Federal Government could bring to bear in an emer- 
gency, and which, though halting and uncertain in its 
invading movements, was able and willing to trust all to 
immediate battle the moment a Confederate army left its 
own territory. Perhaps he saw here a foreshadowing of the 
final result. The task laid upon his shoulders by the Con- 
federate Government was heavy; for he might beat the 



BOTH ARMIES REST. 327 

Federal army one day, — a week later, that army, as strong 
as ever, would rise up before him again, and deal him 
heavier blows. 

It was, therefore, no wonder that he became somewhat 
morose and severe. An instance is given by one writer, 
who notes that during the battle at Antietam, Lee ordered 
a Confederate soldier to be shot for killing a stray hog, con- 
trary to his general order to refrain from pillaging, and the 
order would have been executed, had not Jackson, whose 
soldier it was that had been sentenced, taken it upon him- 
self to commute the sentence, by sending the man to the 
front rank amidst the hottest battle at Antietam, and this 
without the knowledge of Lee, who did not inquire further. 
The General felt keenly the reproaches that some news- 
papers in the Southern States heaped upon him ; and 
though the Government said nothing except to condole with 
him for his ill-success, and to express satisfaction with the 
masterly manner of effecting his escape, he offered his resig- 
nation to Davis, who promptly refused to accept it. Davis 
had recogni':ed the fact that in Lee he had the best Captain 
in his service, and the temper of the army, which now 
idolized its leader, would not have permitted a change at 
this juncture. 

During the remainder of the month of September and 
all of October, the Confederate army was permitted to rest 
and recruit in the fertile valley of the Shenandoah, the Fed- 
eral General meanwhile keeping his army encamped near 
Harper's Ferry while he quarreled with the National 
Government about supplies, troops and plans, — his usual 
course of procedure. 

Nothing disturbed the peace of these weeks so excellent 
for campaign purposes, except a cavalry raid which Lee 



328 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OK GRANT AND LEE 

sent under Stuart into central Penns3/lvania, for the pur- 
pose of levying supplies from the inhabitants, and also for 
the purpose of attracting the attention of the Federal Gov- 
ernment in that direction and keeping McClellan from 
advancing into Virginia. The raid v^as very successful, 
Stuart gathering an immense train of animals and vehicles, 
and supplies of boots, shoes, clothing, and in fact every- 
thing which man needs in a state of civilization, and v^hich 
the state of Pennsylvania so fruitfully produces. Pleason- 
ton, the Federal cavalry commander, pursued him, but did 
not materially injure him. 

The Confederate army was soon in good condition again. 
One week after the battle at Antietam, Lee gathered 
together all the fragments of his regiments, the reinforce- 
ments that here joined him having come through the 
mountains from the direction of Leesburg, and numbered 
seventy-four thousand men, effective and ready for service. 
He soon brought order out of all this disorderly mass by 
consolidating fragments, filling broken ranks and re-forming 
the various brigades. A month later he had almost as 
many men in line as he had before the army crossed the 
Rappahannock to go against Pope. 

About this time (Nov. i ), he noted a movement of the 
Union army, which, in response to the urgent orders of 
President Lincoln, was at last in motion, across the Poto- 
mac, and southward along the eastern base of the Blue 
Ridge mountains. Lee, determined not to let that army 
interpose between him and Richmond, broke camp, at once 
moved up the valley and passed through the mountains to 
the east side, where he halted along the headwater streams 
of the Rappahannock. Here he waited further movements. 

The Federal army had again halted. McClellan had 



BURNSIDE IN COMMAND. 



329 



exhausted the patience of Lincoln, who was much cha- 
grined that he had allowed Lee to escape from the field of 
Antietam without further battle, and who considered the 
demands for supplies which he afterward made as wholly 
without reason, and finally having concluded that McClel- 




MAJOR GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE. 



Ian was too slow, he removed him and appointed General 
Burnside to command the Army of the Potomac in his 
place. 

Lee thereupon assumed a position between the Rapidan 
and Rappahannock and watched and waited for his new 
opponent's movements. He soon perceived that Burnside 



330 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 




had adopted a vigorous, 
policy and was about 
to cross the Rappahan- 
nock at Fredericksburg. 
He thereupon broke 
camp again, hurried 
to Fredericksburg, oc- 
cupied the heights and 
the fortifications that 
crou^ned them, and, 
busying himself in rais- 
ing further works, 
calmly awaited the at'* 
tempt. 
^ The Rappanannock 
S valley, as it approaches 

s Fredericksburg, be- 

° 1 

S comes narrower and so 

continues until it reach- 
es a point a mile below 
the city where it again 
spread so ut. At no 
point near the city is it 
wider than a mile, and 
the banks on eitherside 
though not high, are 
quite abrupt. The land 
along the southern 
shore rises in three ter- 
races to the general 
level of the country. 
On the terrace nearest 



lee's position at FREDERICKSBURG. 331 

the river stands the city. On the terrace above this, was the 
field of battle, in the contest about to be described. The 
second terrace was a half mile in width. On the steep 
broken knolls and bluffs leading up to the third terrace, or 
general level of the country, were the fortifications, and 
behind them was the Confederate army. 

Lee was not certain at what point the enemy intended 
crossing, and therefore he stationed his troops at conven- 
ient points from Banks Ford, above the city, to the Massa- 
ponax, a large creek below, which emptied into the river, 
and his line was thus made about ten miles long. Smaller 
forces guarded points above and below this position. When 
he perceived that Burnside intended to cross at the city and 
at a point below, he drew in his left wing and massed at the 
threatened points. 

Marye's Hill, at the centre of this line, was the 
key-point of the position and was about half a mile 
south of the city. On every prominent knob and knoll, 
artilllery was placed, so that from various points a con- 
centric fire could be directed upon any point within the 
reach of cannon. Upon Marye's Hill and Deep Run, a 
creek east of the Hill a short distance, one hundred heavy 
guns were brought to bear at times during the battle. 
Longstreet commanded the left wing, holding around the 
city, while Jackson commanded the right, lying along a rail- 
road embankment almost parallel with the river. Jackson's 
position was thus very strong, and was still further strength- 
ened by breastworks. Marye's Hill was steep and was ren- 
dered almost inaccessable by a stone wall which ran along 
its side, and before which Lee caused a ditch to be dug. 
He was satisfied that his position was almost impregnable — 
it would have been so, even with an army a third less in size 
to defend it. 




'COMFEDERATE FORCES 
-union F0RCE.5 



p3a2 



BURNSIDE PREPARES FOR AN ASSAULT. 333 

But the Federal general, eager to win a battle and una- 
ble to perceive what difficulties lay before him, approached 
this position from the north and prepared to attack it. 
Burnside remembered how McClellan fell because of a lack 
of energy; but, unfortunately, he proceeded to the opposite 
extreme, until his energy became rashness. He had one 
hundred thousand men; but two hundred thousand might 
not have driven Lee from his stronghold without terrible 
loss. He carefully studied his opponent's position and 
resolved to assail its centre and right. He therefore caused 
two pontoon bridges to be laid across the river, one oppo- 
site the city, the other opposite Deep Run, against which 
points he was about to hurl his army. He led the attack at 
the city in person; Gen. Franklin commanded the left wing 
which attacked at Deep Run. 

Lee annoyed the Federals so much with his sharpshoot- 
ers while they were laying the upper bridge that Burnside, 
exasperated, ordered his artillery to shell the city, and 
nearly two hundred cannon were turned upon it, almost 
destroying it. The sharpshooters were effectually driven 
away. Under cover of artillery, the bridges were completed 
(nth Dec.) The bridge at Deep Run was more easily laid. 
During the afternoon, an artillery duel raged all along the 
lines, it being Burnside's design to protect the crossing of 
troops from Lee's attack, and the Confederate design to 
hinder the crossing as much as possible. 

Lee now perceived plainly the points at which the 
assaults of the enemy would likely be made, and made dis- 
positions to oppose them. He prudently refrained from 
taking the offensive, as he might have done with success in 
the confusion at the crossing. He saved his men, by neg- 
lecting a chance of inflicting defeat upon the Federals at 



334 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the outset. But he gained the advantage of having his 
enemy assault his position, where he could inflict fearful 
loss upon him. The error of allowing the crossing to go on 
unopposed was thus equalled by the gain of repelling the 
attacks later. 

By dark the Union army had crossed and had assumed 
the positions from which Burnside thought most proper for 
the assaults to begin, and was prepared to enter the trap of 
death which Lee set for it. The soldiers of both armies 
rested on their arms during the night, knowing that the 
morrow would see a great battle. Morning dawned again 
and with its coming the troops took up their arms. Burn- 
side, however, was slow about making his connections 
between the left and right wings, and did not move to the 
assault before nine o'clock. Then Franklin, commanding 
the left wing, sent forth an assaulting column against Jack- 
son, under General Meade, a very competent officer. 

Jackson's men were drawn up in triple lines along the 
embankment of the railroad, through which embrasures 
had been cut for cannon, and along the hillsides south of it. 
The Union assault was exceedingly strong. It burst over 
the embankment, pressed back Jackson's first line to the 
second and the two back to the third, which was moving up 
to their support. Jackson's men fought desperately, but 
the immense weight of the attacking column, and the inten- 
sity with which it followed up its first success, bore his lines 
back up the hill and over its crest. The slaughter on both 
sides was very great. The musketry fire was one continu- 
ous roll of thunder. Meade pushed into an open space 
between two of Hill's brigades, and pressed forward like a 
wedge. Jackson hurried every reserve up and sent to Lee 
for more troops. These were speedily forthcoming; for the 



A PARTIAL SUCCESS. 



335 




position that Longstreet 
held was so strong that 
he could well spare a 
large number of men. 
The tide of defeat was 
stayed. 

The assault slackened. 
Franklin, directing move- 
ments at another part of 
the field, failed to send 
Meade support, and the 
force of the column of 
i attack was spent. But 
I Lee had lost a mile of 
I ground, and Jackson's 
S men were now drawn 
i around from Longstreet's 
« right in a semicircle to the 
« south-east so as to pro- 
tect the right f^ank. From 
this point the Confeder- 
ates recovered and dur- 
ing the afternoon regain- 
ed a part of their lost 
ground. The battle was 
not, however, so severe in 
this part of the field 
during the remainder of 
the day. 

Burnside was concent- 
rating every available 
man to the assault on 



336 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Marye's Hill. General Sumner, commanding in this part 
of the field, was a thorough fighter. The assaults which 
he directed against the key-point of the position were 
exceedingly bloody and entailed fearful loss upon his men. 
For Longstreet's corps from behind the secure breastwork 
of stone, the fence on the hillside, poured such a deadly 
storm of bullets upon the assailants as soon as they came 
within range of musketry, that whole ranks fell to the earth 
to rise no more, and the hundred cannon from the sur- 
rounding hills poured shot and shell like hail upon them as 
they passed over the half mile of open ground to reach the 
hill. The Federal dead lay in heaps and rows upon the 
field. Greater valor never has been shown by troops than 
did Sumner's and Hooker's brave soldiers exhibit, but it 
was unavailing. Longstreet lost but few men. Four thou- 
sand Federals fell on that fatal hillside. 

Once or twice the assailants reached the stone wall, but 
they could not cross the ditch nor scale the wall in the face 
of the fire. Four most determined assaults were made 
during the day. Sumner, then, weeping because he had lost 
so man}^ brave men without reward, drew off his troops, and 
lay in the city during the night. With the coming of night 
the battle ended. Twelve thousand Federals and half as 
many Confederates lay on the field dead or wounded, the 
greatest carnival of slaughter yet seen on eastern fields in 
the same period of time. 

During the battle, Lee had made his headquarters on a 
prominent ridge, whence he could view the struggle at 
Marye's Hill and most of the battle-field. Only once had 
his army been in danger of defeat, when Jackson was forced 
back at the right, but this danger was imminent only as long 
as the pressure continued there. The victory might have 



VICTORY RESTS WITH LEE. 337 

been with Burnside had he made his main attack with the 
left wing of his army, and used his right only to hold Long- 
street's attention. Failing to improve the time, he lost the 
victory. But Lee did not care to attack in return. He 
preferred to let his enemy fret himself to death against his 
works, hoping that he would again be rash enough to assail 
them. But Burnside was discouraged. He occupied one 
day in burying the dead and caring for the wounded, and on 
the night following, by an adroit movement, withdrew all 
his corps to the north side of the river, thus ending 
ingloriously in retreat what he had so bravely begun. 

The victory and the field remained with Lee, though he 
reaped no further benefit from his success than the tem- 
porary halt of the Federals from advancing upon Rich- 
mond ; for, while Burnside failed to carry the hills, Lee 
failed by a counter-attack to take advantage of the repulse. 
But the victory, though negative, encouraged his troops 
wonderfully, after the terrible usage they had received at 
Antietam, and re-aroused the confidence of the Southern 
people in the General. No more demands were heard for 
his retirement. 

This battle conciuded the season's campaigning. The 
army went into winter quarters on the heights of Fredericks- 
burg, and the Federals encamped along the northern shore 
of the Rappahannock, opposite. Lee occupied himself 
during the long winter months with recruiting, procuring 
supplies, and governing his encampment. He was more 
hopeful of the success of his cause now. He looked forward 
to the coming year's campaign with less dread. Meanwhile, 
his government prepared to prosecute the war with vigor, 
though Grant's victories in the west and the defeat at 
Antietam had shaken its power to the very foundation. 



338 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The Federal Government, nothing daunted by the 
repulse at Fredericksburg, issued the Emancipation Procla- 
mation (January ist, 1863), of v^^hich Lincoln had given 
notice previously, and thus the original cause of all this 
trouble was removed ; but, though the cause was removed, 
the trouble remained, and years of war were still necessary 
to give effect to the proclamation., The South saw in this 
master-stroke of policy the end of their social system or 
the final element of separation from the Northern States. 
With their cause the system of slavery must fall ; with it 
slavery would continue. Now the issue was clearly defined. 
For, though the proclamation was a war measure, all knew 
it was the intention of the Government to finally abolish the 
iniquitous system wherever found within the National 
territory, the seceding portion thereof included. 

The Confederate Government took up the glove of con- 
test thus thrown them by the loyal people, and used every 
exertion to replenish the armies with men and supplies. 
Their hope that the Democratic party at the North would 
so exert its influence as to bring about peace and inde- 
pendence now became fainter. By 'force of arms must they 
compel the desired recognition. Lee watched all the 
political movements rather with the eye of a soldier than a 
statesman ; he meddled not with politics. He required men 
and army supplies, the rest he left to the schemers at the 
seat of goverRment. 

Life at camp was somewhat monotonous. It was 
enlivened occasionally by picket skirmishing and cavalry 
battles of small moment. The enemies watched each other 
very closely. Their scouting parties constantly ranged 
around the flanks, and even passed around the rear of the 
opposing army. But there was no contest approaching the 



WINTER PREPARATIONS. 339 

proportions of a battle. The general's conduct towards his 
troops was at all times marked with kindness, though he 
never became familiar with them, and, during the time of 
rest here, he endeared himself to them by going in person 
about the camp, and seeing to it that every comfort possible 
to obtain in the winter was provided. General Longstreet, 
with a part of his corps, was sent to Petersburg to subsist for 
the winter, as provisions were more plentiful in the regions 
around that city. He was directed, also, to gather and 
forward supplies to the camp at Fredericksburg. Lee re- 
organized his troops thoroughly, still retaining Jackson and 
Longstreet in command of the two chief divisions. The 
artillery was organized under a separate chief, and General 
Pendleton was made its commander. The cavalry was also 
made more efficient, and Stuart was appointed its leader, 
and under him served Wade Hampton, \V. H. F. Lee and 
Fitz Hugh Lee, the latter General Lee's cousin, each com- 
manding a brigade. 

But despite the General's care and exertions, it was hard 
to bring the army into good condition for the coming cam- 
paign. Many of the soldiers, whose terms of enlistment 
expired during the winter, refused to re-enlist, and went 
home. The remainder were poorly clothed and sometimes 
in actual want of the necessaries of life. Some deserted. 
So that, though large bodies of conscripts were brought to 
camp, the army was not any larger when active operations 
began in the Spring (April, 1863) than when they ended in 
the previous Fall. Lee then had in readiness for battle 
about seventy-five thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand 
were with Longstreet at Petersburg. 

Meanwhile, the National Government had not been idle. 
The Army of the Potomac again numbered over one hun- 



340 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

dred thousand men, and was now commanded by General 
Hooker, who brought it up to a very high state ot efficiency 
and discipline. Lee noted the Federal preparations with 
apprehension, and it is said, even considered the advisability 
of raising a strong line of defences along the North Anna 
River, fearing that he might be flanked out of his present 
position. But, as his engineers reported adversely to the 
plan, he let it drop. 

Hooker's movements caused Lee to abandon all designs 
of fortifying a camp on the Anna River, and to call Long- 
street to the army with all speed. The Federal General, 
taught by Burnside's failure to force a crossing, studied how 
best to get across the river without having an impregnable 
camp to storm at the crossing. He desired to get Lee out of 
the strong camp on the heights of Fredericksburg and into 
a position where he could fight him and make his superior 
numbers count in the contest. He at last decided upon a 
plan, which was excellent in its conception, but which was 
not so good in execution. 

Lee noted movements on the part of his adversary, and 
doubled his scouts and guards, while holding his army in hand 
for instant action. He could not determine at what point 
Hooker intended to strike. Hooker's design was to deceive 
him as to the real intent, and it succeeded. First, Stone- 
man's cavalry swept out to the southwest, crossed the rivers, 
passed completely around the rear of the Confederate camp, 
destroying railroads, depots and supplies, and crippling Lee's 
communications with Richmond as much as possible. For 
a day or two all communication with the Capital was shut off, 
much to the consternation of the Confederate Government. 
Second, Gen. Sedgwick with a force of thirty thousand men 
descended the Rappahannock in sight of Lee's army; he 



hooker's flank movement. 341 

presently disappeared among the hills on the northern side 
of the river, and countermarched to the camp again, and 
later descended the river again with the same troops, 

Lee, upon seeing such heavy demonstrations, thought 
Hooker intended to attempt a crossing below, and extended 
his right wing to meet the attempt, at the same time prepar- 
ing to follow with the bulk of his army. Suddenly (ist May) 
came the astounding news by frightened and hurrying scouts 
that Hooker with his whole army had crossed the Rappa- 
hannock and Rapidan above their junction, and was rapidly 
advancing upon Chancellorsville, Lee then thought that 
Sedgwick had been maneuvering simply to deceive. But in 
this he was again deceived. For Sedgwick did proceed 
down stream several miles and cross, with the intention of 
moving up against the Confederate right and rear. 

Lee was not slow in this emergency. Leaving ten thou- 
sand men to hold the camp against any surprise, he hurried 
into the Wilderness to meet Hooker, But he would even 
now have been too late, had Hooker been acute enough to 
have perceived that his best course lay in moving out of the 
Wilderness to open ground, instead of stopping to fortify a 
camp in the woods. For such is the nature of those his- 
toric fields, known as the Wilderness, that disparity of num- 
bers, where the hostile armies are both large, is rather an 
advantage to the one which is the smaller. 

A large flat bottom, or plain, low-lying, and here and 
there intersected by swamps and marshes, covered with a 
very close growth of small trees — the later growth on 
ground where before the primeval forest had stood — and 
these so close together that wagons and horses could not 
pass, and only footmen with difficulty, except where paths 
or roads had been cut through, and all casting a shade 



342 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

which made noonday more like twilight, and necessitat- 
ing the use of a compass to one not acquainted with the 
locality, and matted over all, numerous vines and creepers 
— such was the Wilderness, in which Hooker chose to sit 
down and await attack. 

The form of his camp was almost a right angle, the apex 
being near Chancellorsville, the left side extending north- 
ward to United States Ford on the river, the right westward 
along the plank and turnpike roads, the two highways, 
which, coming up from the southwest, form a junction near 
the village above named. Thus his right wing was in air 
and subject to being turned, the only vulnerable point in an 
otherwise strong position. Hooker's design was to await 
attack from Lee here, while Sedgwick should move up river 
from the rear and capture the heights of Fredericksburg, 
and then move against the rear of the attacking army. 

Lee almost fell into the trap set for him; but, when he 
learned the situation, he proceeded with consummate skill 
and coolness to extricate his army from its dangerous posi- 
tion. He had allowed Hooker to outflank him and had 
thereby lost his advantage. It was necessary, in order to 
recover the lost advantage, to proceed with all possible dis- 
patch and caution. His army moved swiftly until it arrived 
upon the edge of the Wilderness, into which, with strong 
lines of skirmishers pushed out in advance, it boldly plunged 
to develop the Federal position. At a distance of two hun- 
dred yards the skirmishers could see no enemy, but the 
steady crackle and snap of musketry gave notice of the pro- 
gress of the advance. Soon the scattering fire of skirmish- 
ers grew into a steady roar, and the Union lines were found. 
Then Lee caused a halt and rode to the front to examine 
Hooker's position. 



STONEWALL JACKSOn's PLAN. 343 

It was exceedingly difficult to determine the exact extent 
of Hooker's lines, but as he had caused the timber to be cut 
away from before them to a width of a hundred yards or 
more, a great part of the works were visible. During the 
rest of the day Lee's forces were moved up and around the 
ap x of the angle, sharp skirmishing frequently resulting. 
The advance line that had been thrown out in front of the for- 
tified lines was recalled by Hooker, who believed that Lee 
would be foolish enough to hurl his troops to certain destruc- 
tion against his position. But Lee and Jackson were studying 
how best to come at him without the risk of defeat. Gen- 
eral Jackson, it is agreed by all authorities, here showed the 
\yisest spirit and the greatest military genius that he ever 
exhibited. Lee gave him the command of the fifty thou- 
sand troops which were now confronting Hooker, and told 
him to hold the enemy in check till the remainder of the 
army could be brought upon the ground. 

Jackson, upon receiving the order, knowing the desper- 
ate task assigned him, entered his tent and cast himself 
upon his knees in prayer before the Ruler of battles; then, 
calm and confident, led his men to their work. He it was 
who perceived the weak point in the Union position and 
suggested to Lee the possibility of turning Hooker's right 
wing by moving a heavy force to their right flank by a 
forest road and assailing its extremity. This would neces- 
sitate the greatest caution and swiftness. A heavy mass 
must be moved to give weight to the assault, and this would 
leave a small force only to hold Hooker in check should he 
attempt to leave his lines and advance. But Lee, counting 
that Jackson's attack at the Federal right would draw 
Hooker's attention to that point, while if the assault should 
succeed, the attacking force would be moving down upon 



344 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



the centre of the field and would soon join with his left 
again, and seeing that in its success lay his only salvation, 
retreat being the only alternative, approved the plan, and 
ordered Jackson to proceed. 

Jackson took twenty-five thousand men and in the morn- 
ing, as soon as dawn had partially dispelled the darkness 
which rested upon the Wilderness, led by competent guides, 
moved off to the southwest in a round-about way, silently 




Coprright 1868, Harper & Bro8. From Harper's History of ttit Civil War 

REGION NEAR CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

and expeditiously, while Lee undertook the task of attract- 
ing Hooker's attention to his front, which he accomplished 
so successfully that the Union right wing was totally neg- 
lected. A sound of axes, making way through parts of the 
deep wood for Jackson, was heard by some of the army at 
the right of their position, but no one could imagine what 
it portended. They knew the Confederate army was at 
their left toward Fredericksburg, and they did not dream 
that Lee would divide his army for any purpose. 



THE UNION ARMY SURPRISED. 345 

It was a p^reat risk that Lee here assumed. For, if by 
any chance, Hooker had become cognizant of Jackson's 
- intention two hours before the attack came, he would 
have refused his right wing, reinforced it, pushed out a 
strong body of troops between the two divisions of the 
Southern army, and defeated them in detail with ease. 
And this chance was likely to happen. 

Hooker had no cavalry, however, to scout the woods, 
and missed his chance of victory. A part of Jackson's 
troops were perceived indeed, moving to the southwest, by 
some of the outposts and a sharp fire was opened upon 
them; but, as their line of march was changed. Hooker sup- 
posed it was either a scouting party, or that Lee was mov- 
ing off towards Orange Court House, and seeking to 
escape. But, as through the dense woods nothing could be 
perceived plainl}/', and Lee was assailing his left wing, 
Hooker made no further attempt to examine the Confeder- 
ate design. 

Meanwhile, Jackson, with unremitting energy, had 
reached a point on the Plank Road west of Hooker's 
extreme right and at five o'clock p. m. was forming his tired 
troops in heavy double lines at right angles across the road, 
and across the Turnpike Road further north facing the Union 
position. Howard commanded the extreme right division 
of the Federal army and had one small division only on the 
roads down which Jackson was now marching. The Union 
troops, part of whom had just stacked arms and were pre- 
paring their suppers, were astonished to see coming down 
upon them through the gloom of evening, the solid masses 
of the enemy. The sentries and pickets fired upon their 
assailants, but with no other effect than to draw a return 
blast that cut them down like reeds before a sickle. 




■61^ 



BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 347 

Then all was haste and confusion in camp. Officers and 
men rushed to arms, formed hastily across the road, and 
desperately attempted to stop the torrent rolling upon them. 
But the first line fled at the shock. Howard perceived the 
terrible danger of his corps. The various division com- 
manders sought heroically to interpose their divisions, one 
after the other, to the onset, but they only succeeded in 
causing some delay. At first swiftly, then more slowly, as 
the resistance became more desperate, Jackson crumbled 
the Union line, and rolled it down upon its centre. 

At the same time, Lee, hearing the heavy boom of 
battle, and knowing that Jackson was bearing down towards 
him, assaulted more fiercely the works along the centre and 
right. His lines were weak and made no impression, but he 
succeeded for some time in holding the attention of Hooker. 
Hooker soon learned, however, the extent of his danger, 
and hurried several divisions from his centre and left to 
block Jackson's path. One hour after the first shot was 
fired, Jackson had broken Howard's corps in pieces, and 
was threatening to treat the third corps in a like manner. 
The battle drew nearer and nearer the Federal centre. 

Hooker's headquarters were almost in sight of the con- 
tending forces. Here there was a clearing of about fifty 
acres, and on this clearing General Pleasonton gathered the 
fragments of batteries that came in broken or disabled from 
the front, and posted several reserve batteries. Here the 
fragments of Howard's corps rallied to the support of the 
guns, and Hooker sent some fresh divisions to form to right 
and left. Pleasonton double-shotted his cannon, and as 
soon as the retreating troops had passed his guns, and the 
Confederates appeared upon the open ground, he dis- 
charged a tempest of shot upon them that caused th§m to 



348 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEB. 

reel, halt, and fall back. They re-formed and assaulted 
again, but only to be swept from the earth by the storm that 
roared in their faces, Jackson then drew back and re- 
formed his lines. His progress was stopped. The struggle 
to win even this much had been bitter, and, after the first 
hour, tedious and prolonged. 

The night came as he reached this point. His troops 
v/ere very v/eary. Many men had been lost. Hooker was 
massing every available man against him. But, again, he 
returned to the assault. His lines were now extended to 
meet Lee's left, who was making great exertions to form 
connections, and to still further envelop the Federal right, 
which Hooker had drawn back till it was nearly parallel 
with his left. A terrible struggle ensued. Hooker sent 
division after division to reinforce his staggering right- 
Jackson pressed more and more with his left, and the 
Federals slowly receded before him. Lee urged the battle 
briskly along his right and centre, but did not dare attack 
the breastworks. Darkness concealed the troops, and 
Jackson, who saw victory nigh, was heard to exclaim, " Oh, 
for one more hour of daylight!" But he was now facing 
fifty thousand men, who, though partly disorganized, were 
desperate and brave. Darkness saved the Union army. 

The battle ceased at about ten o'clock, when Jackson, 
who had ridden to the front to examine the situation, was 
shot by a troop of his ov/n soldiers, who thought him a 
Union scout. He was mortally v/ounded, and was borne to 
the rear by his horror-stricken officers. Hill assumed com- 
mand, but was soon severely wounded. The news of Jack- 
son's mishap was kept as much as possible from the troops. 
So ended the first day of battle, and the advantage was 
with Lee. 



PREPARATIONS FOR RENEWING THE BATTLE. 349 

During the night both Generals improved the oppor- 
tunit}^ to re-form their lines. Hooker especially had need 
of reorganization. He brought the troops which had borne 
the brunt of battle to the left wing, and replaced them with 
others. He changed his lines so as to face in an acute angle, 
both southeast and southwest, thus guarding his communi- 
cations with the river. He, moreover, caused an interior 
camp to be fortified, the shape being similar to his newly 
assumed position and the wings resting on the river above 
and below United States Ford. Lee directed Stuart, now 
commanding the left wing, to continue the attack on the Fed- 
eral centre, aiming to capture Chancellorsville and to con- 
nect his right wing with the left of that portion more 
immediately under his direction. 

Sedgwick's movements below Fredericksburg were now 
causing Lee much uneasiness. He was acquainted with 
Sedgwick's habitual caution and slowness, and counted much 
on being able to crush Hooker before that General could 
arrive within striking distance. He instructed Early, who 
commanded at Fredericksburg to delay Sedgwick as much 
as possible. Hoping to conquer Hooker in a short time, he 
ordered the assault to be renewed at daybreak (Sunday the 
3d), and himself took direction of the battle. He was 
exceedingly anxious to close the gap between Stuart's com- 
mand and the right wing, fearing that Hooker might yet 
assume the offensive and push in between them. 

Hooker, however, had no idea of doing this. He was 
only intent on holding his own and beating off his enemy. 
He was dispirited by the sudden reverse that had overtaken 
his right wing. He ordered Birny to fall back, if too hard 
pressed, to the stronger line on the rear, but Birny, who 
commanded the threatened point, retired immediately when 



350 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Stuart advanced, thus giving him the idea that victory was 
now come. However, victory was not so easily won. The 
Federal troops withstood the most fiery assaults for several 
hours. The battle raged without intermission from day- 
light until ten o'clock, during which time prodigies of valor 
were performed. 

Lee succeeded, then, in bringing about a junction of his 
two wings, and now directed all his power upon the central 
Union point at Chancellorsville. Charges were given and 
taken by both sides. Faces were blackened by discharges 
from belching cannon, so close were the lines. The fury of 
the assailants was irresistable. Hooker, stunned by a can- 
non-shot, lost control of the battle. Couch, who assumed 
command for the time, directed his troops to relinquish 
Chancellorsville, and to fall back into the interior lines now 
made very strong. The Confederates followed exulting, 
but they were hurled back with fearful loss. All their 
efforts were unavailing and no more . progress was made. 
And now Lee's attention was called imperatively to the 
danger threatening from the rear. 

Sedgwick, gathering energy, drove Early out of Freder- 
icksburg, stormed Marye's Hill, drove the enemy in hot 
haste out of their strong lines, and was now pursuing them, 
and rapidly drawing near. Shortly after noon, Lee seeing 
that all efforts were unavailing to push Hooker further, 
ordered his Lieutenants to fortify on their advanced ground, 
and hold it, while he, withdrawing two strong divisions, hur- 
ried them to the aid of Early, designing to crush Sedgwick. 

That General had thus lost to Hooker whatever advant- 
age his presence a day earlier might have afforded. His slow- 
ness took from Hooker a probable victory. Lee's magnifi- 
cent genius was here shown conspicuously. Holding a larger 



LEE ATTACKS SEDGWICK. 351 

enemy, thoroughly cowed, within lines, he turned upon 
another formidable force in his rear and assailed it. His 
army was in a most dangerous position. Reduced to fifty 
thousand on the field, it was much shattered. An advance 
by Hooker would have ruined it. Sedgwick, who had failed 
to come to Hooker's aid, now looked in vain for aid from 
Hooker. Had Hooker now known of Lee's movement, he 
might still have overpowered the force left in his front. 

The Federal General was acting under a cloud of con- 
fusion, alike destructive to his own energy and that of his 
subordinates. The forces sent to Early enabled him to take 
a position at or near Salem Church and to hold Sedgwick 
in check until night stopped operations. Sedgwick waited 
anxiously to hear from Hooker during the night and the 
forenoon of the next day (4th) . He held his position, 
undetermined what to do. His lines occupied a ridge of 
hills almost in the form of a square, his wings drawn at the 
right close to the river at Bank's Ford, his left around so as 
to face the roads to Fredericksburg. Lee, seeing that 
Hooker would not attack, proceeded in person to command 
the troops facing Sedgwick. He left Stuart before Hook- 
er's lines with barely twenty thousand men, and concen- 
trated the remainder on Sedgwick, who, he saw, must be 
dislodged. He directed a small force to re-occupy Fred- 
ericksburg, and placed his other divisions for assault. 

Late in the afternoon he ordered the attack to begin. 
The troops gallantly struggled over the difiicult hollows 
and up the hills; but Sedgwick had the advantage of 
position, and, after an exceedingly bloody contest, beat the 
assailants off, and held his position intact. But Lee was 
determined to crush him, and renewed the assault with 
great fury. The General himself said at one time, that in 



352 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

all the war he never participated in a bloodier battle than 
this. His efforts were unavailing. Night closed the third 
day's battle. During the darkness Sedgwick withdrew to 
the north side of the Rappahannock. During the next night 
and morning, Hooker also withdrew across the river, 
thoroughly beaten, and having considerably less confidence 
in his ability to cope with the genius of war he had invoked 
to battle. 

The Confederate loss in this series of battles amounted to 
twelve thousand killed and wounded besides a few prison- 
ers. Hooker lost about the same in killed and wounded, 
besides five thousand prisoners. It was unquestionably 
Lee's greatest victory. Though outflanked, he had recov- 
ered; though outnumbered, he had outgeneraled his oppo- 
nent; though assailed in rear, while fighting with a stronger 
enemy, he had turned and swiftly accomplished the defeat 
of both antagonists, before they could hasten their move- 
ments or act in concert. If no other battle or campaign 
had marked Lee a great General, this victory would have 
stamped him such. It unquestionably raised him to the 
highest rank of merit among all Southern generals. Like 
Grant's campaign at Vicksburg, it was swift, brilliant, 
against larger forces, and gained by striking hard and 
quickly at the open points presented by the antagonist. 

Military critics have said that Lee made several capital 
military errors in this battle. First, he divided his army by 
sending Jackson a day's march to the left, thus giving 
Hooker a chance to destroy both in detail. Second, he 
assaulted intrenched lines with an inferior force. Third, 
he again divided his army to go against Sedgwick. Only 
the inability of his opponent could allow such errors to go 
unheeded and Lee, as a good general, ought to have 



LEE PLANS ANOTHER INVASION OF THE NORTH. 353 

retreated, drawn in Longstreet and given battle with his 
whole army. Had Hooker been a better General, he would 
not have awaited attack in the Wilderness, having opportu- 
nity to get out of it; he would not have lain supinely still and 
allowed the enemy to flank him in open day; he would not 
have permitted Stuart and Lee to join wings on the second 
day, he w^ould not have permitted Sedgwick to be assailed 
on the third day without aid; he would not have remained 
ever on the defensive and Lee could not have been victori- 
ous — but, while nothing can be said against Hooker's fight- 
ing qualities and his ability to lead a corps or division under 
orders, it was a mistake for him to undertake the guidance 
of an army. Thus at the Rappahannock river, Lee had 
foiled and beaten the Army of the Potomac under two Gen- 
erals, and had won not only fame for himself, but had 
encouraged the Confederate Government to persevere. 

Lee conducted his victorious regiments back to their 
camp at Fredericksburg and reorganized. Many of the 
companies, and even regiments, had been shattered until 
they had lost all organization, and there were no officers to 
command the fragments. He now divided his army into 
three corps of three divisions each. Longstreet, Ewell and 
A. P. Hill were placed in command of the corps. His 
artillery was also made a separate organization. Long- 
street soon arrived in camp, and all reserves were drawn in 
and those on leave of absence recalled. The army soon 
numbered again almost one hundred thousand men, the 
greater part being veterans of more than one campaign. 
Lee, encouraged by his recent victory, and feeling strong 
with the great army at his back, began to think of again 
invading the loyal states. 

Untaught by his defeat at Antietam and the ill-success 
23 



354 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

of his first expedition, he was eager to blot out the remem- 
brance of that defeat by executing a greater design. He 
supposed the Union army to be discouraged and demoralized 
by its recent reverses, and that it would not stand before 
him with confidence. He had conceived a kind of contempt 
towards its commanders. Other considerations also induced 
him to attempt the expedition, Virginia was exhausted 
and needed rest. For nearly two 3'ears it had been the 
theatre of war, and had been alternately trodden down and 
devastated by rushing armies. Pennsylvania was still un- 
touched, almost, by the hand of war ; it would furnish him 
rich fields for supplies. Also, if by any means he should 
win a great victory on loyal soil, that, he believed, coupled 
with the reverses recently inflicted, would compel the 
National Government to grant favorable terms to the Con- 
federate States. All the considerations which had before 
induced him to invade Maryland, now influenced him to 
invade Pennsylvania. 

The only consideration that weighed against the plan 
was that the movement would uncover Richmond ; but he 
had no great love for that city as a military point. Indeed, 
he came afterwards to consider it a drag that weighed down 
the movements of his army. He did not believe that the 
Federal Government would permit Hooker to march upon 
Richmond while the Confederate army was cutting into the 
heart of the Union. His supposition was correct. He com- 
municated his plan to Davis for approval. That gentleman 
readily assented, not desiring to cross the wishes of the lion 
of the day. Lee was now the champion of the Southern 
cause — recognized as such by all, friend and foe. Davis 
sought to float with popular sentiment. President Lincoln, 
in great perplexity, was casting about to find a worthy 
antagonist to match against Lee. 



LEE S ARMY MOVES. 355 

Lee prepared to move. First, he ordered all reinforce- 
ments and supplies designed for his army to be sent into the 
Shenandoah Valley, having chosen that route as the best to 
Pennsylvania, because the mountains vi^ould protect his right 
flank from attack. His first task was to remove his army 
from the presence of the enemy without being assailed in 
force. He trusted to Hooker's inactivity and discourage- 
ment to allow him to do this. First, he sent one corps — 
Ewell's — to Culpepper Court House (ist June, 1863), 3-^<^' 
seeing that Hooker did not move, he then transferred the 
remaining corps to the same point, leaving a small force at 
Fredericksburg to watch the enemy. 

Hooker thought that Lee was about to attempt a flank 
movement similar to that which ruined Pope, and at once 
moved up the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite 
the Confederate position. The Union cavalry here crossed 
to the south side to feel for Lee's position (9th), and 
assailed Stuart, who, at Brandy Station, was threatening and 
maneuvering, in obedience to Lee's orders, who used him to 
cover his actual movements. But Pleasonton, the leader of 
the Federal cavalry, accomplished more than Lee designed 
or wished. He routed Stuart and captured his baggage 
and a letter of instructions therein, which revealed to him 
Lee's whole plan. Hooker's orders would not allow him to 
cross the river and attack. 

Lee, meanwhile, was not idle. He was pleased to note 
that the enemy did not design making a counter movement 
upon Richmond, but was following him. Under cover of 
his cavalry, he now extended Ewell's corps northwestward 
into the Shenandoah as far as Winchester, while for a few 
days he remained near Culpepper himself with the other 
two corps watching Hooker. It was a dangerous expedient, 



356 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

this separation of his army, one which an energetic oppo- 
nent would have made to count against him with effect. 
When Ewell at Winchester attacked General Milroy, who 
with a small force held that point, and thus revealed his 
position, Lincoln well expressed the disgust of the people at 
the inactivity of Hooker and the mistake of Halleck in not 
directing him to cross the Rappahannock and attack, by 
saying: "If the head of Lee's army is at Winchester and the 
tail of it on the Plank Road somewhere between Freder- 
icksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim 
somewhere!" 

The fight at Winchester occurred on the nth, and Lee 
at once hurried forward with the remainder of his troops. 
The army was soon consolidated, and thence marched to 
Shepherdstown and crossed the Potomac (23d-27th June), 
now fully ninety thousand strong, while Hooker, outwitted, 
harassed by dispatches from Washington, chafing at 
restraints, hurried to Leesburg and there crossed. Stuart 
and his cavalry, numbering nearly fifteen thousand, had 
tried to cover the passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains 
to prevent the Federals from assailing the Confederate 
flank, and had fought several hot battles with Pleasonton, 
who at last sorely defeated them and chased them through 
Ashley Gap to the protection of the main army. Pleason- 
ton then discovered the long lines of Southern soldiery 
marching swiftly northward, and reported to Hooker. 

The Confederate army advanced directly upon Cham- 
bersburg, Pa., and there halted. Ewell, however, was directed 
toward Harrisburg, and slowly marched upon that city. Lee 
desired to rest his troops here, and also to gain information 
of his opponent's intentions. He issued a proclamation 
to the troops and inhabitants counseling moderation and 



358 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

forbearance from rapine and violence. But, nevertheless, 
the soldiers took all the supplies and forage they could find, 
and contributions were levied upon the populace. Lee 
feared that Hooker would strike at his communications with 
the Shenandoah, and forebore to proceed further until he 
could learn concerning his movements. 

Stuart was sent out towards Frederick to learn particu- 
lars; but that bold rider, after hearing that the Union army 
was near Frederick, proceeded eastward instead of keeping 
between it and the Southern army, and was lost sight of by 
Lee until on the field of Gettysburg he reported on the 
extreme left. Lee learned enough, however, to make him 
fearful of losing his communications, and knowing that a 
battle must be fought, he resolved to so threaten Washing- 
ton and Baltimore that the Union army would be compelled 
to meet him instead of cutting his communications. He 
therefore directed his columns toward Gettysburg. 

Meanwhile Hooker had been engaged in a dispute with 
the Government, and was removed from command. General 
Meade being directed to assume command, to follow Lee, 
and to fight him when found. Meade, with some misgiv- 
ings as to his ability, assumed the task so suddenly and in 
such time of peril thrust upon him, and at once set the army 
in motion towards Gettysburg, not knowing that Lee was 
also marching upon that little city, but resolved to hinder 
his further advance towards eastern Pennsylvania, (27th 
June). 

Thus it came about that the two gigantic adversaries 
were again rushing together, neither knowing where he 
would meet the other, neither knowing what position at 
Gettysburg, if any should be needed, would be most desir- 
able, and neither believing the contact would happen there. 



THE BATTLE FIELD. 359 

Though Lee was nearer that field, yet it seems that the God 
of Battles designed that Meade should arrive first and 
attain the stronghold. 

Gettysburg, a city of schools, is situated at the head of a 
small valley formed by two parallel ridges of high hills, run- 
ning north and south. The eastern ridge comes to an 
abrupt end a short distance south of the city, having a 
precipitous face northward, and here is known as Cemetery 
Hill. This ridge extends thence southward about four 
miles, and has at its southern end two mounts, or very high 
hills, known as Little and Great Round Top. The western 
ridge, known as Seminary Ridge, from a school situated 
upon it, and rising opposite the Round Tops, from Marsh 
Creek, extends northward past the city and connects with 
an irregular range of hills running east and west on the 
north side. From the hills north of the city flows Rock 
Creek, southeastward, skirting the eastern base of the hills 
known as Culp's and Wolfs Hills, which are parts of the 
same ridge as Cemetery Hill, and are situated east of that 
hill. East of the creek were other hills, irregularly follow- 
ing its course. 

Thus, it will be seen, that the city lies in a depression, 
with two valleys running southward, the one between Ceme- 
tery and Seminary Ridges, varying from a half to two miles 
in width, the other being the basin of the creek, and narrow 
and steep-sided. Seminary Ridge is double, the more east- 
ern part being known as Oak Ridge. Of all the hills and 
ridges mentioned, Cemetery Hill was the central point, and 
the highest. Its sides, west and north, were rough and pre- 
cipitous. The ridge, going south from it, and descending 
westward more gently to the valley, until near the Round 
Tops, where it became rough and difficult, was seamed with 
ravines and jagged with cliffs. 



860 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The key point to the field therefore, was Cemetery Hill 
— the party holding it could prevent an enemy from holding 
the neighboring hills. From its summit, South Mountain, 
ten miles away, could be seen. The valleys round about 
were cultivated, and fields of wheat and corn waved in the 
breezes sweeping up from the ocean. Woods of oak, 
hickory and other trees covered the hills, with clearings 
here and there interspersed. It was a peaceful scene, shortly 
to be broken in upon by the mighty armies hurrying towards 
it from south, west and north. Lee, deprived of the use of 
his cavalry — for Meade was now interposed between Stuart 
and the army coming from Chambersburg — could not learn 
the movements of the enemy. He only knew that his 
communications were threatened and he was resolved 
to press hard towards Washington to relieve the danger. 
Nor did Meade dream that so soon would a battle be fought. 
He had barely assumed the reins of his command; he 
expected only to intercept Lee's march towards the Susque- 
hanna. Lee, therefore, did not hurry his marching, while 
the Federals did. 

The advance of the Union army under Buford and Rey- 
nolds, cavalry and infantry, reached Gettysburg (istjuly), 
and proceeded out on the Chambersburg road northwest to 
feel for the enemy. Here Hill's corps appeared and both 
parties were surprised to perceive an enemy. They at once 
prepared for action. Willoughby's Run, a small stream, 
having low, but steep banks, lay between them. The Fed- 
erals numbered fifteen thousand men; Hill's corps was of 
about the same number, and part of Ewell's corps soon came 
along from a northern road, having been deflected from his 
march upon Harrisburg by Lee's order, thus giving the 
Confederates the advantage of numbers. The fight was at 



THE OPENING BATTLE. 361 

first with the Federal cavalry, which gallantly resisted the 
advance until the infantry could come up into position along 
a low ridge east of the Run. 

Reynolds at once determined to give battle, believing 
that he ought to hold Lee in check until Meade could concen- 
trate the army at Gettysburg or some point in the rear. He 
sent word therefore to his Commander, and made dispo- 
sitions to give a hard fight. Hill also, was not loth to 
engage. He sent word to Lee, disposed his men and bat- 
teries and ordered an advance. A hot contest ensued. 
Heth led the assaulting division of the Confederates and a 
part of his troops crossed the Run. But he was driven back, 
losing many men. Heth himself was killed, and the greater 
part of one brigade, which, to escape the fire of Federal 
batteries, had taken refuge in a railroad cut, was captured. 
But the Federals also lost Reynolds, who was shot while 
reconnoitering, a loss equal to that of Heth. Hill made no 
further attempt to force the Union position till Ewell came 
up, when he again assaulted. 

Meanwhile Howard's corps had also come up and taken 
position at the right and rear of Buford. Hill and Ewell 
extended their lines to the left and joined battle. They 
outflanked Howard's corps. It now seemed that the lat- 
ter had not recovered its fright at Chancellorsville, for it 
retired before the furious onset. Ewell pressed after. 
Buford's flank being thus uncovered, his command was com- 
pelled to retire. The retreat at the right became more 
rapid, and at last, when passing into Gettysburg, degener- 
ated into a rout. The Confederates captured many pris- 
oners and entered the city at the fugitives' heels. 

Meanwhile, Hancock's corps of Federals and General 
Humphrey, chief engineer, had arrived on the scene, and at 




OF THE BATTLE 

showuiff Fwxtions' JtdcL 
JULr I?r2?&5?1863. 

""■" VrtioTvUnt^. 
— — CnnfkdervUe. » 

ScaZe^ofJMUe'. 



Copyright 1868, Harper & Bros. 



p362 



From H«rper'B History tf Civil War. 



THE TWO ARMIES IN POSITION. 363 

once took possession of Cemetery Hill, and were there in 
time to receive and protect the fugitives of Howard's corps. 
Lee shortly arrived on the scene, and, seeing that the 
enemy were already in possession of a very strong position 
and were fortifying it, he refrained from attacking. But 
he issued orders to his corps commanders to take possession 
of Oak Ridge and to extend their lines southward along it, 
designing to assault the Union position as soon as his corps 
could be brought together. He did not desire to risk defeat 
with but half of his army at hand. But here he made a 
mi'^take. For not half of the Union army was on the field 
and no fortification had yet been raised of any considerable 
strength. While his troops were flushed with victory, he 
stood much more chance of gaining possession of the key- 
point to the field than at any time thereafter. 

The two armies, now face to face, exerted themselves 
to concentrate troops, and all night the tramp of marching 
feet and the rumble of wheels and stamp of horses sounded 
over the hills. By morning almost all the forces were on 
the ground; but neither General was prepared to make the 
first advance. Lee spent the whole morning in arranging 
his divisions, in looking over the ground and laying plans. 
His line, with Longstreet commanding the right, extended 
down almost to Marsh Creek, to which his pickets did 
extend; and along Oak and Seminary Ridges north to 
Gettysburg, Hill holding the center, while Ewell's line bent 
around eastward across Rock Creek to the hills east and 
northeast of Gulp's and Wolfs Hills. 

The Federal lines were almost parallel to this line, the 
left wing reaching down into the valley, west of the Round 
Tops, where Sickles, by mistake, had placed his corps, 
thence up the side and along the ridge to Cemetery Hill, 



364 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



thence around eastward, encircling Gulp's and Wolf's Hills, 
while their great train was parked in the rear, and within 
the protection of the hook, or semi-circle, at the north. 
Small bodies of cavalry guarded the flanks, the larger part 
of those bodies being with Stuart and Pleasonton, now 
maneuvering and fighting among the hills several miles to 
the east. Lee noted the mistake made by Sickles, who had 




MEADE's headquarters, GETTYSBURG. 

been ordered to occupy the Round Tops and their bases, 
but who had chosen to move out to a low ridge, a half mile 
out in the valley, and take position in an old peach orchard 
and along the acclivities of a small brook, and who was thus 
separated at right and left from the general line of the 
Federal army, with a gap between his right flank and the 
corps next to him. 

Lee directed Longstreet to assail Sickles, out his orders 



lee's mistake. 365 

were not positive as to when, and Longstreet, thinking his 
lines not in order, delayed several hours to move. Lee 
ought to have attacked at daybreak, for then very slight 
intrenchments had been thrown up by his opponents, and all 
their troops were not yet in position. Nor did Lee here 
correctly estimate the support that Longstreet would 
require in his task. Indeed, it may be said, Lee did not at 
all correctly conceive the strength of his enemy's position. 
With seventy thousand infantry, he was about to assail 
eighty-four thousand, whose strength was doubled by reason 
of position. To be sure, a third of Meade's troops were 
raw, having never seen a battle ; but as long as Meade kept 
on the defensive, these troops could do as good service as 
veterans. 

It was rashness in Lee. He should have moved south- 
ward and threatened Meade's left flank, and thus compelled 
him to abandon his stronghold ; or, he should have awaited 
attack, or maneuvered to the left or rear and drawn the 
enemy out. But he chose the only alternative that, to a 
military mind, gave the least prospect of success. Yet, it 
will be remembered, he was flushed with victory, his army 
despised its adversary, he could not trust to a long line of 
communication for many days, and it was better to fight 
than to retreat without 'attempting to win. Meade had 
the advantage of short lines of communication, and could 
wait an indefinite time. He seemed disposed to wait, at 
least, until his own camp was made impregnable by for= 
tifications. 

Lee's plan of attack was, m brief, to assail the ex- 
tremities of the Federal wings — Longstreet leading against 
their left, Ewell against their right — and if they could be 
turned, these generals were to press on, and strive to form 



366 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



a junction in the Union rear, thus inclosing and crushing 
the army. The plan for the destruction of the enemy's 
army was good, if the wings could have been broken ; but, 
as Meade held the interior line, and could move supports 
with great ease from left to right, by a short road across, or 
from the centre to either, it was a hopeless task given these 
two lieutenants. 




lee's headquarters, GETTYSBURG. 

Longstreet delayed his attack till late in the afternoan 
(2d July) , as some say, through his own fault and slowness, 
as others say, because Lee's orders to him were not definite 
as to time. Ewell, also, was delayed, and when he did 
move, it was not simultaneously with Longstreet, and his 
orders were also indefinite as to the exact point of attack. 
It seems that Lee was in much doubt what would be the 
best course to pursue, and that his lines were so long 



THE CAPTURE OF THE PEACH ORCHARD 367 

that he could not make them work in unison. One true 
criticism maybe made of him in general — he left to his 
subordinates too much discretion, giving them general 
directions, but leaving them to execute the instructions in 
their own way. So in the case of this afternoon's battle. 
Longstreet and Ewell could not cooperate, being too far 
apart, and each intent only upon doing his own task without 
reference to the other. 

Longstreet's corps emerged from behind the trees on 
Oak Ridge at four o'clock, and swept down into the valley 
towards Sickles, aiming to overlap his flanks and push in 
between his rear and the Union lines on Great Round Top. 
Sickles' danger became immediately apparent to Meade, who 
sent reinforcements to meet him, should he be forced back, 
and directions to fall back to the ridge if too hard pressed. 
The Federal artillery opened heavily from the heights 
against the assailants, but did not cause them to halt. Rein- 
forcements were hurried forward. Longstreet's heavy lines 
struck Sickles' corps with terrific force, and though the 
troops fought with power and obstinacy, they were driven 
back. 

The Peach Orchard was won, the lines were broken and 
compelled to retire. Longstreet strove hard to push a body 
of troops into the gap and take Sickles in the rear, but this 
Sickles avoided by rapid retreating. However, one brigade 
succeeded in penetrating a deep ravine known as "The 
Devil's Den," at the base of Little Round Top, and from it 
climbed the rough hill-side almost to the crest of the ridge. 
For by Sickles' mistake, this had been left uncovered, and 
in his retreat he was pressed back to ground further north. 
But General Warren, seeing the imminent danger of the 
position, hastily called up a brigade of troops passing him 



368 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and rushed to the threatened point. So that Hood's bold 
climbers found a strong party awaiting them, and after a 
brief struggle, retreated down the ravine again. The Union 
line was driven from the valley. 

Longstreet halted to re-form his lines, preparatory to 
storming the heights. He looked in vain for the supports 
which he had a right to expect would be sent him by Lee, and 
without them it seemed madness to make the attempt. The 
reinforcements sent by Meade had arrived meanwhile, and 
with the broken regiments of Sickles and those that still 
held firm, presented an unbroken line of muskets and can- 
non along the brow of the hill. Longstreet soon gave the 
order to advance. His men swept up the hillside subjected 
to a storm of heavy shot and shell, under which they stag- 
gered, and when they arrived within musket range, the Fed- 
eral troops poured upon them such a withering blast of 
musketry that they halted, and wavered. Then the latter 
leaned from their intrenchments and charged down the 
hill. The Confederates at once retreated; and, though they 
were not followed far, they continued the retreat to a shel- 
ter behind the low ridge in the Peach Orchard and the 
adjoining fields. Night came and closed the contest here. 

Meanwhile Ewell had won some laurels at the left. He 
first rashly attacked the north slope of Cemetery Hill, and 
even reached the batteries on the crest; but there the 
infantry poured down upon him with such power that he 
called his men off, and retired to his lines above the city. 
Then he turned his attention to the extreme right of the 
Union line, and late at night, as darkness was gathering, he 
caused a storming party to come down out of the hills 
beyond Rock Creek, and assail the lines around the base of 
Gulp's Hill. Meade had drawn off many of the troops from 



CLOSE OF THE SECOND DAY. 869 

his right to reinforce his left against Longstreet, and the 
Hne of defence was rather weak between Gulp's Hill and 
McAllister's Hill, a rise south of the first, and there, though 
at all other points the storming party was repulsed with 
great slaughter, the Confederates captured the breastworks 
and penetrated some distance to their rear. Meade was 
soon informed of his danger and strong reinforcements were 
hurried from various directions, which stopped the pro- 
gress of and beat the victors back to the captured works, 
which they obstinately held, however, all night. 

Here the battle ended shortly before midnight. Meade 
then drew a cordon of troops around the break, posted 
heavy artillery and waited impatiently for daylight, deter- 
mined to expel the invaders at all hazards. So the second 
day ended, and the troops lay down upon their arms to 
rest. But more than a score of thousands lay dead or sorely 
wounded on the plains and hills, evidence of the severity 
of the struggle. 

The second day of battle left the advantage with neither 
antagonist. For, though Longstreet had driven in Sickles, 
yet the Union line was thereby made stronger; and, though 
a part of Ewell's corps had taken a line of breastworks of 
short extent, yet Meade was not thereby endangered, hav- 
ing now formed an interior line much stronger. But there 
was some success to encourage the Southern soldiery. 
Lee, thinking Ewell's success promised more, directed that 
he continue the assault at the point where he had pene- 
trated, and that Longstreet should continue to assail the 
left. He did not think it was Meade's intention to assume 
the offensive in the morning; but such was the case. 

Meade, at the earliest dawn, opened a terrific fire upon 
the enemy in his breastworks, and then suddenly hurled a 
24 



370 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

mass of troops upon them with fixed bayonets, driving them 
out in haste. But Ewell had been gathering his troops here 
and now made haste to send up reinforcements. The battle 
soon raged with the greatest fury. Ewell not only placed 
every man of his own in the contest, but called upon Lee 
for aid. The General, fearing that Ewell would lose all he 
had gained, drew division after division from Hill and 
Longstreet and sent them to Ewell's aid. Longstreet, thus 
deprived of support, did not dare attack the ridge again in 
his front, but contented himself with skirmishing and artil- 
lery practice. Indeed the batteries on both sides, along the 
whole of the battle-lines, kept up a constant duel. 

But Ewell's efforts to retake the recaptured works were in 
vain. His masses surged up again and again to the assault. 
Meade concentrated heavily here, and easily held off the 
assailants. For five hours the contest continued, the sound 
of battle being one continuous roar. Then Ewell, terrified 
at the slaughter of his men and convinced that the whole 
army could not retake the works, gave up the fight and 
withdrew to the hills in his rear. He contracted his left 
wing and refused it, fearing a counter attack, 

Lee suddenly awoke to the danger of his position. 
Defeat stared him in the face. If it had been impossible 
for his strongest corps to break through the weakest point 
of the Union line, it would certainly be impossible to break 
through at all. It was madness to drive troops up against 
the heights in front of Longstreet. Yet only one alternative 
remained; he must win or retreat, and he would rather lose 
all than retreat. He called together his chief officers and 
considered the courses open to pursue. Most of his troops 
had been engaged in the battle, but Pickett's fine division 
had not as yet suffered, and several other divisions were 



Pickett's charge. S71 

still intact. But the greater part of his army was disabled. 

He studied the Federal position. But one point 
remained yet untried. Just south of the boldest height of 
Cemetery Hill the slope of the ridge became gentler, where 
a road coming up the valley ascended its side and passed 
over the crest near the cemetery, and the hillside in a long 
slope descended to the level of the plain. Along the side 
of the hill near the crest Hancock's corps occupied two lines 
of breast works, while batteries frowned above. This point 
Lee determined to assault. From ten o'clock till noon he 
prepared his storming party. He drew divisions from 
each corps, concentrated them behind Oak Ridge and 
formed them in triple lines. He directed his batteries to be 
placed so that they might concentrate their fire upon the 
point of attack. He instructed Longstreet and Ewell to 
make feints of attack at right and left to draw Meade's 
attention. He prepared the forlorn hope of the contest. 
He knew that if it should fail, he would lose the battle. 

From ten o'clock till noon silence reigned over the blood- 
stained fields. The Federals curiously scanned the oppos- 
ing hills behind which so much activity was being displayed, 
but could not divine Lee's purpose. At one o'clock, all the 
Confederate batteries suddenly opened fire, and threw a 
hail of shot and shell across the narrow valley. One hun- 
dred and fifty great guns spoke at once. The Union bat- 
teries promptly responded, and the roar of more than three 
hundred guns bellowed sullenly from the hills. Two hours 
did the duel continue. By this bombardment Lee hoped to 
disable the enemy's batteries and throw Hancock's men 
into confusion. Solid shot, projectiles, and shells hurled 
through the air, falling for the most part be^^ond the Union 
line of breastworks. As the troops lay flat on the earth 









p372 



THE LAST DAY 




AT GETTYSBURG 



p373 



374 the: lives and campaigns of grant and lee. 

behind their works, the shot did little damage among them. 
Nor did the bombardment affect the batteries to any great 
extent, all broken guns being immediately replaced. The 
Confederate artillery suffered much, being exposed on the 
ridge, but the soldiers of the storming party rested safely 
behind the ridge. 

Meade now suspected this bombardment portended an 
assault, and in order to preserve his ammunition for the 
emergency, and also to draw the attack at once, ordered his 
batteries to cease firing. Lee supposed his bombardment 
had caused the destruction of or the withdrawal of the 
Union batteries from range, and gave the order for Pickett 
to advance. All the batteries ceased firing, and a deathlike 
stillness brooded over the field for several moments. Then 
the assaulting lines appeared on the crest of Oak Ridge 
and with quickened step marched down into the valley and 
across. The Federals seemed lost in admiration for some 
moments, as the Confederates, in order as if parading, 
swept down the hill. Then Meade ordered his batteries to 
open fire, and directed all his reserves to be brought up 
within supporting distance of the threatened corps. 

The batteries opened. Great swathes were cut through 
the ranks of the gallant troops, but they closed up and went 
forward. Lee stood on the ridge behind them and watched 
them with pride and apprehension. The sight was grand — 
to him the result of the assault would be momentous. He 
ordered his batteries to reply to the Federals, and the roar 
of his guns again was heard, while the shot and shell 
screamed through the air over the heads of his troops. But 
Lee formed this attacking force without providing for sup- 
ports. He ought to have followed it with a strong corps, 
and secured what its momentum should win. But he neg- 



Close of the battle. S75 

lected to do this and lost whatever chance it might have 
afforded. The assaulting force pressed steadily across the 
valley, reached the base of the hill and toiled up the side. 
A rail fence interposed, but they climed over this and went 
on, closing up and dressing their lines swiftly. No grander 
charge was ever made, nor one more hopeless. 

The Federals now used grape and canister and redoub- 
led the discharges of their cannon. Then the musketry 
opened. The first Confederate line disappeared, cut down 
to the earth. The second reeled and stopped, but the third 
closed up to it, and with a rush passed over a part of the 
Federal first line. Here, however, they were stopped. 
Unterrified, the Union soldiers clubbed their muskets and 
used their bayonets and a bloody hand-to-hand fight raged 
for a few minutes. Then reinforcements were hurried for- 
ward by Hancock and a cross-fire was poured into the Con- 
federate lines from batteries to right and left, and unable to 
withstand the storm of death, some threw themselves flat 
upon the earth to escape it, others fled down the hillside 
and could not be stopped. Scattered, confused, routed and 
without form, the divisions, which had come across so 
proudly and orderly, now fled, while the Federal cannon 
hurled murderous discharges of shot and shell amongst 
them. Had Lee supported these troops when they broke 
over the Union works, he might have effected a lodgement; 
but he did not, and lost even this very doubtful chance of 
success. The battle of Gettysburg was ended. 

Had Meade been less cautious and followed up this ter- 
rible repulse by a counter attack in force, there can be little 
doubt, the Confederate army would have been driven from 
the field, and perhaps routed. But he was cautious to a 
fault. He did not know the extent of the injury he had 



376 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



inflicted, nor the extreme confusion that now reigned 
throughout Lee's army. He caused an advance of his left 
and drove Lee's right out of the valley, but did not pursue 




MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE G MEADE. 



further. It is said that Pickett w^ept, because of the de- 
struction of his magnificent division, when he returned to 
his Chieftain. 

Lee expected an assault in return and exerted himself to 



THE CONFEDERATE LOSSES. 377 

prepare for it. He immediately ordered Longstreet and 
Ewell to abandon the extreme positions they held and to 
contract upon the centre of the army, refusing to right and 
left so as to protect flanks. He set all his men at work for- 
tifying a camp. He could not retreat now, owing to the 
confusion of his troops, without great loss; he thought that 
he could better resist assault than a pursuit. His trains were 
also in the way and would have to be abandoned. If Meade 
would give him an hour to reform, he did not fear that an 
attack from him would be dangerous. Meade gave him 
that hour and more. As the darkness of night came, and 
still Meade remained quiet, he and his Lieutenants recov- 
ered energy in a measure, and succeeded in placing the 
army in shape for fighting. 

So the third day of the contest closed, and Lee was com- 
pelled to acknowledge himself beaten. His losses had been 
terrible since crossing the Potomac. Twenty-seven thou- 
sand men had been killed or wounded, and ten thousand 
more were captured or were missing; a loss of more than 
one-third of his army. His supplies were almost exhausted; 
his artillery was crippled; his trains were cumbersome. He 
had rashly attempted to storm a strong position held by a 
superior enemy — defeat was the natural result. One can 
not but admire the splendid fighting done here by the Con- 
federate army; but the judgment must condemn Lee for 
rashness, for pushing his men into the very jaws of death, 
for allowing his subordinates to make disconnected attacks, 
for not properly supporting his assaulting columns — in a 
word, for at all risking a battle at Gettysburg. He lost 
here the prestige that he had won at Fredericksburg and 
Chancellorsville. He had laughed Burnside to scorn for 
attempting to drive him out of Fredericksburg, but a few 



378 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

months later he had tried to drive Meade, with the same 
army that Burnside led, out of an equally strong position. 
It would have been better for Lee's reputation as a great 
commander if he had retreated to Virginia without a battle 
rather than to have fought on this field; it would have saved 
to his army the part it lost. 

A competent and, apparently, disinterested critic has 
thus summed up the errors here made by Lee : First, in 
attempting a battle in preference to retreating, maneuvering 
to right or left, or moving southward to the mountains ; 
second, in not ordering an attack at daybreak of the second 
day, while Meade was still not in position ; third, in giving 
Longstreet no positive orders to attack, thus losing much 
valuable time by his exercise of discretion ; fourth, in not 
giving Longstreet force enough to follow up any advan- 
tages he might obtain ; fifth, in dividing his power, and not 
concentrating it all at one point of attack ; sixth, in deploy- 
ing his line so far south, stretching it to a length of more 
than five miles, and thus weakening it ; seventh, in leaving 
too much discretion to his lieutenants, and thus making it 
almost impossible to have his wings act in unison, a very 
necessary element of success in war. Thes^ are sufficient 
to bar Lee from the position claimed for him — that of 
rank with the few greatest captains of the world. For a 
general may fall into one error and be excused, but when 
he commits a half dozen errors in one battle, he is not to be 
excused so readily. 

Stuart had, meanwhile, after being severely handled by 
the Federal cavalry, formed a junction with Ewell, and 
reported to Lee for prders. The contracted line of the 
Confederates now occupied only the ridges known as Oak 
and Seminary, and Stuart was directed to operate on the 



LEE S RETREAT. 



379 



right flank, chiefly as a protection to the contemplated 
retreat. Lee stood defiant during a part of the national 
holiday — the Fourth of July — but urged his preparations 
for retreat. He was well pleased that Meade did no more 
than observe his movements. He dispatched his trains 
towards the passes of South Mountain under a strong guard, 
sending them by a road not easily to be seen by the 
Federals, and following them, sent a strong body of infantry, 
while the cavalry covered the roads leading south. Then 
as soon as night fell, he silently withdrew all his troops 
from their trenches and marched away. 

Thus it came about, by a kind of coincidence, that 
while Lee was hurriedly retreating with his shattered 
army to the passes of South Mountain, Grant, his future 
antagonist, was victoriously entering the city of Vicksburg, 
after having completed a magnificent campaign of invasion 
by the capture of the enemy's army. Each had started out 
with an army inferior to that of the enemy, but Grant had 
chosen an extremely difficult task to perform, while Lee 
made no maneuvers after arriving upon hostile territory, 
but rushed to battle at the first opportunity. The endings 
of the campaigns were very different. Here, then, is to be 
seen a difference in the men : Grant could lead an army of 
invasion as well as one of defense, Lee could not lead well 
an invading army, but was not to be surpassed in defensive 
operations. Three times and more had Grant hitherto 
shown his ability to lead an invasion ; three times — in West 
Virginia, in Maryland, in Pennsylvania — had Lee attempted 
the same, and each time met with disaster and defeat. No 
further comments or comparisons are necessary. On the 
soil of Virginia, with every foot of which he was well 
acquainted, Lee could prove himself a most formidable 
antagonist ; on foreign soil he lost his prestige, 



380 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Meade did not perceive Lee's retreat at once, and did 
not order pursuit promptly when he did perceive it. He 
had lost twenty-four thousand men in the battles here, and 
was engaged in repairing his organization. Some have 
said, in view of the weight of this struggle and the interests 
depending thereon, that it was the most critical battle of the 
war, and that had Lee won, it would have ended the war. 
But not so. For Grant, at the west, was on that day vic- 
torious, and at the head of a magnificent army, which could 
have been transferred to Washington, by rail, in a very few 
days, and from the blows of which, one may reasonably say, 
Lee could not easily have won victory. And the vast 
North and Northwest, with the heroic Lincoln as leader, and 
Grant and other Federal generals as commanders, would 
have prosecuted the war to a successful conclusion. 

So that Meade, though he unquestionably deserved high 
praise for the manner in which he conducted the battle, 
could not, and did not — for he was a ver}^ modest soldier — 
claim any transcendent glory on account of the victory. He 
had done no more than Lee had done at Fredericksburg. 
No more did he try to take advantage of the enem3^'s 
decided repulse than did Lee at that time. He sent a small 
force to harrass and retard the fugitives, but did not set 
any strong force in motion for several hours ; so that Lee 
reached the passes of South Mountain, and arrived at the 
Potomac, near Williamsport, without serious molestation. 
But here he found the river swollen and almost impassable, 
and he was compelled to intrench a camp and wait. He 
was in desperate straits, for Meade might assail him here, 
if he chose, with power sufficient to crush him. He 
strained every nerve to build a bridge strong enough to 
transfer his army. 



BACK IX THE OLD POSITIONS. 381 

Meade arrived in his presence, in a short time, with his 
whole army, and threw a Hne of circumvallation around his 
camp, but did not attack. He paused too long intrenching. 
A week passed. The bridge was completed, and during 
nighttime (13th Jul}-), the Southern army safely crossed. 
The advantage of the victor}^ was thus partly lost to Meade. 

Thus Lee, a second time driven off loyal territory, with 
the loss of a third of his army, reached Winchester, and 
halted to rest. He issued a gratulatory letter to his troops, 
striving to encourage them, but his feelings belied his words, 
and the gravit}' of his countenance showed the depressed 
state of his spirit. But, in all adversity, he retained the 
confidence of the troops and of his Government. There 
was no other general who could claim greater merit 
among the Soutnern chieftains, and there was no thought of 
superseding him in the command. Henceforth, however, 
he stood on the defensive, and stayed on his own ground. 

Meade transferred his army to the south side of the 
Potomac, crossing at Harper's Ferry, and moved down the 
east side of the mountains, not onl}' to cover Washington 
against any attack through the mountain passes, but to cut 
in between Lee and Richmond, if possible. But Lee 
promptly resumed his progress southward, emerged from 
the mountains eastward, and threw himself into position 
behind the Rapidan river. Here he made a strong camp 
and raised elaborate defences. Meade did not seek to cross 
and attack him, but sat down at Culpepper Court House 
and advanced his pickets to the Rapidan. Thus the armies 
were back again in the relative positions occupied before 
the campaign just ended. Here they rested, while in other 
fields the war was fiercel}^ waged. Lee at once called for 
reinforcements, and his decimated ranks were filled with 
conscripts. 




ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 



p382 



I MINOR MOVEMENTS. 383 

Both armies were being prepared for active operations 
when the battle of Chickamauga at the west, so disastrous 
to the Federals, called attention and diverted troops to that 
field. Longstreet, with his corps, was sent to Bragg's aid, 
and Hooker, with a strong corps, to Chattanooga. The 
armies, thus weakened, still retained their proportionate 
strength, and their commanders soon began to seek an 
opening to assail each other. A campaign of field strategy- 
ensued, alike creditable to the skill of each, both demon- 
strating that they were masters of their art. 

Lee made the first movement. Leaving his camp 
(9th Oct.), he marched westward towards Madison Court 
House, then turned northward and sought to turn the Fed- 
eral right wing. The high land south of the Rapidan par- 
tially concealed his movements; but the Union signal 
officers on the summits of Thoroughfare Mountains per- 
ceived them. Meade at once sent Kilpatrick, commanding 
cavalry, to annoy Lee, and drew in his right wing slowly 
along the Orange and Alexandria railroad. He left Pleas- 
onton's cavalry to cover the withdrawal. Stuart, with the 
Confederate cavalry pressed after, and assailed Pleasonton 
at Brandy Station. A brilliant engagement ensued, the 
advantage being claimed by both parties. Meade trans- 
ferred his army to the north side of the Rappahannock, and 
Pleasonton destroyed the railroad bridge afterwards. 

Lee then marched upon Warrenton, still with the design 
of flanking his enemy, Meade perceived the design and 
also marched upon Warrenton. A race ensued, which Lee 
won, Meade having been delayed somewhat by his center 
corps and left wing. But he thereupon turned the head of 
his column towards Centerville, determined to place him- 
self between Lee and Washington and there fight a battle. 



384 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lee stopped long enough to get his corps together, then 
dispatched Hill towards Centerville. But the Federals 
now had the lead, and their rear division was passing 
through Bristoe Station when Hill arrived. Hill at once 
advanced to the assault, and the Federals, nothing loth, 
took position behind a railroad embankment and gave 
battle. 

Hill deployed his men at right angles with the embank- 
ment and sought, by a flank attack, to dislodge the enemy, 
swinging his masses upon their line by a rotary movement. 
His assault was met by a murderous fire that caused the 
troops to recoil. He formed again and assaulted, but with 
like fortune. The Federals stubbornly held their ground 
and beat off his every attempt, causing great slaughter 
among his troops. Then, to cap their success, they charged 
out of their breastworks and captured a fine battery of six 
guns, and drove Hill's men in hot haste from their position. 
Hill then gave up the struggle and waited for Lee. He had 
lost one thousand men and a fine battery, and when Lee 
arrived, he was severely censured for attacking without 
orders. Warren, in command of the Federal rear guard, 
meanwhile slowly retreated towards Centerville, where 
Meade was about to range his lines for battle. 

The decided check which Hill had received, however, 
convinced Lee that Meade was prepared for battle and that 
on chosen ground. He therefore decided to return to his 
camp. He moved towards the river slowly, tearing up the 
railroad as he went, recrossed the Rappahannock, and 
stopped at Culpepper Court House. Meade, forseeing the 
retreat, followed, rebuilding the railroad as he went. The 
Federal cavalry, moving in advance, pressed hard upon the 
enemy's rear, and overtook and attacked their cavalry at 



BUCKLAND RACES. 385 

Buckland and drove it in hot haste from the field; but, 
presently, the fugitives receiving reinforcements, turned and 
drove back the Union cavalry. And so swift were both 
parties in retreat and chase here, -? that the battle has since 
been known as the " Buckland Races." 

Lee, with the mistaken idea of preventing Meade from 
crossing the river at once, left a strong brigade intrenched 
on the north side at Kelley's Ford. Meade at once caused 
the works containing the brigade to be surrounded and 
stormed. The whole force, except a few who threw them- 
selves into the river, was captured, after a fierce struggle 
extending into the night. More than two thousand men 
were thus uselessly wasted by the Confederate General. 
Meade, having now taken the initiative, and having his 
army well in hand, crossed the river and advanced upon 
Culpepper. Lee thereupon promptly retreated to his camp 
behind the Rapidan. Both armies thus resumed their orig- 
inal positions. This campaign, which consisted principally 
of marching, resulted in a loss of three thousand men and 
several cannon and no gain to the Southern army. Meade 
lost nothing but a few men. There seems to have been but 
one fault in its conduct. Lee halted too long at Warrenton 
and allowed Meade time to pass him, but this delay, it seems, 
could not well have been avoided, owing to the necessity of 
having the corps within supporting distance of each other. 
Hill's defeat, even then, was due to a lack of support from 
the other corps. 

Lee's camp on the south side of the Rapidan was exceed- 
ingly well chosen, both on account of its strength and cen- 
tral position from which to move, and because of its health- 
ful situation. The land on that side was higher than on the 
opposite side of the river, and hence overlooked it. At the 
25 



386 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

right was the swamp of Mine Run guarding the flank; at 
the left, the river, coming up from the southwest, and with 
mountainous heights along its course from which an enemy 
could be seen afar off. vLee, thinking there would be no 
further action during the season, prepared for winter. He 
sent one corps under Longstreet to Orange Court House, 
twenty miles south of his camp, to encamp, retaining the 
others in his works. 

Meade soon learned this arrangement and resolved to 
take advantage of it. He thought he might flank the Con- 
federate camp by a swift, silent movement, and fall upon the 
two corps and crush them before the third could come up; 
afterwards the third could be crushed. Mine Run, at the 
right of Lee's camp, was the objective of the expedition. 
He calculated that thirty hours would be sufficient to march 
his army to that point, a distance of twenty-five miles by the 
route necessary to be taken. If he could march fifteen 
miles without being perceived, he calculated that he 
could then beat Lee in a race for the position over the 
remaining distance. The preparations were made with the 
greatest secrecy and the expedition started at dark (26th 
Nov.) . It would have succeeded in all probability, had not 
one corps of the army taken a wrong road, and thus delayed 
the march till daylight. Lee's pickets discovered the army 
crossing the river. 

Upon receiving the news, Lee acted with promptness, 
ordered Longstreet up to Mine Run with his corps, and 
himself, with the other two, marched directly towards the 
same line. He there caused rude but effective fortifications 
to be thrown up, planted his batteries so as to sweep every 
approach, and was ready. His position was very strong. 
The west bank of Mine Run, a small tributary of the Rapi- 



MINE RUN. 387 

dan, was high; the east bank was low and marshy. These 
formed a natural moat and ditch, with an embankment, 
which when crowned by artificial works, were almost 
impregnable. Meade succeeded in getting his army across 
the river without trouble, and approached this position from 
the east. But when he noted the Confederate position and 
saw its strength, he gave up all idea of going further. He 
extended his left wing, however, hoping to over-lap the 
Confederate right. Lee caused his right to be likewise 
extended, and as Longstreet presently arrived, he was equal 
to a battle. 

It is said that the Union soldiers, when they were 
brought before these works, and while it was still unde- 
termined whether an assault should be made, pinned pieces 
of paper to their clothing on which were written their 
names and rank, that they might be found when the battle 
should end, so sure were they that only death would be 
gained by assaulting. But Meade did not desire to make 
an unnecessary sacrifice of life; and, by an adroit move- 
ment, he withdrew his army from the swamp, recrossed the 
river and sat down again in camp. As the Federals left 
their pickets in line and camp-fires burning, while they 
withdrew during the night (ist Dec), Lee did not discover 
their absence till too late to pursue. He then moved his 
army back to its camp. 

No other actions of note were thenceforth performed by 
either army till Grant took supreme command of all the 
Federal armies. Little faults of delay caused the failure of 
these campaigns of strategy; but they demonstrated that 
Meade and Lee were equal masters of the art of war, and 
neither could catch the other in a fault. 

The winter passed away, while the Confederate Govern- 




p3i8 



THE REASONS FOR LEe's POPULARITY. 8^0 

menl made every exertion to raise troops to fill up the ranks 
of the army, knowing that a severe campaign would likely be 
upon it the following year. This winter was perhaps the dark- 
est to Lee and his cause of all the winters that the war had 
yet seen. The victories of Grant at the west and Lee's 
failure at Gettysburg shook the Confederate power to its 
foundations. But Lee remained hopeful. He meditated 
how best to retrieve disaster; he waited for events to shape 
themselves. When he saw the great preparations being 
made by the north he nerved himself for the combat. He 
still held the confidence of the Government, of the people 
and of his army. He had won that confidence well. Placed 
in command of an army that was almost defeated, and while 
it was in the face of the enemy, he had driven the enemy 
from its front, had carried the army twice into hostile terri- 
tor}/ further than any before him; and, though suffering 
reverses, he had still preserved a brave front and brought it 
off not without honor; he had won victories with it against 
a superior foe; he had been defeated only by a foe of supe- 
rior numbers. He had checked all the efforts of the 
National troops to seize Richmond, and had won for himself 
the undoubted right to be known as the first Confederate 
General. 

He had committed errors, open, glaring military errors; 
but he had retrieved always by some other action leading to 
success, the honor which he had thereby lost. One can not 
but admire him, as, at the head of an army which his own 
influence had made as firm and hard as one of Virginia's 
mountains, he faced the enemy, greater in numbers, but led 
by inferior men, and dealt him blow after blow, keeping him 
off from the line of the Chickahominy or the Rapidan and 
Rappahannock, despite his most strenuous efforts. 



390 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

Thus have these two, Genii, Leaders, Commanders, at 
the head of armies, been followed to the time when they 
stood face to face and measured arms for a death struggle. 
Iron men, with wills as firm as rock; men of genius, with ex- 
perience to guide their abilities; men of energy, ready ever 
to act; men of courage, never flinching from the bloodiest 
ordeals — such have we seen them, and these are they whom 
the respective belligerents have pitted against each other^ 
and the prize for which they contest is the success of their 
respective causes. 



"SBook jFour. 



THE CONFLICT 




HE Spring of the year, 1864, saw the inception of 
campaigns which caused the downfall of the Confeder- 
acy and the end of the war. For more than three 
years the hostile armies had faced each other with vary- 
ing success, and the end seemed no nearer than at the com- 
mencement. A population of nine millions, occupying an 
area of at least eight hundred thousand square miles, and 
with five hundred thousand soldiers in arms, was not easily 
compelled to return to the dominion of the Union. The 
battle line now reached from the mouth of the Potomac in 
the east, across the states of Virginia and West Virginia, 
along the southern border of Tennessee and across Arkansas 
and Louisana into Texas at the west. 

Two large Federal armies, one at Culpepper Court 
House in Virginia, the other near Chattanooga, Tennessee, 
faced two large Confederate armies. Smaller armies in 
Arkansas, Louisiana, the Shenandoah Valley, and at For- 
tress Monroe, also faced opposing armies of similar strength. 
The Mississippi River, owing to Grant's splendid victories, 
was in possession of the Union along its whole length. The 



S92 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

coast, both along the Atlantic and the Gulf, was blockaded 
quite effectually. Such was the situation of the contending 
powers. The available Federal troops of all kinds 
numbered about six hundred and fifty thousand men, of 
whom about three hundred thousand were on active field 
duty, and the remainder were in camp or garrison duty. 

The Federal military system consisted of nineteen depart- 
ments, and the army of twenty-one corps. These depart- 
ments had heretofore operated almost independently, 
subject to Halleck's and the President's directions, but 
being distinct in organization. Now Grant, by his methods, 
if not b}^ express change, amalgamated them, and assumed 
personal direction of their affairs. But he appointed Sher- 
man to command the troops west of the Alleghaney Moun- 
tains, except Banks' army in Louisiana, now on the fruitless 
expedition up Red River, while Butler remained in com- 
mand on the James. The forces elsewhere were auxiliary 
to these. Thus unity was secured. And in the grand 
scheme which Grant now adopted, of regarding Sherman's 
force as the right wing of the Union grand army, Meade's 
as the centre, and Butler's as the left, still further unity was 
secured. Grant, occupying a central position, with Meade's 
army, by means of the telegraph could direct the move- 
ments of this immense force so that it should and did 
act in concert. 

One, in studying the campaign about to open, must ever 
bear in mind the fact that the Commander in every move- 
ment made by every army, had in view the execution of 
one plan, of which these movements were simply details. 
The grandeur of his task may then be appreciated. For, 
while he personally directed the movements of the centre 
under Meade, even to field details, he also directed the gen- 



GRANT S PLAN. 



393 



erai movements of the right and left, leaving to his subordi- 
nates discretion as to methods of attaining an object, 
because they, being on the ground, could better judge what 
would be best. But his dispatches to Sherman and Butler 
show that he was cognizant of all their movements, and that 
his advice and directions, wherever followed, led to success. 

His general plan of operations, adopted now and pur- 
sued to the end, was simple: Meade, with the centre, to 
assail Lee's army; Butler with the left, to strike at Rich- 
mond; Sherman, with the right, to strike the army before 
him; and all — left, centre and right — to keep the opposing 
forces so employed in their front that they could send no help 
to each other. Thus, as Butler would face westward, Sherman 
to the southeast and Meade to the southwest, by advancing 
they would draw together, and the Confederate armies 
would be driven together, surrounded and crushed. How 
closely this plan was executed; how, in fact, the two chief 
Southern armies were placed between Sherman and Meade 
at the end, history shows. 

In order to make this plan succeed Grant was resolved 
to leave no means untried. His first orders caused the 
return of all able-bodied troops to their places in the ranks. 
He called upon the Government for men and supplies, and 
the Government exerted every energy to place them at his 
disposal. He combined all the smaller bodies of men, all 
the separated and straggling garrisons, and brought them 
into active service with the main armies. The Government 
had resorted to the draft to supply troops, and this law was 
more rigorousl}^ enforced. By the time he was ready for 
campaigning, he had more than three hundred thousand 
men in line whom he could lead against the enemy. 

To oppose this grand combination the Confederate 



394 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Government placed all its power in the field. Every able- 
bodied man was drafted and sent to the front, and their 
places at home, in the field and at the mill, were left to the 
negroes to care for and occupy as far as possible. All 
garrisons and guards, which were not expected to do active 
duty, were sent to the front, and their places given to boys 
and old men, who were drafted for that purpose. As one 
has well said, "They robbed the cradle and the grave to 
furnish troops for their armies." 

Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, was him- 
self a soldier, and did not hesitate to take upon himself, as 
Commander-in-Chief, the general direction of the war. 
But to General Lee he had always given the freedom of 
action, which the General deserved while in command of the 
army. General J. E. Johnston was placed in command of 
the army opposed to Sherman, and Beauregard had com- 
mand of the troops sent to face Butler. The total active 
strength of the armies at Davis' disposal numbered, perhaps, 
two hundred and fifty thousand men. With this power he 
hoped to be able, though his armies had recently been so se- 
verely handled, to hold off the Federals until they should tire 
of the war, or at least until the coming election of President 
and members of Congress, under the National Government 
should take place, when it was hoped the Democratic party, 
which, as a party, was pronouncedly in favor of peace on any 
terms, would come to power. If that election should be 
favorable to the Democrats, Davis was sure that the inde- 
pendence of the Confederate States of America would be 
recognized. The election would occur in November of this 
year (1864.) 

The whole policy of the South, therefore, was one of de- 
fense, a policy that would be more favorable to the exist- 



FACE TO FACE. 395 

tence of the weakened armies, and in case of reverse 
would result in a less degree of disaster. Indeed, the 
great energy of the Union Commander would allow the 
enemy no other course — Grant took the offensive and 
retained it from first to last. Sherman, Meade and Butler 
went forward, and though Butler failed to continue, yet 
the others accomplished their tasks. When Charles of 
France met and defeated the Saracens who were invading 
Europe, he won the nick-name, " The Hammer," — so Grant, 
by his manner of conducting war, won a like sobriquet. 
He believed that the Rebellion could be. put down only 
by hard and continuous blows — blows from which it might 
not have time to recover; and, as soon as he had su- 
preme command of all the armies, he followed this be- 
lief and made it his policy. Lee, not having power enough 
at his disposal to take the offensive, and not having com- 
mand beyond his army, could do nothing else than oppose a 
bold front to the blows aimed at him and ward them off as 
best he was able. 

Having decided that he would go with the Army of the 
Potomac, Grant made his headquarters with it in the field. 
Thus it came about that these two men, both possessed of 
wonderful ability, the greatest generals, by all odds, of their 
respective parties, came face to face, with only the narrow 
Rapidan between them. They were about to grapple in a 
death struggle, and, as gladiators used to do, they carefully 
measured each other's strength before joining battle. The 
one represented the power of a nation resolved that it 
would slay treason and rebuild the Union ; the other, the 
power that defiantly stood out, determined to rend away a 
Dart of the Union, and build up a nation whose corner-stone 
should be human slavery. The people of the country 



396 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

watched them in suspense ; the people of the world looked 
upon them with intense interest. With the success of 
the one, republican institutions would be vindicated and 
proven ; with the success of the other, would fall the idea 
that a people might be free and yet be a nation. 

It may be proper here to describe the personal appear- 
ance of these men before proceeding to relate their actions. 
They differed at this time much in every way. 

Grant was of medium height, strongly built, though not 
heavy out of proportion, and had a slight stoop in his 
shoulders, not noticeable, however, except when he was in 
meditation. He wore a full beard, cut close, and his hair 
was rather long, according to the custom of the day ; both 
hair and beard were brown. His features were marked, but 
not prominent ; his eyes, blue and clear, but not piercing ; 
and the expression of his countenance was one of calm 
thoughtfulness — -that of a judge. His face never betrayed 
his thoughts, and seldom his feelings; his jaw was heavy, 
his mouth had an expression of mingled firmness and 
sweetness, one has said, which at once inspired confidence 
and respect ; his brow was broad and square, and the shape 
of his head indicated a massive brain, an intellect full of 
energy and will power ; his nose was shapely and straight, 
except for a slight raise at the bridge, not to be noticed^ 
unless upon critical examination ; his hands and feet were 
small; his manner was quiet and unobtrusive, rather that 
of a gentleman and scholar than of a soldier ; but, under 
this quiet exterior, there was hidden a power of energy, 
which, in times of peril or in a great emergency, would light 
up his countenance and transform it, as does the lightning 
a heavy cloud. 

To those who were little acquainted with him, he seemed 










V^"^ ^J \ ^- ^;:xv 



« 




.^^ 



f } \ ^ 



p397 



GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT. 



398 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

but an ordinary man ; to those who knew him, he was a 
man of intense power, a man of firmness, hardly ever paral- 
lelled ; one who could never be fathomed or measured. 
Some men are shallow, others are deep, but so transparent 
that one may know them and all their parts, but Grant was 
neither. He impressed those about him with the feeling 
that he would be equal to any emergency that might arise, 
so that they were willing to trust him, while satisfied not to 
question his actions or demand to know what he intended 
to do next. And yet when he spoke, he was never misun- 
derstood. He used the common American style of English, 
or that speech which obtains most amongst the masses, and 
in his orders one may often note expressions which are 
unpolished — even slangy and rough — but which always 
express his meaning better than any formal phraseology 
could. Not that he could not use the English language in 
its purity, for his works speak otherwise, but that the men 
whom he commanded, the soldiers whom he directed, could 
better understand the spirit of his expression from the 
language he chose to use. So that when he directed his 
officers to " pitch into the enemy," they well understood 
that he meant they should attack with spirit ; and when he 
said that he would " fight it out on this line, if it takes all 
Summer," he expressed his determination better than if he 
had said he proposed to continue this plan of procedure, 
if necessary, all Summer. 

His dress was very common, generally that of a civilian, 
and he made no display of sword, stripes or epaullettes. 
Yet he did not affect such negligence in dress — it was rather 
in keeping with his disposition, which was averse to making 
parade. While loving and appreciating the good opinion 
which people entertained of him, he was not made vain 



« 



grant's personal characteristics. 399 

thereby, and he disdained flattery. He treated every man 
as an equal, not preferring the rich and powerful to the 
lowliest and poorest private. And that he was among the 
the first to recognize the manhood in a negro who had been 
a slave, all men of that color should know. 

In his family, he was kind yet firm; in his social rela- 
tions, he was obliging and courteous. In the army, he 
moved among the soldiers without haughtiness and without 
repelling any; but his manner commanded respect, and none 
sought to be too familiar. He inspired his troops with con- 
fidence, rather than with the adoration which troops often 
pay their commanders. In battle, he preserved his calm 
demeanor; but ready orders were on his tongue; the slow- 
ness of speech, which was at times characteristic, then gave 
way to prompt expression. He never gave an order without 
considering well its subject; but his judgment required 
little time to weigh reasons. It seemed that he had learned 
its parts before the battle was joined, and was ready in any 
emergency to give directions. 

His mind was given to studying plans, imagining contin- 
gencies and supplying remedies; and, often, after hearing 
without comment the opinions of his officers upon the situa- 
tion of affairs, he would startle them with an expression 
that would open to them a plan, complete in all its details, 
and capable of being followed, and all suggestions, ques- 
tions and objections, would find a ready answer. Grant 
studied his campaigns in every light and with reference to 
every possibility; and, before they commenced, he knew 
what he should do, in case the enemy did thus and so, or if 
the enemy should do the contrary from what he would rea- 
sonably expect; and his readiness to change the details of 
his plans to suit the occasion, marked his great ability. 




GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE. 



pm 



GRANT NOT A MARTINET. 401 

As to his custom with regard to discipline, he regarded 
efficiency as the test of soldiers. No matter whether the 
troops presented an excellent appearance and were good at 
dress parade, or not, though he liked a careful soldier, if the 
men were brave and obedient, it was all he required. 

It is related, that, one time, as he, according to custom, 
was walking on the borders of his camp, dressed only in a 
privates clothes outwardly, he came upon a sentinel asleep, 
who, though a brave man and a good soldier, had been 
tired out by long marches and lack of rest; and the Com- 
mander, instead of sending him to the guard house, took up 
the soldier's musket and trod the beat till the man awoke. 
Then, making himself known to the terrified sentinel, he 
gave him a few words of warning and left him. But where 
severity was needed, he was capable of applying it, and he 
had at the outset of his career in this war tamed an unruly 
regiment in a very short time. At this time, he was still a 
young man, in the prime of life, being forty-two years old, 
and in posession of all his powers. He had only one habit 
evil to his health, a habit that later it is said led to his 
death, — ^that of smoking cigars, — for which he became 
noted. 

Lee at this time was fifty-seven years old, a man of com- 
manding and graceful address. He was a soldier, not only 
in appearance, but in habit. His hair, once black, was now 
well streaked with gra}^ and his beard, worn full and of 
medium length, was also gray. His eyes were large and 
dark, and rather piercing; his nose was prominent, and of 
the Roman type; his mouth and chin were large and firm. 
The lines of his face indicated thought and care, and his 
features still retained much of the beauty which marked his 
youth. His forehead was rather high and receding, with 
26 



402 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

prominent and shaggy eye-brows. His body was well pro- 
portioned, his hands being always carefully kept in order. 
His clothes were always neat and of the best material, and 
he was seldom without his uniform. He moved and 
appeared a Commander, having unconsciously acquired the 
habit from his military training, aided by his highly strung 
nature. 

He was an aristocratic soldier, if one maybe allowed the 
expression for the purpose of description. His bearing 
towards private soldiers was reserved but gracious, none 
daring to be familiar with him. To his officers, he was 
generally kind and genial, but at times silent and moody. 
His temper was naturally violent and excitable, but he held 
it under by his iron will, and seldom allowed it to be 
exhibited. 

In battle he was full of life and energy, but generally 
self possessed and calm. But on occasion, if an emergency 
existed, he sometimes threw away caution and self-posses- 
sion and exposed himself to danger without stopping to 
think of the consequences of his death, should he be killed. 
He preserved strict discipline among his troops, but was not 
severe in his regulations. He left all details of camp and 
march to his subordinates, being averse to bothering with 
them and to examining reports, and allowing matters only 
of a general nature to be brought before him. His orders 
were always expressed with clearness and precision, and 
were generally couched in military language. His plans 
were well laid and generally well executed. 

Lee possessed in his division and corps commanders — 
Jackson, Longstreet, the Hills, Ewell and Stuart — officers 
good both in council and in the field. He was more fortu- 
nate than many other army Commanders in this war. But 



lee's personal magnetism. 403 

he owed to good judgment, perhaps, that he possessed such 
officers, Jackson and Longstreet especially were excellent 
soldiers, and themselves capable of leading an army. To 
their opinion he deferred much. 

He always went for discussion to his council of officers, 
and though his clear judgment chose from the mass of argu- 
ment and advice what was best, he owed much to them. 
With them he was as a fellow commander, anxious to do the 
best and willing to accept suggestion and even to overturn 
his own plan for one that might be shown to be better. He 
was unlike Grant in this; for Grant formed his own plans, and, 
though he would listen to any suggestions and to discussion, 
he never allowed the plans of any one else under him to 
take the place of his own, confident always that his plan 
was the best, and believing firmly that he could accomplish 
best in his own way any assumed task. 

Lee studied his campaigns by light of precedent and in 
the council of his officers ; Grant, while giving attention to 
all aides and advisers, revolved his plans in his own mind, 
formed them, and, if it suited his purpose, then announced 
them. But, while Grant inspired only confidence in those 
who knew him little, Lee, by his personal magnetism and 
bearing, inspired enthusiasm ; and while the Federal 
soldiers under Grant came to believe that he would carry 
them through to victor}^ Lee's troops rushed to battle, 
under his eyes, with the valor of men who would die, not 
only for the cause they represented, but for the man who 
led them. 

Usually, the General was very careful not to cause his 
men to enter into unnecessary danger, but, when in 
desperate straits, as at the last charge at Gettysburg, he 
broke out of this care, and hurled them upon death with the 



404 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

fiercest energy. But in his defensive campaigns, he saved 
them all unnecessary exposure. Possessing the confidence 
of his troops and of the people of the seceding states, it 
would have been wise, perhaps, to have given him supreme 
command of all the armies, so that, like Grant, he might 
have formed a combination to oppose the Federal Com- 
mander. His task in the campaign was simpler, being only 
to defeat the efforts of the Army of the Potomac to crush 
his army and to enter Richmond, while the Confederate 
Government strained every nerve to support him. Such 
were the men about to grapple in a death struggle. 

Soon after receiving his commission as Lieutenant- 
General (gth March, 1864), together with the solemn 
injunction from President Lincoln to hold his dangerous 
and powerful trust worthily, Grant visited Meade at Cul- 
pepper, Sherman in Tennessee, and Butler at Fortress 
Monroe, and having learned from each the situation of the 
forces under his command, and having talked over with 
them his general purpose, he returned to the Army of the 
Potomac, and began to place it in shape for immediate 
service. 

The camp was eighty miles from Washington, but was 
connected by telegraph with that city, and messages were 
constantly passing over the wires. He had resolved that 
for one campaign, at least, the great Army of the Potomac, 
which was an independent command, and not under a 
departmental regulation, should be permitted to go forward 
without being hampered, and its efforts made of no effect 
by the political parties at the Capital. This was one of the 
reasons that influenced him to take personal direction of 
its movements. He bent every energy towards filling its 
regiments with recruits, bringing forward trains and sup- 



I 



grant's preparations. 405 

plies, and generally placing it in good condition for the 
heavy work before it. Clothes, ammunition, provisions, 
and all other army necessaries, were brought forward in 
abundance. 

The raw recruits which came to him were distributed 
through the army, that their weakness might be turned 
to strength, and the rules and regulations of war were 
rapidly taught them. He also gave attention to the 
western army's needs, and directed that all western recruits 
be sent to Sherman. Sherman soon had nearly one 
hundred thousand men in line. Butler also was strength- 
ened, until he had forty thousand men with which to move. 
Meade had, counting Burnside's corps, which was not now 
under his orders (ist May), about one hundred and seven- 
teen thousand, divided in arms as follows : Infantry, 94,000; 
cavalry, 14,000 ; artillery, 9,000. Besides these, there came 
up to guard the trains three thousand colored troops. To 
make this great body of men efficient for service, no pains 
or care were spared. All the scientific appliances of prac- 
tical use in warfare were used. 

The line of battle occupied by so many men would be 
long, and in order that it could act promptly, Grant caused 
a telegraph system to be arranged, so that his headquarters 
would be connected in camp or in battle with the headquar- 
ters of each corps. He could thus learn with rapidity and 
certainty every proposed movement and the progress of 
every divison. The usefulness of this system was great but 
its service was not perfect. 

The army consisted of four corps, three of which were 
under Meade's direction, and were commanded by Hancock, 
Warren and Sedgwick; Burnside's corps operated for a time 
independently, but under the orders of Grant as an adjunct 



406 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

to the army. Sheridan commanded the cavalry, a young 
officer who had shov^n much ability in western fields, and in 
whom Grant perceived the qualities of a great leader. The 
artillery consisted of three hundred guns and was under the 
command of General Hunt. The train, consisting of four 
thousand wagons and carriages, was divided, in proportion, 
among the various brigades. 

To oppose this array, Lee had seventy-five thousand 
men, divided as follows in arms: Infantry. 60,000; cavalry, 
10,000; artillery, 5,000. Both armies, of course, had recruits 
and reinforcements constantly coming in from their respec- 
tive Governments, but the above figures represent closely the 
power of each army at the inception of the campaign. Long- 
street, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, commanded the three corps of 
infantry, into which Lee's army was still divided, and Stuart 
the cavalry. Lee's train was proportionately large and his 
cannon numbered more than two hundred. He had not the 
appliances which his opponent made use of, but as his army 
was not so large and unwieldly, the lack of them did not 
injure him. With this army, while he did not feel able to 
cross the Rapidan and assail the enemy, he felt confident he 
could stop an advance of that enemy towards his Capital. 

As before stated. Grant's plan of campaign contemplated 
the simultaneous movement of the three grand divisions of 
the army, commanded by Sherman, Meade and Butler, 
towards the centre of the Confederacy, the one to strike the 
army under Johnston, the second to strike that under Lee, 
and the third to operate up the James River towards Rich- 
mond. As adjuncts to these. Banks, now in Louisiana, was 
directed as soon as he should return from the fruitless Red 
River expedition, to collect an army and proceed against 
Mobile; and Sigel, in the Shenandoah, was directed to work 



TWO PLANS PRESENT THEMSELVES. 407 

southward and endeavor to take Lynchburg and the rail- 
roads in the rear of Richmond. Banks was afterwards 
superseded, and the expedition against Mobile was delayed. 

The more immediate object of the army of the Potomac 
under Meade was the destruction of Lee; the secondary 
object the capture of Richmond. How to accomplish these 
was Grant's study. The destruction of the Lee's army 
would naturally lead to the fall of Richmond; the capture 
of Richmond would so demoralize the Confederacy that it 
would probably lead to the destruction of the army or its 
surrender. Two plans of procedure naturally presented 
themselves to Grant's mind, since it would be unadvisable 
to cross the Rapidan and assail Lee in his camp directly. 
The movement might be made by the right flank; but this 
would necessitate the maintenance of a long supply line, 
subject constantly to interruption by guerrillas and requiring 
an army to guard it. The other was the movement by the 
left flank, the only practicable plan. For, as the sea was 
already in possession of the Union, and as the line of march 
would lead southward and seldom depart more than fifty 
miles from the coast, provisions could be carried in vessels 
to points nearest the army, the base changing as the army 
should advance, and few men would be required for guards; 
also, if, as the alternative plan required, it should be 
found impossible to destroy Lee above Richmond, the army 
could be by this route most easily transferred to the jl^es 
River, and could then operate up that river towards Rich- 
mond, having the James as a supply line, guarded by Fed- 
eral boats. 

The plan of proceeding up the James was, for a time, 
seriously considered by the Commander as the only course; 
but as his object was primarily to fight and destroy Lee's 




408 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

army, and as Lee might abandon Richmond to its fate and 
march upon Washington, this plan was adopted only as an 
alternative, not to be used until the enemy would be too far 
south to attempt the destruction of the Capital. 

Grant's main idea, so expressed, was to fight the Confeder- 
ate army wherever found, if at all practicable. He depended 
upon Butler, in a great measure, to seize the important rail- 
road centre of Petersburg; and he believed that, when once 
his army should be planted in that town, Richmond would 
fall. His opinion was correct, as after-events proved. Yet 
he did not depend too much upon his ability to destroy the 
southern army above Richmond. He well knew Lee's ability 
and the furious valor of his army, and that on their own 
soil, where every route was known and every strong point 
was noted, they would make a great campaign; and he con- 
sidered it very probable that the James River would be the 
final line of march. Hence he was prepared at the favor- 
able time to adopt it. The route, therefore, which he 
chose, was that by the left flank. 

The topography of the country through which the line 
of march led was varied.. The nature of the Wilderness, 
into which he designed to plunge, has already been de- 
scribed. Its low, marshy surface, its thick matted covering 
of trees, shrubs and vines; its damp, shaded thickets, its 
narrow roads, made it a dif^cult place in which to handle a 
large army; but it gave the counter-advantage of conceal- 
ment. Southward the route led through a hilly, broken 
country, cut up by small rivers and creeks, and covered with 
sylvania was passed. Thence, till the Anna rivers were 
reached, the roads led through a beautiful upland countr}-, 
where the cultivated surface exceeded the unbroken. From 



THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN. 409 

these rivers to the Chickahominy. the country alternated 
between rough surface, and swampy, wide-stretching bot- 
toms, the latter being the general rule. Down the 
Chickahominy and to the James, swamp lands, and low- 
lying hills were interspersed. So that there was much fault 
to be found with the route, because the land was better for 
defensive than offensive operations. But these difficulties 
were not insurmountable, and the reasons for adopting the 
course were greater than those for rejecting it. 

The Commander set the day for the beginning of the 
campaign, and directed that all the corps of the Grand 
Army, Sherman at Chattanooga, Butler on the James, Sigel 
in the Valley, and Meade at the Rapidan, should move 
simultaneously (night, 3d- 4th May, A. D. 1864). He did 
not make known his plans to any one definitely until a very 
few days before the advance begun, and then only to his 
chief officers. When he indicated to Lincoln that opera- 
tions were about to begin, the President addressed him a 
letter, expressing his entire satisfaction with the arrange- 
ments which had been made, and what had been done, and 
that though he did not know his plans or purposes, not wish- 
ing to know them, until he should see fit to divulge them, he 
had perfect confidence in him, concluding with the devout 
prayer, "May God sustain you." 

Grant, much affected by the great President's trust in 
him, replied, expressing his extreme satisfaction for the 
trust shown, and stating that the administration had done 
all in its power to aid him; and that if he should fail by 
fortune of war, to accomplish all that he hoped to, it would 
be his own fault, and that he assumed all responsibility. 
So they mutually encouraged each other, the first time, per- 
haps, during the war, that Lincoln had become satisfied 



410 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

he had at last found the right man for the right place, and a 
great contrast to the suspicious and complaining manner in 
which the first great commander of the armies of the nation, 
McClellan, had started out upon his operations from the 
Potomac. 

The chief Lieutenants of the Army of the Potomac, and 
its commander, Meade, were now called together by Grant, 
and made acquainted with his designs. The orders were 
prepared for the march and issued, and the great conflict 
between Grant and Lee began. For, it is the purpose of 
this work only to follow closely the movements of these 
two, henceforth, as they affected each other, and to glance 
in a general way only at the grand strategy of the Federal 
Commander, which moved simultaneously three great 
armies against the Confederacy. Grant had a higher com- 
mand than Lee, in rank, and higher duties to perform; but 
for the purposes of this study, it is only necessay to recog- 
nize that fact, while following the operations more particu- 
larly of the armies which they command in the field in 
person. Lee's task was only to resist the army marching 
upon Richmond. 

Midnight (3d-4th Mayj, came, and with it the move- 
ment of the Grand Army began. The central army under 
Meade marched swiftly to the Rapidan, Warren's and 
Sedgwick's corps, preceded by cavalry, reaching it at Ger- 
mania Ford, and Hancock's corps at Ely's Ford, the first 
about ten miles east, or below the extreme Confederate 
right and the other six miles further down stream. Burn- 
side's corps was left at Warrenton to watch Lee and pre- 
vent him making a counter attack on the Federal rear, if 
the army should be delayed in crossing the river. The 
cavalry quickly crossed the river and either captured or 




B*»««^' 



\ ^%. 



\ 



The entire region shown in this map was densely wooded and covered with a thick undergrowth, 
but for purpose of making the map rnore clear the forests hay^ not been indicated, 

p4U 



412 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

drove off the enemy's pickets stationed there. Pontoons 
were immediately placed and over them, and at both fords, 
the long lines of troops marched swiftly across and disap- 
peared along the roads leading southward. 

It will be remembered that two roads come up from the 
southwest running almost parallel through the Wilderness 
until they come to and intersect the Brock and Germania 
Ford Roads, after which they unite. The Ely Ford Road 
connects with the Turnpike about one mile east of this 
intersection. The Turnpike Road is the more northern of 
the two, lying near the river; the Plank Road, the southern. 
The two roads form a junction at Wilderness Church, 
about one mile east of their intersection with the Brock 
Road, or as it is sometimes known, the Culpepper Road. A 
second road from Ely's Ford reaches Chancellorsville, and 
from this vicinity several roads lead southward and south- 
westward. One of these, leading southwestward passes 
Catharpin Furnace and strikes the Brock Road between two 
and three miles south of the intersection of the Brock with 
the Plank Road, where it turns still further south and runs 
toward Shady Grove Church. 

Grant suspected that Lee, if he should discover the army 
crossing the river, as he must sooner or later, would immedi- 
ately occupy the position of Mine Run, or would plunge 
into the Wilderness to attack him; and, hence, he hurried 
Warren southward with instructions to push out along the 
Turnpike Road and across by a wood road to the Plank 
Road and to fortify a defensive line. 

At about noon, the enemy's signals having been read, it 
was ascertained that Lee had become aware of the Federal 
movement, and was setting his army in motion. The cross- 
ing having been assured, orders were dispatched to 



POSITION OF THE UNION ARMY. 



413 



Burnside to come up with all speed. He came at once, 
marching forty miles during the evening and night, and 
crossing the river the next morning. The trains had been 
dispatched by a road still east of Hancock's line of march, 
covered and guarded by cavalry. Wilson's division of 
cavalry was pushed southward, along the Brock Road, to 
guard against surprise in that direction. When night came, 
the Union army was posted thus : Warren, facing west on 




CROSSING THE RAPIDAN. 



the Turnpike Road, with his left extending out towards the 
Plank Road, and his right connecting with Sedgwick along 
the Germania Ford Road. Sedgwick lay along the Ger- 
mania Ford Road, with his right guarding the ford, that 
Burnside might find the crossing clear. Hancock camped 
near Chancellorsville, on the old battle-ground where 
Hooker had suffered defeat. Burnside was hurrying with 
all speed to the field. Sheridan's cavalry was guarding the 



414 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

train, and pushing out to the southwest along the Catharpin 
Road. 

The crossing had been safely made and Lee's position 
flanked. Grant remained near Germania Ford in order to 
communicate with Burnside at the first possible moment, 
that officer being senior in rank to Meade, and hence not 
under his command, as no special order had yet been made 
consolidating his corps with the Army of the Potomac. 
Grant issued his orders during the night for the next day. 
He did not believe that Lee would attack him, but was pre- 
pared. He directed Warren to advance to the southwest 
by the left flank, pushing out on the Turnpike Road, and 
crossing to the Plank Road through the woods. Sedgwick 
was directed, also, to move to the left and join Warren's 
right, taking the course of the Turnpike Road as soon as 
Warren should leave it. Hancock was directed to turn 
westward and follow the Catharpin and other roads, making 
connection with Warren's left as soon as possible. This 
would make room for Burnside, when he should arrive, at 
Sedgwick's right and rear ; but the Commander designed 
using Burnside's corps as a reserve corps, to be used where 
emergency should demand. Emergency very shortly com- 
pelled this corps to go to the centre of the field. 

These orders contemplated a delay on Lee's part of 
several hours, as Grant knew Longstreet's corps was several 
miles further south than the other corps, and would, 
doubtless, cause delay to Lee's movements. But he was 
deceived this time as to the Confederate General's 
prudence, for, at that very moment, Lee, with two corps of 
his army, was plunging into the Wilderness to attack him, 
having thrown prudence to the winds, and hoping to sur- 
prise the Union army entangled in the woods. 



) LEE DECIDES TO ATTACK. 415 

1 

Lee became aware of the Federal movement about noon 
(4th) of the day of the crossing of the river, and at once 
acted promptly. He was not surprised. He had expected 
some movement on the part of Grant, but not so soon. 
Hence, he had not called Longstreet up from his winter 
quarters, and now found himself outflanked and his army 
separated. But he had concentrated against Meade once 
before in the Wilderness, and did not hesitate now. He 
resolved, however, not to stop at Mine Run as before, but 
to strike suddenly at the enemy in the depths of the Wilder- 
ness before he could get his army in shape for battle. 

He had not been able to determine what course Grant 
would take, whether by right or left flank, and in that 
respect was unprepared. He now dispatched instant orders 
to Longstreet to move up along the Plank Road from his 
quarters, and marched with the other corps, except one 
division which he left to guard his camp, towards Mine 
Run. Longstreet was at Gordonsville twenty miles away. 
Lee did not wait for him, but plunged boldly into the Wil- 
derness. He had almost fifty thousand determined men, 
and the Wilderness would neutralize the power of the half 
of Grant's army. He might be able to strike the enemy 
along the two roads, the Turnpike and the Plank Road, with 
such power as to break their line of march and carry disas- 
ter to right and left. Night found him in the Wilderness 
about three miles from the enemy's advance corps, feeling 
his way slowly along the roads, with Ewell on the Turnpike 
and Hill crossing through the wood-roads to get upon the 
Plank Road. 

It is said that Lee was so confident during the night that 
he would surprise the Federals, that he told his lieutenants 
to prepare for another Hooker campaign, since the Union 



416 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

General had repeated Hooker's error. But he had not yet 
learned that a very different General commanded the Fed- 
eral army. He sent out one division of Ewell's corps to 
feel for the enemy at early morning, and busily arranged 
the other divisions with him to support or to reinforce as 
occasion should demand. 

Thus it came about in the morning ( 5th ) that Warren 
and Ewell were advancing slowly and suspiciously towards 
each other on the Turnpike Road, and that they shortly 
met about a mile beyond the Union camp of the night 
before. Both parties at once began skirmishing and 
deployed to right and left preparatory to battle. Both sent 
word to their respective commanders that the enemy was 
found, and both ordered the attack to begin. Immediately 
Warren's troops moved to the attack and pressed forward 
so vigorously that the Confederate division was compelled 
to retire. Thus, instead of assailing a confused army strug- 
gling through the depths of the forest, Lee found himself 
assailed and his front division being driven back. He at 
once ordered the remainder of Ewell's corps to support the 
advance division, and directed Hill to form at Ewell's right 
and connect with him, covering the Plank Road at the same 
time. Also he sent one division of Ewell's to form on the 
left of the advance division. 

Grant not knowing as yet the Confederate army was in 
force, but leaning to Meade's opinion that it was a division 
sent to cover Lee's retreat, nevertheless sent word to 
Hancock to hasten to the Brock Road and to make con- 
nection 'with Warren as soon as possible on his right, and 
taking two divisions of Sedgwick's corps, he sent one under 
Getty to Warren's left to occupy and hold the Plank Road 
at its intersection with the Brock Road, until Hancock 



THE WILDERNESS. 417 

should come, and the other to support Warren s right. He 
also ordered Sedgwick to advance at Warren's right through 
the woods as rapidly as possible. 

He saw the immense importance of holding the intersec- 
tion of the Brock Road and the Plank Road, because from 
it, if once in his possession, Lee might move directly upon 
Chancellorsville, and to left and right, cutting across the 
line of march and seizing the key to the field. He, there- 
fore, a little later, again sent orders to Hancock to hurry 
forward with all the force he could to the crossing, where 
Getty had been sent. 

Meanwhile, the Federal line, under Warren, had steadily 
driven back the advance Confederate division, passing over 
nearly a mile of ground. But here the right flank being 
exposed, since Sedgwick, owing to the density of the woods, 
had not been able to make connections with it, the division 
which Lee had sent to Ewell's left took the line in flank, 
and drove it back in some confusion. Then Ewell, being 
reinforced, pressed after Warren, and regained much of the 
ground he had lost. Meanwhile, also. Hill had formed on 
the Plank Road, and was now slowly advancing. Ewell, 
after Warren retired, did not pursue far, but directed his 
troops to fortify. 

Foiled in his attempt to surprise the Union army, Lee 
saw no other course of safety — except retreat, and that he 
would not — than to fortify a camp, that he might retire to 
in case of reverse, or of sudden attack by the overwhelming 
forces of the enemy. All these operations, which upon open 
ground would not have occupied more than a couple of 
hours, consumed many hours in these woods, and no heavy 
fighting occurred till late in the afternoon, though Getty's 
division had a sharp skirmish with the Confederate advance 
27 



418 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

on the Plank Road, which had been sent out by Hill to feel 
for the enemy. Lee was satisfied that Grant was prepared 
at all points, and now halted for the purpose of intrenching. 
Nor were the Federals idle. The spade and axe were used 
with rapidity. Long, crooked lines of rude works rose 
through the dim forest with magic swiftness. 

These works were peculiar to American warfare. First, 
a ditch was dug three or four feet deep, the earth excavated 
being heaped out towards the enemy, thus increasing the 
height of the shelter; then, upon the heaped-up earth, rails, 
logs, or any other material at hand, were placed, and loop- 
holes fixed between. And, if a forest stood around, the 
trees, in a space several rods wide, were cut down, with the 
tops felled towards the enemy, and the branches sharpened. 
Thus a rude abattis, an escarpment, and a ditch were 
formed, so rude and simple as not to need the superin- 
tendence of an engineer in their building, but withal, so 
strong that a small force behind them could resist, with 
ease, double its number of enemies. 

Grant moved his headquarters to the intersection of the 
Turnpike and Brock Roads, near Wilderness Tavern, early 
in the day, and placed them on the crest of a knoll, the only 
eminence in the Wilderness, from which he could see the 
surrounding country, and perceive, in part, by the rising 
smoke, the position of the contending forces. Burnside's 
corps was now crossing the river. Grant was anxious to 
take the initiative, believing that now was the time to 
strike, and that he who should strike first would win the 
battle ; for he was not able to see how Lee could bring 
up Longstreet in so short a time, and believed that a sudden 
attack, followed up, would disconcert, and, perhaps, drive 
him from the field. 



4 




p419 



420 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

He therefore ordered Hancock to move up his first 
division, which, at two o'clock, had appeared on the field, 
and advance. But Hancock spent much time in arranging 
his men and in bringing up his other divisions. Grant 
became impatient, and repeated his orders, and Meade 
directed Getty to move whether Hancock did or not ; for 
both Grant and Meade feared that Lee would endeavor, by 
pushing forward on the Plank Road, to come in upon 
Warren's left, which lay in the woods north of the road, 
separated by its advance from Getty's right. But Lee had 
not discovered this hiatus, and was in no condition to take 
advantage of it had he done so. The density of the woods 
hindered him much also, although he was perfectly familiar 
with every path and road through them, and was utilizing 
his knowledge as best he could. Burnside was directed to 
move with all possible speed along the Brock Road, in rear 
of Sedgwick and Warren, and place his corps between the 
latter and Getty, thus closing the break and strengthening 
the most critical point in the field. Hancock formed his 
divisions south of the Plank Road, when he should have 
formed on the road and north of it. 

In order to create a diversion to the attack by his left. 
Grant ordered Warren and Sedgwick forward again, and a 
sharp battle occurred along their front. At last Getty 
moved, and Hancock sent two divisions with him to the 
assault. The enemy was found within three hundred yards 
of the Federal lines, having by the delay been permitted to 
work up so close. The bulk of Hill's corps was concentrated 
here; for already Lee was noting this point as the key point 
to the field, and was laying plans to capture it. 

The battle began with a sudden roar and roll of mus- 
ketry, few cannon being used. The destruction of life was 



I 



STUBBOKN FIGHTING. 421 

terrible. The Confederates stood their ground, concealed 
in part behind the thickets, and the fight went on amidst 
the gloom of evening, which made the twilight of the woods 
almost darkness. Getty was wounded, and his men could 
make no headway. Grant listened for an hour to the 
terrible roll of the musketry, which seemed never to cease, 
and noting that it was stationary, and that Hancock did 
not seem to be making progress, he dispatched a divi- 
sion and a brigade, imder Wadsworth, and ordered them 
to the support of his right. But owing to the gathering 
darkness, these reinforcements had much difificulty in find- 
ing their way and did not arrive in time to be of service to 
Hancock. 

Lee also anxiously listened to the sullen sound of battle 
which filled all the bottom lands with its noise, and he sent 
all his reserves to Hill's aid. Hancock brought up all his 
divisions and, as fast as they appeared on the field, placed 
them in battle line. But, owing to the lateness of the hour, 
when he had succeeded in getting them well in hand, he fore- 
bore to order a general advance. The battle continued, 
however, till darkness stopped it. Neither side could claim 
the advantage. Both had suffered terrible punishment. The 
battle in the Wilderness, had it been fought on an open 
field, with such terrible loss of life, would soon have been 
decided. For the sight of so many stricken down has the 
effect of inspiring terror in troops and General; but here 
the soldiers could not see how their friends were faring ten 
rods away, and hence had not the terror of death to combat 
so much. 

Meanwhile, another battle had taken place further south: 
Wilson's cavalry had proceeded as far as Todd's Tavern, in 
its southwestward scouting, and there found itself face to 



422 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

face with a superior Confederate force under Rosser, which 
at once assailed it, and was giving it a rough handling when 
Sheridan arrived with a larger force, and put the Confed- 
erates to flight, chasing them two miles or more westward. 
There he concentrated his cavalry, and effectually prevented 
the enemy's cavalry from annoying the Federal left, or 
attacking the trains. So ended the day's battle, and nothing 
decisive had been accomplished. 

Lee had plunged into the forest with the avowed inten- 
tion of taking the initiative and surprising the Union army ; 
but he found his designs foiled and himself attacked. 
Then he had attempted to seize the key-point to the field, 
the intersection of the Brock and Plank Roads, and in this 
found himself likewise foiled. He now sent couriers to 
hurry Longstreet to the field. The advantage of the day, 
therefore, lay with Grant, who had not only foiled Lee's 
attempt to surprise him by bold offensive movements, but 
had, in the face of the enemy, concentrated his army, placed 
it in battle line, seized the vantage points, and made himself 
ready to sustain all the power that Lee could bring against 
him. The forces engaged during the day in battle were 
about equal, so that neither could boast having repelled a 
greater foe. 

Grant, during the day, had been intensely active. The 
crossing of Burnside, the movements of the divisions of 
Sedgwick and Warren, and the concentration of the corps 
of Hancock, and the divisions sent to the intersection of the 
Brock Road with the Plank Road had been difficult. Twice 
he rode down to the front of Sedgwick and Warren, and 
noted the lay of the ground. Lee also had been active, 
remaining at the rear of Hill's corps, where he expected 
Longstreet to come, and watching with much anxiety the 



I 



PLANS FOR THE SECOND DAY. 423 

gathering of the Federal forces in this part of the field. 
When night came the tired Commanders lay down with 
their aides on the ground under trees and slept; but not 
before they had issued orders for the operations on the 
morrow. 

Grant was now convinced that the bulk of the Southern 
army was before him, but did not believe that Longstreet 
had yet come up, a belief in which he was confirmed by 
information obtained during the evening. To take ad- 
vantage of the absence of that strong corps, he directed 
that Hancock, having massed his corps along the Plank 
Road, should attack at daybreak with all his power. He 
further knew that there had been a hiatus between Hill's 
corps and Ewell's, similar to that which had existed be- 
tween Hancock, or rather Getty, and Warren, but which was 
now closed by Wadsworth's division and part of Burnside's 
corps. Grant directed Wadsworth, whose troops lay 
almost perpendicularly across the general battle line, to 
push out like a wedge between Hill and Ewell, turn 
to the left and take Hill's troops in rear, which, thus 
assailed in front by Hancock and in rear by Wadsworth, 
could not fail of destruction. Burnside was directed to 
move promptly and support this movement. 

The Federal battle line was now five miles long, and 
occupying what might be well denominated, a glade 
through the thick forest. So thick was the undergrowth 
were Wadsworth lay that he was compelled to use a com- 
pass to ascertain in what direction he was moving. The 
difficulty thus met in moving, partially defeated the plan, 
which, simplified, was as follows: To assail Hill's corps 
with the masses of Hancock; to penetrate the Confederate 
centre with Wadsworth's division and Burnside's corps, then 



424 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

to turn the latter southward and crush Hill; meanwhile 
Warren and Sedgwick to attack Ewell. 

Lee, during the night, by the aid of competent guides, 
succeeded in making a connection of Ewell's right with 
Hill's left. He believed that the Federals would endeavor 
to hold the Brock and Plank Roads crossing with all their 
power, but he was resolved to win that point if possible. 
Therefore he gave Hill all the troops that could possibly be 
spared by Ewell, with instructions to hold the Plank Road 
until Longstreet, who was yet several miles from the field, 
should come, and as soon as he should be joined by Long- 
street, to assault Hancock's position. As a diversion, and 
to save Hill from attack by the bulk of the Union army, he 
ordered Ewell to move at the earliest dawn against 
Warren. 

Thus both Generals sought to take the initiative, both 
with the left wing of their respective armies. Grant's orders 
were, that the assault by Hancock should be begun at half 
past four o'clock in the morning (6th) ; but Hancock stated 
that it would be impossible to get ready, and the order was 
changed to half an hour later. Hence Ewell succeeded in 
drawing the enemy's fire a few minutes earlier than Han- 
cock, but his attack did not materially affect the Federal 
movement, and he was easily held off from the works of 
Warren and Sedgwick. 

Hancock at last put his forces in motion; but a report 
that Longstreet was coming up on the Catharpin Road and 
would presently strike the Brock Road and his extreme left, 
caused him to delay until he could send a battery and a 
brigade out on that road to hold Longstreet in check if he 
should come. To meet such contingency also, he left a 
force in his breastworks. A little later the sound of heavy 



HILL FORCED BACK. 425 

Strong and continuous firing towards Todd's Tavern seemed 
to confirm his fears; but this was only the sound of a despe- 
rate cavalry battle between Sheridan and Stuart. Neverthe- 
less, it took away much of the force of Hancock's assault. 
The assault was delivered, however, with great power. 

Getty, Birne}^ and Mott, supported on their right by 
Wadsworth, moved out of their intrenchments and swept 
forward at a steady pace. It was not many moments until 
they met Hill's lines, and a desperate, bloody struggle of an 
hour's duration took place, in which the men of both armies 
stood face to face uncovered except by forest trees, and 
delivered and received fire. Wadsworth was not able to 
pierce between Hill and Ewell because Lee had filled the 
gap between during the night. Burnside was not able to 
advance in time to strengthen Wadsworth so that he might 
break through. But the weight of the Union lines could 
not be long sustained by Hill's decimated ranks, and they 
fell slowly back. The Federals advanced, cheering, and 
pressed them hard. Then the retreat became almost a rout. 
Hill's troops became disorganized. The thickets did not 
permit them to fall back in order, nor permit the one part 
to see the position of the other and thus regulate the con- 
dition of the lines. Hancock's men also lost their organiza- 
tion, but pressed forward for more than a mile, sending 
deadly blasts of bullets into the thickets and brush, and 
among the retiring enemy. Hancock and his division com- 
manders strove hard to preserve at least the formation of 
the line of attack, but this was difficult to do. 

So the tide rolled against Lee, who almost in despair saw 
his brave troops coming back to their fortified lines in 
scattered masses, but turning at intervals to send showers 
of bullets upon the victors. Hancock, still alarmed by the 



426 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

noise of battle far to the southward, began to fear that he 
might get so far from his base and his left wing so much in 
air, that Longstreet, coming up from that direction would 
be able to take him in flank and rear. He caused the 
advance of his men to become slower, and endeavored to 
refuse his left so that it should face southward. 

But Longstreet was not coming in that direction. He 
too heard the approach of the sound of battle as it rolled 
westward along the Plank Road, and panting steeds bore 
couriers to him ordering him to move at double-quick. For 
now Hill's men had come back so far that they were 
pouring over the line of works which Lee had caused to be 
erected on the first day, and the Federal bullets were pat- 
tering around the headquarters of the General. Longstreet 
gave the required directions and his tired soldiers came 
over the last half mile at a run. It was well they did so. 
They filed into the breastworks just in time to stay the mad 
rush of the fugitives. Their muskets now spoke, and so 
deadly was their fire that the triumphant Federals paused 
to form. Lee and his officers worked with feverish zeal to 
re-form Hill's shattered divisions, and the men of that corps, 
now under the protection of Longstreet's veterans, regained 
spirit, re-formed as they might and soon presented again a 
brave front to the enemy. 

Here came the crisis of the day. Had the Federals, who 
won this success, continued their assault, they could have 
taken the breastworks before many of Longstreet's men could 
have come, and, having them in possession, could have held 
them against all assaults. But Hancock thought it better to 
re-form before continuing the movement. Grant saw the 
emergency and directed the assault to be constantly pushed, 
and to support it, again and again ordered Gibbon, who 



II 



LEE HEADS A CHARGE. 427 

commanded the division at Hancock's extreme left, and who 
had been left to guard against the approach of Longstreet 
from the south, and Burnside, who had been unable to find 
his place, but was groping blindly forward, to move up to 
the support of the assaulting divisions. He inwardly chafed 
at the delay, believing, truly, that victory would be won or 
lost within the next hour. 

In half an hour Longstreet's men had been placed in the 
front rank of the battle line, and Hill's men re-formed irreg- 
ularly behind, making an exceedingly strong line. Lee was 
delighted. He was determined to win back the ground he 
had lost at all hazards. In his excitement and fury, he 
placed himself at the head of a Texan Brigade, gave the 
order to advance and was about to plunge into the hail of 
bullets that awaited them. An officer seized the head of his 
charger and begged him to retire to the rear, and a universal 
shout went up from the troops, declaring they would not 
advance unless he should retire. He recovered his pru- 
dence, and went to the rear, but he followed closely as the 
troops went forward and personally, with Longstreet, direc- 
ted the battle. The advance was made with great fury and 
power. Hancock soon became convinced that he had made 
a mistake, and knew now that Longstreet had arrived and 
was before him. But he gave a stout fight. He had half of 
the Union army at his command and used it with great 
judgment as it came in hand. But two-thirds of Lee's army, 
mad because of defeat, were pressing him, and though with 
reluctance, he was compelled to retire. Reinforcements now 
arrived from his rear divisions, and he was able to bear 
up against the masses in his front and for an hour held his 
men to the deadly work. 

The conflict, fought wholly with muskets, has never been 



428 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 



surpassed in intensity and slaughter, anb seldom equalled. 
Had Burnside been able to add the power of his fine 
divisions to that of Hancock's staggering corps, victory 
Mrould still have declared for the Union. But he was not 
able to come up in time. Again the Federals were com- 
pelled to retire; but they did so slowly, fighting at every 
step. Wadsworth and many other fine officers were slain. 




SCENE FO WADSWORTH'S DEATH — THE WILDERNESS. 

At this time also the Confederates lost their leader. Long- 
street was desperately wounded and taken from the field. 

Lee assumed personal command of the right wing and 
during the rest of the day directed all its movements. See- 
ing that the Federals were retiring and that his men had 
again lost organization because of the terrible fighting and 
the nature of the woods, he called a halt to re-form, making 
precisely the same mistake that Hancock had made, stop- 
ping in the moment of victory, when he might have pushed 



lee's last advance. 429 

over the Federal works by the very impetus of his advance. 
There came a lull in the battle. It was nine o'clock. Four 
hours of bloody struggle had well nigh disorganized the 
the Union left and the Confederate right wings. Desultory 
firing occurred along the centre and right all day, but there 
was no heavy fighting until late in the afternoon. Lee and 
Hancock were busily engaged re-forming. The former in- 
tended to make one grand effort to gain the intersection of 
the Brock and Plank Roads; he placed every available man in 
line for the attempt, massing particularly at the north side 
of the road. If this attempt should fail, his plan of destroy- 
ing Grant's army in the Wilderness must fail. For he had 
lost so many men, and his regiments, brigades and divisions 
were so confused, that it would be impossible to continue the 
battle, except behind breastworks. 

An ominous quiet reigned along the battle line in the 
neighborhood of the objective point. Hancock, having 
retired to his works, got his men well in hand again and 
waited, confident that Lee intended to assail him here. 
The junction with Burnside at his right was properly made, 
the lines straightened and placed in better shape than at 
any time previously during the battle. In order that he 
might have a clear front and know where the enemy lay, 
he ordered a brigade to form line perpendicularly to the 
breastworks and traverse their front. This was done, and 
the enemy's skirmishers hastily retired. 

Shortly after four o'clock in the afternoon, Lee suc- 
ceeded in completing the desired re-formation, and ordered 
an advance. His troops moved up through the thick woods 
to within one hundred yards of the Union works, and opened 
a terrible fire of musketry. But the Federals replied, and 
caused them to halt. Nor did they dare charge across the 



430 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Open ground immediately in front of the works. No line of 
men could have lived there. Cannon came into play, and 
the boom of heavy guns added its sound to the steady roar 
of musketry. One hundred thousand muskets were handled 
here, their holders loading and firing at will. The bursting 
shells communicated fire to the leaves and dead grass, here 
and there throughout the forest, and at one point the fire 
caught in the Federal works, compelling the defenders 
to retire. Lee seized the opportunity, and ordered Ander- 
son, who commanded at that point, to take possession of 
the deserted works. Anderson obeyed and planted his 
flags on the works. But Hancock was ready, and sent a 
brigade at double-quick, which, at the point of the bayonet, 
drove the intruders headlong out, and back to the cover of 
the forest. 

For half an hour the Confederates stood to their task 
with the greatest tenacity, though their losses were terrible. 
But they could not make an impression on Hancock's lines 
sufficient to warrant an assault, and the return fire was so 
terrible that they had to give way. First, a regiment 
retired, then a brigade, and presently a division. These 
were followed by the whole assaulting force. Lee gave up 
the fight, and slowly withdrew to his works, a mile and a 
half away. His troops were very weary, dispirited, and 
confused. Darkness prevented Hancock from following 
them, or their retreat might have become a rout. 

Lee expected a counter attack, and strove hard, assisted 
by his officers, to preserve the semblance of a formation ; 
but as soon as he was sure he would be unmolested, he 
directed his weary men — all that were left of the mag- 
nificent divisions — to retire rapidly to their works and 
there re-form. And to divert Grant's mind from any 



RESULTS OF THE BATTLE IN THE WILDERNESS. 431 

purpose he might have of again assaulting along the Plank 
Road, he ordered Ewell to assail the extreme Federal right. 
Ewell did so as darkness closed down, and captured several 
hundred of Sedgwick's troops, creating a panic for a short 
time. Grant knew what this meant, however, and was not 
disturbed. He directed assistance to be sent to Sedgwick, 
and calmly lay down to sleep, tired out by the day's work. 
Ewell's troops w^ere so much confused, also, that after the 
first success, they hastily retreated and left the surprised 
Sedgwick to re-form at leisure. So ended the battle of the 
Wilderness. 

In losses sustained, in dogged, stubborn fighting, in the 
importance of the issue, in the obscurity of details, this 
battle was not surpassed by any in this war. Neither 
General was willing to attack again, but both lay quiet 
behind their works and occupied the greater part of the 
following day in burying the dead and caring for the 
wounded. Grant, indeed, in order to find whether Lee had 
retreated from the field, caused a reconnaissance in force 
to be made, and found that the Confederate army was lying 
behind its works; but no fighting occurred. The losses, on 
each side, had amounted to more than fourteen thousand 
men, few prisoners being of that number. The dead alone 
numbered, on each side, more than two thousand, while the 
wounded quadrupled that number. 

Neither side could claim a decisive victory. The advan- 
tage remained with Grant, who had done all that could 
have been done, and had saved his army intact, even if he 
had not inflicted total defeat upon the enemy. Lee had 
designed to be assailant, to take Grant by surprise before he 
could form for battle, but was foiled and defeated in the 
attempt. Grant had not designed to fight a battle, if it could 



432 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

be avoided in the Wilderness, but to get out upon a more 
open country, and there seek a contest; but he was ready 
to fight even here. One can not but admire the consum- 
mate skill with which, after finding the enemy in force at 
his front, he seized the key-point of the field, the crossing 
of the Brock and Plank Roads, and clustered his divisions 
there in time to repulse all efforts on the part of Lee to 
capture it. Could his orders have been carried out to the 
letter, and could Hancock, supported by Burnside, have 
assailed Hill, as commanded, Lee's whole army would have 
been routed on the morning of the second day, the 6th. 
For, with Hill crushed, Ewell would have been taken in 
fiank and rear and could not have escaped capture, while 
Longstreet must have escaped only by a hasty retreat. The 
campaign would have ended there. 

Lee planned with ability, but failed in the execution. 
When he found Grant prepared, he was non-plussed, and 
recognized his danger. He ought then and there to have 
retreated, or at least to have fortified a line and lain still 
until Longstreet should come. It was the greatest rashness 
to push Hill so closely up to the Federal line, that when 
overcome, he had to retreat more than a mile to protection. 
When, after Longstreet came, Hancock was driven back, he 
committed another error, perhaps, in not pushing his men 
immediately against the Federal works, instead of grant- 
ing them time to re-form. But the great confusion of his 
troops, and the defiant attitude of Hancock's retreating 
divisions, was sufficient excuse for doing this. The loss of 
Longstreet, his second great Lieutenant, on the same field 
that saw the fall of his other, Jackson, was a strange coinci- 
dence, and happened during a like successful movement. 
He could not be replaced. 



THE BATTLE NOT AN AIMLESS ONE. 433 

Some writers have been pleased to denominate this 
battle an exhibition of brute force in an aimless struggle, 
where neither General understood his business. But the 
student will notice that much tactical skill was displayed by 
both, and that every movement, though hindered and partly 
thwarted by the nature of the field, was ordered for a pur- 
pose. Lee sought to surprise his enemy, and for that pur- 
pose plunged swiftly into the woods. Grant, watching for 
such an attempt, though not believing it would be made, 
had prepared for it by advancing Warren along the roads, 
westward. Then Lee's efforts were directed towards the 
capture of the key-point before mentioned, and he caused 
assaults to be made by his left as diversions. Grant also saw 
the critical point and bent all efforts to making it safe, and 
to do this, ordered Warren and Sedgwick to attack with the 
right wing as a diversion while concentrating others there. 
Then, as to the operations of the second day — the massing 
under Hancock, the plan of separating Hill and Ewell and 
crushing the former — could it have been executed as 
ordered, would have led to certain victory. There was no 
blindness or confusion in the orders given — only in the 
execution of the orders did the lieutenants fail, and that 
because of the nature of the ground. 

Perhaps two-thirds of the Union army was engaged in 
battle; every man of the Confederates took part. The dis- 
parity in numbers did not greatly benefit Grant, nor, after 
Longstreet arrived, endanger Lee. The forest would not 
permit the best use of the Federal masses; it protected 
Lee's weakness. 

The conduct of the generals differed much. Grant 
at all times was calm and quiet, staying near his head- 
quarters except when twice or thrice, not being satis- 

28 



434 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

fied with the reports he received, he rode to the front 
to view the field himself. This was his proper course. For 
the army being distributed over more than five miles of 
ground, it was necessary that the orderlies should know 
where to find him. His task of concentrating at the key- 
point of the field in the face of the enemy was a delicate 
one, but was accomplished with surprising celerity. And it 
is indeed a matter of surprise that even he, with all his 
ability, was able to handle the masses of his great army on 
the narrow roads and amidst the thickets of this jungle-like 
field, and to secure the measure of precision that he did. 

Lee, as was his custom, stayed close at the rear of one 
corps. Hill's, its operations being the chief on his part. 
That he became excited because of the imminent danger of 
defeat which he had passed through, and rashly attempted to 
lead the charge of a brigade, shows only the intense energy 
of his nature, which was the cause of the effectiveness of 
his movements, and served to inspire his troops with 
enthusiasm. After the fall of Longstreet, having assumed 
personal direction of the right wing, he let slip the chance 
of taking the Union works, by halting the troops, and 
showed no tactical skill in moving his re-formed troops up 
against the face of the works, where they could hope to do 
nothing but die. This last movement was similar, in its 
hopeless nature, to the grand last charge at Gettysburg. 

From the effects of this battle, neither he nor his army 
ever recovered. It took away the spirit with which they had 
rushed to battle. All his great efforts thereafter were 
defensive, his battles fought from behind breastworks, and 
his tactics to meet and thwart the offensive operations of 
his enemy. He could not afford to hurl his army against 
the solid front that Grant placed before him. He recog- 



ANOTHER FLANK MOVEMENT. 435 

nized the fact that he was confronted by one whom he 
could not out-general, who would meet him at every point, 
and take advantage of every error. He could only counter- 
balance the advantage which numbers gave to Grant by 
constantly making use of works and converting his army 
practically into a garrison, a method of conducting war that 
showed well his wisdom as a commander. 

Grant was convinced that Lee would not again attack 
him in the Wilderness, and also that it would lead to useless 
slaughter for his army to be advanced upon the Confeder- 
ate fortifications. He, therefore, determined to again flank 
his opponent's position and bring the contest on in more 
open fields. He feared that Lee might suddenly abandon 
his camp, fly to the James and with his army united to that 
of the troops opposed to Butler, fall suddenly upon the lat- 
ter and destroy him before aid could be sent him. For, 
already, he had received news of the movements of his 
other armies. Sherman had moved on the appointed day 
and was closing down upon Johnston's army. Sigel was 
moving up the Shenandoah valley. Butler had moved 
promptly and had taken City Point, and was preparing to 
move out towards Petersburg. 

It might be that Lee would leave the field where he had 
been so severely repulsed and endeavor to wreak vengeance 
upon Butler, and in order to place himself in a position 
which would not only compel Lee to abandon his present 
strong camp, and from which he might dispatch aid by an 
equal route to Butler, he issued orders for a movement by 
the left flank upon Spottsylvania Court House. 

The mode adopted of making this movement argues the 
most perfect military skill and adroitness in the projector 
thereof. First (7th May), the cavalry under Sheridan was 



436 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

sent forward to operate in advance and on the roads north- 
west of the objective point, so as to clear the wa}- and 
conceal as much as possible the design. Second, the trains 
were advanced by a road parallel to and east of the Brock 
Road, by which it was proposed to march. Third, and 
almost simultaneously with the trains, Sedgwick's corps, 
followed by Burnside's corps, was withdrawn towards 
Chancellorsville, and dispatched, by a parallel road, south- 
ward. Fourth, Warren's corps was withdrawn and dis- 
patched on the Brock Road directly, passing along the rear 
of HancQck's corps, which was ordered to remain facing the 
enemy until the other corps were well under way, and which 
was then to follow as a rear guard with all speed. 

Swiftness was the most essential element to the success- 
ful execution of this plan, which, it will be observed, with- 
drew the army from right to left, making the former right 
wing the left and the left the right, while all the time mov- 
ing towards the objective point. Warren was directed to 
get possession of Spottsylvania as soon as possible, there 
fortify, and await the arrival of the other corps. It will be 
observed also that the army followed two or three roads 
in progress southward, with the cavalry guarding the right. 
The movement began and proceeded unmolested. Grant 
turned his face southward, and, it is said, that as he moved 
along the rear of Hancock's corps, the soldiers recognized 
him and perceiving that the movement meant an advance 
instead of a retreat, as before had often happened, raised 
such a shout that the Confederates, fearing an attack was 
about to be made, opened fire with the artillery into the 
woods. 

That the Federals were making some movement, Lee 
did not doubt, but just what direction it was taking he was 



A FORTUNATE CHANCE. 



437 



not satisfied. His cavalry, though chased by the Federal 
cavalry from the vicinity where it might make observations, 
had nevertheless noted a movement of the trains and of 
two corps near Chancellorsville, and reported a movement 
toward Fredericksburg. Lee argued that it was a retreat, 
and directed his corps commanders to be ready to move, 
Anderson now in command of Longstreet's corps, being 
directed to get upon the roads leading southeast at an early 
hour next morning ( 8th) and to move towards Spottsyl- 
vania, the others to wait developments. The Brock Road 




SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 



was in possession of the Federals and Anderson was com- 
pelled to proceed by a route further west. 

Here chance came to Lee's aid. Anderson's orders 
were that he should move in the morning; but the woods 
caught fire and compelled him to move during the night 
several miles, thus placing him much nearer the objective 
point of the Union army than were they themselves. But, 
even now, had not Meade made a grave error, he would 
have been stopped in his progress. For Grant's orders to 
Sheridan contemplated the capture and possession of all 
the crossings and bridges over the Po River northwest of 



438 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Spottsylvania, which river, vv^inding among the low hills, 
crosses the Shady Grove Road, the first road west of the 
Brock Road and the one by which Anderson was advancing, 
three times before it passes southward of Spottsylvania, 
and is a great obstacle in the way of a marching army. 

Sheridan had gallantly accomplished his orders, driven 
the enemy's cavalry in haste across this stream to the west- 
ward and taken possession of the fords and bridges. He 
was making dispositions to hold them, when Meade, who 
desired rather the possession of Spottsylvania, and did not 
know the intent of Grant's order, directed him to draw in 
closer to the Brock Road and to move in advance of and 
with Warren's corps. Sheridan reluctantly complied with 
the order and left the crossings uncovered; and when 
Anderson resumed his march early in the morning, he found 
no opposition made to his crossing them. The Federal 
cavalry, now moving in detachments, occupied Spottsyl- 
vania, driving out a party of Confederates, but left it again 
when they heard the firing out towards the northwest where 
some of their scouting parties were already skirmishing 
with Anderson's advance. 

The distance from the camps in the Wilderness to 
Spottsylvania was about fifteen miles. Warren traveled 
slowly, not endeavoring to make a forced march. Ander- 
son, by his night march out of the burning woods, had gone 
ahead somewhat, and when his cavalry reported that the 
Union troops were moving southward, instead of by the 
rear to Fredericksburg, he hastened his march, and swept 
down into Spottsylvania an hour ahead of Warren's 
columns. He reported to Lee the facts, who at once set 
the remainder of his troops in motion, hastening to seize the 
vantage ground. Hancock, about this time, withdrew from 



SPOTTSYLVANIA. 439 

his works, after skirmishing w'th Early, who was command- 
ing Hill's corps — the latter being sick and absent — who 
also attempted to advance upon the Brock Road, but 
desisted when he found the Federals still in force there. 

Thus both armies were moving towards one point. 
Stuart's cavalry, reinforced and having the infantry near, 
returned, passed through Spottsylvania, coming in at the 
west from ^the Shady Grove Road, which penetrated the 
fields around Spottsylvania Court House from that direction, 
and fought a stubborn battle with the advance of the Union 
cavalry. The battle went against them, finally, but the vic- 
torious Federals were suddenly surprised by the sight of a 
line of gleaming bayonets, as Anderson's tired men came at 
a double-quick through the village. The Federals retired 
skirmishing, and reported to Warren, who, instead of coming 
up quickly, began to make dispositions for resistance to an 
attack, and reported to the Commander. 

Grant immediately perceived the error which had let in 
Anderson ahead, but hoping yet to gain the vantage of 
the fields, and to crush Anderson before Lee could arrive, 
directed Warren to assault as soon as he could get within 
range, and sent orders to Sedgwick, who was almost even 
with Warren on the road, further east, to close up to 
Warren and advance with him. But Warren spent several 
hours getting his corps together and reconnoitering. He 
then found that Anderson had come out from Spottsylvania 
northward nearly a mile, had seized a strong position on a 
ridge, and had thrown up fortifications. Finally, he sent 
forward one division in response to Grant's urgent orders, 
and caused a feeble assault to be made. It was easily 
repulsed. Other desultory attacks by separate divisions 
were made here and there, but with no other effect than to 
give the Federals an idea of the Confederate position. 



440 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Grant rode to the front as soon as possible after being 
notified of the condition of affairs, and at once issued orders 
for the concentration of all his corps. Lee also arrived on 
the field, and caused Ewell and Early to come up with all 
speed possible. He now perceived his error in supposing 
that Grant was retreating, and resolved to throw himself 
directly in the road between him and Richmond, fortify, and 
risk a battle. Grant, after Warren's failures, did not imme- 
diately attempt further assaults, but, while his corps were 
coming to the field, examined the ground with a view to 
maneuvering for the best position and making an effective 
attack. All next day, also (9th), the armies were occupied 
in establishing their positions and feeling their way towards 
each other. Breastworks and rifle-pits were thrown up 
along the entire extent of the lines ; batteries were planted 
at the most commanding points. 

The Confederate lines, when established, extended from 
the Po River, at the left, in an irregular semi-circle facing 
northward, far around eastward of Spottsylvania Court 
House, and occupied an irregular ridge, or succession of 
hills, connected by intervening ridges, tree-covered, steep 
and rough, an excellent position for defence. Lee made a 
wise choice of position, and placed his troops in a semi- 
circle, in order that it might be possible to more easily move 
troops from one wing to another as needed, thus compelling 
the enemy to stretch his battle line in order to encircle it, 
and making it difficult for him to reinforce one point by 
troops drawn from another. Part of a division of Con- 
federates had moved far out to their right, aiming to attack 
the Federal right flank if Grant should move off towards 
Fredericksburg, but these were drawn back, as Burnside, 
who came up at Grant's left, advanced along the Ny to a point 



HANCOCK CROSSES THE PO. 441 

east of the Court House. Hancock moved slowly from his 
position in the Wilderness, closely watching Early that he 
might not attack the Union rear, and arrived in the after- 
noon on the right, overlooking the valley of the Po. 

Grant had suspicions that Lee would try to strike at his 
communications by a movement to the right flank, and 
ordered Hancock to cross the Po, and come in upon the 
Confederate left flank as a counter-movement. Hancock 
at once began transferring his troops to the south side of 
the river. The Po, at a point about two miles west of 
Spottsylvania, has its course towards 'the east, but there 
turns, by a short bend, southward and westward, and con- 
tinues thus several miles before it finally resumes its general 
southeastern course. Both armies were on the left bank of 
the stream. The Confederate right, under Anderson, rested 
at the point of curvature in the bend, and it was Hancock's 
duty to cross the stream twice and come in at Anderson's 
rear, by roads leading across the tongue of land in the bend. 
He succeeded in crossing to the south side, but darkness 
prevented his recrossing again to the desired point. 

The night found the armies thus : Hancock, south of 
the Po, faced eastward on the Catharpin Road, which, 
coming in from the west, crosses the Po by a wooden bridge 
directly west of the Court House. As Anderson, who 
commanded the Confederate left, rested on the river 
above the bridge, Hancock had thus flanked his position. 
Lee, seeing this, was already engaged in drawing heavy 
forces from his right and centre to cover the bridge. 
Warren confronted Anderson, resting his right at the river. 
Sedgwick, next to Warren and at his left, confronted Ewell, 
and Burnside's corps, the extreme left of the Federal army, 
confronted Early. Burnside had, by night time of this day 



442 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

(9th), pushed far around beyond the enemy's right flank, 
but was ignorant of the advantage of his situation. 

In making these movements he was involved in a sharp 
contest for position, which caused Grant to take still further 
precautions against the possibility of Lee's attempting to 
pass around to his left and to get in between him and Fred- 
ericksburg. Grant hoped that Lee would attempt this, and 
gave instructions to Hancock to move in that case directly 
upon the rear of the Confederate army and cut its commu- 
nications with Richmond. But it was not Lee's intention so 
to do, after he was assured that the Federal army was 
advancing southward instead of retreating to Fredericks- 
burg. He resolved only to hold his present position, and to 
fight a battle behind his works if Grant should attack him. 
On the previous day, Grant had detached Sheridan with 
his cavalry and ordered him to pass around to the rear of 
the Confederate army and endeavor to cut its communica- 
tions with Richmond, and to damage as much as possible 
the enemy's resources. The purpose of the raid was three- 
fold — to cut the communications, as aforsaid, so as to ham- 
per the enemy and to take away the possibility of Lee sud- 
denly leaving the field to strike at Butler on the James; to 
keep the Southern cavalry employed so that it would not 
assail the Federal trains and communications, and to des- 
troy the resources of the country as much as possible. 

A river at the right; an irregular succession of hills, 
seamed with gullies and separated by deep hollows, covered 
with thickets of scrub trees, bushes and vines, with openings 
here and there amongst them, and with marshes in the 
bottoms of the hollows, where water and mud stood contin- 
ually; and these hollows bearing off north and east towards 
another river, the Ny, — such was the country occupied by 
the armies. 



444 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lee occupied a sort of table land down from which these 
hills and hollows proceeded, and his line was made irregu- 
lar so as to follow the projection of the hills, presenting 
thus at various points 1-arge bastions and angles. His posi- 
tion was partially concealed by the forest and thickets. 
Lee realized the danger which threatened his left flank from 
Hancock, but relied upon the Po for protection. During 
the night he placed force enough at the wooden bridge to 
make it exceedingly doubtful whether Hancock would be 
able to cross there. 

During the night Grant learned that Lee was not 
attempting to execute a flank movement eastward, but 
had weakened his centre and right to send troops against 
Hancock. Deeming it not best to attempt to continue the 
movement under Hancock, and satisfied that he had 
brought Lee's attention from the Federal left, he ordered 
Hancock to withdraw his troops from the south side of the 
Po. He directed Warren and Wright, the latter now com- 
manding the corps formerly under Sedgwick, who had been 
killed, to assault the Confederate centre hoping to break 
through it while weakened by the withdrawal of the troops 
sent against Hancock. He also directed Burnside to press 
the enemy's right and endeavor to turn it. But in order to 
hold Lee's attention to his left, while these attacks were 
being made, he directed Hancock to leave one division on 
the south side of the Po to threaten attack while he should 
place the other two at the rear of Warren's corps in mass. 

This was done. Hancock, who had succeeded in crossing 
a small force below the wooden bridge, withdrew and re- 
crossed the Po with two divisions, leaving one under Barlow, 
a gallant officer, who intrenched slightly and awaited devel- 
opments. The corps of the Union army moved slowly forward 



THE ATTACK ON BARLOW. 445 

feeling their way to the opposing lines, and advancing at 
some points more than a mile. They finally came into colli- 
sion with the main defence line of the enemy, and, though at 
some points there was a sharp battle, nothing was accom- 
plished during the forenoon, further than that the army was 
brought face to face with the enemy and the true positions 
of the Confederates ascertained. Shortly before noon War- 
ren sent forward two divisions to assault a point that he 
thought weak; but these were repulsed with loss, after gal- 
lantly reaching the line of defence. 

Meanwhile Lee had not been inactive. Seeing that 
Hancock had withdrawn two of his divisions from the south 
side of the Po, he thought that the third might be crushed, 
and directed the troops, which were covering the wooden 
bridge, to advance against it. But the bulk of the troops he 
returned to the lines, whence they had been drawn, weak- 
ening the force sent against Barlow so much, that it was 
rather worsted in the contest which ensued, but securing his 
line against the contemplated Federal assault. Barlow's 
division was outnumbered, but it fought with great courage 
and effect. Behind rude breastworks of rails and fallen 
trees it beat off assault after assault, until fire from bursting 
shells caught in the dry grass and leaves lying in the woods, 
and thence entered the works, compelling it to retreat. 
Grant had caused batteries to be placed on the hills south 
of the Po, which materially aided Barlow by shelling the 
attacking forces. 

Shortly after noon. Grant, seeing that it would de useless 
to keep Barlow on the south side, ordered Hancock to with- 
draw him. The Confederates pressed hard upon the 
division, making it an exceedingly difficult task, but Barlow 
beat off his assailants, recrossed the Po in good order and 



446 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

destroyed the bridge after him. Grant thus had his army 
in hand, without a river separating any part of it from the 
main body. In order to relieve the pressure on Barlow, he 
had renewed his orders to Warren and Wright to assault; 
but they cautiously reconnoitered and delayed so long that 
their attacks, when delivered, were too late to be of assist- 
ance to him. At about four o'clock, however, the assaulting 
parties were ready. The one from Wright's corps, led by 
Colonel Upton, a gallant officer, was composed of twelve 
regiments and was directed against a salient in Ewell's line 
of defence. Mott's division was directed to support him. 
Warren made a general assault with his whole division, sup- 
ported by one division of Hancock's corps. In both cases, 
the assaults were gallantly made, and involved the opposing 
armies at once in a dreadful conflict, with immense losses to 
both. 

Warren and Wright had recommended the assault, stat- 
ing that they believed themselves able to carry the Confed- 
erate lines; but they had miscalculated the strength of the 
position. Warren's corps suffered terribly, and could get no 
further than the outside of the enemy's works, whence they 
were driven back in confusion. But Upton was more for- 
tunate. The impetuosity of his charge carried the stormers 
over the works, whence spreading to right and left, they took 
the Confederates in rear, capturing nine hundred prisoners 
and some guns. But Lee was watching the battle and 
hurried troops to the breach; and so heavily did they press 
Upton, that Grant feared he would be captured and ordered 
him to retire. Mott had failed to support him, and thus 
thrown him into great danger. Upton's troops wept when 
the order was received; and, as Upton assured Grant he 
could hold the works. Grant ordered Warren to renew the 



Upton's gallantry. 447 

assault with his corps to relieve him, and sternly directed 
Mott to advance. 

The battle was bloody and well sustained before Upton. 
It is said that Lee here again became excited by the immi- 
nent danger that threatened his army, and placed himself at 
the head of Gordon's brigade of Confederates, to lead a 
charge, but was with difficulty pursuaded to relinquish the 
rash intention. Hancock had now returned from the relief 
of Barlow and added another division to Warren's strength. 
A desperate assault was made. The Federals gained the 
crest of the works and succeeded in getting over at several 
points; but there they were met by such dreadful fire, enfil- 
ading from hills on their flank, that they were compelled to 
retreat. Grant then finally ordered Upton to retire, he hav- 
ing done all he could and being prevented only by Mott's 
delay in supporting him from advancing far into the Con- 
federate position. 

The Commander having the power, made Upton a Brig- 
adier General then and there for gallantry on the field. The 
battle on the right of the Federals ceased with the night, 
both armies occupying the position where night found them. 
But on the left, Burnside continued his movement far into 
the night. He, during the day, had slowly swung around to 
the rear of Lee's army without knowing where he was with 
relation to it, and in the movement had become separated 
from the left of Wright's corps. 

Grant became aware of the hiatus in his line at the left, 
and not knowing that Burnside was at the rear of the Con- 
federate army, but thinking he had gone too far south, or- 
dered him to close up to Wright so as to prevent the enemy 
from entering between the corps. To do this, Burnside had 
to retrace his steps nearly half a mile and lost his advantage 



448 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

of position. Lee, discovering his danger after it was over, 
took precaution that it should not happen again, and ex- 
tended his right wing to meet Burnside's advance. The end 
of the battle of this day saw the opposing lines occupying 
parallel positions, within gun-shot of each other, from the 
Po on the west, to a point about one mile east of Spottsyl- 
vania Court House, a line about four miles in length. 

Twice already had Grant threatened seriously the 
existence of the Confederate army. Could Hancock have 
crossed the Po at the Wooden Bridge during the evening of 
the Qth, Lee's position would have been wholly untenable; 
but darkness prevented this. Had Mott supported Upton, 
as ordered, the breach in the lines could have been widened 
and deepened, and Lee's centre would have been irretriev- 
ably broken; but Mott's slowness saved the Southern army. 
The difficult nature of the ground seriously impeded the 
Federal movements, and aided Lee much, who had no 
maneuvres to make, but contented himself with defence. 

Lee showed on this day great ability in defensive opera- 
tions. He noted every move of his opponent; he had ready 
a remedy for every dangerous crisis. When Hancock 
delayed at the bridge, he hurried troops to confront him. 
When Upton broke through Ewell's line, he met him with 
a strong force and drove him back. Having but a short 
interior line across from wing to wing, he easily moved 
bodies of troops from one point to another and was able to 
cover any threatened point with heavy masses. With com- 
paratively small cost to himself, he was able to inflict ter- 
rible losses upon his enemy. 

Both armies rested during the next day (nth) and 
buried their dead. But Grant was not idle. He continually 
examined the opposing lines to find a weak point, and his 



grant's famous dispatch. 449 

division commanders and corps commanders were similarly 
engaged. On this day, Grant wrote his famous dispatch, 
containing the words, "I propose to fight it out on this line, 
if it takes all Summer." He had met heavy losses and dis- 
appointments, but he was, as ever, resolved to prosecute his 
plans to a successful issue. Both armies had lost a fourth 
each of their original numbers; but there was no flinching 
from the dread work. 

The Commander received news on this day, from the 
other divisions of his great army. Sherman was reported 
steadily advancing; Sigel was approaching the enemy in the 
Valley; Butler had taken and was holding a strong position 
at Bermuda Hundred; and Sheridan had cut the railroads 
between Lee and Richmond, captured and destroyed a train 
containing a supply of medical stores, and had created an 
immense furor of terror and excitement in the Capital which 
was thus cut off from the army. 

Reconnoitering parties reported that an impression 
might be made against a salient at the Confederate right 
centre in front of the left wing of Wright's corps. Grant 
resolved to attempt a surprise, and issued orders to 
Hancock to move his corps in rear of Wright and Warren 
to a point covering the left face of the angle and directed 
Burnside to move up to the right, or eastern face, of the 
same. The ground in front of the salient sloped down to 
marshy rivulets, and the sides of the hill were covered with 
thickets; but the thickets were broken and scattered, per- 
mitting the passage of troops without much delay. The 
angle was deep and narrow, following the sides of a broad 
hill for several hundred yards, and at its base not being 
more than a mile wide. 

Hancock moved his corps by night to the required 
29 



450 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

position; but was so impeded by the nature of the ground 
and the rain, which fell steadily, that he did not arrive long 
enough before the hour appointed for the assault to give 
his soldiers a much needed rest. He formed his men about 
twelve hundred yards from the enemy's works in double 
column, Barlow at the left, Birney at the right, and Mott 
and Gibbon supporting. Wright's and Warren's corps 
were directed by Grant to stand to arms, ready to give sup- 
port or to assault the works before them as they should be 
directed later. Burnside's corps was directed to attack 
simultaneously with Hancock's corps, and Grant sent an 
officer to stay with Burnside to impress him with the neces- 
sity of prompt action. Grant took position at a central 
point near the left of Hancock from which he could direct 
operations. 

The enemy was not expecting the assault. Indeed they 
had an idea that Grant was about to attempt a new flank 
movement, and Lee was preparing to meet such movement. 
The order directed that the attack should be delivered at 
earliest daylight, at four o'clock; but the fog, which then 
prevailed, retained the darkness so long, that it was delayed 
one hour. Finally the order was given. The long lines 
arose from the damp ground and moved down from the 
hill where they had lain, across the intervening hollow, 
with its muddy bottom, and up the opposite side of the 
depression, gaining momentum as they went. The enthu- 
siasm of the hour was upon the troops, and breaking into a 
cheer they dashed over the Confederate works before the 
astonished defenders could grasp arms or move into line. 
But few shots were fired. Muskets were clubbed and at 
points a hand-to-hand struggle took place; but, in a few 
minutes, a whole division, that of Johnston, a brigade and 



Hancock's successful assault. 451 

a regiment, surrendered to the exultant assailants and were 
sent to the rear under guard. 

Hancock then reformed his lines, turned the cannon, of 
which he had taken twenty, upon the Confederates who 
were hastening to the breach, and advanced into the 
salient, his long lines sweeping down its sides and driving 
all before him. Burnside's attack was not so successful. 
He did not succeed in moving with Hancock, and the enemy 
before him was ready; but, in the face of a hot fire, he 
succeeding in reaching the works and placing one division 
over them. The assault was resisted by Early with such 
force and effect, that he could not advance further, and was 
shortly obliged to relinquish his advantage. 

Meanwhile Hancock was advancing, and Lee was making 
strenuous efforts to check him. Divisions were drawn from 
Anderson and driven against the invading lines. All the 
reserves at hand were placed before him to check him. 
And while his progress was thus retarded, a line of battle 
was drawn across the base of the salient, and rude works, 
which had been begun previously, were occupied and 
strengthened. During the first two hours, Hancock broke 
all opposition and advanced more than a mile, and until he 
reached the new line of works. Here he was met by Lee 
with nearly half of his army, and Hancock came to a halt. 
A terrible conflict was here waged for half an hour. 

Grant recognized the terrible force being hurled upon 
Hancock, and made every arrangement possible to aid him. 
He ordered Wright to lead his corps forward to Han- 
cock's assistance shortly before six o'clock, when it be- 
came evident that Lee would still contest the field. But 
Wright did not move promptly, and a second order urged 
him forward. He could not aid Hancock, however, till nearly 



452 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

two hours had passed. Grant again directed Burnside to 
assault, to hold troops at least from going against Hancock, 
and to connect with Hancock's left. Burnside did so, and 
succeeded in making connection for a short time, but lost it 
again later. Grant issued a third order, directing Warren 
to assault with all power the lines in his front, so as to hold 
troops from going to the aid of Ewell; but Warren not only 
did not obey promptly, but spent his time till almost noon in 
taking observations and studying the situation, and, by that 
time, the advantage was lost. By this delay he allowed Lee 
to strip his left wing of troops and to concentrate against 
Hancock the bulk of his army. 

The turning point of the battle came when Hancock 
arrived before the temporary lines which Lee had caused to 
be drawn across the base of the salient. Here again the Gen- 
eral of the Confederate army lost his equanimity and 
spurred his horse to the front rank of his troops, which 
he had prepared for a counter-charge, and would have led 
them into the hail of death which swept the earth before 
the Federal ranks; but the troops, seeing the danger, 
refused to advance unless he should retire to the rear, and 
the subordinate officers prevailed upon him, with many en- 
treaties, to go back. But his example, though the fruit of 
an excited brain, which now recognized the fact that, unless 
Hancock were driven back, the army was lost, raised the 
spirits of his troops, who charged forward with the most 
reckless fury. 

Hancock's disordered and exhausted lines could not 
withstand the shock, but stopped, and, after a few moments, 
gave back and slowly retired. Lee regained his calmness, 
and seized every body of troops that appeared, and poured 
them upon the Union lines. Having begun to retire, the 



THE CAPTURED WORKS HELD. 453 

Federals could not regain the advantage of the offensive, 
and though Wright's troops arrived and restored the battle, 
the backward movement was continued until they reached 
the works they had captured, which they now turned, and 
held in spite of the most furious assaults of the Confederate 
host. 

Grant heard the approaching roar of contest as it came 
back to the works, and chafed exceedingly because of the 
ineffectual aid which Burnside and Warren rendered. 
With Warren, especially, he was disgusted. Having re- 
peated his orders to him thrice to advance and attack the 
enemy in his front with all power, and having received 
excuses each time and delay all the time, he at length 
ordered Meade to relieve Warren at once unless he should 
advance instantly. Warren then directed an attack, but 
very feebly, and as it was now noon and the Confederates 
were assailing Hancock behind his captured intrenchments, 
it availed little. 

Lee was determined to regain his lost works, and massed 
his troops five different times, and made five successive 
bloody assaults upon Hancock's and Wright's position. At 
times, the combatants fought over the breastworks. Federal 
on one side and Confederate on the other. There were 
hand-to-hand conflicts, where the clubbed musket and the 
bayonet made deadly work. The roar of musketry was 
incessant, and the hail of bullets so terrible that trees of a 
foot in diameter were cut down. A hundred thousand men 
struggled along a line not more than one mile in length. 
From daylight in the morning until midnight the contest 
raged, but Lee could not regain his lost works. 

Twenty hours of unceasing struggle with the constant 
roar of musketry and the boom of heavy cannon as accom- 



454 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

paniment, and with thousands of killed and wounded as the 
result — such was this day's battle. Then Lee gave over 
attempting to retake his lost works, and sullenly retired to 
the temporary line across the base of the salient, which he 
now strongly fortified and made. a part of his defensive line, 
thus neutralizing the advantage gained by Hancock and 
strengthening his own position greatly. The battle ground 
remained in the possession of Hancock, but the Union army 
could not claim more than the advantage in battle. They 
had not defeated Lee, who still stood defiant and ready for 
further contest. So closed the day (12th), and with it the 
sternest day of the battle of Spottsylvania Court House. 

Again had victory been within Grant's grasp, again had 
the incapacity and disobedience of a subordinate rendered 
the advantage null. He was so disgusted with Warren that, 
although he did not at once relieve him of command, he did 
separate his corps, and place two of the divisions, for a 
time, under the command of the other corps officers. 
General Humphrey, one of the Commander's staff, also, 
was directed to remain with Warren, and see that he should 
obey orders in the future. 

Both armies rested during the following day (13th), and 
buried their dead. Grant, however, was active. He 
examined Lee's works, received reports, and laid plans for 
further operations. Lee carefully watched the movements 
of his antagonist. Grant sent Mott's division to feel the 
new line of defence across the base of the salient which 
Hancock had taken, thinking that, perhaps, Lee would now 
retreat, but a sharp fire met the division, and it retired. 
During the following night. Grant moved the divisions of 
Warren and Wright along the rear of his line southward, 
and placed them upon the extreme left. Then Hancock 



A NEW PLAN. 455 

was drawn back to the rear and placed in reserve. By this 
means Lee's present strong position was outflanked, and he 
was compelled to assume a new line facing eastward. Both 
armies then occupied lines running almost due north and 
south. 

Grant's design was to draw Lee into abandoning his 
very strong works facing the north, and then to send 
Hancock's corps to occupy them. The movement brought 
on a sharp contest at the left of the Federal position. 
Upton attacked and captured a knoll which the enemy were 
attempting to fortify. He there intrenched and held his 
ground. Grant feared that Lee might come out and attack 
Burnside's right, now the extreme right of the army, and 
directed Hancock to be ready for such attempt, and ordered 
his corps commanders to be ready to lead a general assault 
along the whole line, if he should so attack. This was his 
method of relieving a threatened point — a counter attack. 

While these movements were in progress, he received 
news from the other armies, particularly from Butler, who 
reported that he had captured Drury's Bluff, and from 
Sherman, who had forced Johnston to evacuate Dalton. 
News also came from the fiery Sheridan, relating how he 
had cut railroads and telegraph lines, had fought a battle 
with cavalry under Stuart and gained a complete victory, 
killing Stuart, who was one of the best of Southern soldiers. 
These reports were all encouraging, and showed that the 
grand, strategic plans were being carried out to the letter. 
But his attention was more closely drawn to Lee. He 
n-oted with satisfaction that the Confederate army had been 
shifted to meet his new line, and he now ordered Hancock 
and Wright to make a night march by the right flank, and 
occupy the deserted works (i6-i7th). 



456 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lee was by some means, supposedly by spies or traitors, 
informed of the order, and at once hastened back to the old 
lines. He had the shorter distance to travel, being interior 
to the works, and was able to confront the Federal corps 
with a strong force. Hancock was astonished, but directed 
an assault to be made at once. The assault was repulsed. 
The successive disappointments threw a gloom upon the 
army. The following day, bad news from Butler and Sigel 
came, adding to the gloom, 

Butler had been driven back from Drury's Bluff and Sigel 
had been defeated at New Market. Also, if these were not 
enough, news arrived that Banks had suffered disastrous 
defeat on the Red River. These reverses to the Union 
arms permitted the sending of reinforcements to Lee, who 
much needed them. About six thousand new troops also 
arrived to the Federal army. 

But, in spite of all the discouraging news. Grant never 
suffered his iron will to bend from its purpose; he at once 
laid plans for an advance by the left flank. His orders 
were already issued to that effect (iQth). But Lee now 
thought to inflict damage upon the Federal right flank and 
the trains parked in its rear. He directed Ewell to march 
out by his left flank and assail the troops who had just 
arrived, and who, under Tyler, were camped near the 
trains. Early was ordered to extend his corps to the left in 
order to support Ewell. 

Grant divined the intention of his antagonist as soon as 
he saw the movement begin, and directed Hancock to hurry 
troops to the aid of Tyler, and hoping to cut off Ewell from 
the rest of the army, directed Warren to push his right 
wing in between Ewell and Early, and attack Ewell's corps 
in the rear. Ewell perceived his danger shortly after get- 



RESULTS OF SPOTTSYLVANIA. 457 

ting out of his lines, and made haste to go back. Had 
Warren moved more promptly, he, even then, would have 
been cut off. A party of his troops attacked the trains, but 
was gallantly repulsed by Ferrero's colored troops. Ewell, 
by a wide detour, succeeded in saving his corps, but Lee did 
not again attempt a like maneuvre. 

These were the last operations on this field. The losses 
had been very heavy. The Federals lost fourteen thousand 
men ; the Confederates lost fully as many, but of these over 
four thousand were prisoners ; their loss in killed and 
wounded being less, on account of the fact that they fought 
behind works much of the time. Grant captured twenty 
cannon and lost one. This battle presents a strange suc- 
cession of successes and failures on the part of each army, 
of fearful struggles, fierce combats, stubborn assaults, and 
no less stubborn resistance. Twice, by superior strategy, 
had Grant won the advantage, and twice had it been lost by 
the slowness of a subordinate. Never had such vexatious 
delays defeated the plans of a commander with greater 
fatality. Grant's evil star seemed to have brooded over the 
bloody field and to triumph, although he was twice almost 
victor. 

It was a drawn battle. The Federals could not force 
their opponents from their position, the Confederates did 
not dare come out and fight in the open field. Never did 
Grant show greater ability in handling huge masses of 
troops than here ; never did Lee show greater genius in 
warding off attacks. Each had found an equal in their 
respective qualities. A feint at the right, a blow from the 
centre, a following blow from the left centre ; these were 
the principal features of Grant's tactics, each being sup- 
ported by diversive assaults at right and left. Like a 



458 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

pugilist seeking an opening, did Grant feint and strike ; like 
a pugilist, did Lee watch his antagonist, and meet or avoid 
the attacks. Here \y2ls no confusion, no blind battle, no 
aimless attack ; but every movement w^as studied and had 
its effect. Because the plans were thwarted by incompetent 
subordinates, or by deceptive appearances, does not at all 
argue them bad. No man can guard wholly against the 
faults of other free agents ; no one can wholly understand 
the conditions of a vast field of battle. The second great 
struggle was ended, and the Union army, taking up its 
unfolding and revolving movement by the left flank, com- 
pelled Lee to leave his strong lines and hasten to new 
scenes. But the movement was ever forward on the part of 
one, ever backward on the part of the other. 

Grant now ordered his base of supplies to be changed 
from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, in order that it might 
follow the southward progress of the army. The excellence 
of his plans therein appeared, because supplies could be 
brought to Port Royal, and later to White House, by water, 
and with great facility and safety, the Federals being 
masters of the sea. From these bases the supplies could be 
transported in trains by a short route to the army. No long 
line, in danger of being cut by the enemy, was to be 
guarded ; the momentum of the forward movement thus 
had no drag to stop it. 

Grant's purpose, in making this movement, was the same 
that he had sought to accomplish in that which had brought 
him to Spottsylvania. His method of making it was similar 
to that then pursued. Burnside and Wright were directed 
to move up close to the Confederate lines, as if to assault, 
and to engage the enemy's attention, while the other corps 
were being advanced. Hancock was directed to march by 



ANOTHER FLANK MOVEMENT. 459 

the rear of these corps, take the Fredericksburg and Rich- 
mond Road, and proceed southward as fast as possible, and 
Warren was ordered to follow in Hancock's steps, and be 
ready to support him. 

Grant hoped by this maneuvre, and by thus throwing 
Hancock's corps out to an isolated position, with relation to 
the rest of the army, to induce Lee to attack him. Hancock 
had orders not to avoid a battle, but to accept it, to intrench 
and hold his ground, if attacked, and await the coming of 
Warren. If Lee should leave his lines to fall upon Hancock, 
then Wright and Burnside would be at once advanced 
against his rear, and he thus be taken between two fires. 
If, on the other hand, Lee should attack Wright and Burn- 
side, they had orders to receive his attack upon their works, 
or to retreat southward in the track of the other corps, who 
would by that time be between Lee and his Capital. 

So convinced was Grant that Lee would not attack 
unless he had every chance and condition in his favor, that 
he advanced Hancock beyond the bounds which prudence 
would suggest. But he desired so much to get his corps in 
between the Confederate army and Richmond, that he 
willingly assumed the risk. Hancock moved out during the 
night (i A. M., 20th), and next day was at Milford twenty 
miles below. Warren moved out next morning and rapidly 
closed down towards him. 

The route which the Federals were compelled to take to 
Hanover Junction, which was a great strategic point on 
account of being the crossing of the Virginia Central and 
Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroads, besides the chief 
wagon roads of the country, was thirty-five miles in length. 
From Lee's camp, by the Telegraph Road, a direct route, 
the distance was but twenty-two miles. Lee, therefore had 



460 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the advantage; and, as soon as he became aware of the 
Federal movement, he resolved not to lose that advantage, 
but set his army in motion towards the Junction. Hancock, 
at Milford, met and scattered a brigade of reinforcements 
that were coming up to Lee's aid. He rested here a few 
hours to await the movements of the other corps, and then 
swept on across the country. Lee's army, withdrawn from 
its lines, now marched along the Telegraph Road. Burn- 
side and Wright, as soon as they were certain that Lee had 
departed, also left their lines and followed Hancock and 
Warren. The Matapony, a name whose syllables represent 
so many rivers joined in one, was soon crossed. 

Lee allowed the splendid chance of striking a corps of 
the Union army, while distant from its supporters, to pass. 
He thought Grant was striving only to get between him and 
Richmond, and this he was resolved to prevent. He had a 
strong camp already marked out between the two Anna 
rivers, and to this he hurried without turning to strike at 
the great army stretching out across the country at his left. 
One has said that this neglect on his part, this timidity, this 
Fabian policy, marked him as a second-rate general; but, 
though it was perhaps so if Grant had not been Grant, yet 
it was not so, when one remembers that Grant was prepared, 
and that Lee had already learned in two battles, that his 
enemy was not to be taken unawares. He did not take the 
bait, though tempting, which his antagonist held out to him; 
but, pursuing his policy, he moved rapidly to the front, 
placed his army across the path of the invader, threw up 
works and waited with his weakened but intrepid force, 
for the hostile Commander to hurl his troops upon impreg- 
nable works. Having the shorter route, he reached the 
Anna Rivers first. 




p461 



462 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The Union army, though one of its corps had the lead, 
was hindered by its imperfect knowledge of the roads, ai d 
the nature of the path pursued. In their progress, the 
several corps gradually came abreast, Warren forging to the 
right, followed at his left and rear by Wright, Burnside 
came in at the centre, and Hancock found himself shortly 
on the left. In this manner, they arrived at the shore of 
the North Anna river (23d), Warren at Jericho Ford, Burn- 
side at Ox Ford, and Hancock at a wooden bridge, known 
as the Chesterfield Bridge. 

Lee's position was exceedingly well chosen for defence. 
His lines formed an obtuse angle, with the apex resting at 
Ox Ford, one side of the angle extending southeastward 
along the river and railroad, and covering Hanover Junc- 
tion, and the other side drawn across southwestward to 
Little River. A short distance below this position, the two 
rivers join, and form the Pamunkey. Thus, with a river 
guarding its front and another its rear, and with low swampy 
ground all around it, the Southern army was in a position of 
extraordinary strength. Its position was partially concealed 
by low woods and low-lying sand ridges. Heavy entrench- 
ments had been raised. Morasses and ridges, ditches and 
trees, had been utilized; and the strength of nature so 
improved, that it would have been madness to have at- 
tempted to carry the position by assault. And the shape of 
the camp was such that reinforcements could be hurried 
from one wing across to another in a very short time, enab- 
ling both to be massed at any threatened point on short 
notice. The angle was Lee's favorite plan for defensive 
works. Here, strengthened by twelve thousand rein- 
forcements, he waited attack. 

Grant was not acquainted at all with the lay of the land 



CROSSING THE NORTH ANNA. 



463 



nor with Lee's position, having but very imperfect maps, 
and not being able to rely wholly upon the reports of scouts. 
Therefore, to feel the enemy's position, and to cross the 
whole army over the river as soon as possible, he ordered 
all his corps commanders to make attempts to cross. War- 
ren was first to get over, driving off the opposing sharp- 




JERICHO MILLS, NORTH ANNA. 

shooters and Forming a battle line, almost perpendicular to 
the river, facing southward towards the Confederate camp. 
Wright soon followed, and joined Warren with his left, 
extending his line almost to Little River. But before 
Wright got into position, and while Warren was forming. 



464 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



Lee sought to take advantage of the confusion occasioned 
b)'^ the crossing, and sent Hill's corps to assail Warren. 

The Union General, seeing his danger, sent out a strong 
force to meet and hold Hill in check, while he worked with 
feverish zeal to get his artillery across and into position. 
His men acted gallantly. Hill's corps was stopped, driven 




quarle's mill, north anna. 
back and pursued almost to its camp. When Wright came 
into position, all danger of misfortune was obviated, and the 
Federal line closed the neck of the peninsula formed by the 
two rivers. The fight between Warren and Hill had been 
very fierce. The musketry fire was exceedingly rapid and 
accurate. 



lee's impregnable position. 465 

But although Warren had won the field and taken five 
hundred prisoners, Grant now saw that Lee's army was in a 
position which was well nigh unassailable. He now per- 
ceived that he had a serious problem before him to dislodge 
Lee. For the. other corps were not able to cross the river 
as easily, and his arm}^ was thereby divided. Burnside 
reported it impossible to cross at Ox Ford. Hancock at the 
wooden bridge had found a strong body of troops intrenched 
on the left bank of the stream, and had sent two columns 
against it which, coming up at different points, had rushed 
over the works, and captured or killed or driven into the 
river the garrison. But he had not attempted to cross. Still 
Grant hoped in the morning to effect a crossing, and directed 
Hancock and Warren to send each a body of troops along 
the river to Ox Ford to assist Burnside. Burnside was 
directed to send one division across the river by way of 
Quarle's Ford which was about half way between Ox and 
Jericho Fords, to cooperate with Warren's left in the 
attempt to break the apex of Lee's camp. 

The orders were executed, but not with the hoped-for 
result. Hancock crossed with his corps, and ranged it for 
assault along the front of the Confederate right, and did 
make an assault at his extreme left, but without result, other 
than to learn that the works were exceedingly strong. 
Crittenden, leading the division sent by Burnside, crossed, 
and supported by Warren's corps, attempted the left centre 
of the Confederate works, but with no better result than 
Hancock had met. 

All the corps then intrenched and lay on their arms, 
waiting the Commander's pleasure. Their commanders re- 
ported to Grant the strength of Lee's works, and the latter 
decided not to assail them. He issued orders for their 
30 



466 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



retirement near the river. He hoped Lee would attack. 
For he felt confident that Hancock and Warren with Wright, 
could defeat any attempt upon them, and he desired, above 
all things, to engage in a battle. But Lee was prudent. 
He had his communications well guarded, his army in a 
secure place, and was not willing to risk a general battle in 




RIFLE PITS, NORTH ANNA. 



the open field. Seeing that his adversary would neither 
fight nor retreat. Grant now laid plans to flank him out of 
his camp. 

The Commander was already resolved to change his base 
of operations to the James, unless the fortune of war should 
serve his plans better than hitherto; but to do this, he must 



OFF FOR THE JAMES. 4G7 

first extricate his army from its delicate position. For it 
was in a delicate position; since, though it might be able to 
defeat any attack while it remained in its works, it was not 
to be hoped that Lee would allow it to withdraw and recross 
the river without attacking it while in the confusion of 
crossing. 

And now Grant showed the supreme genius of a tactician 
and a strategist — the Commander never better exhibited 
itself in him than at this time. The most adverse critics 
have praised the manner in which the huge army, without 
the loss of a man or a gun was taken out from under the 
enemy's guns, across a deep river, and sent on a successful 
flanking movement southward. First, to give unity to the 
army, the Commander issued an order placing Burnside's 
corps under the command of Meade, as were the other corps; 
and Burnside, though the senior officer, gracefully accepted 
the position of subordinate to Meade. Thus the army, 
through Meade, could be made to move as a body and without 
friction. Grant now directed that his base of supplies should 
be changed from Port Royal to White House on the Pamun- 
key, to accompany the movement. 

The withdrawal from Lee's front was accomplished as 
follows: First, Wilson's cavalry was sent out to the Federal 
right, threatening the crossings of Little River, so as to induce 
Lee to believe that the army was about to attempt a right 
flank movement. At the same time, Sheridan, who had just 
returned from his expedition, after defeating Stuart, almost 
capturing Richmond, and communicating with Butler, who 
was lying at Burmuda Hundred, shut up as in a " bottle 
tightly corked," according to Grant's terse report, advanced 
(late p. M. 26th), to Littlepage's Crossing, opposite Hanover- 
town, the objective point of this flank movement, and cap- 
tured the fords and bridges there. 



468 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



Second, all of Wright's and Warren's trains and artil- 
lery were withdrawn during the afternoon, and Wright's 
artillery and trains, together with one of his divisions, 
was dispatched in Sheridan's tracks, marching by night 
to the captured fords. To conceal the withdrawal of 
this division of Wright's corps, Warren's corps and the 
remainder of Wright's were stretched out to fill the deser- 




CROSSING THE NORTH ANNA. 

ted lines. Lee was completely deceived, watching Wilson's 
maneuvres, and holding himself ready to oppose any 
attempted crossing in that direction. Then, when night 
fell, Wright and Warren quickly and deftly withrew their 
entire corps to the east side of the Anna and marched to the 
rear of Burnside and Hancock. The most difficult part of 
the operation was completed. 

Third, at early morning next day (27th), Sheridan 
crossed the river and after a sharp battle with a body of the 



LEE DECEIVED. 469 

enemy at Hanovertown, captured and held the town. Mean- 
while, the whole army was moving rapidly down the river. 
Wright pursued a road leading along the left or east 
shore of the rivers Anna and Pamunkey: Warren traveled 
a parallel road further out to. the east, and the trains accom- 
panied him and traveled by roads still further east. And 
as soon as they were so far along as to be out of the way, 
Burnside's corps turned southward and followed Warren, 
while Hancock quickly withdrew to the east side, leaving 
pickets to deceive Lee, and followed Wright. Then Wilson, 
with his cavalry followed in the rear, guarding the fords and 
crqssings, and ready to stubbornly contest any effort Lee 
might make to pursue by crossing the Anna. 

Thus the great Union army, without the loss of a man, 
was consolidated, and was moving its masses quickly but 
orderly towards Hanovertown; while Lee, finding his an- 
tagonist suddenly gone, surprised and chagrined that he had 
got off without trouble, and much afraid that he would be 
found between the Capital and his own army, broke camp 
hurriedly and moved southward, heading towards Cold 
Harbor, and throwing out scouts to find the line of march of 
the Union army. So completely hidden had been the purpose 
of his antagonist, and so swift and stealthy his movements, 
that Lee was completely at a loss to know where he had 
gone. But the Federal army reached and crossed the Pa- 
munkey (28th) , leaving Burnside's corps temporarily on the 
east side to guard the trains, should Lee attempt to follow 
them. The other corps were formed in battle line, with 
their right resting on the Pamunkey and their line extending 
southward, Warren at the left, Hancock in the centre, and 
Wright touching the river, all facing westward, ready to 
meet Lee if he should attack from that direction. 



470 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 




Thus was Lee 
outflanked; thus 
was the Federal 
army moved 
again by the left 
flank, and now it 
was within twen- 
ty miles of Rich- 
mond. Between 
the20thand 26th 
Grant's losses 
amounted to lit- 
tle more than 
> one thousand 
I men. The Con- 
t. federate losses 
£ were heavier, 
I more prisoners 
I havingbeenlost. 
Warren, by his 
victory over Hill 
had almost re- 
gained Grant's 
favor. His corps 
was restored to 
him in full; but 
the Commander 
was careful not 
to place too 
much rel iance 
upon him in the 
future. As the 



Sheridan's movements. 471 

army had traveled forty miles by forced march smce break- 
ing camp, it was allowed to rest one day, while the cav- 
alry explored the roads leading towards Richmond. 

The army had now come, crossing the Matapony and 
its morasses, the Pamunkey and its swamps, to the lands 
leading down to the Chickahominy, and its hilly regions, 
its swampy wastes, and jungles of dwarf trees and shrub- 
bery. The hills were not hills in fact, but low ridges, inter- 
sected by ravines, and surrounded on all sides by low, 
swampy tracts, through which the Totopotomoy creek 
oozed slowly towards the Pamunkey. Pine woods, thick 
but low, covered most of the ground; and the jungles were 
so dense in places, with bushes, vines and creepers, that 
they were almost impenetrable. Two roads lead out from 
Hanover Ferry towards Richmond. The more northerly 
branches after a few miles, one branch leading to Meadow 
Bridge over the Chickahominy, and the other through 
Mechanicsville and across a bridge about two miles below 
Meadow Bridge. The more southerly of the two, after 
passing southward through Old and New Cold Harbor, 
crosses the river at New Bridge. 

The country along the more northerly road was open and 
less difficult for an army than the southern route; and for 
that reason the Federal army was advanced first along it. 
But Lee was found to have taken position across it and 
along the Totopotomoy creek near Atlee's Station, and was 
so strongly and advantageously intrenched that it would 
be difficult to advance in that direction. Sheridan, push- 
ing out from Hanovertown (28th), advanced as far as 
Hawse's Shop, situated at the point where the Mechanics- 
ville Road branches from the Meadow Bridge Road. 
There he found a body of Confederate cavalry, dismounted 



472 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and intrenched. With one division he was unable to dis- 
lodge them; but, when his other divisions came up, he was 
victorious. 

The contest took upon itself the nature of a battle before 
it ended, each side losing more than five hundred men. It 
convinced Grant that Lee was ready. Lee had indeed, 
now been able to ascertain the position of his antagonist 
by means of scouts; and, though he had not come in time to 
oppose the crossing of the Pamunkey, he took up a strong 
position along the Totopotomoy, reaching from Atlee's 
Station southward towards Bethesda Church, his line being 
in the form of an arc, with its centre and left resting along 
the before-mentioned creek. Here he halted to await his 
antagonist's further movement. The greater part of his 
cavalry, after the affair at Hawse's Shop, he sent to his right 
wing, rightly judging that the Federal cavalry would push 
out to the southwest, and anxious to be beforehand with 
Grant in the seizure of strategical points. 

Grant, on his part, perceiving that the enemy was again 
across his path, moved Warren out to the southward to a 
point about three miles south of the Totopotomoy; and, 
designing to move upon Cold Harbor, caused his cavalry to 
forge ahead in that direction. Cold Harbor, the Old and 
New, the one some distance northeast from the other, was 
a strategical point, owing to the fact that several roads con- 
verge to it. The roads on which the two armies, closely 
watching each other, were drifting southward by side move- 
ments, and the roads from White House and other points 
east, pass through it to the south, and towards Richmond. 
Hence it was an important point. Lee had already sent a 
small force of cavalry to occupy Old Cold Harbor, but as 
Grant's movements were very threatening along the line of 



WARREN DEFEATS EARLY. 473 

the Totopotomoy, he thought a battle would happen there, 
and hence kept his cavalry close in upon the wings of the 
army. 

When the present movement began from the North 
Anna, Grant had sent orders to General Butler directing 
him to send Smith's corps from the James to White 
House, whence it should come to join the army of the 
Potomac, He felt the need of reinforcements, as he knew 
Lee was receiving large reinforcements daily from the 
Capital close by; and he now began to make dispositions 
for the protection of Smith who w^ould come up along the 
Pamunkey and be exposed to any sudden attack that Lee 
might choose to make upon him. In order to keep Lee's 
attention, while Sheridan and Smith were performing their 
movements, he directed Hancock to move up close to the 
enemy's lines, while Warren was pushed still further south- 
ward. Burnside's corps was drawn back to the rear of 
Hancock's corps so as to be ready for emergencies (29th). 

During the next day Warren came in contact with the 
Confederate right under Early, who attempted to turn his 
flank, and well nigh succeeded, compelling his front 
divisions to fall back in haste. Grant, in order to relieve 
the pressure on Warren until he should be able to get all 
his divisions into action, directed Hancock to assault the 
enemy in his front. The order was obeyed with spirit, and 
outlying rifle-pits were captured. This drew Lee's atten- 
tention. Warren, having brought his troops into position, 
now advanced, and drove Early swiftly back about one mile 
to his works, 

Lee made no further movement of offense, but contented 
himself with changing his front so as to bar the progress of 
the Federals southward. On this day Smith landed at 




Jl 



p474 



SHERIDAN SEIZES COLD HARBOR. 475 

White House and began his progress up the Pamunkey. 
Also the Union cavalry had a sharp battle with a detach- 
ment of the enemy's cavalry at the extreme left. Next day 
Sheridan dashed upon Cold Harbor; and, while with one 
division he assailed in front, with another, by a detour, he 
assailed the place in rear, and scattered the force that 
sought to hold it. The Confederates were reinforced and 
sought to retake the place, but without avail. Sheridan 
caused the works to be turned, and held them against all 
attempts. 

Grant, meanwhile, had drawn out Wright's corps and 
dispatched it with all haste to Sheridan's aid, sending or- 
ders to Sheridan to hold the place at all hazards. Sheridan, 
before receiving the order, thought the enemy was pushing 
a column in between him and the main army, and began to 
retreat, but, when he received the order, dismounted his 
force, strengthened the captured works, and informed his 
men that the place must be held. He was not molested 
during the night; but, in the morning, he was assailed twice 
very fiercely, and was in much danger. He succeeded in 
holding out till Wright, after a long, fatiguing march, came 
into the works. Grant also directed'Smith, who had been 
delayed by taking a wrong road, to join Wright at Cold 
Harbor. 

Lee, believing that Grant was aiming to concentrate his 
forces at this point, drew out Anderson's corps from its 
trenches and dispatched it along the rear of his army to a po- 
sition west of Cold Harbor, and made arrangements to follow 
with the other corps so as to anticipate Grant in securing 
advantageous positions. Grant perceived the movement of 
Anderson, and directed Warren, along whose front its move- 
ments were first observed, to assault him, and ordered Wright 



476 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

to attack the enemy as soon as he should be found near Cold 
Harbor, in order that he might not be allowed to intrench. 
But Warren, instead of attacking with troops, opened only 
with artillery fire which, while it accelerated Anderson's mo- 
tion, did not hurt him much. Nor could Wright accomplish 
much, his corps being worn and tired from its march and its 
own position not secured. Anderson, therefore, took a 
position west of Wright and immediately intrenched. Smith 
arrived late in the afternoon (June ist). He brought about 
ten thousand good troops, a welcome addition to the army 
at that time. Wright and Smith, obeying the command at 
last, did, late in the afternoon, assault and carry some of 
Anderson's outworks, capturing several hundred prisoners, 
but were not able to do more. Grant was bitterly disap- 
pointed. Had Warren attacked Anderson with men, his 
progress would have been stopped, and Wright and Smith 
could have swung in on Lee's right flank. Afterwards had 
Wright advanced vigorously to New Cold Harbor, he could 
have assailed the enemy before they were intrenched. 

Both armies were at this time stretched over a line 
nine miles in length, and both Commanders exerted 
themselves during the night to concentrate their forces to a 
line having Cold Harbor for its centre. Old Cold Harbor 
being in possession of the Federals and New Cold Harbor 
in that of the Confederates. Grant's desire was to bring 
on a battle at the earliest moment, and, if possible, before 
Lee could thoroughly fortify. Lee's desire was to avoid a 
contest until his breastworks were thrown up and artillery in 
position. 

The ground won by Smith and Wright during the after- 
noon (ist June), was of much importance to Grant; for, 
through it passed roads to the southward which he used 



PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE. 



477 



later in his movement to the James River. During the 
night, Lee kept up a series of attacks and feints, sometimes 

almost forcing a battle in order to deceive his enemy into 
the belief that his army was there and ready for battle, 
while his working parties industriously threw up intrench- 
ments. Hancock was withdrawn from the extreme right, 
and directed by Grant to take position at Old Cold Harbor. 

Smith and Wright moved more to the left, thus extending 
the line to the Chickahominy, along which Sheridan, with 
two divisions of cavalry stood guard, while Wilson, with an- 
other cavalry division, operated on the right. It was Grant's 
design to turn the Confederate right, and to make his 
heaviest attack on that part of Lee's position. Warren 
then became the right of the Union army, Burnside's corps 
being refused and massed at the right and rear of his corps. 
An assault was ordered to be made as soon as Hancock 
should be in position. But in spite of all night marching 
and great exertions, the bad roads and hot weather so 
delayed Hancock and exhausted the troops, that Grant was 
compelled to change his design of attacking in the morning 
(2d), and directed the attack to be made at five o'clock in 
the afternoon. 

Lee noted the fact that his antagonist was placing the 
bulk of his army on the left, and to prevent too heavy con- 
centration of force against his right, he caused several au- 
dacious feints to be made upon the Union right, even going 
so far as to attack Burnside's corps. The attacks were 
promptly repulsed, but were not followed up by counter- 
attacks. Grant, exasperated at the inaction of his corps 
commanders, ordered that the next like assault should be 
followed up, even by a rush over the Confederate lines. 

Meanwhile, both Generals studied the problem before 



478 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

them. Grant sent Sheridan down the Chickahominy to 
examine the roads, and received a report that they were 
dry and passable. He was already laying plans for the 
transfer of his army to the James. He was very doubtful of 
success in the battle he was resolved to give here. He was 
loth to leave the north side of the Chickahominy without 
a decisive action. Whether it could be fought here, he 
could not tell. 

The position of the enemy was so well masked, that 
while their general position was known, their strength could 
not be seen. All reconnoitering parties were repelled so 
fiercely, that nothing could be learned without a demonstra- 
tion in force. From the corps commanders Grant could 
learn little more than he could see, but all thought that some 
points of the enemy's line were weak, and that an assault 
would succeed. The fact was, that Lee had so strong a 
picket line, that the Federal officers thought it was his main 
battle line, and did not reckon upon the distance required 
to be passed over, crossing which their men would be 
exposed to a terrible fire. 

A part of Lee's lines occupied the face and crest of a 
long, low ridge, the same on which he had won his victory 
over Porter almost two years ago, but which he now held 
instead of the Federals. The marshy border of the Chicka- 
hominy was guarded by a strong picket line. The hill, 
ascending gently a few hundred yards from the stream till 
it reached a point half a mile north, thence trended away to 
the northwest into a broad table-land, along the brow of 
which the Confederate line ran, with morasses and jungles 
of scrub and creeper in front. Between Old and New Cold 
Harbor the line passed through a swamp, and thence, about 
two miles northward, over broken ground, following, as near 



BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 479 

as the conformation of the ground would permit, the edges 
of morasses and banks of ravines. 

Lee chose his position so that it would be concealed as 
much as possible amidst the thickets and behind the ridges, 
while in front should be open ground and swamps. Along 
the front of his centre and right, two hundred yards of 
open ground lay between his and the Union lines. It was 
across this that Grant intended his assault to pass, so that it 
should not be broken by the jungles of trees, vines and grass 
on other parts of the field. But, unfortunately for his 
design, Lee massed the strength of his army here and 
planted the heaviest of his cannon. 

The Confederate lines were double, the outer being close 
to the edge of the covering trees and swamps, and occupied 
only by a very strong skirmish line ; while the main line was 
back further, and was so arranged that at many points cross 
fires would sweep the earth, and the range of the guns was 
unimpeded by any natural obstacles. At all points the trees 
had been felled before the works, and formed into an abattis. 

Along the face of the ridge at the right for several hun- 
dred yards, a sunken road passed, in which troops were 
placed, and it proved quite as serviceable as a regularly 
made trench. The ditches and embankments raised by Lee 
presented the appearance of walls of forts, so high and 
strong were they, and through them peered two hundred 
heavy cannon, while between seventy and eighty thousand 
men stood ready to defend them. To assault these Grant 
had about one hundred thousand men, a force suiiftcient, 
indeed, it seemed, to warrant an attempt upon the strong 
position, but, as events proved, not strong enough to over- 
come the line of forts that Lee had raised. 

Grant's design was to break through Lee's right wing, 



480 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

and, if possible, cut his communications with Richmond. 
Hence, he directed that Hancock, Wright and Smith should 
carry forward the principal attack, while Warren and Burn- 
side should attack at the right with sufficient persistence to 
restrain Lee from massing against the main assault. His 
general orders were, also, that wherever the enemy should 
be forced to retire he should be followed, and that each 
corps commander should concentrate to the point where the 
impression should be made. 

As the second day of June was too far gone, because of 
the difficulty the corps experienced in getting to their 
positions, for the assault to be made, the order to attack was 
modified, and the assault directed to take place at half-past 
four o'clock next morning. Lee, noting the fact that Burn- 
side had been drawn in at the rear and right flank of 
Warren's corps, and believing this portended a serious 
assault at some portion of his line other than the left, 
directed General Early to make serious demonstrations 
against Warren's extreme right, and if feasible, turn it. 
Early soon made such dispositions in that direction that 
Grant was compelled, in order to guard against a flank 
attack, to direct Burnside to take up his line on the right 
again, and so modified his orders for assault as to direct 
Burnside to attack in unison with the other corps. Thus 
the assault, when made in the morning, became almost a 
general battle along the whole line, but the main effort was 
made as before directed. 

Wilson's cavalry was ordered to operate against the left 
and rear of Lee's army, while Sheridan guarded the Federal 
left flank and the bridges and fords of the Chickahominy. 
The points of attack of each corps being left to their 
respective commanders, Hancock directed two divisions 



DREADFUL SLAUGHTER. 



481 




toward the sunken road 
before mentioned, and 
Smith and Wright took 
advantage of ravines and 
low ridges in their front. 
The assault began 
promptly as ordered, and 
during the three hours 
following, the most terri- 
ble slaughter took place. 
For, though the Federals 
gallantly carried the 
outer line of rifle pits and 
§ at some points reached 
i and broke over the main 

2 defence line, they were 
^exposed during the time 

3 they were crossmg the 
< space before them, to the 

most pitiless discharge 
of grape, canister and 
musketry. The fire of 
the enemy's gunners was 
swift and deadly. Having 
unobstructed range for 
their guns, they deliber- 
ately, from behind the pro- 
tection of their works 
struck down the assail- 
ants by hundreds and 
thousands. 

Hancock captured sev- 



31 



482 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

eral hundred prisoners and three cannon, but could not 
accomplish more. His troops were re-formed and sent 
forward several times, but as often they were compelled 
to retire. Grant had given the corps commanders strict 
injunctions, since he did not know the strength of the 
enemy's position, that they should retire at once upon 
becoming satisfied that the works were too strong. 
The morasses, the thickets, the ditches, and the roads 
were thickly strewn with the dead and wounded. Nearly 
seven thousand National troops fell upon the bloody field 
killed or wounded. 

The corps commanders were called before the Lieuten- 
ant-General, and their opinion of the strength of the works 
asked. Having satisfied himself that the position could not 
be carried without a greater loss of life than could be af- 
forded, the Commander then ordered the assault to cease, 
and the army to entrench along the advanced line it had 
taken. 

Lee's loss was about one-third that of his opponent. 
Again he had saved his army and beaten off the enemy. 
He had given Grant the most decided repulse that he had 
sustained in any conflict since the siege of Vicksburg, and 
that, too, without proportionate loss to his own army. 

If General Grant ever made a false movement during 
his career as a warrior, it was here. But there were many 
circumstances which warranted the assault. First, his army 
was the stronger. Second, the strength of the works was 
concealed. Third, success here meant the fall of Rich- 
mond and the destruction of Lee's army. It was not in 
keeping with the character of the campaign, that the army 
should be transferred from this line to another without an 
effort. Fourth, the Nation would not have approved the 



RESULTS OF BATTLE. 4S3 

transfer of operations to the James without a battle, and it 
expected the Commander to do his best to accomplish the 
object for which he had set out before entering upon a new 
line. 

The repulse did not approach the proportions of a 
defeat; for the army was at all times in condition to renew 
the battle, and in a few hours to have made new advance 
movements. Nor did it give Lee any advantage; for he 
did not dare to come out to attack in turn. But it had a 
depressing effect upon the morale of the Federal army, and 
a corresponding inspiriting effect upon the Confederate 
host. " Von Moltke at Gravelotte and Napoleon at Heilsburg, 
and Wellington at Badajos," says one authority, "suffered 
worse repulses than did Grant here; yet afterwards were 
victorious." So with Grant — he was not discouraged though 
compelled to take up the alternative plan which he had 
formerly laid down. He had taken works as strong at 
Donelson, had overcome strong lines at Spottsylvania, and 
had not been beaten in any action as yet. But here he 
came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to break 
through the lines which his skillful adversary had thrown in 
his way without a greater loss of life than the success would 
warrant. 

The battle proper did not last more than three hours 
though the firing and desultory conflicts did not cease 
till noon; and at night Lee withdrew his left wing from its 
advanced position and refused it somewhat, in order to 
guard againt any flank attack that might be attempted, and 
also to shorten and strengthen his battle line preparatory to 
further attack. The operations of Wilson's division of 
cavalry also hastened this movement. The armies had been 
fighting, marching and maneuvering now about thirty days, 



484 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 

and the roar of Northern guns was again heard at Rich- 
mond, causing great panic and apprehension there. 

The defensive works around the city were placed in 
good condition and troops were called from various parts of 
the country to the defence of the Capital. All around — 
Grant, at the east and northeast, Hunter at the northwest, 
Sherman farther west, and Butler at the south — was the 
circle of fire approaching, moved by one mind to a central 
point. Only the most heroic exertions could save the Con- 
federate Capital and put off the day of doom, and these 
exertions the Government and its leaders were prepared to 
put forth. 

Grant received news at this time of the movements of 
his other armies. Hunter was advancing rapidly up the 
Shenandoah; Sherman was steadily pushing the western 
army; Butler reported that he had occupied Petersburg, but 
had lost it again. Grant now set in motion the various 
bodies which should accomplish the removal to Petersburg. 

In order that his army might not be impeded by the 
enemy's cavalry and that Lee might turn his attention from 
the proposed route, he directed Sheridan with two of the 
three divisions of the cavalry corps, to march out by the 
right flank northwestward as far as Gordonsville, destroy 
the railroads and try to form a junction with Hunter near 
Charlottesville, when both should work towards and destroy 
the Lynchburg canal, and cut the roads in rear of Rich- 
mond. If Sheridan could not join Hunter, he was directed 
to return by any feasible route to the army, but to continue 
operations on that line until the main army should have 
time to reach the James. Grant had no doubt that Lee 
would detach largely to follow Sheridan, giving him less 
force to face in his swift movement. Nor was he mistaken. 



THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES. 485 

For Lee at once sent Hampton, with the cavalry, after Sheri- 
dan, and Breckinridge, with a division of infantry, towards 
Gordonsville. 

Sheridan met, and, after stubborn fighting, defeated 
Hampton in two battles near Trevillian Station; but, as 
Hunter did not turn towards Charlottesville, and as Breck- 
inridge, having a shorter route had already reached Gor- 
donsville, he turned to retrace his way to the army (June 12) . 
But he succeeded in the main object of his march. For 
Grant, after ordering Butler to be ready as soon as Smith's 
corps should arrive, to capture Petersburg, having quietly 
sent that corps by way of White House and the James to 
City Point for the purpose of getting it upon the ground 
before Lee could perceive his intention and forestall him, 
set his army in motion. 

First, he caused the bridges and fords of the Chicka- 
hominy to be fortified and well guarded for several miles 
from his left wing down stream, and caused the cavalry 
remaining with him to move down to and seize Long Bridge. 
Quietly withdrawing his right wing from its trenches he 
placed it along the river to hold that against any attempt 
that Lee might make to cross. 

Second, the centre and the left wing were also with- 
drawn from the lines, and sent with all possible speed down 
the east side of the river to Long Bridge. A part of the 
cavalry was also employed in guarding the rear and the 
trains which, meanwhile, had been sent by roads farther 
east to Long Bridge. After crossing at Long Bridge, the 
advance corps at once formed a battle line, facing towards 
Richmond, and the rear corps was then withdrawn and 
crossed. 

The whole army, with the exception of part of the train 



486 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

which was at White House, was thus transferred to the south 
side of the Chickahominy (13th). As no enemy appeared 
to molest, the corps and train marched by parallel 
roads to the James at and near Cole's Ferry. The cavalry 
so completely covered the rear that the Confederate army 
and its scouts did not know where the enemy had gone. 
Lee was completely deceived. His attention was first 
directed towards Sheridan. He thought Grant contem- 
plated a movement by the right flank. But as Grant made 
no movement in that direction, he turned his attention to 
getting up reinforcements and perfecting his lines of de- 
fence. He did not note the absence of the Federal army 
from his front until the rear corps was rapidly disappearing 
down the river. Then, after a hasty examination, he came 
to the conclusion that Grant was crossing below and was 
endeavoring to get in between him and Richmond by 
another left detour. 

He hastily drew out his army and hurried into and 
through the outer defence lines of Richmond, and, arriving 
at White Oak Swamp, sent out reconnoitering parties to 
find his enemy. But these parties were held off at such dis- 
tance by the Union cavalry and so sharply attacked that 
Lee was persuaded Grant was simply forming beyond 
the swamp for an advance to Richmond. Nor was he 
undeceived, till he learned that the army was crossing the 
James and that a strong force was advancing against Peters- 
burg. 

Then, divining Grant's intention, he dropped all impedi- 
ments and hastened by forced marches and by means of the 
railroad to Petersburg, upon the keeping of which depended 
the life of Richmond. For all but one of the railroads 
which enter Richmond pass through or are so closely con- 



488 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

nected with Petersburg, that possession of the city would 
give possession of the supply lines of the Capital. 

With the crossing of the James ended the overland cam- 
paign, during which more sanguijiary fighting with less 
decisive results, was done than during any campaign of this 
war. It had been half the time battle, half the time 
maneuvering for position. Four distinct conflicts, made up 
of many battles had occurred, in which neither side could 
claim the victory. The Union army had lost in killed, 
wounded and missing, about thirty-nine thousand men; the 
Confederates not so many by perhaps ten or fifteen 
thousand, although on account of lying rumors and falsified 
reports, and the errors of commission as well as of omission 
on the part of partisan historians, the numbers of the losses 
on both sides have been magnified or diminished to suit the 
argument. But from the most reliable data, and the witness 
of most impartial historians, the figures given above are held 
to be most nearly correct. 

The losses were in direct proportion to the size of the 
armies and the conditions under which they fought. The 
Federals lost most heavily because they were the aggressors 
and fought uncovered much of the time against breast- 
works, while the Confederates were on the defensive and 
covered with works except in a few instances. The battles 
were bloody; but, in none of them did so many men fall as 
in some of the terrible battles of the wars in the old world. 
Waterloo could count the fall of more men. Even Gettys- 
burg was scarce equalled. Yet for stubborn fighting, for 
bravery and skill shown, and for losses sustained during the 
hours of battle, this campaign has never been surpassed. 

Forty-three days had Grant held his great army in hand, 
and rolled it southward; and that long had Lee stood at 



PETERSBURG. 



489 



bay, guarding the roads to Richmond. During all this time, 
except during the days in the Wilderness, Grant had kept 
the offensive, and Lee the defensive. Lee had demon- 
strated that his chief ability lay in defensive operations. 
Grant added new evidences of his ability to conduct an 
offensive campaign. And so genius met genius, valor met 
valor, skill met skill, and breastworks having made the 
forces equal, the result was a draw. 




PETERSBURG. 



Petersburg, destined to become famous because of the 
siege which it was about to sustain, lies on the south bank of 
the Appomatox River, about six miles above the junc- 
tion of this stream with the James River, and is about 
twenty miles south of Richmond. It was an important 
strategical point, because through it, as before observed, 
passed the railways and roads over which flowed the 
supplies furnished by the people of the country south and 



490 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

west of the Capital. The principal portion of the supplies 
for the Army of Northern Virginia came from these dis- 
tricts. Should it fall, Lee would have to evacuate Rich- 
mond and seek a line further west; and Grant desired this 
as much as to capture the Capital, since then, the Confeder- 
ate armies would be confined to a small area, and with Sher- 
man's army on the west and his own on the east, the Con- 
federacy would be between two stones which would grind 
it to powder. 

The city had been elaborately fortified during the earlier 
part of the war, and at this time (15th June, 1864) , was gar- 
risoned by about twenty-two hundred men under General 
Beauregard. The neck of Bermuda Hundred was also 
strongly fortified, done so to hold Butler safely "corked as 
in a bottle," according to Grant's description of the situa- 
tion, and General Hoke with ten or twelve thousand men 
held the line of fortifications. 

Grant, before beginning the transfer of his army to the 
James, had directed Butler to seize Petersburg, as before 
noticed, and had dispatched Smith by water to him so that 
he should be able to do so. Smith arrived at City Point at 
the rear of Butler's army in due time (14th), and was 
directed at once to advance upon Petersburg. Every hour 
was as precious at this time as days had been during the 
campaign thus far; but Smith, owing to lack of preparation 
by Butler, and his own slowness, lost many hours. Never- 
theless, next morning he advanced, crossing the Appomatox 
at Point-of-Rocks, and continuing leisurely till he struck the 
outworks of Petersburg. A small picket-guard with a rifle 
pit and a battery here confronted him, and he, instead of at 
once driving over it, stopped several hours to reconnoitre. 

Meanwhile, Grant had arrived at the James in person. 



i 



ATTACK ON PETERSBURG. 491 

and Hancock's corps was being transported over the river. 
This corps had orders to at once advance to Smith's aid, and 
without waiting to get all his rations distributed, Hancock 
advanced to the front. Delay in transmitting orders to him, 
however, kept him so long at the crossing, that it was late 
in the afternoon before he reached the Appomatox, and 
night when he arrived on the field. Smith, meanwhile, had 
at last disposed his men, driven the enemy out of the works 
in his front, and captured the outworks of the main line. 
He even now had the town at his mercy had he continued 
his advance, but he contented himself with holding what he 
had gained and sending for Hancock. 

In the assault on the outworks he lost six hundred men 
killed and wounded, witnessing the fact that Beauregard 
was alive to the importance of holding this point. Beaure- 
gard now sent to Hoke, at Bermuda Hundred, for troops, 
and that General responded by sending enough reinforce- 
ments to increase his force to ten thousand men during the 
night. Hancock, although senior in rank, allowed Smith to 
retain command, and offered him two divisions to aid in 
capturing the town ; but Smith, instead of continuing the 
advance, relieved his own troops with these, and only con- 
tinued to hold the works he had gained. During the night, 
Beauregard threw up a strong interior line of works, re- 
ported to Lee the situation, and disposed his men as best 
he could, Hancock assumed command next morning. 

Grant, hearing of Smith's failure, directed Butler to 
advance upon the Confederate lines in front of Bermuda 
Hundred, and he himself went to the front at Peters- 
burg, after directing Meade to bring up the other corps of 
his army at once. Hancock advanced during the morning, 
and stormed a redan, capturing a part of the rifle-pits con- 



492 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

nected with it. Grant afterwards, during the day, believing 
that Hancock would do his duty, and Meade having also 
arrived on the field, returned again to City Point, fearful 
that Lee would, in coming across the James, turn aside to 
fall upon Bermuda Hundred, and wishing to be at that place 
to attend to the matter of receiving and forwarding the 
corps as they came across the river. 

During the afternoon desperate fighting occurred before 
Petersburg. Hancock stormed and carried another redan, 
and so much of the main line of the fortifications as to make 
them untenable. But Beauregard's troops fought with great 
courage and obstinacy, and night came before the Federals 
could reach the town. During the night, Beauregard caused 
the main works to be abandoned, and fell back into the new 
and shorter line, which he had caused to be raised and 
strengthened during the day. 

And now Lee was coming, urging his troops to their best 
speed, and during the night approached the beleaguered 
town. Butler had, meanwhile, captured a part of the works 
which had hemmed him in so long at Bermuda Hundred, 
but Lee deflected a part of his force under Pickett, as they 
hurried to Petersburg, with orders to recapture these. 
Pickett (17th, A M.) fiercely assaulted Butler's troops, and 
after a desperate struggle, recaptured their works and the 
railroad which they guarded. Anderson's corps rushed 
into the works of Petersburg just as it seemed they must 
yield to Meade's repeated assaults. The last assault on the 
works was then repulsed with loss (i8th), and the attempt 
tQ seize Petersburg had failed. The failure was due to the 
slowness of Smith, whose caution made him reconnoitre 
works held by a force scarce larger than a picket guard 
of the Army of the Potomac, which he might have brushed 



I 



grant's plans thwarted. 493 

from his path easily, and this for several hours, during 
which he could have marched to the Appomatox Bridge at 
the Town crossing. 

Grant was extremely disappointed. He had every rea- 
son to believe that Smith and Hancock, having with them 
forty thousand men, would accomplish the task assigned 
them with ease. They had all the time necessary. For Lee 
did not know where the attack had fallen until twenty-four 
hours after Smith had faced the first Confederate works 
before the town. /\nd even on the next and succeeding days, 
there was no good reason why Petersburg was not captured. 
It should have been taken, even with double the loss sus- 
tained, which, during the three days, amounted to nearly 
six thousand men. On the last day (i8th), the Confederate 
army was sixty thousand strong in the city, and the works 
were being strengthened until they were well nigh impreg- 
nable to assault. 

Grant's logistics were excellent. The withdrawal of the 
army from Cold Harbor, hidden by the cavalry, the crossing 
of the James, a river here nearly a mile wide, without the 
loss of a man or a wagon, the sending of Smith with power 
to take Petersburg, and Hancock to help him hold it after 
the capture, and. the subsequent movements of Butler in aid, 
and of Burnside and Wright to the front, was one of the 
most masterly combinations of the war. But Smith failed 
to seize the objective point, and Butler failed to retain his 
hold on the works between the objective and that which 
depended upon it, while Hancock, whose old wound, break- 
ing out, disabled him in part, so that he had to relinquish 
the command of his corps a little later, did not display the 
energy which the execution of Grant's plan demanded. 
Knowing that his design of seizing the strategic point had 



494 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

been foiled by his own generals, neither of whom he there- 
after trusted with important movements, the Lieutenant- 
General resolved to stop here and try the virtue of siege 
operations, and to endeavor to capture the Confederate 
army by surrounding it with bodies of men it could not reach 
and by cutting off its communications with the States of 
the Confederacy. 

With almost magic swiftness fortifications arose around 
the beleagured city. Lee, seeing the enemy stop and begin 
to fortify, redoubled his exertions to make the city imper- 
vious to assault. This was really the siege of Richmond, 
and Lee realized that here the final contest must take place. 
Here his policy of fighting behind works would be con- 
tinued with all the advantages which a besieged point could 
desire. The river, furnishing water, the railroads and pike 
roads, communicating with the richest parts of the Con- 
federacy and drawing supplies from all, and further the 
likelihood that Grant would not swing out and cut connec- 
tion with his last, most southern base of supplies, which 
another left-flank movement would demand, all combined 
to induce this belief. The line of defence really included 
Richmond, beginning on the James above, encircling the 
Capital by an eastward sweep; again, touching the James 
near Chapin's Farm, opposite Drury's Bluff; thence extend- 
ing across the neck of the peninsula of Bermuda Hundred to 
the Appomatox River at a point northeast of Petersburg; 
thence by a southwestward sweep to the Weldon Railroad — 
the inner line turning northward again to the Appomatox, 
at the point where the Jerusalem Plank Road intersected 
the outer works, and ending at the Appomatox, above Peters- 
burg. But, as it was Lee's intention to guard against Grant's 
evident designs to capture and cut the railroads south and 



496 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

southwest of Petersburg, he caused several different lines of 
fortifications, now and later, to be erected south and west, 
extending beyond the inner line many miles in that direction. 

The fortifications about Richmond proper, were triple, 
the outer line following the ridge of low bluffs overlooking 
the Chickahominy, and at a general distance of six miles 
from the city; the second, at a general distance of three 
miles; and the third, about one and a half miles out. The 
outer works were very elaborate. They ^consisted of a 
series of forts, mounting batteries, with connecting works of 
parapet and ditch, and with chevaux-de-frise, abbattis and 
rifle pits for pickets in front and under range of the bat- 
teries. From the position of the various forts, cross-fires 
could be had, and more than one battery turned upon any 
given point. Covered galleries, bomb-proofs and embank- 
ments afforded protection. Mines, for the purpose of 
entrapping the enemy's sappers and to discover counter- 
mines were run wherever there might be a possibility of 
danger. The lines across Bermuda Hundred and around 
Petersburg were of the same nature. The second line was a 
continuous work, mounting several batteries, and capable of 
being further armed, in casethe first line should be pierced. 

The inner line was a series of detached works covering 
the principal avenues of approach to the city. But the 
works before Petersburg assumed the proportions of a fort 
along their whole extent and were much stronger and more 
elaborate, at the end of the siege, than those north of the 
James. At intervals of two or three hundred yards, batter- 
ies were thrown forward as salients, bastions, demi-bastions 
and lunettes, and all were united by lines of parapets, and 
ditches, while in front, the abbattis and chevaux-de-frise 
were strong and not easily to be removed. The batteries were 



THE OPPOSING LINES. 497 

like forts, on the sides toward the enemy, but open at the rear 
to permit free passage to the garrison. In front of all were 
rifle pits for pickets, which were fully as strong as an ordi- 
nary field intrenchment. 

Such were the fortifications behind which Lee was able 
during nine long months of seige, to hold his own against 
the efforts of the first captain of the age. The Federal 
works were similar, but more compact, and the batteries 
were real forts capable of holding their own in case the line 
might be pierced and the}^ taken in rear, being, unlike the 
Confederate batteries or forts, entirely inclosed. 

The Federal line soon ran parallel to that of the enemy's 
from a point near Deep Bottom, north of the James, across 
Bermuda Hundred almost to the Weldon Road; and it was 
Grant's policy to steadily extend his left wing so as to over- 
lap Lee's right. During the nine months of siege, this 
stretching process went on till Hatcher's Run was reached, 
and Five Forks, where at last the Confederate line was 
broken to pieces. The embankments of the fortifications 
were at points ten feet high, and similar to those made use 
of at Vicksburg, though perhaps more elaborate. At some 
points the hostile lines were not more than two hundred 
yards apart, and the distance varied from this to a mile or 
more. 

The Army of the James held the lines north of the 
Appomatox, from that river across to Deep Bottom north 
of the James, Butler commanding. The Army of the Poto- 
mac, Meade commanding, held the lines from the Appo- 
matox southwestward. Over all Grant presided; and his 
attention was not only given to every movement of corps 
but to those even of divisions; and besides extended all 
over the country where armed forces were moving. Burn- 
32 



498 THE LIVES And campaigns of grant and lee. 

side's corps touched the Appomatox; next at his left was 
Warren; next Birney, now commanding the corps formerly 
under Hancock, and at the extreme left was Wright's corps. 

These positions were afterwards changed as often as 
occasion demanded, but they were generally held by the 
corps mentioned during the inactive parts of the siege. 
The right wing north of the James was bent around to the 
rear till it rested upon the James at Malvern Hill, thus 
obviating the danger of having its flank attacked, and yet 
holding a point on the northern shore from which to 
threaten Richmond. The left wing also was similarly 
refused, in order to guard against surprises, while the cav- 
alry scoured the country and watched. Lee's cavalry was 
held generally at the rear of the right wing, or opposed to 
the Federal cavalry wherever it appeared. 

Grant was not content to sit down at once to a siege, 
although so great works were erected, but sought to seize 
the Weldon Road. For this purpose he directed Wright to 
form his corps facing westward, move out, and seize that 
road and Intrench. Also he directed Birney to extend his 
left wing so as to retain connection with Wright, and to main- 
tain a continuous line. But unluckily, Birney's corps swung 
too far northward in its extension movement, while Wright 
did not move out so as to retain connection, thus placing 
Birney's left In air. Lee saw his opportunity (22d June) ; 
and, although he had thought it almost Impossible to hold 
connection with the Weldon Road any longer, he hurried a 
strong body of troops into the opening between Birney and 
Wright and caused much confusion, capturing sixteen hun- 
dred prisoners and forcing Birney back to his former 
position. But Weight hurried up supports and stopped the 
retrograde movement; and ne'xt morning, having completed 



WILSON S CAVALRY DEFEATD. 



499 



a junction with Birne3''s left, he pushed the enemy rapidl}^ 
back to their own Hnes. During the night, Wright was 
draw^n back some distance by Meade, and directed to 
intrench. The Union \vorking parties, however, could now 
reach the Weldon Road. 

Meanwhile farther southwest another battle had been 
brought on by the cavalry under V/ilson, which, pursuant to 
Grant's orders, had swung far out to the southwest and cut 
the railroads, even tearing up a part of the Southside Road. 







A MORTAR BATTERY. 



Grant had directed Wilson to cut these roads and then to 
move on tow-ards Lynchbarg and either to join Hunter in 
his southward march or Sheridan, who had been directed 
also upon that point, or to return at his discretion. Wilson, 
after destroying a part of the roads, thought it best to 
return, as the Confederate cavalry was gathering around 
him. Hampton's cavalry, w^hich had been following Sheri- 
dan, now hurriedly came against Wilson, and reinforced by 
a strong body of infantry', met and gave him a disastrous 



500 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

defeat on the Nottoway River, capturing his trains and sep- 
arating his brigades. The different brigades escaped by 
different routes, one joining Wright at Reams' Station, 
M^hom Grant had sent to Wilson's aid, and the other into 
the Union Hnes by a wide southern detour. Wilson had 
fifty-five hundred men with him when he started, but lost a 
thousand of them. 

By the last of June, fighting for position was done, and 
the army sat down to a siege, which should become as 
famous as the sieges of Sebastopol, Saragossa or London- 
derry, although it was carried on in a different manner 
from all these. Grant, recognizing the strength of the 
enemy's works, wrote to the Government to send him all 
available troops, and that all new levies should be sent either 
to him or to Sherman, and all garrisons should be cut down 
and the men sent to the army in the field. For, while he 
had men enough to resist any attack upon himself, he had 
not enough to warrant attacks upon the Confederate works, 
or to hold his present lines and attempt the extension of his 
left wing so as to outflank Lee's position. Sheridan, at this 
time, returned to the army, coming by way of White House 
and bringing with him the remaining trains. He brought 
the trains through safely, although one division under 
Gregg had to fight a stubborn battle with a part of Hamp- 
ton's cavalry near Nance's Shop. 

While Grant was giving attention to the erection of his 
lines of circumvallation, and to schemes having for their 
object the seizure of the Weldon Road, and while a part of 
Burnside's corps was engaged in the task of running tunnels 
beneath a fort of the opposing line, with the intention of 
blowing it up, and while Lee was strengthening his works 
and watching his antagonist closely, and also running 



(I 



EARLY THREATENS WASHINGTON. 501 

counter-mines to discover the underground works threat- 
ening his forts, the attention of both was called to other 
fields, particularly to the Shenandoah Valley. 

Grant's mind was also full of the plans and prospects of 
his Generals in the west and south. Sherman was now 
pushing Johnston near Kenesaw Mountain, with every pros- 
pect of success. But Hunter, who had made a successful 
advance to Lynchburg, found Early with a strong force 
almost in his rear, who offered him battle, which, as he was 
short of ammunition and far from the base of his supplies, 
he declined, turned aside, marched westward through the 
mountains, and sought the Potomac by a round-about way, 
amidst the rocks and hills of Western Virginia, and up 
the Ohio river roads. This threw open the road to the 
North, through the Shenandoah Valley, and Lee, thinking 
to again draw the Federal army from its position before 
Petersburg by threatening the overthrow of the National 
Capital, ordered Early to advance rapidly northward. 

This ruse had succeeded before, when McClellan lay 
below Richmond, but a different commander was nowrulinor 
the armies of the nation. Immediately the greatest excite- 
ment occurred throughout the Northern States and at the 
Capital. Urgent demands were made upon Grant to turn 
the army at once homeward and defend the Capital, even if 
all else were lost. But he was not frightened. Instead, 
he detached Wright's corps, and sent it to the defence of 
Washington, saying, that he would himself keep Lee so 
busy that he could not get away, and that he wished Lee 
would attempt to move northward, so that he might get in 
upon his rear. 

But so rapid were the movements of Early, that had it 
not been for the skill and bravery of General Lew Wallace, 



502 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

who gathered a small force of militia, worn-out veterans, 
and some convalescents, amounting to less than half of 
Early's force, with whom he advanced to the Monocacy and 
gave him battle, delaying him a day, Washington might 
have fallen into his hands. Of course, Wallace's troops 
were driven from the field, but not before they had made a 
gallant fight. 

Early then advanced slowly to Washington, and came in 
sight of the Queen City (nth July), but he found its for- 
tifications fully garrisoned, and was compelled to beat a 
hasty retreat to Winchester, followed by General Wright, 
who had arrived on the field. Nothing of importance hap- 
pened further in this field till Sheridan was sent there later. 

During these days of excitement at the Capital, Grant 
prosecuted the siege vigorously. The mine which Burn- 
side's corps was digging, though he had not much faith in 
its utility, was forwarded by the Commander as a matter 
to keep the troops occupied, and one which might lead to 
good results. The work was begun almost as soon as the 
siege began (25th June) , and was carried forward during 
one month by details of troops — practical miners from the 
coal-fields of the nation — under competent engineers. It 
was then calculated that it had been extended to a point 
below one of the enemy's forts. Eight thousand pounds of 
powder were placed in it, and a fuse was laid. The order 
was given directing that it be fired (30th July) . 

In order to draw as many of the Confederate troops as 
possible, for the time, out of the works in Petersburg, Grant 
directed Sheridan, with Hancock's corps supporting, to lead 
his cavalry across the James and make a dash at Richmond, 
try to turn the Confederate left, and hold all troops that 
should be sent to oppose them. Butler was directed to 



THE MINE. 503 

cooperate with them in thb movement. As soon as it 
should become apparent to Grant that Hancock and 
Sheridan could not break through to Richmond, and that 
Lee had detached largely from Petersburg to oppose them, 
he designed bringing Hancock and Sheridan back to the 
rear of Burnside's corps to take part in the assault which 
would be made after the explosion of the mine. The order 
to fire the mine would be given only when they should 
arrive. 

Grant issued minute orders for the whole operations — 
orders which, if they should be carried out in full, could not 
fail of their object. To Warren's corps was delegated the 
task of holding the works to guard against counter attacks. 
Burnside's corps had the task of storming the works after the 
mine should be fired; and its commander was now engaged 
in practicing and training Ferrero's colored division for the 
storming part3\ The whole corps was directed to be massed 
in the vicinit}- of the point of attack to support this division. 
Ord's corps was directed to be placed in position to support 
Burnside. Thus every precaution was taken to have prompt 
support given to the assailing division. But, with that 
strange fate b}- which the sub-commanders of the Army of 
the Potomac seemed to be governed while Grant had com- 
mand — but one would not say that it was because they 
were jealous of a western man, but rather that they were 
used to differently constituted commanders — the plan was 
brought to nought b}' reason of dela}^ and wrangling among 
the subordinates. 

Sheridan, "Grant's Hammer," was prompt with his duty; 
and Hancock crossed the James and took a part of the 
enem3''s outworks, but there delayed till sufficient reinforce- 
ments were brought from Petersburg to effectually stop him, 



504 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGN'S OF GRANT AND LEE. 

while the cavalry could do nothing without support. Sheri- 
dan fought a stubborn battle with infantry and cavalry at 
Darbeytown and gained a brilliant success (27th July). 
Trains of empty wagons were marched and counter- 
marched — the first by day, the latter by night — across the 
pontoon bridge over the James. 

Lee was deceived into believing that Grant intended to 
make his principal campaign in that direction, and drew out 
a large portion of the garrison of Petersburg. The Com- 
mander himself came to Hancock's front to observe mat- 
ters, and becoming convinced that the Confederate General 
had been deceived and was present on the field in person, 
ordered Hancock and Sheridan to return during the night 
(2Q-3oth) , and issued orders that the firing of the mine and 
the assault should take place early next morning. Hancock 
and Sheridan were sixteen miles from the place of attack 
and beyond two large rivers, but they made such good 
speed that they arrived in position before the time set. 
Half of Lee's army was now north of the James, and to save 
the garrison at Deep Bottom from being overcome by it, 
Grant directed the Federal fleet, riding on the James, to 
move up so that its guns could assist in repelling attack. 

So far the Commander's plan of drawing away Lee and 
his forces was entirely successful. Nothing remained but 
the firing of the mine and its accompanying assault, and this 
failed of success. Meade, without Grant's authority, and 
while he was absent with Hancock, took it upon himself to 
interfere with the execution of the order of assault given 
to Burnside, and which should have properly been left with 
that General. Meade directed that the choice of divisions 
to lead the assault should be made by lot, whereas Burnside 
had been training Ferrero's division for the express pur- 
pose. Burnside objected; but his objection was overruled. 



THE EXPLOSION OF THE MINE. 505 

The choice fell upon Ledlie's division, whose com- 
mander proved to be too cowardly to assume this im- 
portant and dangerous honor; and Burnside, having 
sauced Meade, raved at his officers, and generally made 
himself angry, neglected to have the abattis cut away in 
front of the point of attack, as had been ordered, did not 
place his other divisions so that they could be moved 
promptly, and obstinately refused to exert himself at all in 
the matter. Under such circumstances, failure was certain. 
But at the appointed time, the fuse to the mine was lighted; 
and although it did not connect with the powder at once; it 
did after a second attempt, and a mighty upheaval occurred. 

A huge column of debris, earth, cannon, men and small 
arms rose in air and fell again in a heavy shower. One 
whole bastion was blown up, and a breach several hundred 
feet wide was made in the fortifications. The order was 
for Ledlie to charge; but he could not be found. There 
were many moments of delay. The Confederates in the 
neighboring lines, who had fled in terror when the explosion 
happened, began to return. Mahone, with great presence 
of mind, rapidly drew out a part of his division and hurried 
it to form a cordon around the breach. Then the Federals 
rushed to the assault, descended into the crater, and there 
stayed, not knowing the orders that had been given their 
leaders to pass beyond and spread to the right and left. 

Batteries from either side of the breach turned upon the 
struggling mass and poured grape and canister with deadly 
effect upon it, now become a veritable slaughter-pen. For 
fully half an hour did they remain, without knowing which 
way to go, and without support being sent them by Burn- 
side. And when help did come, it met the storm of bullets 
which the batteries and Mahone's division, now in line be- 



506 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



yond the crater, poured upon it, and could go no further. 
Grant saw that the scheme was a failure. He had in- 
structed Burnside to withdraw at the moment success should 
become doubtful. He anxiously waited for the troops to 




EXPLOSION OF THE MINE. 



retire; but, seeing that they did not, he rode in person to 
Burnside and ordered him to draw the men out of the 
death-pit, and the order was given in no very gentle terms. 
They were withdrawn finally, and although the firing on 
both sides was sustained several hours, the affair lasted but 
two hours. The Federals lost over four thousand men; the 
enemy about one-fourth as many. 



SHERIDAN SENT TO SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 507 

This attempt having failed, nothing more was done 
worthy of account, on this field for several days. Mean- 
while the attention of the opposing Generals was again 
turned to the Shenandoah valley. Grant was very much 
dissatisfied with the state of affairs there. Early, after 
Hunter had disappeared through the mountains, had not 
been again confronted by an energetic enemy. Wright had 
been on the ground some time, but had accomplished 
nothing. Hunter had resumed command of all the forces 
in that field as soon as he had arrived again at the Potomac, 
but had remained inactive. Grant now chose Sheridan to 
accomplish his purpose of destroying Early's forces, and 
ordered that General to report to Hunter. 

Lincoln was as much disturbed as Grant because of the 
inactivity of the Generals opposed to Early, and advised 
Grant to come in person to the field and look into the situa- 
tion. Grant did so, and issued to Hunter an order, direct- 
ing him to advance at once, endeavor to get south of the 
enemy and cut off his retreat. Hunter, in answer to the 
query as to the position of Early's army, replied that he 
did not know where it was. Grant said he would find out 
its whereabouts in a very short time, and directed the army 
to advance. Within a very few hours after he arrived at 
Harper's Ferry, the enemy was found. The Commander 
suggested to Hunter that Sheridan should be allowed to 
command in the field; whereupon Hunter politely resigned 
his position, and Grant accepted the resignation. 

Having seen Sheridan properly in command, and having 
unfolded to him his views of the campaign which ought to be 
pressed forward, Grant returned to his headquarters before 
Petersburg. The Commander had now obtained the instru- 
ment with which the fatal blows of the final campaign were 



508 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

to be given. He had long been cognizant of the brilliant 
qualities of Sheridan, and had steadily advanced him, since 
the power of advancement had come to his hand. He be- 
lieved, and correctly so, that he had found a man who could 
be trusted to strike with all the power and effect, which he 
so much desired. Hitherto the best laid plans of this great 
campaign had come to naught through the inability or slow- 
ness of his subordinates. None of them, unless Hancock 
be excepted, had the energy which the Commander's plans 
required for their successful execution. The story of the 
campaign thus far had been a repetition of failures because 
of slowness, or of timidity or indecision; but, in Sheridan, 
he found one who would grasp his idea, and with the power 
and force of a thunderbolt, carry it into action, and reap the 
result designed. "Grant's Hammer," is the cognomen this 
brilliant General received and deserved. 

Sheridan advanced at once. Early was soon discovered, 
retiring towards Strasburg, and could not be brought to 
battle. The Union centre was thus restored once more to 
its proper place. Grant, having his own eye upon the left 
wing, having Sheridan in command of the centre and Sher- 
man of the right wing, felt now more certain of the end 
coming soon. 

Lee recognized the situation as soon as Early began to 
retire; and, to aid him, sent him Anderson's corps from the 
army at Petersburg. Grant learned this, and warned Sheri- 
dan, who at once threw himself upon the defensive and 
retired to a point a few miles east of Harper's Ferry, where 
he fortified a strong defensive line and waited attack. But 
Early contented himself with reconnoitering this position 
and with making excursions northward to and beyond the 
Potomac. 



MOVEMENTS TO AID SHERIDAN. 509 

Meanwhile Grant was determined to prevent Lee de- 
taching more troops to Early, and to draw back those he 
had sent. A movement similar to that last made was 
planned, the design being three-fold — first, [to relieve the 
pressure upon Sheridan, and to restrain Lee from sending 
more troops against him; second, to capture and break 
through the Confederate line north of the James if possible; 
third, to seize the Weldon Road. 

His assaults and movements, were always manifold in 
their objects — no plan was ever laid blindly. The move- 
ment north of the James, while it was with the object of 
breaking through the lines there, was chiefly designed to 
call the troops of the defensive army out of Petersburg, so 
that the seizure of the Weldon Road should be assured. 
Hancock's corps was designated for the movement. To 
create the impression that the troops were designed to be 
sent to Washington, they were embarked on boats at City 
Point ( 13th August), in sight of the enemy. 

During the following night, the artillery of the corps was 
sent to Deep Bottom over a pontoon bridge erected by But- 
ler's troops, and Hancock's corps was disembarked at that 
point, also before daylight next morning. Meade was di- 
rected to have his troops under arms, ready, either to assail 
Petersburg if its garrison should be sufficiently weakened, 
or to move Warren against the Weldon Road if such an 
order should be given. Hancock did not move his divi- 
sions with much coherence; though during the day he suc- 
ceeded in capturing a part of the Confederate works at 
Barly's Creek. He accomplished nothing more than to 
restrain Lee from detaching further aid to Early and to 
compel him to draw out strong bodies of troops from Peters- 
burg to oppose these attacks. 



510 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Severe fighting occurred on the three succeeding days, 
and the persistence with which Hancock returned to the 
attack upon the works here, caused Lee to think that, 
finally, Grant had decided to make his principal efforts in 
this direction, and strong reinforcements were drawn from 
Petersburg to strengthen the threatened works. Grant was 
watching the effect of the movements. Perceiving that 
Petersburg was now bare of its reserve troops, he directed 
Meade to set Warren in motion for the Weldon Road. The 
extreme left wing of the Union army was distant from this 
road about three miles. 

Warren (igth August) moved out promptly, scattered 
the troops that opposed his march, and seized the road ; 
then, throwing up fortifications, he prepared to hold it 
against all attacks. The Federal left was extended so as to 
connect with his right, and a new line of works rapidly 
arose. Lee recognized his loss, and made desperate efforts 
to regain the road. Grant re-called Hancock, and dis- 
patched him to Warren's aid. Hancock came by forced 
marches, and went into position at the left of Warren, 
taking possession of Ream's Station and fortifying it. 
Hill's corps was designated by Lee to retake the lost 
ground. He made a heavy assault upon Warren, breaking 
his right wing and capturing some prisoners. But his suc- 
cess was temporary, and artillery having been brought up, 
he was repulsed. In the battles for the road during the first 
two days, four thousand men fell. Grant retained his prize 
however. 

Lee now drew off the troops he had sent north of the 
James, determined to do some mischief to the Union left, if 
possible, and seeing that Hancock's troops were somewhat 
isolated at Ream's Station, and numbering not more than 



J 



CArXURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD. 511 

eight thousand, moved a heavy torce against him. A sHght 
assault upon Warren, to attract attention (25th August), 
was followed by a fierce dash at Hancock. A. P. Hill was 
in command. Hancock received the assailants behind his 
works, and at first hurled them off with terrible loss. The 
assault was renewed again and again. Warren failed to 
send any reinforcements to Hancock, and Grant was not on 
the field to order them up, so that late in the day the Con- 
federates captured Hancock's works, and compelled him to 
retire to Warren's rear. Hill's forces were so badly shat- 
tered, however, that he could not follow up his success, but 
fell back to his own lines, fearing attack from reinforce- 
ments that were arriving to Hancock's aid. 

The Federal loss in this action amounted to more than 
one-fourth the number engaged, while Hill's loss, since his 
force was greater and was the assailant, more than 
doubled this number, being placed at six thousand by some 
writers. Thus the Weldon Road passed out of Lee's grasp. 
He reported to his Government that another source of sup- 
plies to his needy army was gone. Grant had not only 
kept troops from being detached to Early, but had inflicted 
an irreparable injury upon the Confederate army. 

As Sheridan remained inactive in his intrenched camp 
waiting for the depletion of Early's forces, and as the 
Government was pressing for something more to be done, 
and the people were clamoring for better results. Grant 
decided to again visit the Shenandoah, and give Sheridan 
a plan of campaign. He accordingly went to him (Sept. 
15), and advised with him. He found that Sheridan had 
already mapped out the plan of a campaign, excellent in its 
conception, and capable of being carried out, and as he 
made it a rule to approve plans of his Generals where 



512 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

they would be sufficient for the purpose, instead of 
obtruding his own, he did not impart his own plan of a 
campaign to him. 

That his judgment was not at fault, events speedily 
proved. Sheridan was upon the point of setting out, and 
that the credit of a success might not be attributed to him- 
self, Grant left the field at once, and went back to his head- 
quarters. He had hardly arrived at Petersburg before he 
received the news that Sheridan, hearing that Early had 
detached a part of his forces, had attacked him at Opequan 
Creek, and gained a complete and brilliant victory. Grant, 
in honor of the event, ordered one hundred shotted cannon 
to be fired into the works at Petersburg. Sheridan followed 
Early to an intrenched camp at Fisher's Hill, which he out- 
flanked, stormed, and captured, driving his army in utter 
rout up the Valley. 

Early made no more attempts to stand before him at this 
time, but gathered the remnant of his army, and took refuge 
in the mountains at Brown's Gap. Then, in obedience to in- 
structions from Grant, Sheridan destroyed all the crops and 
supplies which an army might use, to be found in the valley, 
and rendered this rich store-house entirely useless for at 
least a year. The Commander directed this to be done, for 
the purpose of keeping the enemy out of the valley, and to 
cut off one of the most fruitful sources of supply that Lee 
had. Not to kill men was his object, so much as to compel 
them to surrender because their supplies were exhausted, 
and their means of continuing war at an end. 

General' Lee saw with dismay the rapidity and thorough- 
ness of Sheridan's operations. He rebuked Early for scat- 
tering his forces and allowing the enemy to strike him in de- 
tail, but did not remove him from command. He could not 



CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON. 513 

send him re-inforcements at this time, because Grant, fearing 
that he would do so, had renewed his assaults on the right 
and left, and given him enough to do to hold his own lines for 
the time. 

Grant, indeed, fearing that Lee would now detach aid to 
Early, seeing him so badly used, ordered another movement 
to break through the Confederate left north of the James, 
and to extend his own left towards the remaining supply 
lines of the enemy. General Birney, commanding Hancock's 
corps, was directed to cross the James and cooperate with 
Ord, of Butler's army, and under the general command of 
Butler, in making an assault upon the Confederate works 
near Deep Bottom. To insure success, the utmost caution 
was observed. The attack was made with great spirit (29th 
Sept.) , and Fort Harrison, a strong outwork, was captured. 

The battle for its possession was sharp and bloody. Ord 
failed to follow up his success, his troops having taken the 
work, but stopped to re-form and turn the guns of the fort 
upon its late defenders. Grant came upon the field, entered 
the fort, and, amidst flying shot and shell, carefully looked 
over the ground. Though much time had been lost, he still 
hoped to get beyond the enemy's main line, and directed all 
the troops to be advanced. An advance was made; but the 
Confederates from adjacent lines were poured into the 
threatened works, and the attack failed. Lee could ill 
afford to lose the fort; and, having drawn heavy forces to 
that point from Petersburg and Richmond, caused several 
bloody assaults to be made for the purpose of recapturing 
it. But the work had been turned so effectually, that it was 
impossible to retake it. It remained in Butler's possession. 
Lee's attention was called also to the imminent danger in 
which his right was placed at this time. 
33 



514 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEfi. 

Grant, seeing that much of Lee's army was north of the 
James, gave Meade the order to have Warren advance 
from the left. That General did so promptly, and the 
thunder of his guns before the lines near Peeble's Farm 
v^arned Lee that his indefatigable enemy v^^as again carrying 
out his plan of extension to the left. Warren carried a small 
fort, named McRae, by storm, and captured a line of out- 
works, forcing the enemy back to his main line. Parke, 
moving with one of Warren's divisions near the Confederate 
line, was attacked by a heavy force of the enemy and 
roughly used. But Warren hurried up supports to him, and 
the assailants were driven again to their works. 

The Federals strongly fortified this new line, and made 
it a part of their siege works. Their position at Peeble's 
Farm was not more than three miles from the Southside 
Road, which, except the Lynchburg Canal and Railroad, was 
the sole remaining supply line of the Southern army. In 
these battles, Sheridan and Early had each about thirty 
thousand men with them; Grant and Lee each used about 
sixty-five thousand men in the operations at the right and 
left; and the losses amounted to about four thousand 
each. But the gain of Fort Harrison, a post not more 
than six miles from Richmond, causing the greatest con- 
sternation in that city, and the planting of the Union line 
so near the last road which he depended upon for supplies 
from the southwest, were serious losses to Lee. 

Early, meanwhile, had been gathering his forces 
together and watching for a chance to fall upon Sheridan's 
army when unprepared. He saw this chance when Sheri- 
dan, who was called away to meet a member of the govern- 
ment on business, was absent from the army. During a 
foggy night and a succeeding misty morning, Early's army 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



515 




moved down on the un- 
suspecting Federals near 
Cedar Creek, now under 
command of Wright, and 
by a sudden flank attack, 
routed half the army, and 
drove the remainder sev- 
eral miles, Sheridan, 
near Winchester on his 
way back to the army, 
heard the boom of can- 
non, and rode hard to the 
battle-field, but only to 
meet his fugitive troops. 
His magnetic presence 
re-inspirited the soldiers, 
who rallied and went 
back against the foe, and, 
with that part which had 
preserved its organiza- 
tion, he moved back upon 
the enemy, who had stop- 
ped to plunder the cap- 
tured camp. 

The end of the matter 
was that Early was in his 
turn completely routed 
and driven from the field 
in such hot haste as to 
lose the greater part of 
his artillery and all he 
had captured from the 



516 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Federals. Sheridan followed up his success and in two 
other smaller conflicts, killed or captured a greater part 
of the Confederate army and drove Early out of the 
Valley. During the campaign, Sheridan had killed or cap- 
tured more than twenty thousand men, and taken all the 
artillery and other paraphernalia of an army. Henceforth 
the lower Shenandoah was left untroubled by an armed 
force of the enemy. 

Grant, well pleased with the result of this work, now 
directed the return of Wright's corps to Petersburg, and 
endeavored to increase his army sufficiently to warrant the 
entension of his left wing further towards the Southside 
Road. He then ordered another movement to be made in 
that direction (27th Oct.), and as a feint directed Butler to 
move a force out to the extreme Confederate left and 
endeavor to turn it and get in between it and Richmond, 
since that extremity was thought to lie now but a short dis- 
tance beyond the extreme Union right at Deep Bottom. 
But he was directed not to assault any works unless there 
was every chance of success. This was in effect the same 
plan he had tried with partial success thrice before. The 
moving column, under the direct command of Meade, and 
consisting of Hancock's and Warren's corps and portions of 
others, amounted to forty thousand men. Hancock had 
the left wing, Warren the right, with Parke's division 
leading. 

It was believed that the Confederate right ended at a 
a point near where the Boydton Pike Road crosses Hatch- 
er's Run, and the design was to move beyond the extremity 
of their line, and by a left wheel come in upon their right 
flank. The corps moved out, reached Hatcher's Run, and 
entered the wooded marshes beyond, where they became 



i 



ANOTHER MOVEMENT TO THE LEFT. 517 

separated. Grant was on the field in person and soon dis- 
covered that the enemy's line of defense did not end where 
it was supposed, but more than two miles beyond, and also 
that it was well nigh impossible to make progress through 
the thickets and marshes without going a wide detour.to the 
southward, which he did not desire to do, owing to the fact 
that the corps would expose themselves to a rear and flank 
attack. The generals in command at Lee's right had early 
discovered the movement, and a heavy body of troops 
moved out into the woods beyond the Run to dispute the 
Federal progress. 

A severe battle ensued. Grant had noted the fact that 
the corps had been separated, and had directed a division 
under Crawford to fill up the gap between. As it was, the 
enemy fell upon Hancock's right before Crawford could 
close up, and created some confusion; but the gallantry of 
General Egan, commanding the Union troops there, pre- 
vented a disaster, and the assailants were driven back, losing 
nearly a thousand prisoners. 

Seeing that he had been deceived as to the position of 
the opposing lines, and that the enemy was alert. Grant 
decided to suspend the movement, directed Hancock and 
Warren to retire to their former camps, and went back to 
City Point. His loss in this movement amounted to nearly 
thirteen hundred men; that of Lee to more, since a large 
number of prisoners were taken by Egan. The success of 
the expedition was not as great as had been desired and 
prepared for; but it had not been organized to proceed 
independently, and without doing so could not have passed 
beyond the enemy's works. Grant was not ready for the 
movement which he made later, when his cavalry took so 
leading a part. Butler meanwhile, instead of attempting to 



518 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEli. 



turn the Confederate left by a flank movement, and 
maneuvering simply with the purpose of keeping their 
attention in his front, had ordered an assault, the result 
being that his troops were repulsed with a loss of over one 
thousand men. Grant extended to him a reprimand, and 
later sent him to a different command. 




grant's headquarters at city point. 

The people of the loyal states were not a patient people 
with their generals, and had not the steady, uninterrupted 
support of the Great President been given the Lieutenant- 
General during the latter part of this and the beginning of 
the next year (1864-5), Grant's star might have set in unde- 
served clouds. For, though the Union army had made 
progress in the siege, yet the Commander had determined 



MURMURS AGAINST GRANT. 519 

that more could be done with less loss of life by cutting off 
the resources of the South and weakening the enemy, than 
by direct, murderous attacks; and also, he had determined 
to bring to himself a stronger force and to concentrate a. i 
his armies closer towards the central point before finally 
engaging in a struggle which he had determined should be 
the death struggle. Therefore, while still retaining grip 
upon Petersburg, he turned his attention to the operations 
of Sherman who had reached Atlanta and was marching 
across the states to the ocean at Savannah, and to the oper- 
ations of Sheridan and other generals, who were engaged 
principally in destroying the sources of the enemy's sup- 
plies. 

His inaction was misconstrued by some of his friends 
and flaunted as lack of ability by his enemies, the latter 
composed chiefly of the Democratic party and its adherents, 
who at this time were pushing General McClellan forward 
to the Presidency in opposition to Lincoln, whom the 
Republicans, and all who stood for the Union, were sup- 
porting for a second term of office. The victories of Sheri- 
dan and the successes of Sherman made the cause of 
Lincoln strong, and he won the race, being re-elected by a 
great majority. 

Lincoln stood by his great lieutenant, and the enemies 
of the latter were defeated in their attempts to supplant 
him. Some suggested that Sherman, because of his late 
success, due in a great measure to the advice and support of 
Grant, should be made a Lieutenant-General and given 
supreme command; but Sherman, although Grant assured 
him that he was favorable to such action and would obey 
his orders with the same readiness that Sherman had 
always obeyed him, indignantly rejected the proposition 



520 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

made by his friends, and placed his refusal in such terms 
that the matter was dropped. So great was the mutual 
love and respect between these two m,en, that neither would 
profit by the disgrace of the» other; and Sherman found 
later, when accused of treason, that Grant could requite the 
fidelity of a friend with a like tender office. 

S9 while Sherman marched to the sea, and thence 
turned northward, and while Thomas drew Hood into his 
toils at Nashville, and then fell upon and crushed his army 
as the whirlwind does a shattered tenement, and while the 
Government exerted itself to fill the ranks of the army, 
depleted by the expiration of the time of service of thousands 
of soldiers, and while the armies slowl}^ came into position 
and ,gathered the enemy into a closing circle with south- 
western Virginia as a central point, the Commander quietly 
and silently endured odium, formed his plans and made the 
combinations which would finally crush the Rebellion within 
ten days after the final movements should begin. 

A few of the directions and orders issued will give an 
idea of the nature of these combinations. Sherman, having 
reached Savannah, was confronted by an army under Joseph 
E. Johnston. Grant directed Sherman to march northward, 
and lest Lee should detach enough troops suddenly to fall 
upon him with overwhelming power, he brought General 
Schofield from the western army (7th Jan. 1865) to take 
Wilmington, and thence march towards Goldsboro, where 
he should form a junction with Sherman, who would march 
upon that place, and thus reinforce him with from thirty to 
fifty thousand men. He next directed a part of Thomas' 
army under command of Canby (i8th Jan.) to proceed 
against Mobile, take that place and thence range northeast- 
ward towards the rear of Lee's army, so as to cut off escape 



THE TOILS CLOSING. 521 

in that direction, should Lee attempt it later. Then, Gen. 
Stoneman was ordered with the western cavalry to start from 
Thomas' army, and range eastward, destroying railroads 
and supplies, with Lynchburg as his objective point, where 
Sheridan marching southward from the Shenandoah was to 
form a junctfon with him, and thence with the combined 
force range southward to cut Lee's last supply line, and to 
prevent escape to the mountains of that region. 

The army of the Potomac was to remain quiet, but 
vigilant, until Schofield should join Sherman, and Sheri- 
dan should be ready to do his part. Sheridan's impetuosity 
caused a little change in this program, but his ability re- 
paired the breach in it by bringing success along another 
line. To be ready for the final movement to the left, which 
he was determined should be made as soon as the other 
armies were in their proper places. Grant caused great 
exertions to be made throughout the northern states to re- 
cruit the army of the Potomac; and as a result its numbers 
steadily increased during the two months preceding the 
commencement of the campaign. 

Lee noted the combinations being made around him, and 
the various movements by the Federal armies under Grant's 
direction; and, as he noted these and counted the resources 
at the command of the Confederate Government, his anxiety 
became marked, and a general gloom prevaded his head- 
quarters. He could not but see that the end was drawing 
nigh, and that only an almost miraculous success could avail 
his cause. To meet the necessity of the case, he made con- 
stant and urgent demands upon the government for men, 
munitions and provisions. He did not despair. He sought 
to infuse his own invincible spirit into troops and Govern- 
ment; but it was a desperate task. 



LEE FORESEES THE END. 523 

For the troops in the trenches at Petersburg were becom- 
ing dispirited. The unceasing watch necessary to keep upon 
the enemy; the sudden attacks at the extreme ends of their 
Hues, compelling long, forced marching; the constant exten- 
sion of the Union lines to the left, threatening their com- 
munications; and the hopelessness of attacking the enemy, 
besides the increasing and disastrous reports of failures in 
other fields, — all combined to dispirit the troops. They de- 
serted in great numbers. 

In imitation of the National Government, and because 
the people clamored for it, Lee was made Commander-in- 
Chief of all the Confederate armies (Feb. 6, 1865) ; but this 
was done too late for him to reap any benefits or accomplish 
any great work. The combinations of Grant were then too 
far consummated for him to break and foil them. During 
the latter part of this month the desertions increased to an 
alarming extent. Lee reported to Breckinridge, the Con- 
federate Secretary of War, over foiir hundred desertions in 
one day, and ten days later reported that twelve hundred 
more men had gone over to the enemy. These troops sim- 
ply stole away from their lines, gave up their arms to the 
Federals, and were sent to the rear, or paroled and allowed 
to go home. 

During the latter part of this month also, Lee formed defi- 
nite plans for a retreat, and suggested that supplies should 
be gathered at or near Lynchburg, or should be made ready 
to meet him at Burksville Junction, preparatory for such a 
movement. His idea was to form a junction with Johnston, 
retire to a line on the Staunton river, and trust all to a cam- 
paign with a single army. He had at this time about seventy 
thousand men under arms at Petersbifrg, and the lines con- 
necting it with Richmond. Johnston, in the Carolinas, was 



524 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

rapidly drawing together various fragments of forces, and 
would have in a short time fifty thousand men. But deser- 
tions and casualties were rapidly thinning these forces, and 
it was almost impossible to get new men to enlist, either by 
persuasion or force. In fact the terrible devastations being 
done by the armies and expeditions which the Federal Com- 
mander was continually setting in motion, were causing the 
people to become thoroughly tired of a contest which im- 
poverished and did not give reasonable hopes of success in 
return. 

It was suggested by members of the Confederate Gov- 
ernment, that negroes should be enlisted, or impressed for 
service; a strange idea, since the war had come to be re- 
garded almost wholly as one for the liberation of the slaves, 
and the negroes themselves were waiting with hope for the 
day when Lincoln's troops should appear and set them free. 
Lee approved the idea, and some steps were taken to draft 
them; but the sudden energy of the Federal armies effectu- 
ally stopped the scheme by putting an end to all hopes of 
success in the war. 

In reply to an address from some members of the Gov- 
ernment asking his views upon the military situation, Lee 
frankly wrote (2d March) , that the situation was dark and 
full of peril; that from the difficulty of obtaining supplies 
and men, it could be seen that the country was exhausted; 
that unless the people by generous contributions came to his 
relief, and unless steps were at once taken to supply his army 
with men and provisions, the present lines must be aban- 
doned. 

What he said was, indeed, true. For, at the time he 
answered this letter, the news came that Sheridan had again 
totally routed the remnant of Early's army at Wayns- 



OVERTURES FOR PEACE. 



525 



borough, and had captured nearly the whole force, and that 
Early had escaped with a few hundred men only, by rapid 
riding and good fortune ; also, that Sherman was moving 
irresistibly up from the South, and Schofield was operating 
successfully at Wilmington, while in the West, Thomas was 
sending out Stoneman. Grant, with the armies of the 
Potomac and James consolidated, held the field in his 
immediate front, and watched closely that Lee should not 
escape. 

About this time Lee addressed a letter to Grant, asking 
a conference, with a view to settling, by a convention of the 
proper authorities, the difficulties of the war. Grant replied 
that he himself had no authority to treat of such matters, 
he having only the prosecuting of the war in his hands, and 
that all matters relating to peace should be addressed to the 
Federal Government. But he referred the matter to the 
Secretary of War, who gave him instructions not to have 
anything to do with the enemy other than concerning mili- 
tary matters. Commissioners from the Confederate 
Government sought Grant, also, endeavoring to obtain 
peace, but he referred them to the President, who as- 
sured them that peace would be granted only when the 
last man had laid down arms and submitted to the Federal 
Government. W^hen these returned to their Government 
with the news of their ill-success, one and all gave up hopes 
of peace, except upon surrender ; and the brave prepared 
to continue the struggle as long as possible, while the more 
timid clamored for peace upon any terms. 

Some have remarked that it was a needless waste of life 
for Lee to continue the struggle when he saw himself 
hemmed in on all sides, and that he ought now to have sur- 
rendered. But Lee was proud, and his people would not 



526 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE 

have submitted to this wiser course without heaping odium 
upon him. He still had a strong army, though it was being 
lessened so rapidly by desertions, that when operations 
began later it amounted to no more than sixty-five thousand 
men, and he believed one great success would increase it. 
He hoped to make a junction with Johnston. He would 
then have an army of over one hundred thousand men, 
strong enough to meet that which Grant — who, by great 
exertions, had increased his numbers to somewhat over one 
hundred and eleven thousand — now had, but not strong 
enough to overcome Grant and Sherman together, should 
they form a junction. 

Still, it was the only hope ; and while he watched the 
enemy before him narrowly, so that he might be prepared 
for any emergency, he anxiously waited for the time when 
Johnston, retiring before Sherman, would be near enough, 
so that by a swift, short movement, they might come 
together. The army at Petersburg was, at this time, in 
actual want of the necessary rations ; and, as for clothing, 
the private soldiers were ragged and many of them bare- 
footed, while the officers had clothing only of the coarsest 
make. 

The cavalry was scattered over the country for miles, 
subsisting as best it might, and more than once it was com- 
pelled, on sudden call, to concentrate from a radius of thirty 
miles. Even then, it was poorly mounted and indifferently 
supplied. The severe measures ordered by Grant were tell- 
ing wofully upon the South, and, perhaps, more than any 
battle that had been fought yet in the war, reduced the 
Confederate armies in numbers and spirit. 

Matters were drawing now to a close, though, perhaps, 
none, except the Commander believed the end was so near. 



SHERIDAN KEJOINS GRANT. 527 

Grant was anxiously waiting until the moment should come 
to order his army forward. That moment would be the 
time of the junction of Sherman and Schofield and of 
Sheridan and Stoneman, when he designed to push his left 
wing rapidly to the Southside Road, and endeavor to meet 
Sheridan as he should push southward from Lynchburg. 
But the delay of Thomas, whose natural caution was 
not to be overcome by urgent commands, kept Stoneman 
from appearing soon enough west of Lynchburg, and 
Sheridan, who had pushed far up towards that city, used 
his own discretion, and turned eastward towards White 
House at the sea shore. Grant did not blame Sheridan, 
who excused this course by reason of Stoneman's dela}', and 
changed his plans to suit. 

He now directed Sheridan, who, after an adroit, swift 
march, had come to White House (igth March), to repair 
at once, with all his cavalry, to the army at Petersburg. 
The Commander wished to use the energy of his brilliant 
lieutenant in the operations about to be begun, which should 
cut the Southside Road, and place a strong force in the rear 
of Lee's army. He was now certain of success, for he had 
no doubt that the resistless enthusiasm and audacious, yet 
skillful, bravery of Sheridan would accomplish the task 
which he desired, and there was no officer in the army with 
him in whom he could so thoroughly trust. 

Sheridan, therefore, repaired to the headquarters of his 
chieftain, and spent the few days of delay that 5^et occurred 
in refitting and resting his cavalry. The further delay was 
occasioned by the movements of Sherman and Schofield, 
who finally succeeded in forming a junction (^Nlarch 23) at 
Goldsboro. 

This happily done, the time had arrived for the army at 



528 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Petersburg to move. Grant issued orders for all to be made 
ready. He then called Sherman to him (28th March), and 
having that general, and Meade, Sheridan and Ord, w^ho 
now commanded the Army of the James in place of Butler, 
together, he unfolded and thoroughly explained his plans 
to them, advised them on all the conditions likely to arise, 
and counseled v^^ith them as to the best methods of pro- 
cedure. The Generals then met the President, w^ho, in 
response to an invitation from the Commander, had come 
to City Point, as he said, " To be in at the death." He 
believed, v^ithout knowing, that his great lieutenant had 
now laid plans which would end the war. Nor was he 
deceived. 

The conference ended. The orders for the campaign 
were issued. Grant would not delay longer, as Lee might at 
any moment attempt to escape and form a junction with John- 
ston. The movement was fixed for the 2Qth. ButLee, seem- 
ingly divining the intention to attack him, and either to break 
through the Federal line and compel the withdrawal of the 
left from its advanced position, or to cover a retreat, made a 
sudden sally. He directed an assault to be made in the 
early morning (25th March) against Fort Steadman and the 
works to its right. General Gordon was appointed to lead 
the assault, with four thousand men as a storming party, to 
be supported by a powerful force. 

Fort Steadman was a square work, occupying the level 
summit of a low hill, and was armed with nine heavy guns. 
It was not more than two hundred yards from the opposing 
Confederate works. Parke commanded the Union corps 
which occupied this part of the line, with Hartranft com- 
manding the division under him. Lee took advantage of 
the practice which his deserters had been accustomed to. 




Copyright I8e)3, Harper & Bros. Vtom H»rper'i PloiorUI History .f the 01»ll W»r. 

GENERAL PHILIP H, SHERIDAN. 



529 



34 



530 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and directed a strong advance guard to proceed at midnight 
dow^n into the vale that separated the hostile lines, act as if 
they v^ere deserters about to give themselves up, seize and 
overpower the Union pickets, and then rush on over the lines, 
while Gordon, with his stormers, was to follow. As it was 
ordered, so did it happen. The luckless sentinels and pickets 
saw an unusually large party of deserters coming to them — 
the next instant they were overpowered, and, a few moments 
later, a long line of Confederate soldiery swept down the 
hill, across the vale and up the incline, bursting over the 
Union works with a cheer and capturing its defenders. 

Gordon at once deployed his men to right and left, cap- 
tured Fort Steadman and turned its guns upon its late 
owners. But the neighboring generals were now aroused. 
The nearest forts turned their guns upon the breach. The 
troops rallied swiftly. A reserve sprang up and hastened 
forward. Divisions were brought swiftly from right and left, 
and soon a cordon of soldiers was drawn around the breach 
and the enemy's progress stopped. Here' Lee failed. The 
beginning was good, but he did not order foward supports, 
or they were so far away that they could not arrive in time. 
The fire from the guns of neighboring forts was so severe 
that the Confederates could neither advance nor retreat. 
Then Hartranft directed several assaults with troops, which 
cleared the trenches. The enemy broke and fled, and the 
Union troops followed them into and over the first line of 
their own works. 

Gordon lost more than half his men in this bloody affair. 
Meade arrived on the field as the conflict ended, and ordered 
an assault with Parke's whole corps. The assault was given 
with a vengeance, but the troops did not succeed in pene- 
trating beyond the outworks of the Confederate defense 



CAPTURE OF FORT STEADMAN. 531 

line. They captured more than eight hundred prisoners, 
however. The Federal loss in this affair numbered about 
eleven hundred. It was unfortunate for Lee in a double 
sense, as its ill-success still further dispirited his army. It 
did not at all hinder the execution of Grant's plans. 

The details of the left-flank movement, the order for 
which had been issued on the day before Gordon's vain 
assault, were carefully explained by Grant to Sheridan, who 
was to lead it, and to Meade commanding the infantry. 
Sheridan at first only commanded the cavalry, which had or- 
ders to move by way of Dinwiddle Court House upon Five 
Forks, a point where three roads intersected, and from this 
point to push on to the Southside Railroad. Warren's corps 
was directed to follow and support Sheridan, while Hum- 
phrey and Ord, the latter with a corps from the Army of 
the James, were to close up to and support Warren so as to 
prevent disaster to his right and rear. 

The total force ordered to take part in this enterprise 
amounted to about ninety thousand men, while the remain- 
der of the army was held in the trenches, with orders to as- 
sault the enemy's works should opportunity offer. The 
main movement was made by Sheridan, Warren and Hum- 
phrey, as Ord simply took Humphrey's place in the main 
line, ready to move in case of need. With Sheridan in the 
lead, Warren at the left, and Humphrey at the right and 
rear, the infantry moving in two columns, the final expedi- 
tion set out (29 March). 

Each soldier carried sixty rounds of ammunition upon his 
person; and four day's provisions accompanied the expedi- 
tion. The order of array of the army was, on this day — 
Weitzel, commanding beyond the Appomatox, Parke with 
his right at. the Appomatox, Wright at his left, then Ord, 



532 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Humphrey and Warren, while Sheridan was still further off 
to the left, and by the evening of the first day, at Dinwid- 
die Court House, five miles from the extreme left of the in- 
fantry. By the evening of this day, also, Warren was at 
the intersection of the Boydton and Quaker Roads, and 
Grant had his headquarters with the infanty at the 
crossing of the Vaughan Road with Gravelly Run. Some 
skirmishing occurred, but no heavy fighting. Rain fell in 
torrents, making the roads miry and very difficult of 
passage. 

General Lee was already aware of the movement, and 
recognized in it the final struggle for Petersburg. In order 
to delay the Federal infantry, he sent a division under Bush- 
rod Johnson to oppose it, and directed Pickett, reinforced 
with all the available men from the works, to move against 
Sheridan by way of Five Forks to Dinwiddle Court House, 
and endeavor to crush him before he could obtain help. He 
also caused the works along the White Oak Road, from 
Five -Forks east, to be further strengthened. These ex- 
tended from Burgess Mills through and beyond Five Forks. 
During the night it rained so incessantly and the roads be- 
came so bad, that Warren and the other officers advised a 
halt, which Grant was loth to approve. 

Sheridan, with fiery impatience, urged his Commander 
not to halt; and his advice, coinciding with Grant's desires, 
was followed. Sheridan now received explicit orders to 
move upon Five Forks without delay, and Warren and 
Humphrey were pushed westward till they came near the 
White Oak Road. Grant transferred his headquarters to a 
point near Dabney's Mills, so as to be ready to receive and 
give orders as needed on the field. He commanded the ex- 
pedition in person so far as the different movements of the 



THE BEGINNING OF THE END. 5B3 

corps were concerned. His orders were sometimes directed 
to Meade, and again to the different corps commanders, and 
Meade Issued no important order without his direction. It 
was due to this, perhaps, as much as to Sheridan's fiery 
valor, that this movement proved successful. 

On the second da}-, light skirmishing occurred, Humphrey 
pressing the enemy back to their lines along Hatcher's Run, 
and Warren moving out between the Boydton and White 
Oak Roads. Warren moved very slowly, impeded by the 
nature of the ground, and on account of his natural caution. 
Sheridan sent out one division of cavalry towards Five 
Forks. Night fell without any decisive action. Warren, in 
direct disobedience to Meade's instructions, so advanced his 
three divisions that they lay now en echelon to the White Oak 
Road, and so far apart that they might not support each 
other quickly in case of sudden attack. So that when he ad- 
vanced close to the road next morning (31st,) the enemy 
moved out in force, struck the leading division In flank and 
drove it back in haste upon the second, which, catching the 
confusion, also retired, and both then retired upon the third 
under Grit^n, which, being formed and ready, received the 
disordered mass, and protected it till it could re-form. 

Nearly one mile of ground was thus lost. Grant pro- 
ceeded to the scene and ordered up a division of Humphrey's 
corps to the support of Warren. He then directed an ad- 
vance, and in the afternoon the troops swept forward and re- 
covered their lost ground. Grif^n's division even gained a 
point in the White Oak Road. Night came, suspending 
operations here, and the news from Sheridan turned all at- 
tention to Dinwiddle Court House. Sheridan, after advanc- 
ing one division of his force almost to the works at Five 
Forks, learned of the arrival upon the scene of a large Con- 
federate infantry force under Pickett. 



534 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



Pickett's advance came from the northwest (a. m. 31st,) 
and found Sheridan prepared for it upon a small plateau 
overlooking Chamberlain's Creek, where the undaunted 
Commander had dismounted his cavalry and intrenched. 
The Confederate cavalry had a desperate conflict with a 
portion of the Union force at about ten o'clock, but was 
thrown off in confusion. The division of the Federal cavalry 
which had advanced towards Five Forks, retired before the 




Copyright 1868. Harper & Bros. 



Prom Harper's Pictorial History of the Civil War. 
MAP OF BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 



infantry to the right of Sheridan's line, and was there fol- 
lowed and assaulted. As the Union line, upon the juncture 
of this division, assumed the form of an arc with the con- 
cave side to the foe, the Confederate infantry, in attacking 
and following this division, exposed its right flank to the 
centre and left of the main Federal line. 

Sheridan saw his advantage and furiously assaulted the 
flank and rear of the infantry, creating much confusion and 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 535 

compelling Pickett to face his men to the rear to receive 
the attack. The division of Federal cavalry which had 
been pressed then escaped, and by a roundabout way came 
in upon Sheridan's rear and joined in the battle at the 
breastworks, to which the latter had again retired. The 
fight became exceedingly fierce and bloody. The Federals 
were outnumbered two to one, but fought so well behind 
their works that night came and found the enemy still unsuc- 
cessful, disheartened, and afraid to charge the line of fire 
with which they were constantly greeted. 

Sheridan now sent to Grant for aid; and Grant ordered 
Warren to proceed at once to him and report to him for 
orders. Grant also instructed Sheridan, that if Warren 
should not move to suit him, he should have the right to 
relieve him, mistrusting that the natural slowness of Warren 
might endanger the success of Sheridan's efforts. For 
Sheridan was now indeed in a dangerous position, as Pickett 
might be able to swing in between him and Warren, and 
drive him away from instead of toward help. But Pickett 
was also in a dangerous position, as he might be cut off at 
once from the base of Five Forks by a column pushed 
westward from Warren's corps. Indeed Grant and Sheridan 
both saw the advantage that might thus be seized; and 
Grant, as soon as he saw that Warren was moving slowly, 
thought best to order him to enter and follow Brook's Road 
from the Boydton Road, which would bring him in at the 
rear of Pickett's men and between him and Five Forks. 

The cavalry of the Army of the James was ordered to go 
to Sheridan with all speed, and a division of infantry under 
Ayers from Warren's corps was hurried to him. But so 
slow was Warren with the other divisions, and so difficult 
the roads, that he did not get to the point desired, and 



536 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Sheridan's reinforcements did not arrive till early next 
morning. 

Sheridan, having received the order directing Warren to 
report to him, dispatched a supplemental order to the latter 
to move rapidly in upon Pickett's rear, indicating what 
roads he should follow. The division, under Ayers, which 
arrived at Sheridan's lines in the early morning, was soon 
formed, and with the cavalry was advanced. But Pickett, 
during the night, had heard of the coming of Warren and 
realized his danger; he therefore fell back rapidly, as the 
Federals advanced, making stands at convenient points to 
beat off the pursuers. Sheridan fumed and cursed, because 
Warren had not come in upon the enemy's rear, but could 
do nothing but press the fugitives to their works along the 
White Oak Road. 

He now, however, conceived a brilliant scheme. The 
various attacks and movements had laid open the fact that 
the Confederate works faced southward till they reached a 
point about one-half mile east of Five Forks, where they 
turned northward. Sheridan determined to press hard with 
his cavalry upon the Confederate right and centre, bring 
the fifth corps under Warren up against the extreme left, 
and by an assault break over, press through and cut off 
Pickett's entire force from Petersburg. His orders there- 
fore became imperative to Warren to move against Pickett's 
left, and Warren turned the heads of his columns in that 
direction. 

By noon the Union cavalry had pressed up to the works, 
but nearly five hours passed before Warren was in position 
to assault. Then he was mistaken as to the position of the 
works and the direction the assault ought to take, and two 
of his divisions wheeled off to the right and proceeded 



Mk 



FICKETT ROUTED. 587 

northward. Sheridan himself now came to the infantry. 
His rage knew no bounds. He brought up the remaining 
division of the fifth corps and himself headed the furious 
assault which was here delivered. 

Now he was the very incarnation of the genius of battle, 
the force, which Grant had long sought, with which to arm 
his troops. The enemy's fire was deadly and staggered the 
division. Sheridan ordered the military bands to play, 
threw himself to the front with brandished sword and rode 
his charger over the Confederate works. The men, 
enthused with the frenzy of battle, followed him like a 
storm, poured over the breastworks, drove the men out of 
their trenches, and scattered them like chaff before a whirl- 
wind. Sheridan now issued an order relieving Warren and 
directing Griffin to assume command of the corps and bring 
up the divisions that had gone astray. Griffin did so 
promptly and now supported the victorious division of 
Ayers. The cavalry also broke over the lines, and the 
victory was won. 

Pickett had much trouble to escape; his men were 
scattered, only a few regiments retaining their organization. 
Six thousand prisoners were taken by Sheridan, and the 
flight and pursuit extended far into the night. The South- 
side Road was seized and torn up for some distance, and 
the broken right wing of the enemy pressed back towards 
the Appomatox, and away from Petersburg. The object of 
the Commander, in this left movement was now obtained, 
and he turned his attention to capturing the remainder of 
the army in Petersburg. 

Grant (31st March) had in anticipation of this victory 
directed the Corps Commanders in the trenches before 
Petersburg to hold themselves ready to assault the lines 



538 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

before them at any time. As soon as he received the news 
of the victory night (Apr. i), he directed them to begin and 
maintain a heavy bombardment until 4 o'clock next morn- 
ing, then to assault. He feared that Lee in desperation 
would draw out a strong detachment and proceed against 
Sheridan, and would make strenuous efforts to regain 
the lost point. Humphrey's corps was faced eastward 
and moved towards Petersburg till it reached the works 
near Hatcher's Run, and Ord was directed to support 
his right. Sheridan, with the fifth corps, rested on the 
battle field. 

Lee was stunned. The inevitable had happened. As 
he had said, "The line was stretched till it had broken." He 
had lost at Five Forks over seven thousand men, according 
to Southern authorities, besides that one-third of his army 
was fleeing towards the Appomatox, cut off from the 
remainder. He at once ordered Longstreet to come from 
the north side of the James with ten thousand men, and 
then, upon the best reports, he had in Petersburg about forty 
thousand men, a force sufficient, in his estimation, to hold 
the works for another day and until the authorities should 
have time to escape from Richmond, and his own broken 
troops time to gather and join him. Still he had no good 
reason, after he knew that Pickett had been overthrown, to 
remain in Petersburg. He might have gained time by leav- 
ing during the night. 

Opposed to him in the trenches were sixty thousand 
troops, while fifty thousand more were closing down upon 
his right or pursuing the defeated fugitives of Five Forks. 
Some authorities aver that Lee was so stunned, so irreso- 
lute upon this occasion, because he saw in this defeat the 
destruction of his cause, that he walked about gloomily, as 



H 



THE FINAL ASSAULT ON PETERSBURG. 539 

if dreaming, and without that springing energy which 
usually caused him to rise in the face of disaster and repel 
it. He sent an order to Pickett directing him to withdraw 
his shattered forces to Petersburg; but this that brave but 
unfortunate general could not accomplish. For next morn- 
ing a portion of Humphrey's corps fell upon the only body 
of Pickett's men which had kept together and which had 
raised some hasty fortifications at Sutherland Station, and, 
after a stubborn conflict, drove it westward till Sheridan, 
with the fifth corps met and scattered it, chasing the rem- 
nant towards the Appomatox. 

At earliest dawn Parke and Wright moved strong 
assaulting columns forward against the wo'-ks in their front. 
Parke attacked at the point where the Jerusalem Plank 
Road entered the Confederate works, and where the inner 
and stronger line of fortifications of Petersburg turned 
towards the north. Wright assailed the outer main line 
further west. The assaults were made rapidly and without 
confusion, under a hot fire. The abattis was cleared away; 
the troops bent their heads to the blast of the shot, and 
rushed over the breastworks and across the ditches. The 
enemy fled before them to the inner line. Parke was 
stopped by the inner works, but held the outer, and, by 
refusing his right and raising hasty fortifications, so as to 
connect with the lines he had just left when moving to 
assault, made good his capture, though till noon strenuous 
efforts were made under Lee's direction to dislodge him. 

Wright's troops plunged boldly into the Confederate 
works, carried them, and drove the defenders pel-mel north- 
ward towards the Southside Road; then, by direction of 
Grant, who was commanding the operations in person on 
the field, turned westward, and resting the left upon the 



PETERSBURG EVACUATED. 541 

Confederate intrenchments as a guide, swept down the 
length of the line, driving the enemy before them. Ord, 
then Humphrey, as soon as the enemy wavered, owing to the 
flanking of Wright, assaulted the lines in their front, carried 
them, and drove the defenders rapidly back. Then Grant 
ordered the corps to be faced eastward, and moved down 
upon Petersburg. Wright's corps alone captured three thou- 
sand prisoners, while Parke took a thousand more, and Ord 
and Humphrey gathered them in by the hundreds. 

At noon the Federal line was continuous from the Appo- 
matox at the east to the Southside Road at the west of 
Petersburg. Shortly after noon, a portion of Ord's corps 
carried a small fort, under the guns of the main works, 
though the three hundred men of its garrison had placed 
themselves there to die, rather than surrender. By night- 
fall, the Union left reached the Appomatox, and Petersburg 
was encircled by the besieging army and the Appomatox 
River. 

At seven o'clock, Lee telegraphed his last dispatch to his 
Government, stating that he must leave Petersburg, and had 
given orders for a retreat upon Amelia Court House. His 
intention was to reach Burksville Junction, if possible, and 
thence strive to form a junction with Johnston. He had lost 
during the last five fatal days twenty thousand men. He 
would make a last struggle to foil his conqueror. Hill, 
Pickett, Heth and Wilcox, with their corps and divisions 
were scattered, captured or killed. He was in desperate 
straits. A less sanguine man would now have thrown down 
his arms and surrendered; but he hoped to escape, and for 
that purpose had, during the day, laid his plans. At ten 
o'clock that night, his troops left their works, marched 
quietly across the Appomatox bridge, joined the remainder 



542 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

of the troops from the north side of the James, and bent 
their weary steps swiftly and sadly westward. By three 
o'clock next morning Petersburg was deserted, except by a 
few pickets, who, in the works, kept up an unceasing fire to 
make the Federals believe that the army was still there. 
Richmond had been abandoned by President Davis and his 
cabinet during the day. 

So fell Petersburg and so fell Richmond. The unceasing 
efforts of the Union Commander had attained one object. 
He now bent all his energies to the capture of Lee. A di- 
vision of his army entered Petersburg in the early morning, 
having Iain on its arms all night ready to assault the last de- 
fence line with the early dawn. The Commander had di- 
vined Lee's purpose and had already issued orders to Sheri- 
dan and Ord, to Griffin and Humphrey, to turn the heads of 
their corps westward and get to the Danville Railroad, at or 
above Burksville Junction as soon as possible, in order to 
head off the retreating army and prevent it forming a junc- 
tion with Johnston's army. President Lincoln entered 
Petersburg in the morning, having been at City Point dur- 
ing the last few days, and expressed his great satisfaction to 
Grant over the results of the last operations. 

The Commander did not halt long, however, but set out 
with the Army of the James, which was following the Army 
of the Potomac in the race just begun, and was repairing 
the railroad as it moved, so that supplies might be forwarded 
rapidly to the pursuers. Weitzel's corps entered Richmond 
during the morning, (3d April), and the national flag was 
raised over the city which had been the Confederate Capi- 
tal during four eventful years of war. 

The final race was now well under way. Lee, passing by 
way of Chesterfield Court House, crossed the Appomatox, 



THE PURSUIT, 



543 




and approached Ame- 
lia Court House, where 
he expected to meet 
supplies which he had 
ordered brought there. 
He had the shortest 
route, and had great 
hopes of finding his 
provisions. As soon as 
he had crossed the 
Appomatox, the bro- 
ken divisions, which 
had suffered at Five 
Forks, came into his 
camp, increasing his 
force several thousand 
men. But desertions 
and straggling were 
becoming frequent; 
and when he discov- 
ered that Sheridan's 
indefatigable cavalry 
had struck the rail- 
road south of Amelia 
Court House, captur- 
ed one train and driven 
back others containing 
his supplies, even he 
was disheartened. He 
was compelled to halt 
here a day to rest and 
forage, though the for- 



544 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

aging yielded but meager returns. The delay enabled 
the Federal cavalry to approach. Griffin, acting under 
Sheridan, intrenched his corps across the Danville Road, 
near Jettersville. Lee might have crushed or driven 
aside Sheridan's force here, since he had nearly forty 
thousand men yet with him, half of whom, at least, were 
still preserving their excellent discipline, while Sheridan 
and Griffin had not more than ten thousand. Sheridan 
now sent urgent appeals to Meade to let him have a 
corps of infantry to come in with him to the front and 
intercept Lee, while Meade, on the contrary, was ordering 
his columns to follow and attack the rear of the retreating 
army. Sheridan, more rightly interpreting Grant's desires, 
knew that Meade's plan would give Lee all chances of 
escape, and therefore he wrote Grant an urgent appeal to 
come to the front and take personal control. 

The Commander, therefore, accompanied by a small 
escort, rode from his quarters with Ord through a dense 
wood and across several miles of country to Sheridan's and 
Meade's headquarters, near Jettersville. After learning the 
situation, he approved Sheridan's idea, and directed that 
the corps should be brought up, so as to attack Lee from the 
south. But Lee did not wait here longer, and was found 
to be moving next morning westward. The Appomatox 
River describes a great arc of a circle from Petersburg 
northward to Clementown, thence westward and southwest- 
ward towards Farmville and Appomatox Court House. 

The armies, pursued and pursuer, were now crossing the 
base of this arc, Lee marching southwestward and Grant 
westward. Grant, perceiving that Lee was again moving, 
directed Sheridan to move rapidly upon Deatonsville, and 
directed the Army of the Potomac to follow, while Ord was 



CAPTURE OF EWELL. 545 

deflected from the general course, and ordered to destroy 
the bridges, if possible, at Farmville and at High Bridge, 
a short distance below Farmville. A part of the Con- 
federate train became exposed as Lee drew rapidly away 
from Amelia, and was captured by the Federal cavalry. 
So stern became the pursuit, that Lee directed Ewell to 
halt with his division at Sailor's Creek and hold the enemy 
in check, so as to give the remainder of the army time to 
reach the Appomatox again. 

It was Lee's intention now to move out towards Lynch- 
burg, and in the mountainous country, near the Staunton 
River, hold off his pursuer till a favorable chance of junction 
with Johnston should offer or the fortune of war should 
change. He, therefore, turned towards Farmville. Sheridan 
appeared upon the flank of Ewell's force, compelling him 
to face his men to the southwest, while the sixth corps of 
Federal infantr}'', hastening by Sheridan's orders, came in 
from the east, and threw one division to the northeast, 
and Ewell's devoted troops were almost surrounded. A 
general advance on the part of both infantry and cavalry 
brought on a desperate conflict — a death struggle on the 
part of the Confederate forlorn hope, a savage, triumphant 
dash on the part of the victors. For, though Ewell's valiant 
men pressed back the advance of the Union infantry 
through the waters of Sailor's Creek, across which they 
had rushed, the cavalry thundered down upon their right 
flank and rear, carrying confusion and terror with it. The 
Confederates broke and fled, all that could escape, north- 
ward towards the Appomatox, pursued b}^ the relentless cav- 
alry, while Ewell himself and seven thousand men were cap- 
tured. Night (6th April) alone saved the few that escaped. 

Thus Grant's coming and the orders he delivered caused 
35 



546 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the surrounding and cutting off of a large portion of the re- 
treating army. Again had his "Hammer" done its effec- 
tive work. Ord, striving to carry out the order to destroy 
the bridges at Farmville and High Bridge, sent forward six 
hundred men to ride rapidly and get to the bridges before 
Lee could arrive. This detachment did not get to the vil- 
lage, but found a force of the enemy there and retired. In 
its retiring, it fell in with the head of Lee's column of infan- 
try hurrying on, and at once charged it. A sharp struggle, 
delaying the retreat some hours, occurred, in which the gal- 
lant leaders of the detachment, Read and Washburn, fell, 
the one killed, the other dangerously wounded. The re- 
mainder surrendered. Humphrey's corps captured two 
thousand of the fugitives from the battle of Sailor's Creek, 
at the mouth of that stream whereto they had retreated. 

Night found the Confederate host in the village of 
Farmville, or crossing at High Bridge to the north side of 
the Appomatox. Lee found a few carloads of provisions at 
the village, but not enough to more than allay the hunger of 
his weary and dispirited men. So ended the day, and 
almost the hope of escape of Lee. Sheridan, in his report 
to Grant, said that he believed if the thing were pressed, 
Lee would presently surrender. Grant repeated the mes- 
sage to Lincoln by telegraph, who laconically replied, "Let 
the thing be pressed!" That portion of the Confederate 
army which crossed at High Bridge stopped at the intersec- 
tion of that road with the one leading westward along the 
river, and intrenched. Humphrey, having crossed at High 
Bridge, came before the works and halted (7th April) . 

The rest of the Union army was on the south side of the 
river, and Lee might have inflicted much damage upon this 
corps. But he did not. He crossed the remainder of his 



LEE ASKS FOR TERMS. 547 

army at Farmville, hotly pressed by Ord. Grant sent a divi- 
sion of infantry to support Humphrey, and ordered Sheridan, 
with Griffin and Ord following, to move rapidly westward 
along the south side of the river, so as to still further head 
off the retreating foe, while the remainder of the army 
was directed to cross and pursue. Thus Lee would pre- 
sently find himself between two fires. And as the Com- 
mander planned, it so happened. 

He now addressed a letter to Lee, demanding the surren- 
der of the Army of North Virginia, to avoid further effusion 
of blood. Lee, though urged by his officers to surrender, 
refused, but asked what terms would be granted. Mean- 
while he continued his flight, following the road which had 
for its general course the north shore of the Appomatox 
River. Lee hoped to find the remainder of his trains of 
provisions at Appomatox Station, some miles further on, 
and bent every effort to reach them. 

Grant (8th April) replied to Lee's note that only one 
chief condition would be asked, which would be that the 
troops in his command should be incapacitated from again 
taking up arms against the Government of the United 
States. Lee replied, proposing a conference looking to the 
establishment of peace, a somewhat arrogant proposition, 
considering his position. Grant answered this by stating 
that he could not treat of peace, but assured him that peace 
would come whenever they should lay down their arms. 
But Lee's career as a Commander was rapidly drawing to a 
close. 

A division of the Federal cavalry dashed into Appoma- 
tox Station late in the afternoon of this day (8th), and cap- 
tured the trains of provisions which Lee thought to meet 
there. Sheridan appeared upon the scene during the night, 



548 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

and sent a message to Ord and Griffin to hurry forward, as 
he had met the advance of the fugitives. Lee was now in 
a trap set for him by Grant — a strong force under a leader 
who would die rather than permit him to break through, 
before him, and the Commander himself with a mighty host 
rapidly pressing up to his rear. But, nevertheless, thinking 
that only the Union cavalry was confronting him at Appo- 
matox, Lee in the morning directed an advance of the only 
disciplined body of troops with him, determined to teach 
the cavalry a lesson and brush it aside. 

But Ord and Griffin arrived on the ground in time, 
formed behind the cavalry and prepared for battle. The 
cavalry retired before the onset of the Confederate lines, 
parted to right and left, and disclosed the strong infantry 
corps, which now moved forward to meet the advance. The 
cavalry formed upon the wings of the infantry and prepared 
to carry confusion to the Confederate flanks. But Lee's 
troops, confounded, stopped and wavered. The Federals 
rapidly advanced at a charge pace, and in another moment 
the last remnant of the Confederate army would have been 
crushed to atoms, had not Lee ordered white flags raised, 
and given up the struggle. He saw the end was come and 
that it could not be avoided. Here fell his dreams of 
power and glory. 

General Lee now sent a note to Grant desiring a confer 
ence with a view to arranging terms of surrender (9th April, 
1865). Grant received the note shortly before noon, and, 
though ill from the effects of exposure during the campaign, 
rode at once to Sheridan's headquarters, where that excited 
and wrathful General who believed the truce a ruse on Lee's 
part to effect escape northward and was consequently desir- 
ous of fighting then and there, was impatiently waiting. 



MEETING OF GRANT AND LEE. 



549 



He soon after met Lee in conference at the house of Farmer 
McLean, near Appomatox Court House. As he passed 
through the ranks of the Federal troops, he was greeted 
with cheers and acclamations. For in him the troops recog- 
nized the one who had brought about this end. 




m'lean's home. 

The two men, who each in himself represented so well 
the genius of their respective parties, now met for the first 
time since they stood side by side under the same flag. The 
difference betw^een them was now marked. Lee, every inch 
the soldier, clad in a new uniform, with his best sword at his 
side, tall, commanding and grave; Grant, the Commander, 



550 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEfc!. 

clad in a soldier's coat, that of the private, v^ith his deco- 
rations as an officer partially concealed, not having had 
time, nor perhaps the inclination, to array himself in a better 
uniform, unthout a sword, but wearing withal that quiet dig- 
nity which distinguished him, they bore here in their dress 
and as well in their mein, the same distinguishing charac- 
teristics they had heretofore shown, 

Lee was prepared to pass through the usual humiliating 
formalities that one surrendering must bear. But Grant did 
not think of formality. There was no surrendering of 
sword, no buncomb, but all was quietly and decently exe- 
cuted. Grant talked a few minutes of old times, when both 
were in the same service; but Lee impatiently recalled the 
present business. Grant thereupon sat down at a table and 
wrote out the terms of surrender in the form of a letter, as 
follows: 

"Appomatox Court House, Virginia," 

Apr, 9, 1865, 
Gen, R. E. Lee, 

ComcCg; C. S. A. 

General'. — In accordance with the substance of my letter 

to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of 

the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms 

towit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in 

duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by 

me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as 

you may designate. The officers to give their individual 

paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the 

United States until properly exchanged; and each company 

or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of 

their commands. The arms, artillery and public property 

to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer 



TERMS OF SURRENDER. 551 

appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace 
the side arms of the officers nor their private horses or 
baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed 
to return to their home, not to be disturbed by United 
States authority, so long as they observe their parole and 
the laws in force where they may reside. 
Very Respectfully, 

U. S. GRANT, 

Lieutenant- General. 
To this letter Lee wrote a reply as follows: 

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia," 

Apr. 9, 1895. 
General: — I received your letter of this date containing 
terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as 
proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as 
those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are 
accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to 
carry the stipulations into effect. 

R. E. LEE, 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. 

In this simple form, the surrender was consummated, and 
by the kindness of the conquerer's heart, the magnanimity 
of him who knew as well how to treat the conquered as to 
conquer the foe, a magnanimity which has never in all 
history been surpassed by hero, knight or soldier, the sur- 
rendering general and his officers were spared unnecessary 
pain; and in pursuance of the same policy, Grant ordered 
that his soldiers should not openly rejoice in their victory. 
As at Vicksburg, so here, he would not permit unnecessary 
pain, unnecessary vaunting. Without vanity himself, never 
boastful, he taught a lesson to American soldiery by these 
orders which will never be forgotten. 



552 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 






^y^^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ ^ ^ 

/-- ^.^ ^c^^ ^^^^ ^^^ 



FAC-SIMILE OF GRANT's LETTER. 553 



V/^-t^ H^ty^^ --pt-^i?^ .^^-f^/^^Ui:,<__ ^^^t^ .^<Z-^i-^f6<__ 




554 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

The details of the surrender were soon accomplished, 
and the Army of Northern Virginia was no more. It had 
been totally destroyed. Armies, not cities, did Grant aim 
to take; for without armies the cities would fall. This day, 
being Sunday, saw the death of treason, and the rise of a 
new America. Grant never wrote a wiser State paper than 
the above letter of capitulation. He looked beyond the 
moment and calculated the effect it would have upon the 
remainder of the Confederate soldiers yet in arms. For all 
sub-commanders would copy after this method in receiving 
captives, and the terms were such that no conquered man 
could find fault or say that it was against his honor to 
accept; and, the last clause, which stipulated that all 
should suffer no harm so long as they observed their paroles 
and the laws in force where they might reside, assured them 
of their safety, while also directing their attention to the 
fact that law must nevertheless be obeyed. While winning 
by kindness, the terms held up respect for law, which has 
been so seldom respected by any large mass of soldiery 
suddenly let out of employment. General Lee acknowl- 
edged the excellence of the terms by saying that they would 
prove good in effect upon the soldiers. 

The number surrendered here amounted to some- 
what over twenty-seven thousand four hundred men. The 
number captured since the movement commenced (2Qth 
March) amounted to about forty-six thousand five hundred 
men. The Federal losses in all amounted to about ten 
thousand. Perhaps ten thousand killed and wounded were 
the Confederate losses, and the remainder of Lee's army, 
estimated at from ten to twent}'' thousand — as different 
authorities hold the true estimate — deserted or escaped 
capture, to enter other commands, or to go home. 



556 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Seldom in history has there been so sudden, so complete 
breakdown of a large army as in this instance. Large 
armies have been surrendered, but seldom so quickly re- 
reduced to a remnant before capitulation. For here Lee 
made the mistake of remaining too long in his intrench- 
ments. He ought to have moved out by his right, suddenly, 
swiftly, and silently, if he had hoped to join Johnston, 
instead of allowing his enemy to cut off his line of escape 
and destroy half his army before he moved. Then, when 
he did move, he ought not to have attempted to go south 
by w^ay of Burksville, knowing the number and energy of 
the Federal cavalry, but to have followed the north bank of 
the Appomatox, seizing and holding bridges and crossings, 
till his provisions could reach him. 

Grant showed consummate skill in the pursuit. To stop 
and capture, not to follow and drive, were his objects ; and 
to do this, he placed Lee between two forces at Appomatox 
Court House. To Sheridan, perhaps, more than to any 
other subordinate officer who took part in this last cam- 
paign, belonged the honor of doing the most effective 
service. Without his energy, his ability, his power over 
men. Grant would have had a much harder task to capture 
the hostile army. Doubtless Grant made a mistake in 
retaining Warren so long in command. He had experienced 
the effect of that General's caution, but he had such respect 
for his bravery, ability and patriotism, that he sought to 
counteract his caution by placing Meade in such a position 
that the latter's orders would govern the movements of 
Warren's corps. 

Nevertheless, when the time came, when the emergency 
arose that would not permit of dallying, Grant gave the 
authority to Sheridan, with whom he, doubtless, had pre- 



THE END NEAR AT HAND. 557 

viously a thorough understanding as to relieving Warren. 
It was done by Sheridan, not when it ought to have 
been done, but after success had become almost certain, 
and when the battle was the hottest. But such are the for- 
tunes of war. One falls and another rises, and the patience 
of the best Commanders may be taxed too long. So in this 
instance. The soldiers seem to have regained in a great 
measure the confidence with which the war had been begun, 
but which by the long series of successes and disasters alter- 
nating, had flagged and grown weary. The astonishing 
marches made, the privations of short provisions and rough 
weather, bad roads and other hardships, were cheerfully 
borne by them. Perhaps one reason why Grant was so suc- 
cessful, was because he thoroughly understood the Ameri- 
can soldier, and knew what possibilities lay in him. 

Thus closed the great conflict between Grant and Lee. 
It had to end in the destruction of one — the victory belonged 
to the strongest. Thus ended Lee's military life, so far as 
command was concerned. But Grant still had work to do, 
before he could lay down his sword and rest. He was 
eager to bring the matter to an end. He saw that the end 
was nigh; but he was aware of the fact that the Govern- 
ment was paying four millions of dollars each day to its 
armies, and as a true patriot, he was eager to see the armies 
disbanded. The expeditions which he had ordered out had 
started. Stoneman was ravaging the country west of Lynch- 
burg; the expedition against Mobile had gotten well under 
way, while Sherman was pushing Johnston's army. Having 
issued the necessary orders to all, and to the Army of the 
Potomac to return by way of Richmond to the Potomac, 
halting at that city until the outcome of the campaign 
against Johnston should appear, he himself went by way of 
Washington to Philadelphia, and visited his children. 



558 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

While he was there (14th April, 1865), he received the 
sad news, astounding to all, that Lincoln had been assassin- 
ated, and he learned afterwards that the plot which slew the 
great President had marked him too as a victim, and that 
probably he also would have suffered harm, had he not passed 
quietly through Washington as he did. He at once returned 
to the Capital, and his calm demeanor, amidst the excitement, 
had much effect upon the country, which reposed confidence 
in him as the head of the army. President Johnson assumed 
the reins of Government, and the troubled public gradually 
became settled. 

In a short time an incident happened which again shows 
the magnanimity of the great Commander. Sherman, nego- 
tiating with Johnston, went far beyond the lenient terms 
which Grant had given Lee, under a mistaken idea of his 
authority. He drew up a sort of protocol, or agreement, 
upon which it was supposed peace might be made throughout 
the country, assuming to say what the States should do to" re- 
turn into the Union. 

Sherman was, no doubt, sincerely patriotic in his inten- 
tions, and Grant thoroughly believed in him. So that when 
an intense storm of vituperation and wrath was raised against 
Sherman for assuming powers which had been expressly re- 
served by Lincoln for the consideration of the Government, 
and when on all sides threats of removal, accusations of 
treason and other preposterous charges were thrown at him, 
Grant defended his friend and stood between him and the 
wrath of the Government. But in obedience to orders, the 
Commander went quietly to Sherman's headquarters and 
instructed him to revoke all arrangements that he had made 
with Johnston, and to accept the surrender on the same 
terms as Lee was given. 



i 



SaRRENDER OF JOHNSTON, 559 

Grant, considering the difficult position in which Sher- 
man was placed, did not let the army with the latter know 
he was there, nor the country at large; but, when Sherman 
obeyed readily, he stole away again in order that Sherman 
might have the honor of receiving the surrender of the 
second great Confederate army. Such generosity, such un- 
selfishness, when he might have, with good right and honor, 
taken the whole matter into his own hands and received 
Johnston's surrender, as, indeed, the Government desired, is 
the quality that has so especially endeared Grant to the 
grateful people whom he served. Never has the voice of 
song ascribed a greater quality than this to man. Words of 
commendation large enough in expression cannot be writ- 
ten. History has revealed, or preserved, for the perusal and 
admiration of man, some characters of whom the people say: 
"He was loved because he loved his fellow-men, and pre- 
ferred them before himself." Grant w^as of these. 

The surrender of Lee and Johnston caused all smaller 
forces to give up their arms, and in less than two months 
after the Spring campaign opened, no large organized body 
of Confederates stood anywhere throughout the United 
States. In pursuance of the policy of lessening expenses, 
and upon the advice of Grant, the Government then pro- 
posed to dismiss and send home the bulk of its forces, bring- 
ing the army down almost to its peace footing. Therefore, 
the two great armies were directed to march to Washington, 
and there pass a grand review, preparatory to disbanding. 
There was joy and rejoicing everywhere, even among the 
rebellious, that the great war was so happily ended. 

There was no danger, as some hinted, that the troops 
would refuse to be disbanded, or if they were, that they 
would break over the laws and plunder the people. Be- 



560 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



cause the armies were composed of the people, a volunteer 
army for the most part, whose members desired Union first, 
the safety of the Government and their homes second, and 
lastly, their own peace. Nor was there thought on the part 
of any one of making Grant a dictator, as some of the Old 
World essayists prophesied. For, after the mighty armies 
of Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, and others had passed in 




THE SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON. 



review before their loved Commander, after their flags had 
dipped in salute before him and the President of the United 
States, after the soldiers had greeted their favorites with 
cheers, they were dismissed, with honorable discharges in 
their hands, which to them should prove in after years, 
among the patriotic, a sufficient warrant for love, admiration 
and gratitude; and the mighty host melted away. 



WITH LEE FELL THE CONFEDERACY. 561 

European wiseacres awoke from fruitless dreaming, 
stopped their bitter prophesies, and began to realize that a 
government founded upon the rights of the people was, 
after all, the strongest, and could withstand a mightier war 
than any one of the countries of the Old World could have 
borne and lived. And the man who was most responsible 
for this state of affairs, was the silent Commander. He had 
met every great Confederate general but one, perhaps, and 
had vanquished all. He had started with Belmont; he had 
added Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, 
and finally Petersburg and Appomatox, to his list of actions. 
Having achieved the principal victories in the west, he had 
come to the east and closed up his work by making an end of 
the Rebellion. For in the fall of Robert E. Lee and his gal- 
lant army, the Confederacy fell — its bulwark was gone; it 
could no longer exist. When he laid down his arms, all the 
others did likewise. When he, the genius of armed and or- 
ganized Rebellion was overthrown, the Genius of Liberty, in 
the person of Grant, or better perhaps, the Genius of the 
American Republic had conquered. The pageant of arms 
melted away; a renewed and re-united country, free from 
the blot of slavery, remained, resting upon the brave men 
who gave themselves so freely for it. 



36 




Booh five. 



REST. 



ERHAPS, at this paragraph, the story of these two 
great participants in the Rebellion ought to cease; 
but, though the war was over as related, the effects 
of it were felt afterwards, even to the present day, 
and the work of restoring the internal affairs of the States 
to their normal condition, did not end with the war. How 
Grant and Lee conducted themselves during the period of 
reconstruction, and contributed to the era of good feeling 
that has sprung up, arguing well for the future peace and 
prosperity of the nation, now indeed "one and inseparable," 
belongs to a civil history; yet one would not understand fully 
the characters and influence of these men, without reviewing 
briefly their lives to the time when those lives ended. 

The lover of peace, the true patriot, turns with pleasure 
from scenes of turmoil and blood to quieter views. The 
Great Rebellion, though so terrible and destructive, was not 
unproductive of good results. For it removed the stain of 
slavery and it taught the world that Government by and for 
the people, may have the same or greater stability, than a 
government by a class or a king. It also taught the people, 
who might and did have ideas to the contrary, that the con- 
stitution of the United States was the supreme law of the 

662 



RESULTS OF THE WAR. 568 

land, that the Government of the United States was above 
that of the States, and that it rested with the people of the 
whole nation, not of an individual State, to say whether law 
should be executed or repealed or abrogated. It demon- 
strated that the chief love of the majority of the people was 
for the Nation, not for the State; that this is one country, 
and not a federation of countries, to each of which the 
respective love of the inhabitants of each should be given. 

The pernicious doctrine that the people owe allegiance 
rather to the State of which they may be residents than to 
the National Government was wholly refuted; for we are 
people of one nation, and state and county governments 
are subdivisions of the political fabric, simply for the appli- 
cation of law^s to the different conditions of residents, not to 
the people at large. The civil wars of Rome, the Rebellion 
of the Netherlands, the French Revolution, the English 
Revolution, ending in the death of Charles I, and the 
American Revolution, were not in their effects farther 
reaching than the great American Rebellion, whose inci- 
dents in part have been herein related, and none of them 
compare with it as to number of troops engaged, the great 
battles fought, or the extent of country over which it was 
waged. 

Some of the further results of the war were four millions 
of slaves liberated ; a nation of civilians made a nation of 
soldiers ; a great impulse given to inventive genius and the 
production of useful articles; the awakening of literature 
and art in America. The cost of all these, however, was 
immense, involving an expenditure of several billions of dol- 
lars and the death of several hundred thousand men. The 
war left for solution the problem of reconstruction and the 
method of paying the debts, as the two chief matters for 
consideration. 



564 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Grant and Lee lived long enough to see the work of 
reconstruction finished, and the nation upon a new road to 
prosperity ; and both, before they died, expressed their 
lively satisfaction at the result. Their lots in life differed 
after the war, the one being raised to the highest honors 
which a grateful nation could give him, and the other living 
a quiet, even obscure life. 

Grant, as Commander-in-Chief, was the busiest of the 
army officers, while the process of disbanding the army pro- 
ceeded. His thorough knowledge of all branches of the 
service made him indispensable to the Government. Until 
Johnson began a course of procedure which did not suit the 
people, as represented by Congress, matters moved along 
smoothly ; but when Congress found fault with the Presi- 
dent and the President quarrelled with Stanton, Secretary 
of War, Grant was placed in an exceedingly difficult posi- 
tion. His calm judgment and his determination to obey 
the voice of the people, alone saved him from going into 
error. His ideas were the same as those advocated by 
Congress. He so shaped his course that, while obeying the 
President as his Commander, so far as in his judgment the 
President had a legal right to command him, he still strictly 
obeyed the laws of Congress. 

Johnson displeased the men who had elected him to the 
Vice-Presidency, first by issuing an amnesty proclamation, 
excluding from its operations and benefits certain persons 
of rank and position who had assisted the late Rebellion. 
When, in pursuance of the policy laid down by the Presi- 
dent, an indictment for treason was found against General 
R. E. Lee, and the General brought it to the notice of 
Grant, relying upon the parole he had taken when he sur- 
rendered to him at Appomattox, Grant at once addressed a 



THE CONFLICT WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. 565 

message to the President remonstrating in the strongest 
terms, and even went so far as to threaten to resign his 
office if his agreements were not respected. 

Johnson could not afford to anger the Commander in 
this matter, since to him, more than to Congress or to the 
President, the people were looking as the safeguard of the 
Republic, and the prosecutions were suddenly dropped. 
One must admire the honor of the soldier in him because of 
this action. Lee knew that he could trust Grant and there- 
fore appealed to him instead of to the President ; his faith 
was met as it deserved. 

Grant was opposed to all harsh measures. He believed 
that the Southern people who had so valiantly stood to arms 
until there was no longer a possibility of winning the con- 
flict, would respond more generously if they were now met 
as honorable men, who, when they said they had submitted 
and would resume their duties, would keep their word; and 
he did not believe that one or a thousand punishments 
visited upon the leaders would produce any further sub- 
mission or work more good, but would rather keep alive the 
bitterness of the late strife. The people who were in the 
Rebellion may therefore thank him, that he, more than any 
other person, befriended them in their misfortunes. And 
in proof that they did so recognize his services, the great 
good-will shown him during his life and at his death by 
them, is proof. 

When Johnson still further separated himself from Con- 
gress by his policy of readmitting the seceded states, on the 
ground that the ordinances of secession had not really sep- 
arated them from the Union, while Congress insisted upon 
forms similar to those passed through by territories asking 
admittance to the Union, Grant carefully avoided any act 



566 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

that would throw him into conflict with either party. But 
nevertheless he supported Sheridan, who in Louisiana 
rigidly enforced the law made by Congress, and prevented by 
his influence the removal of that General by the President, 
though Sheridan was later transferred to another depart- 
ment. Then the President removed Stanton and appointed 
Grant Secretary of War ad interim till another could be 
approved by Congress. 

Grant accepted this office with the understanding that if 
Congress should approve he would retain it, and if not he 
would resign it into Stanton's hands. Johnson claimed 
that Grant promised him to retain it in any event; but Grant 
held otherwise; and, when Congress decided that Stanton 
was not lawfully removed from office, he at once gave up 
the position to him. Johnson hoped that Grant, as the 
head of the army, would retain the office and by that means 
enable him to overawe Congress, and, it is said, even sug- 
gested that course. But Grant was not a person either to 
disobey law or to play dictator, and refused. 

The Commander was secure in his position, and while he 
did not refuse to obey the President as his Commander-in- 
Chief, yet believing him to be pursuing a wrong course, he 
gave him distinctly to understand that he would obey only 
such orders as he was satisfied were legal. The quarrel 
between the President and Congress finally became so bitter 
that articles of impeachment were filed against the former, 
and were well-nigh passed. Finally Johnson's troubled 
administration drew to a close, and the parties of the 
Country came together to nominate his successor. 

It was a foregone conclusion that Grant would be the 
nominee of the Republican party; and he, with Horatio Sey- 
mour as Vice-President, were duly named. The campaign 



GRANT ELECTED PRESIDENT. 567 

preceding the election was very bitter, the opposition heap- 
ing upon Grant all the vituperation and abuse which 
practiced politicians are able to produce. His purposes 
were distorted; his quietness and impassiveness were said to 
be dullness; his very success as a General was attributed to 
accident, and he was held to unmeasured scorn and ridicule. 
But he was elected by an immense majority. He could 
then afford to pass over all charges wherein wrong was 
imputed, with his simple denial, leaving his actions to the 
unbiased judgment of his posterity, so that from them peo- 
ple might learn the purity of his purposes. Grant made no 
effort to obtain the office to which he was now elected. 
With all his preferments this also came unsolicited. 

General Lee (no longer possessing that title, except by 
courtesy,) after taking his parole left his army and went to 
Richmond, where he resided for some time with his family 
in strict seclusion. The war had swept away all his and 
his wife's property, and he was reduced to great poverty, 
subsisting indeed for a time upon rations issued by the 
Federal quartermaster with the troops at the city. A friend 
came to his relief and offered him the use of a house at Car- 
tersville, Va., which he gratefully accepted and occupied 
some months. Many friends came to his aid, but he proudly 
declined assistance. Several firms sought to have him be- 
come connected with them, probably as an advertisement to 
themselves, and made him flattering offers; but he rejected 
them all. 

He was presently (Oct. 1865) offered the Presidency of 
Washington College, at Lexington, Virginia, and accepted 
the position. He remained its President from that time 
until his death. The quiet life of the College suited him 
and comported with the natural dignity of his nature. It is 



568 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

/ 

said that he meditated writing an account of his actions 
during the war; but unfortunately failed to do so. He intro- 
duced a rigid discipline among the students under his 
charge. His duties were rather those of a disciplinarian 
than of a teacher, but the college flourished greatly under 
his care. He was a favorite with his pupils, who looked 
upon him with veneration and love. The majority of them 
were from the leading families of the Southern States, who 
sought in this indirect way to honor their late leader, and 
their children as well, by placing the youths under his 
charge. 

Lee, after his surrender, never gave himself to idle 
lamentations over the lost cause, but advised all with whom 
he came in contact to submit to the inevitable gracefully, 
and to conform their lives and practices to the new order of 
things, giving their steady support to those conservative 
men in public life who sincerely desired the welfare of the 
whole nation, rather than of a part or section. When, at 
the time the indictment for treason, before mentioned, was 
brought against him, he was advised to leave the country, 
he refused, trusting to the sense of honor of his great 
opponent in the late campaign. 

He was not further molested. But, despite the calm ap- 
pearance, and the words of encouragement which he had, it 
was easy to see that his spirit was broken, and that the over- 
throw of his ambition had injured him. He aged rapidly, 
and when a short illness, not necessarily of a fatal nature, 
seized him, he succumbed, and died (loth Oct., 1870) at his 
home in Lexington, aged sixty-four years. In his last mo- 
ments, when delirious, his mind returned to the scenes of 
war, and he cried out, shortly before breathing his last, 
"Strike the Tent! Tell Hill he must come up!" He re- 



DEATH OF LEE. 569 

mained, it may be said from this incident, that soldier who 
had led the Army of Northern Virginia through so many 
of the changeable fortunes of war. 

So died in peace, a peace which he owed to his generous 
conqueror, the greatest soldier whom the rebellious states 
found to lead their troops, a man whom the patriot can not 
but admire for his many noble qualities and great genius, 
while feeling sorrow over the fact that he did not give his 
great abilities to the service of the Country which produced 
him. He left children who have since become worthy and 
noted citizens, x-^nd if, in their lives, they carry forward 
the lesson which their father sought to teach those with 
whom he fought as leader, if they seek the good of the 
whole country and to remove as much as possible the evils 
that still remain amongst the people, causing the old wrath 
to be forgotten by their efforts, they will prove worthy of 
him. A marble monument marks the resting place of Lee's 
remains at Lexington. 

Grant entered upon his duties as Chief Executive (4th 
March, 1869), as the eighteenth President of the United 
States, amidst political troubles of a serious nature. The 
principles which he set forth in his inaugural address and in 
campaign documents, by which he promised to abide during 
his tenure of office, were such that the people had confi- 
dence in him, and the credit of the nation among all coun- 
tries rose at once. He accepted the results of the war as 
conclusive upon the questions over which the struggle oc- 
curred; he would execute all the laws passed by Congress, 
until declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, but would interpose his veto when he disap- 
proved any proposed law; he would conform to the tenure 
of office act so long as it should remain law; he believed in 



570 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

the plan of reconstruction laid down by Congress, and would 
see it carried into effect; he was in favor of maintaining the 
integrity and credit of the Government, by paying every 
dollar of just public debt; he believed in returning to a metal 
basis for money; he would introduce the most rigid economy 
into all the public offices, and endeavor to reduce the public 
debt as rapidly as possible; he was in favor of the ratifica- 
tion of the proposed fifteenth amendment to the constitu- 
tion; he believed in the reduction of internal revenue as 
rapidly as the condition of the country would permit; he 
favored citizenship for the Indians; he favored any laws that 
would help the condition of the laboring classes; he believed 
in pressing the claims of the United States against Great 
Britain on account of the cruiser Alabama; and the educa- 
tion of the freedman should be made his special care. 

These were a few of his principles as expressed; and he 
carried out his promise of supporting them, to the letter. 
He was confronted at the outset with great difficulties, as 
great perhaps as any that confronted Washington when he 
entered upon his first term of office as President. He be- 
lieved that for the protection of the negro the right of 
suffrage should be extended to him; and to protect the 
country from the ignorance of the new citizen, that a special 
commissioner of education, with a sufficient bureau of as- 
sistants, should be appointed to educate him. 

The vexed question of boundary lines with Great Britain 
and the Alabama claims were successfully brought to a de- 
termination by means of arbitration, though the war spirit 
ran high throughout the Nation, whose people had not, and 
have not yet, forgotten their indignation against that coun- 
try. Great Britain paid fifteen million five hundred thou- 
sand dollars in settlement of the Alabama claims. Grant's 



GRANT AS A STAESMAN. 571 

management of his great office, his public documents and 
private papers, all show that he was possessed of no small 
share of statesmanlike ability, that his mind could and did 
grasp the situation of affairs, and that his conservative ad- 
ministration did more to place the Nation upon a sound basis 
for growth and development, than any other influence of the 
time. 

The Government was stable. Business men were able to 
repose confidence in it; none might be doubtful what the 
course of the Administration would be. The United States 
attained a new dignity in the eyes of the powers of the 
world; her flag was respected in every place. So well did 
he serve the people, that at the expiration of his term, he 
was re-elected by such an overwhelming majority over 
Greely, his opponent, one of the most popular men of the 
day, that the latter died of vexation and disappointment, it 
is said, within a few weeks after election. Never was there 
a more popular President than Grant. Even those who had 
lately borne arms against him in the field now supported 
him. On the other hand, never did man have more virulent 
and truculent enemies, who were enraged, not only because 
of his success and popularity, but because of the silent con- 
tempt with which he chose to disregard their accusations. 

In one matter only had he found Congress differing with 
him. He believed that the United States ought to annex 
territory where and when it could be done peacefully and 
profitably; and in this spirit he negotiated the annexation 
of San Domingo Island. Congress rejected the proposition, 
and he did not urge the matter further. But his grand idea 
seemed to be (an idea indeed which many patriotic men now 
advocate) , that the United States should include the whole 
of North America, and the islands adjacent thereto, and he 



572 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

believed, that with the aid of rapid transit and the telegraph, 
such a great country could be as easily governed as the terri- 
tory over which the United States already held sway. 

During the second term of his administration, the Cen- 
tennial Exposition was held at Philadelphia, in honor of the 
hundredth year of the Nation's life. A short, troublesome 
war also broke out among the Sioux Indians, during which 
the brilliant cavalry officer, Custer, who had done such ex- 
cellent service under Sheridan, from the Wilderness to the 
Appomatox, was killed. The end of his term of office was 
somewhat disturbed by the difficulty of determining who 
should succeed him. Hayes, the Republican Candidate, 
claimed the election; Tilden, the Dem.ocratic candidate, 
was also certain that he was elected. Some even threatened 
to use force of arms to establish their favorite. But Grant's 
firm attitude in favor of the plan that Congress should de- 
termine the matter, stopped the turmoil, and held revolu- 
tionary minds in check. A commission decided that Hayes 
was properly elected, and when that officer was declared 
President, Grant relinquished the reins of office to him, and 
gladly retired to private life, having for more than twenty 
years been constantly in the service of his country. 

Grant, it may be said, had now tasted all the delights 
which honorable and requited ambition could demand. He 
had gained all the honor, and received all the rewards, that 
the American People were able to bestow, or his own heart 
desire. He relinquished public life without a sigh. During 
the long term of this public life he had known little leisure, 
either for mind or body. He had been an indefatigable 
worker, whether as General or as President ; and such was 
the strength of his constitution, and the calmness with 
which he met all tasks, a quality which was conducive to 
rest and strength, that he retain-d good health. 



grant's tour of the world. 573 

Having always had an insatiable desire to travel and see 
the world, he now gratified that desire ; and as the Nation's 
guest, carried most of the way in the Nation's vessels, he 
circumnavigated the globe, and visited all the principal 
countries of the earth. Everywhere he was received with 
honors due any king, and to the representative citizen of a 
great nation. No other man could claim so well to repre- 
sent American ideas, energy and perseverance. He was 
the foremost American of the day. Kings, Emperors, and 
all rulers, whose states he visited, vied with each other to 
do him honor. Yet he received it all quietly and unosten- 
tatiously, as the due rather of the Nation he represented 
than of himself, and he returned to the country from which 
he set out, whose people received him with a royal wel- 
come, without being puffed up or rendered proud. No man, 
since the great Washington, was so popular with all classes. 

He now embarked in several private enterprises, to sup- 
port his family, since he had by no means profited by office, 
and was a comparatively poor man, but he was not as suc- 
cessful in these as he might have been, had he been less 
scrupulous and honest. Not that to be successful in busi- 
ness requires dishonesty, but that he might have profited 
financially had he listened to the many suggestions of men 
who live by their wits on the public. 

Grant was not successful in business, first because he had 
never had a business training when young; second, because 
he had always been a soldier ; third, because he was too old 
to learn the arts and ways of business men when he stepped 
down from public office into private life. But he became 
engaged in the forwarding of several laudable enterprises, 
which were more for the benefit of the public than of the 
individuals interested. International railways piercing 



574 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Mexico ; the Nicaragua canal, and various other schemes 
looking to the growth of the influence of the United States, 
were promoted by his efforts. Having to visit Mexico upon 
these matters, he passed through some of the States that 
had been in Rebellion, and received such testimonials of 
gratitude and affection from those to whom he had proven 
so generous and protecting a conqueror, that he was amply 
repaid for the magnanimity which he had been pleased to 
show. His influence had proven a mighty factor in the 
building up of the new social fabric, and in bringing about 
an era of good feeling among all reasonable men, whether 
they had fought for the Union or against it. 

He now made his home at Galena, in the State of Illinois, 
whence he had started to enter the service against the 
Rebellion. Here he committed a blunder, in the eyes of 
many of his fellow citizens, though in it was nothing of 
harm. He permitted his ardent friends to allow his name 
to be presented for nomination to a third term of the office 
of President of the United States, which, it is to be hoped, 
custom will never allow. But he made no effort to obtain 
the nomination. Had he done so, there is no doubt that he 
could have had it, and could have easily been elected. In 
fact, it is believed, he never expressly gave his consent, but 
allowed the persuasion of his friends and the exigencies of 
the occasion to overcome his scruples; and he kept silence, 
until he saw that there was opposition that could not be 
well overcome without effort, when he withdrew. 

The weighty causes of this false step were numerous. 
First, the persuasions of ardent friends; second, the state of 
comparative poverty into which he had stepped from office; 
third, the claims advanced by partisans that his candidacy 
was necessary to heal the splits or dissensions in the party 



REVERSES. 575 

of which he was a member; fourth, he believed that the 
policy he had pursued with the readmitted states of the 
South had been partially abandoned, and that he could, by re- 
suming office, benefit his country by another term of service. 
Had he been elected, he would have served faithfully; not 
being nominated, though having by far the largest number 
of supporters in the Republican Convention at the first, he 
accepted the result in silence, and gave his hearty support 
to the nominee, an excellent man and a brave soldier who 
died all too soon, General Garfield. 

Grant presently removed to New York City to reside. 
His necessities compelled him to accede to the proposition of 
friends that he be placed on the retired list of soldiers at 
the pay of a Lieutenant-General; and though for a long time 
the proposition was opposed bitterly by political opponents, 
this was accomplished. Having entered a partnership busi- 
ness with a man whom he relied upon as honest, he was 
cheated and financially ruined by the latter's rascality. 

At last he began, for the purpose of earning a liv- 
ing, the writing of an account of the military campaigns 
in which he had been engaged, since known as his 
"Memoirs," in which he displayed no small literary skill, his 
style being very simple and perspicuous (A. D. 1882-3). In 
them is no boasting, no grandiloquence, no deception. He 
pointed out faults, as well as praised merits. The Memoirs 
are generally acknowledged to be truthful and authorita- 
tive upon the subject of which they treat. Their compo- 
sition shows that he was possessed of a most versatile 
genius, not brilliant, but simple and sure. 

Death is no respecter of persons, no matter how good or 
great, how bad or unknown. Grant became aware one day, 
while eating fruit, that a painful swelling had begun in the 



576 



THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 



upper part of his throat, which, upon examination, proved to 
be a kind of cancer. It was probably caused by an excessive 
use of tobacco to which he had been for many years addicted. 
Upon instructions, he ceased using the narcotic; but the mis- 
chief was done, and neither doctors nor medicine availed to 
stop the disease's ravages. The approach of death did not 
deter him from work upon his Memoirs, although it caused 
him to shorten the task, and bring to a close his account of 
the great campaign with Lee, giving only an outline of the 
greater part of it. 




grant's tomb. 



grant's death. 577 

He had become a member of the Methodist Church 
some time before, and now felt ready to meet the Supreme 
Being, in whom through all his life, as his utterances and pa- 
pers show, he reposed the strongest faith. He had seen all 
the honors possible to man brought to him, with no effort on 
his part, other than to perform his duty; he had tasted the 
bitter and sweet of life, and when death came to him, on the 
top of Mount McGregor, in the State of New York, whither 
the doctors had taken him, it found him ready. His famous 
words, uttered to quiet the dissensions between the Confed- 
erate and loyal peoples — "Let us have peace!" containing 
the fondest wish and hope of his life, were, so far as he was 
concerned, met and granted (23d July, 1885). 

His age was sixty-three years, one year less than that of 
Lee, when he died. The American people mourned for him, 
as they had never mourned for any man. He was a favorite, 
regardless of section, race or color. Lincoln fell, and the 
loyal and freed peoples mourned bitterly; Grant fell and 
the whole of a reunited people mourned. His body was 
borne to its resting place in Riverside Park, in New 
York City, by an equal number of Federal and ex-Con- 
federate soldiers as befitting the sentiments which he 
had always put forth after the Rebellion was ended. 
And there the body rests at this day, although it seems 
that the State which sent him out upon his glorious 
career ought to have been the resting place of the body; or 
that he ought to rest at the National Capital, whose protec- 
tor he was during many troubled years. 

So ended the lives of Grant and Lee, the chief spirits of 
the time in which they lived. Few have left a more lasting 
impression upon the pages of history than they. As one 
rapidly reviews their careers, much similarity comes to 

37 



578 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

notice. Their lives were almost the same in length; they 
vi^ere students at the same school; they served in the Indian 
and Mexican wars, and in the War of the Rebellion, where 
they became the chief spirits of their respective sides; they 
each displayed military genius after they had arrived at 
middle age. In these respects, their lives were similar, but 
in other respects they differed. Their birth-places were in 
different sections of the country; the conditions of life to 
which they were born were different; their characten; as 
students differed; they chose different sides in the great 
conflict, which brought them to the fore, and they differed 
in genius and ability. 

They had many points in common — irreproachable 
characters, soldierly and gentlemanly instincts, and deeply 
religious natures. Again they differed in qualities. Grant 
was of an equable temperament, seldom angry and always 
calm and self-contained, while Lee would become at times 
violently angry, and was conversational, more impulsive, 
and withal more magnetic, because of his prepossessing 
address. Both possessed good judgment, but Grant had far 
greater perception and was more original, depending less 
upon others than upon himself. Grant followed his own 
judgment, to work out the difficult problems of war sub- 
mitted to him, following beaten paths where he could, but 
always ready to throw aside manuals and use his faculties, 
while Lee followed more closely the lines of war laid down, 
and failing sometimes to apply them to the new conditions 
of this country, failed of success. Grant's genius was inven- 
tive; Lee's applicative. 

Both possessed strong wills and intense energy; but 
Grant's energy was always active, Lee's rather inactive 
except when necessity demanded. Both were quick to see 



WHICH WAS THE GREATER. 579 

an advantage or to correct an error. Grant's mind, how- 
ever, was able to make combinations which Lee could not 
or did not do. Grant could conduct an expedition on 
the field, and at the same time move several other 
armies to the accomplishment of a great object. Lee never 
had the same opportunities that Grant possessed, except 
when in command of all the armies, and then he ought to 
have bent every effort to form a junction of Johnston's 
army with his own. Grant was good in every art of war, 
whether in prosecuting a campaign, conducting a defense, 
or pushing forward a siege. Lee was best when on the 
defensive; he w^as but indifferent in other points as a Com- 
mander. Grant was versatile; Lee was a soldier and a 
specialist. 

The question naturally arises which was the greater 
man? And the further question follows, which was the 
greater General? It is almost impossible to pass a correct 
opinion, if one be prejudiced, and it is almost impossible to 
remain unprejudiced where one's principles are those im- 
pressed by teachings drawn from the late war. The days 
of trouble have not passed far enough into the past to allow 
the coldness of reason and of judgment to interpose be- 
tween sentiment and the verdict. 

If one is to judge as a patriot, Grant, because of his 
loyalty, was the greater man. If one is to judge by the suc- 
cess that attended him, Grant was the better general. If 
one is to judge them socially, Lee was the more polished, 
but not more genial and pleasant to meet. If they are to 
be judged morally, neither can be declared superior to the 
other. 

If one IS to judge by what they accomplished. Grant, 
who rose by his own merits, from unknown and poor 



580 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

parentage, without friends of power and wealth to help him, 
who accomplished so much for the Nation against every 
principal General of the opposition, and afterwards by word, 
act, and example, protected and influenced for good those 
whom he assisted to conquer, must stand far ahead of Lee, 
who was born to power and fortune, the child of prosperity 
and popularity, who, to be sure, raised himself by ability to 
heights which other men of his estate could not attain, and 
who cast his fortunes with a cause which had not the slight 
excuse of expediency even to warrant its action. Grant 
was a self-made man ; Lee, perhaps, owed more to his train- 
ing and education. It may be said that Grant knew by 
instinct, if one may call it so, what Lee had learned by 
study, and hence he was more fertile in resources than the 
latter. 

. But to obtain a better idea of their respective merits, a 
hasty comparison of their campaigns and battles may be 
made. Grant entered the service at the beginning of the 
Rebellion, as a Colonel; Lee entered as a General, com- 
manding all the state troops of Virginia. Grant, rising 
among many other brilliant Generals, won his way by good 
leadership and resultant successes, to the highest command 
that the United States could give him; Lee obtained com- 
mand of the chief Confederate army at the first, but re- 
mained there, until as a forlorn hope, he was invested with 
the command-in-chief of all Confederate forces. Grant's 
first campaign, leaving out the operations at or near Jeffer- 
son City, Missouri, where he had only made ready when 
transferred, known as the Belmont campaign, was a success; 
Lee's Western Virginia campaign was a failure, and almost 
obscured the genius that he really possessed. 

For the purpose of comparison, one should not choose 



A COMPARISON OF CAMPAIGNS. 581 

consecutive campaigns, but rather those which were similar 
in conditions and purposes. Grant's campaign against Forts 
Henry and Donelson, is without parallel in Lee's operations. 
That which included Shiloh and Corinth, ending at the 
latter place, is somewhat similar to that of Lee ending at 
Antietam, except that they were opposite in result. Shiloh, 
or Pittsburg Landing, luka, Corinth — South Mountain, Har- 
per's Ferry and Antietam, the former leading to complete 
victories over two armies; the latter ending in defeat. Also 
Grant's campaign against Vicksburg was without parallel in 
Lee's career, though the operations which ended in the 
defeat of Pope and the withdrawal of McClellan from be- 
low Richmond, contained the same strategic feats — that of 
striking at the enemy before he could be re-inforced. 

For conditions of field, the battles at Chattanooga, end- 
ing in the route of Bragg's army, may be compared with the 
battle at Gettysburg; and if the difference in numbers was 
transposed in these actions, it must be remembered that 
Grant took command of a defeated and dispirited army, 
raised it out of its straits and won a victory, while Lee, with 
an army flushed with success, one of the best that ever trod 
the fields of Virginia, rushed to battle, committed the fault 
of attacking an impregnable position held by a superior 
enemy, and was sorely defeated. 

The battle at Champion Hill, by Grant against Pem- 
berton, may be compared with that of Malvern by Lee 
against McClellan, but the results were far different. For 
Grant assailed a superior force, and by excellent general- 
ship, routed his enemy and drove him from the field ; while 
Lee could accomplish nothing at Malvern over a dispirited 
foe whom he had been pursuing, and suffered a severe re- 
pulse. Mah-ern Hill may be compared more properly, both 



582 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

as to the necessitj^ of battle and the terrible, bloody slaughter 
and repulse, to the battle at Cold Harbor. Both had the 
same purpose, to strike one more blow at an enemy that 
had escaped destruction, and both were delivered with fury 
and perseverance, resulting in fearful destruction of life 
without a corresponding success to compensate. The last 
charge at Gettysburg also may be likened unto the bloody 
assaults at Vicksburg and at Spottsylvania, though the re- 
sult of the former was more disastrous than either of the 
latter. Lee's losses at Antietam and at Gettysburg amounted 
to as many at each as did the Federal losses in the Wilder- 
ness and at Spottsylvania. 

The comparison might be carried on indefinitely, and 
parallels found in many other instances. Both caused the 
shedding of blood as did no other Generals of the war ; but 
both had the same object in view — the destruction of the 
enemy quickly, leading to a less loss of life and property 
than to allow the war to drag out a weary length. Grant's 
campaigns spread over a wide extent of territory, not only 
covering all that Lee trod over, but the wide valley of the 
Mississippi and its tributaries as well. He led two distinct 
armies before he was made leader of all ; Lee retained com- 
mand in Virginia after being made a General for the Con- 
federacy. 

Each conducted five great campaigns and several smaller 
ones ; but Lee operated back and forth over a territory one 
hundred miles long by seventy-five miles wide, and became 
so familiar with it that he knew the location of every road. 
Grant was never decisively defeated, and was repulsed in 
battle only once or twice, all his campaigns being successful. 
Lee suffered four great defeats and some repulses, and was 
beaten in his campaigns as often as he was successful. 



WHERE EACH STOOD. 533 

Grant fought more than a score of battles, gained a 
dozen decisive victories, conducted to a successful issue 
three great sieges, and was never defeated, though suffer- 
ing two repulses, which had only the effect of making his 
efforts stronger. Lee fought one less battle, gained four 
decisive victories, was defeated six times and repulsed as 
many more. The tabular list in the Appendix will explain 
and verify these statements. What is the result of such 
comparison? Grant proved himself equal to every occasion 
and won success in all his plans, or at least was never driven 
to relinquish any of them. He was equally good in all 
points as a General, and must be classed by an unbiased 
judgment with those few known as the greatest soldiers — 
with Cajsar, with Napoleon and with Wellington, or Von 
Moltke. 

Lee was excellent in defence and in commanding on the 
battle-field, but lacked in aggressive strategy, and often- 
times failed to exercise a calm judgment. He must, there- 
fore, stand with those great soldiers, who cannot claim the 
rank of the greatest, but who so nearly approach them along 
some lines of merit, that they must be ranked next. Sher- 
man, Sheridan, Lee, Johnston (who surrendered to Sher- 
man) — these stand in the same rank, and one cannot say 
which was the greatest, while being able to point out 
wherein each excelled the other. 

For Grant combined in himself all the qualities of a 
great and good soldier — ready for any emergency, success- 
ful, magnanimous, patriotic, placing his country before him- 
self, and his friend's advancement before his own, the tool 
of God, the power which, with Lincoln's prompting, freed 
four millions of slaves and saved a Union from destruction, 
which will henceforth, it is believed, last to the end of many 
centuries. 



584 THE LIVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE. 

Lee won admiration as a soldier, but when a century 
shall have passed away, he will be remembered only as the 
greatest opponent that ever drew sword against the silent 
Commander. For the one was the product of democracy, 
as a republican form of Government, and its advocate; the 
other the product of aristocratic institutions, and their ad- 
vocate. As they accepted the outcome of the great strug- 
gle, and as they by example taught their followers to forget 
and forgive, so may we, who have been witnesses of their 
example, do; and the Republic, as the common property 
and the love of all Americans, without section or jealousy, 
will continue to bless mankind. 



THE END. 



APPENDIX. 



A TABULAR STATEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES OF GRANT AND LEE. 



GRANT. 

Campaigns — results: 

In Missouri No result. 

Belmont Success. 

Donelson Success. 

Shiloh and Corinth Success. 

Vicksburg Success, 

Chattanooga Success. 

Wilderness to Appomatox Success. 



Grant . 



LEE. 
Campaigns — results: 

West Virginia Defeat. 

Gaines' Mill to Malvern 

Hill Success. 

Against Pope ( Success & 

to Antietam ( Defeat. 
Along Rappahannock | 
against Burnside and |> Success. 
Hooker J 

Gettysburg Defeat. 

Wilderness to Appomatox Defeat. 

Recapitulation. 
.Successes, 6. Lee Successes, 3. Defeats 4. 



GRANT. 
Battles AND Sieges — results: 

Belmont Victory. 

Ft. Henry, Siege Success. 

Ft. Donelson, Siege Victory. 

Shiloh or Pittsburg > victory 

Landing. ) 

luka Victory. 

Corinth Victory. 

Port Gibson Victory. 

Raymond Victory. 

Jackson Victory. 

Champion Hill Victory. 

Black River Bridge Victory. 

Vicksburg, Siege Success. 

Mission Rid^e and ( Victory. 

Lookout Mountain. ( 

Wilderness \ ^ 

/ Battle. 

Spottsylvania Court \ Drawn 

House. ( Battle. 



LEE. 
Battles and Sieges — results: 

Cheat Mountain Defeat. 

Mechanicsville Repulse 

Gaines' Mill Victory. 

Frazier's Farm Repulse. 

Malvern Hill Repulse. 

Second Manassas Victory. 

South Mountain. Defeat. 

Antietam Defeat. 

Fredericksburg Victory. 

Chancellorsville Victory. 

Gettysburg Defeat. 

Bristoe Station Repulse. 

Wilderness j Drawn 

( Battle. 
Spottsylvania \ Drawn 

Court House. ( Battle. 

North Anna j Repulse 

( Partial. 
Cold Harbor Success. 



586 THE I-IVES AND CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT AND LEE, 



North Anna < Victory 

I Partial. 



Petersburg Defeat. 

Weldon Road Repulse. 

^""^^ "^'■'^°'' ^^P"^^^- Hatcher's Run ^Success 



Petersburg, Siege Success. / 2d Defeat. 

Weldon Road Victory. Dinwiddie Court House . . Defeat. 

Hatcher's Run j Repulse Five Forks Defeat 

( 2d Success. Sailor's Creek Defeat. 

Dinwiddie Court House. .Victory. 

Five Forks Victory, 

Sailor's Creek Victory. 

Recatitulation. 

Grant — Victories and Successes, 20. Drawn Battles, 2. Repulses, 2. 

and Defeats, none, 
Lee — Victories and Successes, 6, Drawn Battles, 2. Repulses, 6. 

and Defeats, q. 

No note is made of minor actions, and the campaigns 
may, in one or two instances, be further separated; but the 
above tables give the most important actions in their proper 
order, and, the author believes, as history will place them. 



ITnbei:. 



Arkansas Post, Capture of 158 

Anna River 460 

Atlanta, Ga., Sherman at 519 

Alabama, The Claims 570 

Alexander, the Great 32, 203 

Alexandria 33 

Allen, Colonel, offered command 142 

Ashley Gap, Battle of 356 

Anderson, General, at Wilderness Battle, 430; at Spottsylvania, 437; at Cold 

Harbor, 475 ; in the Shenandoah 508 

Alice's Station 471 

Ayers, General 535 

Amelia Court House 541 

Aristocrats 21 

Arista, General 49 

Anti-Slavery Doctrines 24 

Aldie Pass 304 

Antietam, Battle of 313.325 

Antietam Creek 317 

Ayotla, Scott at ." -. 62 

Abolitionists 'j'j 

Appomatox River, 489; Court House 549 

Ampudia, General, at Monterey 53 

Adjutant-General's Office, Grant in 80 

Austerlitz 254 

Black Fort, at Monterey 53 

Baltimore, Lee at, 72; threatened 358 

Bragg, General at Shiloh, 122; against Buell, 148; at Chickamauga, 223; 

at Chattanooga 230, 252 

Babylon 161 

Banks, General, at Port Hudson, 170; at Cedar Mountain, 301; in Red River. 392 

Bayou Pierre, Bridge over i 181 

Blair, General, at Milliken's Bend, 184; in Vicksburg Campaign igo 

Baker's Creek, Miss 192 

Black River Bridge, Battle of 198 

Broad Run, Va 304 

587 



588 INDEX 

Banks' Ford 331 

Brandy Station, Battle of, 355 ; second battle 383 

Barlow, General, at Spottsylvania 444 

Badajos 483 

Bailey's Creek 509 

Breckinridge, nominee for President 77 

Breckinridge, General 485 

Belmont Campaign and Battle 87, 94 

Beaver Dam, battle of 282 

Beauregard, General, in the Mexican War, 58; at Shiloh, 121, 136; against 

Butler 394 

Breastworks 418 

Bermuda Hundred 449 

Bethesda Church 472 

Bishop's Palace at Monterey 53 

Big Black River 154, ig8 

Bridgeport, Ala 232 

Bridgeport, Miss., Sherman occupies 197 

Bristoe Station, Battle of, 304; Second battle 384 

Birney, General, at Chancellorsville, 349; at Wilderness, 425; at Petersburg. . 498 

Bowling Green, Fall of H2 

Booneville, Buell at 140 

Bowen, General, at Port Gibson, 178; at Vicksburg 217 

Bolton, Miss., Occupation of 190 

Bonaparte 21, 203, 219, 254,483 

Brown, Major 50 

Brown, Fort, Siege of 51 

Brown, John -raid 262 

Brown's Ferry 230, 232 

Brown's Gap 512 

Boonsboro, Md 314 

Brock Road 412 

Boydton Pike Road 516, 535 

Brook's Road 535 

Buena Vista, Battle of 56 

Buchanan, President, 76; Inaction of 78 

Bull Run, Battle, First 82, 267, 305 

Buford. Colonel, at Belmont 90 

Buell, General, at Bowling Green, 94; march to Pittsburg Landing, 117, 121; 

at Shiloh, 134; at Booneville, 140; against Bragg 148 

Buckner, General, loi ; at Donelson 108, 1 1 1 

Bruinsburg, Miss., Landing at 1 77 

Burnside, General, at Knoxville, 225, 253; at Antietam, 323; commanding 

Army of the Potomac, 329; under Grant 405 

Blue Valley 303 

Bull Mountains 303 

Blue Ridge Mountains 328 

Buford, General, at Willoughby's Run 360 



INDEX 589 

Buckland Races 385 

Butler, General, on the James 3g2 

Burksville Junction 523, 542 

Burgess' Mills 532 

Caesar , 21,203,209 

Charles, King 21 

Clan Grant 29 

Camargo 53 

Chalco Lake 62 

Chapultepec 62 

Cromwell 75 

Cairo, 111., Grant's base, 84; journey to 224 

Canal at Vicksburg 161 

Carthage, La 166 

Champion Hill, Battle of , igi 

Carr, General, at battle Black River Bridge 200 

Chattanooga, Rosecrans' army at, 224; description 228 

Chattanooga Creek 230 

Charleston, S. C 274 

Cambahee River 274 

Chantilly, or Ox Hill battle 309 

Crampton's Gap 314 

Catochin Creek, Md 315 

Cavalier and Roundhead 317 

Chancellorsville, Battle of 341 

Chambersburg, Pa 356 

Charles, King of France 395 

Catharpin Furnace 412 

Charlottesville 484 

Chapin's Farm 4g4 

Canby, General 520 

Chamberlain's Creek 534 

Cartersville, Va .- 567 

Cerro Gordo, Battle of 58 

Cleburn, General, at Mission Ridge 252 

Cedar Mountain, Battle of 301 

Cheat Mountain, W. Va., 268; Battle of 271 

Centreville, 303; Pope retreats to, 308; race for , 383 

Cemetery Hill 350 

Chesterfield Bridge 462 

Cedar Creek, Battle of 515 

Chesterfield Court House C42 



Clementown. 



544 



Centennial Exposition 572 

Cincinnati, O., 29; Grant visits 80 

Chickasaw Bayou, Battle of 157 

Clinton, Miss igg 

Chickamauga, Battle of 223 



590 INDEX 

Citico Creek 230 

Chickahominy River, 275; operations of McClelland on, 279; Grant and 

Lee's operations on 471 

City Point 435, 518 

Crittenden, General, at North Anna 465 

Cromwell 21 

Colonies 21, 26 

Confederate States of America, 354; its chief support, 22; Virginia joins it, 

267; their Independence 394 

Contreros, 62 ; Battle of 63 

Conspiracy, The Rebellion a 23 

Constitution, The 27, 28 

Concessions to Pro-Sla vists 27 

Courtship of Grant, 42 ; of Lee 43 

Coahuila, State of 46 

Corpus Christi 49 

Cortez 53 

Columbus, Ky., operations near, 86; fall of 112 

Corinth, Campaign against, 115; Halleck's campaign, 139; Grant incom- 

mand, 142; Battle of 149 

Copperheads 158 

Coast Defenses 273 

Coosawatchie River 274 

Cold Harbor, Old 285. 469 

Cold Harbor, New, 469; Battle 472 

Couch, General, at Chancellorsville 350 

Coles' Ferry 486 

Cost of war 563 

Congress of the United States 566 

Comparison of Grant and Lee 579 

Church-membership of Grant and Lee 38 

Custis Mary 43 

Churubusco, Battle of 64 

Cuban League, Lee offered command 72 

Cumberland River 95 

Crump's Landing, 115; General Wallace at 116 

Cub Run 307 

Culpepper Court House, Va 355, 381,384 

Culp's Hill 359 

Custer, General, death of 572 

Cyrus the Great 161 

Davis, Jefferson, President of the Confederacy, 78; at Chattanooga, 242; Lee 

his assistant, 267; claims of, 279; as Commander-in-Chief 394 

Dalton 455 

Darbeytown, Battle of 5^4 

Dabney's Mills 532 

Danville Road 542 

Democrats 28, 46, 48, 77» 338. 394 



INDEX 591 

Declaration of Independence 31 

Dress, Grant's mode of 41 

Dent, Julia 43 

Detroit, Grant at 70 

Department, Military, 1 14, 352 ; of Tennessee, Grant in command 1 50 

Decatur 236 

Deep Run 331 

Devil's Den 367 

Deatonsville 544 

Death of Lee 568 

Death of Grant 577 

Dinwiddle Court House 531 

Disbanding armies 560 

Dorchester, Mass 29 

Douglass, Stephen A., a candidate for President "]"] 

Donelson, Fort, 94; expedition against 100, 112 

Dover Village 103 

Drury's Blufif Tj'j^i,^^ 

Dunker's Church 323 

Emancipation 22, 325, 338 

Edward's Station, Miss igi 

Elkwater 270 

Early, General, at Fredericksburg, 350; in the Shenandoah 501 

Egan, General 517 

Ewell, General, placed in command of Corps, 353, 406; advanced into the 

Shenandoah, 355; at Willoughby's Run, 361 ; at Gettysburg 366, 375 

English Revolution 75 

Edisto River 274 

Euphrates River 161 

Ely's Ford 410 

Franklin, General, 289; at Crampton's Gap, 316; at Antietam, 320; at Fred- 
ericksburg 333 

Frazier's Farm, Battle of 290 

Farmville 545 

French Revolution 75 

Fremont, General 83, 86 

Freedman's Bureau 151 

Frederick City 310 

Fredericksburg, 330; Battle of 333 

Ferrero's Colored Troops 457 

Fisher's Hill Battle 512 

Five Forks, 531; Battle of 536 

Fort Brown 49 

Florida, Mo., Expedition to 81 

Foote, Commodore, 96; at Donelson 107 

Floyd, General, 101, 104; Flight of 11 1 

Fourteen Mile Creek 185 

Fugitive Slaves 141, 150 



592 INDEX 

Grant, U. S. representative of his faction, 22, 24; a pacificator, 28; his par- 
ents, 29; his birth, 29; a Farmer, 32; his education, 34; West Point- 
35; personal appearance and habits, 38, 42; modesty of, 41; courtship 
and marriage of, 48, 70; studies for teaching, 44; promoted, 68, 71, 82; 

in politics, 78; Lieutenant- General, 256; personal appearance 396 

Grant, Frederick 43 

Grades, as Students, Grant and Lee 40 

Galena, 111.. Grant at, 72; war-meeting at, 79; home at .• 575 

Grand Gulf, Miss., 169, 170; attack on, 175; occupation of 182 

Granger, General 252 

Garnett, General 268 

Gaines' Mills, Battle of 283, 287 

Grand Army of Virginia 301 

Gainesville, Va 304 

Gravelly Run 532 

Garfield, President 575 

Genius 20 

Genii 26, 390 

Great Rebellion, Why so called 20 

Georgetown, O 32 

Greeks', Comparison 60 

George, King 76 

Gregg, General, at Raymond .^ 185 

Geary, General, at Wauhatchie 234 

Greenbrier Mountain 270 

Great Pass 270 

Glendale, Battle of 290 

Gettysburg, Penn., Battle of 358,375 

Germania Ford 410 

Getty, General at Wilderness battle 416 

Great Britain's Claims 570 

Greeley, Horace 571 

Grierson, Colonel, raid of 171 

Gilliam, General 268 

Gibbon, General, at Wilderness battle 426 

Griffin, General 533, 537 

Groveton, Battle of 305, 308 

Gordonsville 415,484 

Goldsboro 520, 527 

Gordon, General 528 

Hardee, General, 82; at Shiloh 130 

Halleck, General, 83; hostile to Grant, 113, 116; in command at Corinth, 

137; raised to command-in-chief, 141; superseded by Grant 258 

Haines, Bluff, 154; Grant on 202 

Hard Times, La 176 

Hankinson's Ferry 182 

Hannibal the Great 21,203 

" Hard Tack " 210 



INDEX 593 



Hazen, General, at Brown's Ferry 233 

Harper's Ferry, John Brown at, 262; siege and capture of, 312, 313; cross- 
ing of Meade, 381 ; Grant at 507 

Harrison's Landing 298, 301 

Hagerstown, Md 3'4 

Hampton, Wade, General 339. 485 

Harrisburg, Pa 35^ 

Hancock. General, at Gettysburg, 361, 375 ; under Grant 405 

Hammer. The 395. 5o8 

Hanover Junction 459 

Hanoverstown 467 

Hawse's Shop, Battle of 47^ 

Harrison, Fort, capture of 5^3 

Hatcher's Run 516. 533 

Hartranf t, General 528 

Hayes, President 572 

Henry, Fort, 94; Expedition against 96,99 

Heiman, Fort 9^ 

Heiman, Fort, Expedition against 97 

Helena, Ark 164 

Heintzelman, General, at Savage's Station 289 

Heth, General, death 361 

Heilsburg 483 

Hill, D. H., General, 277; at Gaines' Mill, 285; at Turner's Gap 315 

Hill, A. P., General, 277; at Mechanicsville, 282; at Gaines' Mill, 285; pro- 
moted, 353; at Willoughby's Run, 361; at Bristoe Station, 384; in com- 
mand of Corps 406 

Holly Springs, 155; fall of 157 

Hovey, General, at Champion Hill 191 

Hooker, General, at Bridgeport, 233; at Lookout Mountain Battle, 240; at An- 
tietam, 321; in command of Army of Potomac, 340; at Chancellorsville 

Battle, 341 ; on the Rappahannock 356 

Howard, General, at Wauhatchie, 234; at Mission Ridge battle, 242, 245; at 

Chancellorsville, 345 ; at Gettysburg 361 

Hood, General, at Antietam, 321; at Gettysburg 368 

Hoke, General 49° 

Humbolt, Cal., Grant at 71 

Hunter. General 83, 484, 507 

Hurlbut, General, at Shiloh, 120, 124; at Bolivar 144 

Huntsville, W, Va e68 

Huger, General, 277, at Malvern Hill 296 

Humphrey, General, at Gettysburg, 361 ; at Spottsylvania 454 

Hunt, General, under Grant 406 

Island Ten 151 

Independence, Declaration of 31 

Independence Day, 81 ; surrender of Vicksburg on 216 

Impeachment of President Johnson 566 

International Railways 574 



594 INDEX 

Ironton, Mo., 8i ; Grant's Headquarters 82 

luka, Miss., 144; battle of 146 

Jalapa, advance on, 57; capture of 59 

Jackson, Mo., Grant at 84 

Jackson, Miss., 169; campaign against, ist, 186; 2d campaign, 221; 3d cam- 
paign 256 

James River, 277; McClellan retreat to, 289; Grant's alternative of, 407; ad- 
vance to 486 

Jackson, Stonewall, 270, 277; at Gaines' Mill, 284, 287; at White Oak Swamp, 
289; at Malvern Hill. 294; command of a corps, 299; against Pope, 300; at 
Groveton, 306; at Harper's Ferry, 313; at Fredericksburg, 331; at 

Chancellorsville, 343; his death 348 

James, Army of the 497 

Jeflferson, Mo., Grant at 83 

Jefferson, Md 314 

Jericho Ford 462 

Jerusalem Plank Road 539 

Jettersville 544 

Johnston, Albert S., General, at Shiloh 121, 128 

Johnston, Joseph E., General, at Jackson, Miss., 187; at Atlanta, 255; opposed 

to Sherman, 394; surrender of 558 

Johnson, Bushrod, General 532 

Johnson, President 564 

Kanawha River 268 

Kearney, General 52 

Kentucky State, remonstrance to Grant 85 

Kelly's Ford 385 

Kenesaw Mountain 501 

Knights of the Golden Circle 1 59 

Kimball, General 270 

Kilpatrick, General 383 

Knoxville, Tenn., Siege 253 

La Vega, capture of 52 

La Grange 155 

Lawler, General, at Black River Bridge 200 

Lee, Robert E., representative of his faction, 22, 24; a Unionist at first, 28, 
his birth, 31; his parentage, 31; his education, 33; choice of life, 36; 
personal appearance as a Cadet, and habits, 38; engineering, 42; court- 
ship and marriage, 43; promoted, 68; personal appearance, 401; Com- 
mander-in-Chief, 523; surrender, 553; indicted for treason, 564; death. 568 

Lee, Launcelot 31 

Lee, Richard Henry 31 

Letcher, Gov. of Va 267 

Leesburg, Va 310,356 

Lee, W. H. F., General 339 

Lee, Fitz Hugh, General 339 

Ledlie, General 5^5 

Lexington, Va $6j 



INDEX 595 

Liberty, Spirit of 21, 26 

Lincoln, his government, 24; policy, 77; inauguration, 78; calls troops, 79; 
supports Grant, 141; andMcClellan, 328; to Grant, 409; candidate, 519; 

assassination of 558 

Lick Creek 118 

Lieutenant-General, grade 256 

Little River 462 

Littlepage's Crossing 467 

Loudon, France 31 

Lone Star Republic, The 46 

Logan, General, at Belmont, 90; at Raymond, 185; at Champion Hill 194 

Louisville, journey to, by Grant 224 

Lookout Mountain, description, 228; battle of 242 

Lookout Creek 235 

Loring, General 268 

Longstreet, General, at Wauhatchie, 234; against Knoxville, 253; in com- 
mand under Lee, 277,406; at Gaines' Mill, 285; in command of a corps, 
299; at Groverton, 307; at South Mountain and Antietam, 316; at Fred- 
ericksburg, 331; at Petersburg, 339; at Gettysburg, 365; at Orange 

Court House, 386; wounded 428 

Loudon Heights 312, 324 

Long Bridge 485 

Londonderry 500 

Lynchburg, 407; Canal 484 

Massachusetts 29 

Matamoras, 49; occupation of 52 

May, Captain, Charge of 52 

McCall, General, at Mechanicsville 282 

Magruder, General, at Savage's Station, 289; at Malvern Hill 296 

Malvern Hill, Battle of 291, 297 

Manassas Junction 304 

Maryland, ist invasion 310 

Maryland Heights 312 

McLaws, General, at Crampton's Gap 314 

Massaponax Creek 331 

Marye's Hill 331 

Marsh Creek 359 

McAllister's Hill 369 

Madison Court House, Va 383 

Matapony River 460 

Mahone, General, at Petersburg 505 

McRae, Fort, Capture of 514 

Mexican War, Causes 45 

Mexico, 46; City, advance on 60 

Mexico, Mo., Grant's headquarters 81 

Mexicans, The 49 

Memphis, Tenn, Grant as Governor 140 

McPherson, General, at Jackson, Miss., 144; at Corinth, 149; at Vicksburg. . 164 



596 INDEX 

McPherson, General, in Vicksburg Campaign, 175, 207; at Port Gibson, 179; 
at Raymond, 185; at Jackson, Miss., 188; at Champion Hill, 194; at 

Siege of Vicksburg 206 

McClernand, General, at Belmont, 90; at Donelson, 104; at Shiloh, 124; above 
Vicksburg, 152; at Arkansas Post, 157; in campaign against Vicksburg, 
172,205; at battle of Port Gibson, 178; at Champion Hill, 194; at 

siege of Vicksburg, 206; relieved of command 213 

Meridian Campaign, The 256 

Meadow Bridge, Va 271,282 

McClellan, General, in Mexican War, 58; Grant seeks him, 80; campaign in 
W. Va., 82, 268; against Johnston, 275; against Lee and in the Seven 
Days, 275, 299; recalled to Washington, 301; at South Mountain and 

Antietam, 313; candidate for President 519 

Mechanicsville, 279; battle of 282 

McDowell, General 300 

Meade, General, at Fredericksburg, 334; at Gettysburg, 358, 375; under 

Grant 40$ 

McLean's House 549 

Memoirs of Grant 575 

Methodist Church 577 

Mississippi River, Lee's engineering, 42; early operations on by Grant 86 

Milliken's Bend 166 

Mission Ridge, Description, 228; Battle of 241 

Miles, Colonel - 3^3 

Middleton, Md 3i3 

Milroy, General, at Winchester 35^ 

Mine Run 386, 412 

Milf ord, Va 459 

Mine at Vicksburg, 210; Mine at Petersburg 5°^ 

Monroe, Fort — Lee's engineering 42 

Monterey, advance on, 53; Battle of 54 

Montezumas, City of the 62 

Molino del Rey, 64; Battle of 65 

Moltke, Von 203, 483 

Mobile, Projected Expedition against 222, 407 

Moccasin Point 230 

Mott, General 425 

Mount McGregor 577 

Murphy, Colonel J 57 

Nashville, Tenn , capture of, 112; Grant visits, 113; depot, 225 battle of 520 

Napoleon, Ark 158 

Nance's Shop, Battle 5°° 

New England 23 

New Orleans, 49; Grant injured at 222 

New Madrid 86 

Nelson, General, at Shiloh 126, 131 

New Carthage ^75 

Negro Troops 213, 457. 503. 524 



INDEX 597 



New Bridge 277 

New Market, battle of. . 456 

New York City 575 

Nicaragua Canal 574 

North Chickamauga Creek 239, 241 

North Anna River 340.462 

Nottoway River battle 500 

Nueces River 46, 49 

Ny River 440 

Ord, General, at luka, 145; at the battle of Hatchie River Bridge, 149; in 

command of corps, 213; at Petersburg 503 

Orchard Knob 242 

Ox Hill, or Chantilly Battle 309 

Orange Court House 345, 386 

Orange and Alexandria Railroad 383 

Oak Ridge 359 

Oglesby, Col 86 

Osterhaus' Division 241 

Opequan Creek battle 512 

O ligarchy, Slave 23, 25 

Ohio, 29; river 96 

Oxford 156 

Owl Creek 118 

Ox Ford 462 

Partisanship, force of 20 

Partisan Leaders 27 

Palo Alto, battle of 51 

Pascagoula, camp at 69 

Pacific Coast, Grant on 70 

Panama Isthmus, Grant crossing 70 

Palmyra, Mo 81 

Paducah, Xy., occupation by Grant 84 

Palisades, The 228 

Palmer, General, march to Whitesides 233 

Plank Road, The , 345, 412 

Pamunkey River 462, 469 

Parke, General 514, 531 

Prejudice, Weight of 19 

People, The 27 

Perote, Occupation of 59 

Persians, Comparison 60 

Pedregal, The 62 

Prentiss, B. M. General, 82, 84; at Shiloh 120, 124 

Peabody, Colonel 121 

Pemberton, General, in command against Grant, 152, 156; in Vicksburg, 173; 

at Champion Hill, 191 ; surrender of 217 

Pearl River, Mississippi 186 

Pegram, General 268 



598 INDEX 

Pleasonton, General, after Stuart, 328; at Chancellorsville, 347; at Brandy 

Station, 355; at Ashley Gap, 356; at Brandy Station, 2nd Battle 383 

Pennsylvania Invaded, 328; second Invasion 354 

Pendleton, General, Commanding Artillery 339 

Peach Orchard, The 367 

Petersburg, Va., 408, 486; siege of, 489; fall of 542 

Peeble's Farm, battle of 514 

Peace Overtures 525 

President, Grant as 567, 571 

Pillow, General, at Churubusco, 64; at Donelson 108 

Price, General, Fremont against, 86; Campaign against Cornith. 143, 149 

Pittsburg Landing, Camp, 115, 116, 118; battle of 121, 136 

Piper House 324 

Pickett, General, at Gettysburg, 370; at Bermuda Hundred, 492; at Dinwiddie 

Court House 532 

Philadelphia 557 

Pompey 21 

Pro-Slavery Doctrines 24 

Point Pleasant 29 

Polk, James K 48 

Polk, General, commanding Columbus, 86; at Shiloh 130 

Point Isabel 49 

Popocatepetl, visits to 69 

Pope, General, Grant under, 81, 83; in Virginia 300 

Port Hudson, 153; surrender of 222 

Providence Lake 163 

Porter, Admiral, above Vicksburg, 166; passing the Batteries 172 

Port Gibson, Battle of 178 

Potomac, Army of, McClellan in Command, 268; Grant in Command 395 

Porter, Fitz John, General, 279; at Gaines' Mill, 283; at Warrenton, 304; at 

xroveton and Sudley Springs 306 

Potomac River 310, 318, 356 

Po River 437 

Port Royal 458 

Point of Rocks 490 

Puebla, occupation of by Scott 60 

Purdy 121 

Quartermaster, Grant as 53 

Quarle's Ford 465 

Quaker Road 532 

Quincy, 111., Grant's March to 8l 

Raymond, battle of 185 

Raccoon Mountains 230 

Rapidan River, 300, 329; Lee's Camp on, 381, 385; Grant Crossing 410 

Rappahannock River 301, 329, 353 

Revolution, French 21 

Rebellion, The Great, 20, 23; causes of 27, 28 

Resaca de la Palma, battle of 5^ 



INDEX 



599 



Red River, 163; Expedition on 222, 392 

Reynolds, General, at Cheat Mountain, 268; at Mechanicsville, 282; at Wil- 

loughby's Run 360 

Ream's Station. 500; battle of 5'° 

Republicans 77» 5^9 

Read, Colonel 546 

Results of War 5^3 

Rio Grande River 46, 49 

Rio Frio Mountains 60 

Rienzi, Miss., ^44 

Richmond, La I75 

Ringgold , 252 

Richmond, Va., Lee Commissioned there, 265; no military point, 354; Grant's 

object, 407; fall of 542 

Riverside Park ^ • • • 577 

Robespierre 21 

Rosecrans in West Virginia, 82, 268, 273; at Cornith. 144, 148; at Chicka- 

mauga 223 

Rossville 238, 247, 248 

Round Top, Great and Little 359 

Rock Creek 359 

Rosser, General 422 

Slavery 21, 22, 26, 46, 75 

Slaveholders 28 

State-Rights 28,77 

St. Louis, Mo., Grant at 42, 71, 83 

Santa Anna 45, 46, 64 

Salubrity Camp 49 

San Antonio, Texas, 50; Mexico, 63; battle of 63 

San Juan De Ulloa Castle 57 

San Augustin 62 

San Cosme Gate, Grant attacks 66 

Sackett's Harbor, Grant at 7° 

Salt River Bridges 81 

St. Francis River, expedition to 86 

Savanna, Tenn., camp at 115 

Savanna, Ga 274, 519 

Snake Creek 118 

Slaves, Fugitive i4i» 15° 

Stanton, Secretary of War, and Grant 224, 564 

Sharpsburg, Va 3^8 

Salem Church, battle of 35 ' 

Saracens, the defeat of 395 

Shady Grove Church 412 

Saragossa 500 

Strasburg 5°^ 

Staunton River 523 

Sailor's Creek, battle of 545 



600 INDEX 

San Domingo 571 

Secession Leaders 23 

Service of Grant and Lee, First 41 

Sherman, General, at Siiiloh, 120, 136; against Vicksburg, 152, 156; demon- 
strations against Haines' Bluff, 175; in rear of Vicksburg, 184, 206; 
moves against Johnston at Jackson, 221; march to Chattanooga, 236; 
to Knoxville, 253; to Meridian, 256; in command, 392: friendship to 

Grant 519 

Steele's Bayou Route 165 

Sheridan General, at Mission Ridge, 250; under Grant, 406; in the Shenan- 
doah Valley, 507; in Louisiana 566 

Seven Pines, Battle of 27; 

Shenandoah Valley, 277; Lee in, 327; route of Invasion, 355; operations in 501 

Seymour, General, at Mechanicsville 282 

Shepherdstown 325, 356 

Sedgwick, General, at Fredericksburg, 340; under Grant, 405; death of.... 444 

Seminary Ridge 359 

Sebastopol 500 

Steadman, Fort, Assault on 528 

Seymour, Horatio , 566 

Sierra Madre Mountains 58 

Springfield, 111., Grant at 78, 80 

Smith, General, at Paducah, 86; advice to Halleck, 95; at Donelson, 105, 109 

in command, 113; under Grant o 473 

Shiloh, 118; battle of 121 

Smith, General W. F., at Chattanooga Creek. 232; at North Chickamauga 

Creek 254 

Sickles, General, at Gettysburg 363 

Signal officers and stations 383 

Sigel, General, in the Shenandoah, 406; at New Market 456 

Sioux Indians 572 

South Atlantic States, people of 23 

Scott, General, 40; his politics, 48; in command of Southern Mexican Army, 

52, 56; mentioned, 252; efforts for Union 264 

South Carolina, secession of 78, 264 

Stone River Battle 158 

South Chickamauga Creek 230 

Schofield, General, at Knoxville, 255 ; at Wilmington 520 

Stono River 274 

South Mountain 312, 315 

Stoneman, General 340, 521 

Southside Railroad, 514, 531; captured 537 

Spottsylvania Court House, Battle of 437 

Sultan of Turkey 32 

Superintendent West Point, Lee 72 

Stuart, Colonel, at Shiloh 122 

Sunflower River Route 165 

Sumner, General, at Savage's Station, 289: at Antietam 322 



INDEX 601 

Sumner, General, at Fredericksburg 336 

Supreme Court, United States 569 

Sudley Springs, battle of 308 

Stuart, General, passed around McClellan, 280; raid into Pennsylvania, 328; 

at Chancellorsville, 349; at Brandy Station, 355; in Pennsylvania, 358; 

against Grant, 406; death of 455 

Sutherland Station, battle of 539 

Taylor, Zackary, 49; President 67 

Tlalpam, Scott at 62 

Tallahatchie River 156, 164 

Texas, 45 ; its Rebellion, 45, 48, its people - 46 

Texcoco Lake 62 

Tennessee River 95, 230 

Telegraph, The 405 

Trevillian Station, battles of 485 

Twiggs, General, at Monterey, 54; at Churubusco 64 

Tilden, Samuel J 572 

Thompson, Jeff, the guerilla 84 

Thomas, General, sent to Buell, 148; at Chattanooga, 225; at Mission Ridge, 

250; against Dalton, 256; against Hood 520 

Thoroughfare Gap, 303; Lee at 305 

Thoroughfare Mountains 383 

Todd's Tavern 421 

Totopotomoy Creek 471 

Tour Around the World 573 

Turkey, Sultan of 32 

Turkey Bend, Va 289 

Turner's Gap 314 

Turnpike Road, The 345, 412 

Tyler, Colonel 456 

Ulm 219 

Union 26 

United States 48 

United States Ford 342 

Upton General 446 

Valencia, General 63 

Vancouver's Fort, Grant at 71 

Van Dorn, General, Campaign against Corinth 143, 149 

Vaughn Road 532 

Vera Cruz, Scott's army at, 56; siege of 57 

Virginia, First Families 31 

Vicksburg — ist siege, 151; campaign of, 172, 205; 2d siege 204, 220 

Virginia, State of, 262; secession of, 264; exhausted 354 

Volunteer Soldiers 79 

Washington. George 21, 26, 252, 264 

Washington City 42, 257, 300, 358, 502 

War, Mexican — Declaration of 52 

Walnut Springs, camp at 53 



602 INDEX 



War of Rebellion, beginning 79 

Washburn, Congressman 82 

Wallace, Lew, General, at Donelson, 104, 108; at Crump's Landing, 116; at 

Shiloh, 126, 134; at the Battle of Monocacy River 502 

Wallace, W. H. L., General, at Shiloh 120, 122 

Wauhatchie 233 

Washington, Colonel, death of 271 

Warrenton, Va 303. 383 

Warrenton, Miss 212 

Warrenton Turnpike 3°? 

Warren, General, at Gettysburg, 367; at Bristoe Station, 384; under Grant, 

405 ; relieved 537 

Wadsworth, General, at the Wilderness Battle 421 

Waterloo 488 

Waynesborough, battle of 525 

Washburn, Colonel ' A 546 

Washington College, Lee President 5^7 

West Point, 35 ; Lee Superintendent 72 

West Virginia Campaign of Lee 82, 268 

WeUington, Duke of 203, 483 

Weldon Railroad, 494; first battle, 498; capture of 510 

Weitzel, General 53' 

Whigs 28, 46 

William, the Conqueror 3' 

Willow Springs 182 

Wise, General 268 

Whiting, General, 277; against McClellan 281 

White House 285, 467 

Williamsburg, Va 288 

White Oak Swamp, battle of 289 

Winchester, Va 325.356,381, 502 

Wilderness Church 412 

Wilderness, The, 341, 408; battle of 414 

Willoughby's Run Battle 360 

Williamsport 380 

Wright, General, under Grant, 446; sent to the Shenandoah, 501 

Wilmington - 520 

White Oak Road 532 

Wool, General 56 

Worth, General, march on Perote 59 

Wolf's Hill 359 

Yates, Governor, offered troops 79 

Yazoo River '53 

Yalobusha River 164 

Young's Point Camp 158 

Young's Branch of Cub Run 3^7 



LtO>: 



Jb 



